0

Whilst researching philosophical skepticism, I found this answer to the question here which states the following:

[Jon Erison] Extreme skepticism is in fact self-defeating. According the the Wikipedia article linked in the question, "philosophical skepticism is an approach that denies the possibility of knowledge". Therefore philosophical skepticism can not claim even that philosophical skepticism is correct. Therefore a critic of philosophical skepticism can not be compelled to accept any of its claims.

Would my reasoning below be correct, in assessing the validity of the claim "Extreme skepticism is self-defeating"?

Assuming the philosophical skeptic claimant makes the claim:

Knowledge is not possible

(and thus the claimant "denies the possibility of knowledge").

The Claimant (a) believes in this statement; and (b) believes it is true. What is not certain at the moment, is whether the claim is justified, which would determine if the claimant "knew" the claim.

To illustrate why the claimant may not consider it justified there is an example provide by SEOP illustrating the non-consensual nature of belief:

for example, when Kai reads that astronomers no longer classify Pluto as a planet, he acquires a new belief (in this case, the belief that astronomers no longer classify Pluto as a planet).

Then If the claimant takes this further (Let P = " that astronomers no longer classify Pluto as a planet") :

Kai believes that the author(s) of the book state P.

Kai believes that he has read that the author(s) of the book state P.

Kai believes that he has perceived that he has read that the author(s) of the book state P

Kai believes that he has perceived that he has perceived ...

And from hereon, it's just perceptions of perceptions all the way down.

(Just as a side note some definitions, such as that provided by dictionary.com, define perceive as:

to become aware of, know, or identify by means of the senses:

so just to clarify I'm only referring to "aware of" not "know" otherwise that would completely defeat the purpose of this question )

From this,(Assuming Kai stopped the process) Kai may either have "faith" ( faith, as in believing a perceived unjustified proposition) in a proposition or claim that:

Any belief is unjustified

(There's also the possibility that he doesn't claim anything afterward, in which case he wouldn't be deemed a skeptic?.)

So returning to the original claim, the claimant now justifies the claim

Knowledge is not possible

WITH

Any belief is unjustified

which then makes the former claim a True Justified Belief, and thus knowledge?

Would the fact that the claim used to justify "Knowledge is not possible" is unjustified, make "Knowledge is not possible" unjustified?

TomDot Com
  • 183
  • 1
  • 5
  • 1
    It is more accurate to say that careless radical skepticism, which hastens to assert its denials, is self-defeating. But even radical philosophical skeptics aren't careless, they only suspend judgment on all claims, including their own. Self-defeat is more of a pitfall for philosophical novices. – Conifold Oct 10 '20 at 06:36
  • @Conifold So it is conceivable that a radical philosophical skeptic could state: "Knowledge is not possible" and their position still deemed logically consistent? Would they have to remain silent forever after in order to remain consistent? And What sort of statements would qualify a careless radical skeptic as self-defeating? – TomDot Com Oct 10 '20 at 14:00
  • Why stay silent? Language provides plenty of means to avoid claiming anything said. What Pyrrhonians say is "the only justified attitude with respect to any claim is suspension of judgment", this claim included. And make arguments both for and against any claim made by others, where they are free to assume anything others assume, or its opposite. – Conifold Oct 10 '20 at 14:12
  • @Conifold What definition of Judgment does a Pyrrhonic Skeptic employ? From your previous comment, I'd assume that "Blue Cows eat grass" would not qualify as a judgment but a proposition, so what would they quailfy as a judgment? From this article, It seems that any proposition with a copula 'is' (equality signifier) would be a judgment, so would suspending judgment involve never stating any relation between two things, or any proposition with a copula in it? (Except possibley "i read Grass is green" or propositions like it) – TomDot Com Oct 11 '20 at 01:19
  • where the relation has been reported as being perceived, rather than stating it blankly)
  • – TomDot Com Oct 11 '20 at 01:51
  • They can state anything others can, hypothetically or quotationally. Anything that looks like a judgment can be disqualified as one by linguistic stipulation, e.g. "let us suppose that blue cows eat grass", or "some say blue cows eat grass". Their mode of operation is to dispute and undermine all claims made by others, not to add their own. – Conifold Oct 11 '20 at 10:02
  • @Conifold If a careless radical skeptic claimed: "All beliefs are unjustified including this one", and because they claimed it they necessarily believe it thus making it a belief, would this be self-defeating? – TomDot Com Oct 11 '20 at 11:46
  • @Tomdot Com- After finishing your highly amusing game of let's tease the logicians, read the 43 pages on Wikisource of Spinoza's " On the Improvement of the Understanding" and then ask yourself, 'Do I understand what Spinoza means by the existence of certainty and human knowledge in the adequate or true Idea?" Cheers, –  Nov 10 '20 at 03:14