Thank you for your question I've just understood a great deal about logic, from where I come from it is very dear.
- A proposition is either a tautology or not a tautology
- (1) is a proposition
- (1) is either a tautology or not a tautology
It seems like this could go endlessly.
you could then say.
- (3) is a proposition
- (3) is either a tautology or not a tautology
And so on and so on. This might be correct in some logic systems...But
From a previous question I asked about the liars paradox, which is what this reminds me of, M. Cort Ammon replied that a certain M.Gödel concerned himself with systems which could "admit arithmetic". These systems being "strong" logical systems.
And showed that in these systems :
For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, if T includes a statement of its own consistency then T is inconsistent.
so for example:
"1.(1) is not true" Is an inconsistent statement
Now your argument implies that we can easily swap "a proposition" by "(1)" without changing any of the meaning since "a proposition" can be any proposition. That gives us
- (1) is either a tautology or not a tautology
which is inconsistent in a system that admits arithmetic.