Can you choose the things you want?

Question

As a person who is not well-versed in philosophy at all, I have no idea how to phrase this properly. But basically, we all want things. I want to read that book, you want to become (e.g.) an engineer, etc.

Do we choose to want things? Or do we want things without our control over wanting them?

I am asking because I am having a bit of an existential crisis, and my expectations of myself currently do not make me happy, since I fall short of them. Yet I feel justified in having these self-expectations, and I do not think I will change them. Do I decide to keep my expectations of myself the same, or do I just expect things of myself without any control over that expectation?

Answer 1

In the commentary to proposition IX of part 3 in Ethics, Spinoza argues that we decide if things or situations are good based on our desire for them. It is to say, the feeling we have that we want something to happen, or to belong to us, is the hint we use to label them good.

It is to say, desire comes first and is not the fruit of a conscious decision making process: we decide to reach for the cookie because we are hungry, but we did not decide to be hungry. (Or, we decide to refrain from reaching for it because mommy is watching, but we didn't decide to be afraid of mommy's anger).

According to this view, we can't choose what to want, because we make choices according to what we want in the first place.

But that does not mean we are condemned to be perpetually dissatisfied with ourselves, always unable to achieve expectations we did not choose. In the same book Spinoza also argues that when reality does not match our expectations, the problem is not with reality, which is just what it is, but with our expectations, that were not grounded in a sound knowledge of reality to begin with.

For example, a small kid could expect that if they blow hard enough in their own ship's sail, it will move forward because of the wind they created. They would be very disappointed to see it does not work. But had they opened a physics textbook they would know that the principles of action and reaction make such an idea moot from the get go, they wouldn't expect the impossible and they wouldn't be disappointed.

Here, a clarification should be made about the difference between desire or expectations and wishy washy feelings. One could argue that we could still want for something we know to be impossible, like immortality or Jedi powers. But those are two very different situations. Of course one sometimes think "wouldn't it be nice to have Jedi powers?", one can wish it was possible, but a knowledgeable person would not expect to acquire such powers, and so can't be disappointed by not having them. I might wish I had Jedi powers, but I don't act in order to get them or feel like acting towards this goal, I don't desire Jedi powers. It would make about as such sense as to be disappointed that I can't grab the moon by reaching with my hand because it looks so tiny from Earth.

The point I am getting at is, the more we know ourselves, the more our expectations about ourselves tend to match reality and be achievable. This does not mean we have to give up all expectations. We shall always strive for realistic betterment, but knowledge helps us strive for what we can actually obtain.

Instead of feeling bad for not realizing unrealistic expectations, learn about our mistakes, analyse what fact we didn't consider that made our expectations unrealistic, and work toward a better, more suitable goal. Educating ourselves won't help us decide what to desire, but will inform our desires and have them match reality. While this is a way we can influence what we want, note that it is still not a choice as we can't choose what reality is made of and will bring forth.

Answer 2

Recommended reading: Lou Marinoff, Plato, not Prozac. This answer is loosely based on such text.

Following your question, you imply that emotions determine what we want. But this is not always so. A great deal of our acts depend on the capability to determine our acts by means of reason, and not due to emotions.

Imagine that you feel depressed. In your conceptual structure, you might want to commit suicide in order to escape from depression (statistics tell that the main reason for suicide is depression). So, you commit suicide. That, allegedly, because emotions rule our acts at the base. Or you might have a disagreement with your boss, and you start a box fight. Or you feel the need of new emotions and take cocaine.

But personal maturity implies precisely the capability to re-conduct emotions in order to follow a deeper goal. Maturity implies interposing reason between emotions and acts. So, if reason is interposed between emotions and acts, different acts will be taken; and in many circumstances, even emotions ARE voluntarily modified.

Let me provide a couple of examples.

You feel depressed. Instead of committing suicide, you interpose reason. Scientific studies tell that smiling produces dopamines. So, you feel depressed, but smile voluntarily. Dopamines raise, you feel better, and depression might decrease remarkably. Of course, this is just one action that a depressed individual could take. There are others, like rationally identifying the sources of depression and avoiding them, or taking actions that produce joy.

Second example. You have a verbal disagreement with your boss. Instead of hitting him in the face due to anger, you could think. Thinking will probably tell you two things: a) that it's better to lose the argument than losing your job and b) that overcoming loss is important. So, you do it, you don't lose your job, and by learning to lose, you will surely reduce the anger emotions in future interactions (even if it implies just avoiding arguments with your boss).

In synthesis, we do choose what we want, and emotions can be changed by means of reason, so, emotions do not necessarily determine what we want.

Answer 3

We choose an action if we select that action from among alternatives, according to a mental process driven by our desires. That's what choice means.

We choose some of our wants, in the sense that some of our wants are driven by other, more fundamental wants.

Even when we choose an individual action, like choosing to "throw a ball," this is generally not an indivisible, immediate action. It's really choosing to want to throw the ball. In other words, the decision to throw the ball is really a decision that sets a subgoal for having thrown the ball in the immediate future. This subgoal, which we could also call a desire, is fulfilled when we've thrown the ball, and might fail to be fulfilled if it slips through our fingers instead. Once the subgoal is set up, other mental processes get to work fulfilling this subgoal (this "want").

So really almost all choice is a choice to want something - a choice to set up a goal, rather than a choice to instantly achieve an action.

Answer 4

We do not choose our wants.

We can only choose our actions, the method by which we plan to get what we want.

That is the essence of free will.

"Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.” -Arthur Schopenhauer