I am aware that the US began warning other countries regarding the military buildup on the Ukrainian border in November of last year, and that the Russian Government denied that they were going to attack until it actually happened.
But prior to the military buildup it seems that most countries were aware of a potential escalation in conflict, and I was wondering if there is any evidence of attempts to negotiate with Russia to prevent an attack.
Any sources would be greatly appreciated.
The entirety of NATO sat down and negotiated with Russia in a session held in Brussels in mid-January. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (source):
NATO Allies are clear-eyed about the prospects for progress in these talks.
They expressed serious concern about the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine. And called on Russia to immediately de-escalate the situation, And to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours.
They also called on Russia to refrain from aggressive force posturing and malign activities directed against Allies, And abide by all its international obligations and commitments.
All this means that our dialogue is difficult, but even more necessary. NATO Allies stressed that they will make every effort to find a political way forward.
This meeting was held and scheduled apparently in response to a list of security demands published by Russia in December (source):
Russia’s draft "Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" would require that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine. There is little enthusiasm within NATO now for putting Ukraine on a membership track, as Putin and other Russian officials undoubtedly understand. However, the alliance will not reverse its long-standing "open door" policy. That would require consensus, and few allies, let alone all 30, would agree that Russia can dictate NATO policy in this way.
This suggests that a middle ground of “not now but not never” might offer a way to kick this thorny can down the road. That is, if Moscow wishes to defuse the situation.
Thanks to @Danya02, the full English translation of the proposed draft treaties suggested in December by the Russian Federation can be found in the pastebin links below.
Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees
I'd say sort-of. Because the Russian demands vis-a-vis of NATO (withdrawal of Western troops from all of Eastern Europe) were deemed unacceptable by the latter. And the NATO offer of not stationing 3rd party missiles or foreign troops in Ukraine was deemed insufficient by Russia.
Russia told the US on Thursday (17 February) it should withdraw arms and personnel from new NATO members, and that it and NATO must legally commit to stop NATO enlargement eastward.
The demands come following US proposals aimed at defusing tensions at the Ukraine-Russia border. As diplomatic affords to try and calm the situation, the latest details come following reports in media including Russian news agency RIA Novosti and Spanish newspaper El Pais.
On 2 February, the latter released what it said was a leaked copy of a US response to Russian demands, in which Washington offered talks with Moscow on an agreement for both sides to refrain from stationing offensive missiles or troops in Ukraine. The authenticity of the 11-page leaked document has been confirmed. [...]
According to RIA Novosti, the main thrust of the Russian reply is as follows:
Russia considers that the US “distorted” Russia’s proposals for security guarantees in the direction of creating benefits for Washington and its allies, ignoring the package nature of the proposals, choosing convenient topics; Russia considers as unacceptable the Western requests that Russia withdraws troops from certain areas of its own territory; Russia says that for de-escalation around Ukraine, Kyiv must comply with the Minsk agreements, that arms supplies from Western countries to Ukraine must stop, and those already delivered be withdrawn, that all Western advisers and instructors should be withdrawn, and NATO must abandon exercises with Ukraine; Russia insists on withdrawal of all US forces and weapons from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics; Russia expects concrete proposals from the United States and NATO on the content and forms of the alliance’s legal engagement not to expand eastward. Russia has reportedly stated that arms control issues cannot be considered in isolation from other protection measures.
And those points were more or less what Russia had demanded in December:
The demands include a ban on Ukraine entering Nato and a limit to the deployment of troops and weapons to Nato’s eastern flank, in effect returning Nato forces to where they were stationed in 1997, before an eastward expansion.
The eight-point draft treaty was released by Russia’s foreign ministry as its forces massed within striking distance of Ukraine’s borders. Moscow said ignoring its interests would lead to a “military response” similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
So Russia was unwilling to back down from that demand (by Feb). An NATO was not willing to concede to that. Whatever face-to-face they had (and there were some as per other answers) probably did not get much further than that.
And for those interested, breaking with diplomatic tradition, Macron's presidency released a segment of a phone call with Putin from Feb 20. Although not much is said about NATO in the segment released. It's mostly Putin railing about the illegitimacy of Ukraine's government. (The article also mentions that this might have been some kind of payback by the French, for past similar releases by Russia.) It's also true that Macron egged on Putin by suggesting the separatists are not legitimate authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which led to Putin's tirade. Transcript here. Towards the end of the released segment, Putin agrees to a further round of talks with the US, in principle, although no date is set. The next day Russia recognized DPR & LPR as independent countries, and a day after that the LPR/DRP territorial claims to the whole of Donbas (of which they controlled only about a third at that point). It would be, of course, interesting to know if this spat with Macron about the legitimacy of the separatists had any effect on Putin's decision or if his decision had already been made when to recognize the LPD/DPR as independent. But that we'll probably only find out 50-100 years from now when the relevant archives are opened in Moscow.
The UK foreign minister Liz Truss went to Russia. Article dated February 10th. It does not appear to have been a productive meeting.
To add to other answers, that describe different attempts to negotiate with Russia I would like to bring to attention a report for The International Centre for Defence and Security about Russian preparations for war and their negotiation strategy. The main points are:
The first phase of Russia’s preparations to attack Ukraine started almost a year before the outbreak of hostilities. In March 2021, the Russian Armed Forces began the largest deployment exercise in their history. Most combat units of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) were deployed from Siberia to a training range in Pogonovo, south of Voronezh. Simultaneously, near Novoozerne in Crimea, Russian units established an equipment storage area for units belonging to the 58th CAA, deployed from the eastern Caucasus. At the time, the goal of this exercise was not clear to Western observers, although Ukraine may have been a potential invasion target due to its perceived plans to retake the Donbas.
Negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany continued throughout the military build-up. While some hoped that these negotiations could avert the war, it was clear that Ukraine and Russia’s views and expectations were so divergent that no political settlement to satisfy both sides would be possible. Indeed, Moscow’s demands were so unacceptable that it backed itself into a corner and would only be able to walk away empty-handed. These negotiations showed another aspect of Russian war preparations. Russia’s participation in diplomatic discussions during its build-up of forces was not intended to avert war, but to buy time, divert attention from its military activity, and produce false hope that war was avoidable. Regarding Ukraine, this political deception was further boosted by Russia’s calls for a peace process and peaceful solution, and for discussions on troop withdrawal. Just two days before Russia attacked, Putin continued to insist that he was open to finding a diplomatic solution. In fact, Russia had previously announced two troop withdrawals, although neither materialised (some formations may have been withdrawn but more units were added elsewhere, increasing Russia’s overall presence near Ukraine). Moscow presumably wanted to show that it was willing to make concessions and to ease tensions.
