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In Divine Command Theory, is there any distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum, when it comes to divine commandments (as opposed to human defined laws)?

For example, I would see failure to oblige to ritual prescriptions, when seen from a moral realism POV, as malum prohibitum. However if, as DCT seems to imply, morally good and commanded by God are equivalent, wouldn't this imply disobedience to ritual prescriptions would become malum in se?

kutschkem
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  • Rational ethics (malum in se) vs. Arbitrary ethics (malum prohibitum) = Doe God command x because x is good OR Is x good because God commands x? [Euthyphro's dilemma] – Agent Smith Jan 06 '23 at 13:49
  • @AgentSmith The issue at hand is that both sides (of which DCT would be the "x is good because God commands x" side) fail to address that there is a difference in quality between certain commandments, for example in the OT hebrews and gentiles are judged differently in some areas, making it clear that morally speaking, the moral wrongness is simply in disobedience (malum prohibitum?) rather than the thing in itself being universally bad (malum in se). I fail to see how this is addressed in DCT. – kutschkem Jan 06 '23 at 14:05
  • Perhaps we can, how shall I put it?, erase the line between malum in se and malum prohibitum. This is a standard response to the Euthyphro dilemma (God is Good). – Agent Smith Jan 06 '23 at 14:28
  • Is this a question in theology rather than philosophy? Should it be moved to a theology forum? – Frank Jan 06 '23 at 19:18
  • @Frank -- Reasoning about God claims is in the realm of philosophy. The application of philosophic reasoning to theology is the essence of the critical thinking that most atheists argue that the religious need to engage in, and as an atheist yourself, this is a process you would be best off encouraging. The outcome of critical thinking about theology is, more often than not, the development of doubt in the minds of the faithful. – Dcleve Jan 06 '23 at 19:55
  • @AgentSmith -- I argue that the "God is Good, therefore God's commands are both Good, and to be obeyed", which is the most common recent response to Euthyphro, is to reject DCT, because for God is Good to be true and meaningful, then goodness has to have an independent definition than "God's commands". – Dcleve Jan 06 '23 at 20:00
  • @Dcleve I may not be an atheist. Theology is welcome to use logic, but this question does not seem to be about logic, or critical thinking, or proper ways to reason philosophically. – Frank Jan 06 '23 at 20:00
  • @Frank Euthyphro is part of the classic questions philosophy addresses. Logical Positivism's efforts to banish most questions from philosophy still lives on in a few, but the movement, and its motivation, has been widely considered to have been thoroughly refuted. – Dcleve Jan 06 '23 at 20:03
  • @Dcleve I am sure mankind will continue speculating forever. But this question is framed as asking to comment on a specific aspect of DCT. It might be illuminating to better understand DCT, but it's not the same as philosophically discussing the merits of DCT against alternatives, which would be Euthyphro. – Frank Jan 06 '23 at 20:10
  • @Frank Exactly. I framed the question this way because I want to explore DCT more - I am aware of Eutrypho and this question is explicitely about one side of the dilemma, namely the view that Good is what God commands, (rather than merely God commanding the Good, with some independent definition of Good). – kutschkem Jan 09 '23 at 07:08

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John Duns Scotus seems to have thought not quite:

... one important fact about propositions that are self-evident and analytically true is that God himself can’t make them false. They are necessary truths. So the natural law in the strict sense does not depend on God’s will. This means that even if (as I believe) Scotus is some sort of divine-command theorist, he is not whole-hog in his divine command theory. Some moral truths are necessary truths, and even God can’t change those. They would be true no matter what God willed.

... even the first three commandments, once we start looking at them, are not obviously part of the natural law in the strict sense. In particular, the third commandment, the one about the Sabbath day, is a little tricky. Obviously, the proposition “God is to be worshiped on Saturday” is not self-evident or analytic. In fact, Scotus says it’s not even true any more, since Christians are to worship on Sunday, not Saturday. So, Scotus asks, what about the proposition “God is to be worshiped at some time or other”? Even that is not self-evident or analytic. The best one can do is “God is not to be hated.” Now that’s self-evident and analytic, since by definition God is the being most worthy of love and there is nothing in him worthy of hate. But obviously that’s far weaker than any positive commandment about whether and when we should worship God.

So by the time Scotus completes his analysis, we are left with nothing in the natural law in the strict sense except for negative propositions: God is not to be hated, no other gods are to be worshiped, no irreverence is to be done to God. Everything else in the Decalogue belongs to the natural law in a weaker or looser sense.

Kristian Berry
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