Does the future always arrive?

Question

To clarify by example : can a future event and an event that occurs in the present ever be identical ?

Could you please clarify your second sentence "So I'm wondering ..."; thank you. — Jo Wehler, Apr 23 '18 at 06:03
The future is a act of imagination not a real thing waiting to arrive. An event cannot happen in the future since the only time is now. Mind you, as 'Now' has no duration the event can't happen now either. As Zeno notes our usual idea of time is rather garbled. — , Apr 23 '18 at 10:28
You have to be more clear if your question is about determinism or simply about the "use of language": up to now, the "future" always arrived. — Mauro ALLEGRANZA, Apr 23 '18 at 12:37
Although not entirely related, your question brought to my mind the paper "Changes in Events and Changes in Things" by A.N. Prior. A considerable amount time has passed since I've read it, and at what rate it has passed I cannot say (if you read the paper, you might get a good chuckle from what I've said--apologies for the poor attempt at joking), so it may not directly answer your question. Still, it's a fun paper (at least from what I remember). — Eli Bashwinger, Apr 23 '18 at 16:37
@PeterJ. Spot on : we often try to deal with the durationless present by recourse to 'the specious present' but specious is precisely what it is. Neither past nor future is real and the present is a paradox. — Geoffrey Thomas, Apr 23 '18 at 16:40
@PeterJ Not trying to dispute your answer, but does your answer presuppose that the A-theory (tensed theory) of time is true? If so, what are events on a B-theory (tenseless theory) of time? Do events 'happen' or 'take place' on B-theory? If so, it would seem that future events do happen or take place. — Eli Bashwinger, Apr 23 '18 at 16:45
@luke. Your Question really is hard to make out. I have edited it so as to capture what I think it is that you are asking. You can restore the original wording but the risk is that the question will be closed because too unclear. Only trying to help, — Geoffrey Thomas, Apr 23 '18 at 18:03
@luke. If you accept the revised wording, it would help if you gave some reason, any reason, for thinking that the event in the future and the event that is eventually present are not identical. The Question emerges without any background. — Geoffrey Thomas, Apr 23 '18 at 18:12
@Eli Bashwinger. Does Peter J need to frame his response to fit McTaggart's theory of time ? Or, more specifically, how much of McT's theory is embedded in your question ? It's a controversial theory after all, so it's fair to ask. This isn't at all a hostile comment. I think some of McT's work is brilliant but disputes about his theory are endless. Didn't he also think there is a C-series and a D-series ? Best - Geoffrey — Geoffrey Thomas, Apr 23 '18 at 18:22
@EliBashwinger - I'm not sure McT's series is relevant to my comment. although I like his ideas as a method of analysis. But the future and past do not exist and a moment has no duration and this is just the way it is. — , Apr 24 '18 at 13:10
@GeoffreyThomas - I feel your comment is also spot on. The problems begin just as soon as we reify time. — , Apr 24 '18 at 13:13
@PeterJ I don't mean to protract this discussion, but when I say B-theory I mean the theory which holds that the passage of time is illusory, that past, present, and future are equally real. From what I gather, the B-theory receives significant endorsement from the physics community (make of that what you will), and according to this survey 26.3% of the philosophers surveyed espouse B-theory, as opposed to the 15.5% espousing A-theory. So I think it is misleading to assert so positively that the past and future do not exist or are not real. — Eli Bashwinger, Apr 25 '18 at 13:00
See section #4 of this and this, both of which include a warning about using the terms A/B-theory and A/B-Series Given this, the questions posed in my first comment have relevance. — Eli Bashwinger, Apr 25 '18 at 13:00
@EliBashwinger - I see your point but I have no qualms about stating that the past and future do not exist and nobody will ever show otherwise. The idea that they do is (to my mind) utterly daft and it is certainly untestable and unverifiable. No way is it a scientific idea and as a metaphysical idea it doesn't fly. Physicists often endorse ideas of this kind but philosophers need to be more careful. . — , Apr 25 '18 at 13:26

score 1 · Answer 1 · answered Apr 23 '18 at 20:30

According to the well-known model from special relativity (Minkowski space) an event is a point in spacetime. Expressed in common language: An event is at least characterized by 4 components, namely 3-spatial components: Where does the event take place? - Crossing of 48th street with 5th Avenue, 35th floor. And one time component: When does it take place? Tomorrow, 4 p.m. Hence:

A future event is different from a present event, at least because both happen at different time. The two events cannot be the same event.

One could say much more about the relation between different events, about the relativity of time and concerning the question: Does the future really happen, or why does it seem to us as if the future will happen?

But my answer were more focused if you explain a bit more the aim of your question.

score 0 · Answer 2 · answered Apr 23 '18 at 16:03

Is the future real ? If it is, then future events are real. But is it real ? Jan Faye thinks so :

'... the future is [. . .] real if some future fact will make a future utterance of 'e occurs now' true (or false) and if that fact is the same fact which now makes a present utterance of 'e is going to occur' true (or false)'. (Jan Faye, The Reality of the Future: An Essay on Time, Causation and Backward Causation, Odense University Press, 1989, 83.)

One could retort that the future fact and the future utterance are not themselves real. And if the future fact is not real it cannot be the same fact which now makes a present utterance of 'e is going to occur' true (or false). So I am unpersuaded by Faye's argument.

But if purely for the sake of (further) argument one grants that an event, X, 3000 years in the future is real, and also that at some point 'it' is present, there is an identity problem. For X in the future and X (eventually) present to be identical, all descriptions of X-future and X-present must be the same. But there are descriptions of X-future, e.g. that it is 3000 years in the future, that do not apply to X-present.

I offer all this very tentatively. By all means refute it if it is wrong at any or all points but I should like it to be treated as zetetic, investigative. I am happy to risk falling flat on my face.

Does the future always arrive?

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