3

I'm currently reading the George Eliot's translation of the Ethics, edited by Clare Carlisle, and I am french, so I'm not 100% certain I can trust what I think I understood.

Since everything follows from the absolute nature of God, which is demonstrated in proposition XXI and spelled in the XXIInd, is infinite and eternal(aka attributes and modes).

How can Spinoza talk about "Every individual thing[singulare], or any thing which is finite" in prop XXVIII ? And further down, he says "Since some things must have been immediately produced by God, namely, those which necessarily follow from his absolute nature in virtue of those primary attributes".

Here he is proving that things cannot exist but by God and thus be infinite using logic ; he is not insinuating another way of conceiving the absolute reality, correct ? But then he talk about SOME things being produced by God, is it just a phrasing relative to this prop, or does he put an order in the existence of things ? I get that there should be one, as God>Attributes>Modes, but if something is eternal, how could it begin somewhere ?

Or "An understanding [intellectus] in act, whether finite or infinite" in prop XXX ?

Is he using this phrasing to show that even with some absurd conception, the proposition would be correct ?

Thanks a lot.

Willy
  • 31
  • 2
  • 2
    The point is from prop XXVIII every individual thing which is finite cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God in so far as any such attribute is modified by a modification infinite and eternal (you may already understood from your above statements), thus any finite conditioned thing must be necessarily modified (caused) by a finite cause which in turn must be conditioned by another cause, so on and so forth to infinity. And God can be in a sense correctly styled as remote cause of these finite things which are distinguished from things immediately produced by God... – Double Knot May 26 '22 at 02:34
  • 2
    Re your prop XXX, Spinoza famously claimed nothing in the universe is contingent and a true idea must necessarily agree with its object, thus even an absurd idea is within some attribute of God expressing the eternal and infinite essence of thought and the Intellect in function finite or in function infinite must comprehend such absurdity without an iota of doubt. Similarly Intellect and will must be viewed as natura naturata (passive), not as natura natarans (active), thus we arrive at his next conclusion which claims that God does not act according to free will but free cause... – Double Knot May 26 '22 at 02:56
  • 1
    Yes, I think it was about this remote cause that I felt confused. You mean that since an infinite regress can be conceived, God has necessarily made it ? But it has a difference from those other things directly produced by him, I get that now. – Willy May 26 '22 at 09:13
  • 1
    Glad it helps. The remote cause is like the Indra's net of dependent origination in Eastern metaphysics, and yes in Spinoza's system it's also necessarily made by God. And unlike those things directly produced by God, in so far as remotely caused and in itself, finite things are necessarily never absolutely true which is also insinuated by the famous ancient Shurangama sutra such as: To speak of the false is to reveal the true. But both the false and the true are false themselves... – Double Knot May 26 '22 at 23:43

0 Answers0