I would suggest Kant's version of reality; the sum of possibilities. Reason being, for example: when walking around, about to turn a blind corner, I am on the lookout for any speeding cyclist, roller-skater, out-of-control shopping trolley ... basically anything — and that is the reality I have to negotiate; real possibilities that have to be reckoned with. When I have actually turned the corner and find just a couple of pedestrians, well that is the actuality. These definitions make sense to me but perhaps others use different terms. Reality in this sense is actually so much more expansive than actuality. Granted some people call actuality reality.
Heidegger describes Kant's idea of reality in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Chapter One: Kant's Thesis: Being Is Not A Real Predicate, page 34
The concept of reality and the real in Kant does not have the meaning
most often intended nowadays when we speak of the reality of the
external world or of epistemological realism. Reality is not
equivalent to actuality, existence, or extantness. It is not identical
with existence, although Kant indeed uses the concept "objective
reality" identically with existence.
The Kantian meaning of the
term "reality" is the one that is appropriate to the literal sense of
the word. In one place Kant translates "reality" very fittingly by
"thingness," "thing-determinateness." The real is what pertains to
the res. When Kant talks about the omnitudo realitatis, the totality
of all realities, he means not the whole of all beings actually extant
but, just the reverse, the whole of all possible thing-determinations,
the whole of all thing-contents or real-contents, essences, possible
things. Accordingly, realitas is synonymous with Leibniz' term
possibilitas, possibility. Realities are the what-contents of possible
things in general without regard to whether or not they are actual, or
"real" in our modern sense.