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In relation to a prior posted question (which I didn't feel recieved adiquate response), how does Kant claim that observations of objective reality prove something beyond the phenomena, namely noumena? I don't see a necessary link between them, to state there must be a reality beyond perception, within the prolegomena (unless pure reason would be a better source).

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According to Kant, next to nothing can be know about the noumena except for its existence, and that is primarily a question of definition; i.e. if there is no such thing as noumena, it doesn't make sense to speak of phenomena:

"At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in themselves. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd" (Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the Second Edition, Bxxvi)

I find it questionable whether Berkeley could even be considered as denying noumena, because he didn't deny appearances. Something had to be the cause of them, and that cause would then be considered noumena. Therefore, as Kant says, there's no way to deny noumena except to claim that there is no such thing as appearances. I don't believe that Kant addressed that possibility, but I doubt that he would have considered it a tenable position.

  • +1, that's a precise and short answer referring to the original source. (It's CPR Bxxvi - not xxiv) – Jo Wehler Jun 08 '16 at 18:01
  • @JoWehler. Thanks. I edited the reference — my copy of the Critique doesn't show the page numbers very accurately. –  Jun 08 '16 at 18:15
  • @Pé de Leão I think I've had an epiphany. Since his metaphysics only speaks to cognition, and the modes therein, he doesn't care what causes something (unlike metaphysical theories such as materialism, idealism, or dualism). So objects, regardless of a cause, have a cause, for perception, and that is the noumena. – NationWidePants Jun 09 '16 at 10:29
  • @NationWidePants. I think many have exaggerated Kant's concept of the noumena, but for Kant it's importance was in the negative, i.e. he wanted to subsume everything that is knowable about experience under phenomena. That was necessary to establish the applicability of the categories because there was no way to assert that such principles have any relevance for the noumena. –  Jun 09 '16 at 11:05
  • @NationWidePants. Another thing to note is that Kant avoided saying that phenomena is caused by noumena, because he had no way of establishing a causal relation beyond the phenomenal. Thus, to be precise, the noumena is merely that which appears, leaving it up to the imagination as to whether it's possible for the phenomena-noumena relation to be something other than causal. –  Jun 09 '16 at 11:18
  • @Pé de Leão (1) I see your distinction about the phenomena-noumena relationship, I will need to be mindful when addressing the topic.

    (2) I think the "exaggeration" you've noted was what I struggled with.

     – NationWidePants Jun 09 '16 at 11:44
  • @PédeLeão Nitpicking, but there is exactly one causal relation beyond phenomena, that is established in the deduction of the second critique and possible because the categories are of objects generally [Objekten überhaupt], no matter if given sensually or not. But that is the only application. – Philip Klöcking Jun 09 '16 at 14:42
  • @PhilipKlöcking. Kant uses that expression a number of times in Sections 24 & 25 under the heading "Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General." When he speaks of objects in general, he is almost always referring to the phenomenal objects of experience. The noumena provides us with no object at all except what we perceive as phenomena. –  Jun 09 '16 at 17:38
  • "For, indeed, if we regard outer appearances as presentations produced in us by their objects where these objects are taken as things that are in themselves outside us, then it is impossible to see how we can cognize the existence of these objects otherwise than by the inference from effect to cause; and in this inference it must always remain doubtful whether the cause is in us or outside us." (A372) –  Jun 09 '16 at 17:39
  • And it is exactly this what is extended, albeit only in practical regard, by the second critique in the deduction (part II. The Authority of Pure Reason to an Expansion in its Practical Sphere which is not possible for it as such in the Speculative). After explaining Kant's view on Hume once more, he switches to his actual deduction of freedom as negative and positive concept, i.e. as causa noumenon, as an actual application of the category of causality, from the fact of pure reason. Please read it and reconsider your view. – Philip Klöcking Jun 09 '16 at 19:30
  • Opened this question: http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/35890/can-kantian-categories-only-be-applicated-to-objects-given-by-the-senses in order to make room for clarifying this point for all of us. – Philip Klöcking Jun 09 '16 at 19:59
  • The translation is defective. What is the original here?: "while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects," It must mean surrender knowing, but still reserve thinking/cognition. It's true about Berkeley, Berkeley argues for noumena and against 'philosophic material.' He's almost universally misunderstood and lampooned in the textbook accounts. I think this is a largely correct answer, yet false, not really Kant's reason exactly. One need not understand appearances as appearances, for example as with Nietzsche or Husserl... –  Jun 09 '17 at 23:20
  • ...Appearance is the translation of the Greek or Latin phenomenon, nicht? It's more because nature's telos must be believed to exist. It's a necessary presupposition. –  Jun 09 '17 at 23:20