In his article "Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question" (Metaphilosophy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 378-392), Victor Reppert says:
The claim that there are no beliefs seems rather an obvious choice as a candidate for self-refuation. After all, you cannot say "I believe there are no beliefs" without contradicting yourself. But eliminativists, when pressed on this, do not say that they believe there are no beliefs; what they say is that they are in brain state that stands in some kind of successor relationship in the matured neuroscience to what folk psychology calls beliefs.
What, exactly does he mean by brain state that stands in some kind of successor relationship? (From the wording, it seems he is somewhat quoting those who make such claims.) Does it mean, for example: a succession of certain states of configurations of atoms (in the claim maker's brain) enabled the conclusion that ... ?