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Suppose I ask you why there is something rather than nothing. And by something, I mean causal reality in reference to tangible objects and not just abstract objects.

I recently saw a discussion where Graham Oppy, an atheistic philosopher, seems to go with the view that causal reality exists because it had to exist. In other words, he posits this to be necessary.

The other option he mentions is that causal reality exists for no reason.

I’m having trouble understanding the difference between the two. Presumably, by the second option, he is referring to a kind of brute contingency (I.e. in his version of modality of possible worlds, there is a possible world in which causal reality does not exist). And then, the possibility of causal reality existing just happens.

For example, one can imagine a radioactive atom decaying at time t, where t is one of many possible times (a brute contingency). One can also imagine a radioactive atom decaying at time t out of necessity.

Now, usually, in the case of day to day objects, when we speak of things happening by necessity, we think of them happening in a deterministic way. We imagine an effect occurring by necessity because of some law that determined it to be that way.

At the same time, it is not hard to imagine X happening for no deterministic cause and by necessity. Graham, for example, believes that the universe had a beginning but had no cause. However, he thinks that the universe does have a reason or explanation for its existence. But the reason is to appeal to the universe’s necessity. In other words, he claims that the explanation for the universe existing is that it is necessary even though it has no cause.

Is appealing to necessity an explanation for X? Can it be the case that X is necessary but also happen for no reason? Where is the problem in this? If there is no problem, what then, really, is the practical difference between a brute contingency and necessity?

Conifold
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  • At first, I thought that the answer was obvious: a brute contingency is a brute lack of necessity, or a brute fact that there is some possible world without something, so the difference is the mere difference between necessity and contingency. However, I started wondering about iterated modality in this connection, and my feeling of obviousness started to go away (is it necessary that there is a possible world such that it is contingent that... whatever it is that is contingent? but then whence the mere necessity/contingency distinction?). – Kristian Berry Nov 15 '23 at 17:59
  • Is there a link or reference to this discussion? It is hard to understand the difference without seeing what is being discussed. – Conifold Nov 16 '23 at 00:49
  • @Conifold I’ve added a link in the edit but here: https://www.youtube.com/live/-sVvxZk--qs?si=SPm2uxV6UXnV9Tnr. You can skip to 2:00 and follow the discussion there for the next 2-3 minutes if you’re short on time –  Nov 16 '23 at 03:18
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    Oppy explains his self-called "austere view" of necessity in Does The Universe Have A Cause?:"I think that every possible world shares laws and initial history with the actual world, and differs from the actual world only as a result of the outplaying of objective chance." Since all of his possible worlds share the initial state of the universe the latter is necessary. The other option, that most naturalists pick, is more relaxed modal metaphysics, so the initial state is a contingent brute fact. Neither has much to do with providing "reasons". – Conifold Nov 16 '23 at 10:38
  • @Conifold The question remains as to what it even means, in a modal metaphysical sense, for the initial state to have been otherwise, in the case of brute contingency. And how is it practically different from necessity? If it is just that in a possible worlds view, other possible worlds have a different initial state or none, sure. But what does this mean in any “real” sense? For example, one can imagine possible worlds turning out from today to tomorrow using quantum mechanics. But these possible worlds in some sense are postulated based on evidence. There is none for the initial state. –  Nov 16 '23 at 16:34
  • @Conifold Also, elsewhere, he says that there is no difference in explanatory virtue/power between postulating an uncaused, initial beginningless thing (like god) vs. an uncaused, initial beginning thing (like the universe) if one posits each as necessary. Do you think that a thing with a beginning should bear any extra cost or less cost compared to the beginningless thing or no? –  Nov 16 '23 at 16:39
  • The evidence modal metaphysics is based on today is colloquial and scientific uses. Those are largely pragmatic and conventional, so its ontological import is close to zero. Oppy's point seems to be that neither theism nor naturalism can provide any substantive "ultimate" explanation, so we might as well be parsimonious. The "real" sense is the pragmatic choice of "austere" causation (only physical in time) and modality, he is following in Quine's footsteps there. Costs and benefits are in the eye of the beholder, and what I think is beside the point. – Conifold Nov 16 '23 at 21:06
  • Why contemplate the possibility that things keep happening without a cause? We know from experience that this is not the case. We live in a fairly predictable world. Whenever things happen that we couldn't predict, it points to the limits of our knowledge of their causes, rather than the absence of them. – Yuri Zavorotny Jan 16 '24 at 22:03

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Good question. Existence monism or realist monism proposes that there is only one thing - the universe. The moment of initiation was when the universe decided to exist. This was necessary. See also cosmopsychism. See related question, "Why is there something rather than nothing".

Meanach
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Is appealing to necessity an explanation for X? Can it be the case that X is necessary but also happen for no reason?

According to Aristotle, natute is regulated by teleology; what happens (the X in the question) is not an arbitrary ending of a process, but the accomplishment of a pre-defined goal; the ultimate point of a process. Or in other words, physical changes, happen for a specific purpose that is subject to what-is-to-be-accomplished and not to external causes.

He identifies this nessecity as the functional behaviour of X in nature, that ends in the what-is-to-be-accomplished: "εντελέχεια" (entelechy). For example he says that : a seed "wants to be" a tree because this purpose exists inside it, and will be actualized if circumstances allow it.

Where is the problem in this?

So, there is NO problem. The problem is in the mis-understanding of the concept of reason.

If there is no problem, what then, really, is the practical difference between a brute contingency and necessity?

Summing up, necessity is the underlying principle in the unfoldment of reality and brute-contingency is our inability to understand the perplexing interractions of all things, in the process of actualizing their end-goals.

Ioannis Paizis
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  • "physical changes, happen for a specific purpose" -- I wonder if Aristotle was mistranslated or misunderstood. Necessity, as I understand it, means that any event was brought in (necessarily) by some cause in the past. In other words, necessity describes a deterministic Universe. – Yuri Zavorotny Jan 16 '24 at 22:44
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Generally, a fact (or entity) is brute if it has no explanation, and explicable otherwise. The 'explanation' here is in terms of an objective explanation, and not in the sense of epistemic justification. For example, the laws of gravity explain why an apple fell, etc.

Some facts are necessary. Usually, the explanations we care about are contrastive: we are aware that both p and ~p are respectively possible, and want to understand what it is that made p occur instead of ~p. This is the explanation we're looking for.

However, recall that necessary facts are true in any possibility, so nothing in principle could be their contrastive explanation. This is why principles that demand everything be explained, like the controversial Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), range only over contingent facts and not necessary ones. But whether necessities are explicable is a contested and disputed topic, and one we can sidestep.

The difference is this: if the existence of the universe is a brute fact, then it simply has no further explanation (by definition), but it can still be a contingent fact. There can still be possibilities where the universe did not exist, or did not exist in the same way, but we will simply not have an explanation of why this universe obtained instead of that, etc. This is generally what analytic philosophers mean by "brute" in metaphysics.

On the other hand, a necessity is something that is true given any possibility. So regardless of your views on whether necessities are explicable, it becomes clear what the difference between a brute fact and a necessity is. And this I take to be the obvious difference between the options Oppy offers. Fwiw, I think the other answers here are a bit misleading, so beware.

kuro
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