If whatever is actual is possible, but not everything that is possible is also actual, and if everything that is necessary is actual (and hence possible), it looks like it might not make sense to talk of "merely necessary" things (things necessary but inactual and impossible, somehow). Or merely contingent, merely impossible, or merely actual things, for that matter. Maybe "merely contingent" still goes through, though, since this would be something that was not necessary and not impossible, i.e. it has a definition-by-absence, so to qualify it by "merely" so as to exclude other terms, would fail in its purpose (there being no positive terms to exclude, here). Or then merely impossible things might be, again, things referred to as "impossible" without the limiting qualifier. However, a merely actual thing would not be possible also, and if there were a necessary being that was merely actual otherwise, its actuality would not be a function of its necessity ("merely actual" and "merely necessary" conflict with each other, here; an object defined as both is being defined incoherently).
If nothing can be merely necessary, does this show that the concept of possibility is metaphysically prior to that of necessity, or rather does it show that the priority of the concept of necessity is a matter of modal/logical syntax (deduction theory as "the premises necessitate the conclusion"), but the priority of possibility is a matter of logical semantics (possible-worlds talk)?
Two corollary issues:
- Moreover, there are no necessarily merely possible things. If something is merely possible, it is not yet actual; if it must not be actual, then it is actually impossible.
- However, the option of merely possibly possible beings, and so on, also then is provided for us. Or, then, of possibly merely possible beings. The effect of the "merely" qualifier on the base operations, arguably should be had upon the iterated operations too, at least in such a way as to illustrate why (or why not) iterated modality is trivial/collapsible.