The problem comes from definitions. Aristotle's (and all Greek philosophers) reasoning is teleological : the explanation of anything must consider its final cause (what to be achieved, the purpose) as well as its efficient, material, and formal causes.
The Greek word for reason is logos, but logos is not just reason, it means to know something with its cause, to understand it with its fundamentals.
see my analysis on the problem of reasoning.
Another problem is that Aristotle uses the words : "ἀγαθός", "σώφρων" or "φρόνιμος" which in fact are not directly linked with our current understanding of moral. There are more practical concepts, earth-like, not God-like related. Even morality is teleological here.
(In order to grasp the complexity of understanding, even for a Greek speaker would be difficult, because the words used, had different connotations from how they are used today. So in order to really understand what is going on, you have to read from the prototype in ancient Greek.)
To simplify as good as I can or can't do, for ancient Greeks reasoning and "virtue" are so interconnected, that to reason about something, which means to understand it with its fundamentals, means at the same time that you gained "virtue" in the sense that you know how it is, you know what you should do with it, how to use that knowledge. But at the same time, because reasoning is teleological, it contains inside the purpose, so it contains "virtue" too.
To explain "virtue" "αρετή" etymologically from Aristotle's times, it is considered as ability to fit/adapt in certain circumstances, ability to respond to something and generally, ability in the highest level.
