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Analytic philosophy, although not without its faults, has made some real progress in moving us beyond traditional metaphysics. Nobody really believes, for example, in Platonic forms any more.

On the other hand, phenomenology, or the phenomenological method, seems not to have produced anything useful at all... just a lot of jargon-laden hand-waving about vague generalities like subjectivity, etc. etc. The idea of intuiting essences by introspecting really hard just doesn't cut it.

Or am I wrong?

Has phenomenology produced ANY useful philosophical advances?

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    Phenomenology are most used in psychology, sociology, nursing, economics, etc areas by now, while analytic philosophy contribute lot to mathematical logic and foundations and more hard science areas by its positivists tradition. Both contributed to philosophy of language and mind in different ways, postmodern deconstruction uses some phenomenology from both Husserl's epoche and Heidegger's hermeneutic schools. – Double Knot May 13 '21 at 02:56
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    This is a good question I would like to know the answer to as well. A genuine philosophical advance is a high bar to clear and if phenomenology has truly led to one, I'd love to hear it! Don't tell me how this school influenced that school or whatever. Give me a concrete advance in knowledge; a valuable and true proposition that came out of phenomenology. – causative May 13 '21 at 04:20
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    @causative "Moving us beyond traditional metaphysics" does not strike me as a "concrete advance in knowledge" or a "valuable and true proposition" by any kind of neutral criterion. And knowledge and true propositions do not exhaust the ends of human culture that philosophy services as a whole, even positivists left room for "expression of an attitude toward life". Roughly, phenomenology played the same role in methodology of humanities as analytic philosophy in methodology of (harder) sciences, see also influence on AI research. – Conifold May 13 '21 at 08:34
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    @Conifold I dunno, Dreyfus is right that there are serious problems with symbolic AI, but his citings of Heidegger barely seem related to his critiques as far as I can see. Also he seems to be overstating the level of influence of Heidegger and Husserl on AI - he sees that an AI program uses concepts that were also mentioned by philosophers, but has no evidence showing the AI researchers worked with awareness of the philosophers. They probably simply reinvented similar ideas, except in the mentioned case of Pengi. – causative May 13 '21 at 17:38
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    @Conifold Dreyfus interprets Heidegger as taking a position against explicit mental representations, in favor of having the agent engage in an activity without self-conscious modeling of the activity. "Don't think about it, just do it." However, it's not clear from the citations he gives that Heidegger thought all activity should be like this - certainly humans do act with explicit self-conscious mental representations at other times. Also, connectionist AI uses representations as well; deep learning is representation learning. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_learning – causative May 13 '21 at 17:52
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    Also see enactivism in cognitive science and AI, found a paper here which connects it to phenomenology. Incidentally, it is not true that in analytic philosophy "Nobody really believes, for example, in Platonic forms any more", not if you include purely mathematical platonism--for various prominent analytic philosophers who have argued for accepting mathematical objects in our ontology, see the SEP article on Indispensability Arguments in phil. of math. – Hypnosifl May 13 '21 at 18:08
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    @Hypnosifl Causally inert abstract objects of analytic philosophers are not really Plato's forms, which where the ultimate causes of reality. There are some (few) who endorse "real universals", which would be closer, but not in the context of mathematical platonism. – Conifold May 13 '21 at 23:27
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    @causative See also Compton, Some Contributions of Existential Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Natural Science. He is an American philosopher, son of the well-known physicist. – Conifold May 14 '21 at 01:12
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    You may have a look at Dan Zahavi's work on consciousness and subjectivity, which shows that " rigorous phenomenology" is not an absolute oxymoron. – Floridus Floridi May 14 '21 at 08:27
  • @Stephen: You are absolutely right. Unfortunately, the internet is full of this sort of stuff, and proponents can't tell the difference between well-defined and ill-defined. – user21820 Jan 12 '22 at 14:48
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    Btw per your "The idea of intuiting essences by introspecting really hard just doesn't cut it" clearly this is wrong, actually Kantian philosophy and his famous categories is more of phenomenology flavor than that of any analytic school, which later significantly influenced both. Once you realized this, then today's philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive sciences including neuroscience learned a lot from phenomenology, and the future will be better once its knowledge is correctly spread and appreciated... – Double Knot Oct 16 '22 at 05:38

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"Nobody really believes, for example, in Platonic forms any more" - Most mathematicians are Platonists. For example, Grothendieck, Godel and Penrose have explicitly stated that they are Platonists, they all believed that there are eternal forms / ideas that mathematics discovers. Quantum physics is very Platonic. Heisenberg, Schrodinger and Dirac were obvious Platonists.

To answer your question, yes, phenomenology did produce useful results that went beyond philosophy. Modern day AI would not exist without Husserl. His concepts of intentionality, noema, noesis and many others were crucial to the development of all theories of cognitive science. He gave a model of the mind that 100 years later cashed out in ChatGPT, deep learning and machine learning. However, I do admit that analytic philosophy played a great part in those developments as well.

Gestalt psychology is very phenomenological in it's basic approach to human nature.

I don't know if you consider psychoanalysis useful, but Freud was a student of Brentano's (founder of phenomenology) as a young man.

You are right that phenomenology is very difficult and vague compared to analytic philosophy.

I think you will enjoy a book called "Fate of analysis" by a guy called Robert Hanna (i think that's his name, it's been a while since i read it). He pretty much says that analytic philosophy is a bunch of wrong doctrines that was always inconsistent, and it has no future.

Dennis Kozevnikoff
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    +1 While the notion that analytic philosophy is wrong and useless seems a more non- cognitive exclamation than series thesis, your defense of the phenomenological is spot on. – J D Feb 12 '23 at 22:42
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Citing "moving beyond metaphysics" as an achievement of analytic philosophy, with which to compare the supposed lack of achievements of phenomenology, is a very peculiar standard to use. Instead, the absolute failure of the first two "analytic" movements, Logical Positivism, and its child Ordinary Language Philosophy, to banish metaphysics from philosophy is instead taken as an absolute repudiation of the entire idea. In fact, critics of these movements like to revel in spelling out how their starting assumption sets are explicitly metaphysical claims, and the movements were encumbered with self-contradictory assumptions from the outset.

Phenomenology also suffered a major failure. The fundamental reductive strata of qualia that trained self-evaluators identified, proved to be fundamentally inconsistent between those trained from different self-evaluation schools. The two programs were similar in near-absolute failure in their primary goal. But the nature of phenomenology's failure was not intrinsic to a logic contradiction at the outset. Instead, it was an experiment, which had a negative outcome, and it was therefore instructive about the nature of our world.

Phenomenology was the first scientific reductionist program which arrived at a decisive conclusion that the subject matter being evaluated cannot be reduced. Reduction of experience to qualia -- fails.

The rivals to phenomenology illegitimately seized upon this to dismiss the SUBJECT MATTER of phenomenology, as reductionism was still considered unquestionable at that point, and a failure of reduction was seen as a failure of the field. the subsequent limits to reduction which have been encountered in multiple other science endeavors in the latter parts of the 20th century, have lead to a general recognition that aspects of our universe are just non-reducible.

Phenomenology should be seen as the first definitive case of what is now recognized to be a general truism.

Note the efforts to define the most basic components of a meme, lead memetics into a similar morass as the efforts to reduce experience to quales. Units of thought, like units of experience, seem to come only in groups.

The concept of qualia -- that we have unitS of experience, has now been almost universally accepted. And the methods of identifying details of experience, the core methodology of phenomenology, is now essential for providing the data for neuroscience to try to correlate to, in its project of seeking "neural correlates of consciousness".

Dcleve
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  • That's a weird criticism of memetics. All they need is to be is replicating units in cultural substrates - it's always been a vaguer notion than genes. Qualia aren't units of experience, but about private subjectivities. – CriglCragl Jan 10 '22 at 09:57
  • @criglcragl Memetic struggled with the inability to define what a meme is -- and the initially promising field sort of faded away as a result. Memes only come as plurals, and that is not something that became apparent until after the field mostly disappeared. – Dcleve Jan 10 '22 at 10:05
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    Everybody knows what memes are https://knowyourmeme.com - it's just vague. Prototype theory, family resemblance or many other framings can give a suitably fuzzy-edged definition Our current memesphere is like the prebiotic RNA soup, ie just beginning to explore it's possibilities. Do you think the general concept of memes has ceased to be studied or taken seriously in academia? – CriglCragl Jan 10 '22 at 13:04
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    @CriglCragl -- We live in an era of analytic philosophy -- defining terms is often treated as the entry criteria for being considered credibly. The only journal dedicated to memetics folded in 2005. I have had many discussants reject memes outright, and ridicule them to me when I use the concept. While memes have entered common non-professional usage, this is a recent event. Yes, I think memes are unjustly dismissed by most academics. – Dcleve Jan 10 '22 at 16:35
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There is a very good introductory essay in this book. “What is philosophy?” by Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 1889-1977 (1991) Introductory essay by Josef Seifert. Book Available at Internet Archive.

Apparently Ratzinger is a fan of von Hildebrand, so he is finding a link to Plato/ Augustine.

Another Platonic move was Nicolai Hartmann, I think in his Ethics is where he used Phenomenology.

Then you find Gygory Lukacs also interested in Nicolai Hartmann. Lukacs was in search of ontology from Hartmann. Lukacs had the idea of the Soviet disaster in mind, and he was in search of an Ontology and Ethics for Marxism I believe.

Well there we have Ratzinger and Gyorgy Lukacs, two men with excellent philosophical intuition, so this keeps me in the game of investigating Phenomenology. Again the introductory essay by Seifert above is good.

Gordon
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