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I read the SEP entry on miracles a while ago and plan to take a shot at Hume's Of Miracles soon.

Before I get started - I cannot understand how miracles even make sense. Here's my thinking so far:

Premise: Our best predictions state some empirical quantity.

  1. the claim that a miracle can happen equals the claim that our best predictions are sometimes wrong and that our only and therefore best explanation of them is divine will.
  2. the claim that some miracle will happen equals the claim that our best predictions are not our best because of divine will.
  3. the claim that something was in fact a miracle equals the claim that our best explanation of it is divine will.

But it seems to be that 3 is weaker than 1 and 1 weaker than 2; yet, surely, if 3 then 1 and 2, so in effect any miracle means not believing our best empirical predictions, which is absurd.

Where's the error in this line of reasoning?

DBK
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  • I reformatted your question and changed the title. Please feel free to revert my changes if I misconstrued your question. – DBK Aug 18 '14 at 01:22
  • Closely related (but not a duplicate) to http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/914/what-should-a-rational-person-accept-as-a-miracle and http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/14474/what-is-a-miracle-and-why-should-it-influence-our-metaphysical-beliefs – That Guy Aug 18 '14 at 04:41
  • Also related is Lewis's On Miracles, if you're looking for a different perspective. – James Kingsbery Aug 18 '14 at 18:21
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    The logical error is that "best prediction" means most-frequently-accurate-according-to-rigourous-statistical-analysis, not unfailingly-fully-correct. For 2: The claim that some non-specific miracle will happen is the claim that our usually best prediction will not always occur. If something happens 99.99% of the time, it's still our best prediction despite being wrong 1 in 10000 times. The absurdity arises because you confuse statistically-valid with true-without-exception, and because number 2 erroneously assumes that any exceptions stop something being most likely ("best"). – AndrewC Dec 31 '14 at 21:40
  • ah ok, let me mull that over, ta –  Jan 01 '15 at 02:35
  • ok but just because my best prediction is fallible, that doesn't mean i am not rationally obliged to believe it. it's not a miracle that our best prediction is wrong, a miracle is something that breaks a law. and here's MY point: a law is not the same thing as a prediction –  Jan 01 '15 at 02:39
  • @user3293056 Here's my point: Science is a statistical subject, and typically a 5% or 1% significance level is taken as conclusive. That allows for experimental error so that you don't mistakenly discount a model for the wrong reason. Our models change over time - Newtonian mechanics replaced by relativistic mechanics etc. No-one says Newton is an idiot because we discovered a more accurate model, because science isn't true/false like mathematics, it's all about frequency and accuracy of prediction. – AndrewC Jan 01 '15 at 09:55
  • @user3293056 If you believe the current models to be absolutely true, you fly in the face of history, and should send all physisicts home telling them they're wasting their time because we already know the answer. You're also believing self-contradictory things, since relativity and quantum mechanics disagree - physicists are searching for a unified theory partly because they feel there must be a better model that covers both ends of the scale. Science isn't about The Truth, it's about accuracy of prediction, and that mindset was the driving force behind the empirical method - science's basis. – AndrewC Jan 01 '15 at 10:03
  • i'm not saying they're ab. true, only that our best empirical predictions are our most rational belief –  Jan 01 '15 at 15:22
  • @user3293056 Yes. It would be irrational to go about believing that the CIA will blow up your house, you're better of assuming it will stand, since that's the normal state of affairs. (Probably best not to blow up anything yourself, mind.) – AndrewC Jan 01 '15 at 17:31
  • so it's irrational to believe the cia are going to blow up my house. again, i'm not asking if a "miracle" is a contradiction in terms, but whether it contradicts out scientific knowledge. it does.

    but the fact that our scientific knowledge might be wrong does not i think suffice to say that it can be in fact right, but still violated.

     –  Jan 01 '15 at 21:04
  • It's silly to worry that the CIA will blow up your house, but not irrational to believe that the CIA sometimes blows things up. This doesn't contradict our knowledge of engineering for weatherproof houses. The CIA is absolutely not a subtopic of engineering; engineering correctly does not address the existence of the CIA, and our engineering knowledge is right about which houses stand, but this is violated (not invalidated) by the CIA. Belief in both the CIA and engineering is not inconsistent; miracles are correctly not a subtopic of science, but a belief in both is not inconsistent. – AndrewC Jan 01 '15 at 23:43
  • @user3293056 I have no idea whether the CIA has ever blown up any houses, but it's an analogy, so perhaps you can forgive the inaccuracy if there is one. Sorry I didn't spot your comment earlier. – AndrewC Jan 01 '15 at 23:45
  • Engineering (like science) is about what usually happens, and expected forces of nature. Sometimes (a) bricks or beams have unknown flaws, and sometimes (b) weather goes beyond design parameters, and (c) sometimes paramilitaries destroy buildings, but that's all fine for engineering: (a) measurement error, (b) outside of model's parameters - not designed for that, (c) paramilitary action is not considered as a possible weather situation! Engineering is brilliant, but it's not the source of every truth about the universe. Some things are just out of its scope. – AndrewC Jan 02 '15 at 00:02

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That's quite a simple one:

Let's use Hume's definition of "a violation of the laws of nature". The "laws of nature" are simply descriptions of the best experimental data we have.

Our best empirical predictions are under controlled circumstances and predict accurately under those conditions only.

For example, my friend Steffan may catch an apple before it collides with the earth in violation of our previous experimental data, but this does not contradict empiricism, even if in all experiments so far Steffan has not chosen to catch the apple.

Steffan's externality to experimental data means he is not included in the law of gravity. If Steffan ever caught an experimental apple, it would be experimental error.

(Of course this example is an analogy; I'm not asserting Steffan is divine.)

You may or may not believe I have a friend called Steffan, but you have to accept that if he exists, he may be able to disrupt science's prediction about what will happen to the apple with a to-him trivial intervention.

There's no need for anyone to reject science just because they believe Steffan exists and sometimes catches apples, especially if he's taken no interest in any apple experiments so far.

Your beliefs about science and about Steffan are neither mutually contradictory nor mutually supportive.

AndrewC
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