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As I understand it, (correct me if I'm wrong) Husserl believed that the distinction between the mind and brain is violated when we consider the possibility of measuring the qualities of the former with the same level of exactitude and precision that we can achieve in measuring the latter. I'm not asking whether this theory is tenable. What I'm interested in is whether phenomenology, including its contemporary versions, is against the mathematization of the social sciences and social research.

Sab
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    That's a weird take on phenomenology. Without some sort of quote, I'm a little bit in doubt Husserl would make a claim quite like that -- because his project is not a project of philosophy of mind nor is about measurement in the sense you mention. Contemporary versions of phenomenology is also a large variety of different views ranging from say Jean Luc Marion and Michel Henry to Dan Zahavi and John Drummond or say Herbert Dreyfus. – virmaior Apr 04 '15 at 12:37

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