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Which philosophers have defended both the claim that any attitude (a pro attitude to anything) can ground meaning and moral error theory? It may even be the the received view among the population in general.

There are indeed some philosophers who think that any pro attitude toward anything suffices for meaning

One is not really being true to oneself, losing oneself in a meaningful way, or having a genuine reason to live insofar as one, say, successfully maintains 3,732 hairs on one’s head (Taylor 1992, 36), cultivates one’s prowess at long-distance spitting (Wolf 2010, 104), collects a big ball of string (Wolf 2010, 104), or, well, eats one’s own excrement (Wielenberg 2005, 22)... there seem to be certain actions, relationships, and states that are objectively valuable (but see Evers 2017, 30–32) and toward which one’s pro-attitudes ought to be oriented, if meaning is to accrue...[philosophers] usually seek to avoid the counterexamples, lest they have to bite the bullet by accepting the meaningfulness of maintaining 3,732 hairs on one’s head and all the rest (for some who do, see Svensson 2017, 54–55; Belliotti 2019, 181–83).

And if nothing is moral then that might open the floodgates even further, so that not only is maintaining an exact number of hairs meaningful, but that no steps we take to do so (headhunting) are morally wrong.

Who could defend such a claim? To say that anything can be meaningful and no way of getting it is wrong seems like the antithesis of philosophy.

Or are the two are actually incompatible, so that if we take error theory seriously enough subjectivism can be limited and exclude silly (if not evil) counter examples.

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    Moral error theory based on argument from queerness (moral nihilism) and falsity of agent motivation internalism doesn't mean it grounds meaning if any at all by arbitrary attitude, on the contrary it just implicitly ultimately grounds on motivation externalism wherefrom most mundane seemingly subjective individual attitudes could be reduced to nothing else but bodily emotions belonging to human nature as part of the whole nature often observable by others objectively and determined by external causes... – Double Knot Sep 10 '23 at 05:33
  • did you read the quote @DoubleKnot ? ii'm not sure why you disagree with what i said –  Sep 10 '23 at 19:43
  • i am concerned by what you are saying @DoubleKnot you seem to think that if nothing is moral then subjectivism about the meaning of life is automatically limited against all possible counter examples. there is no way i can see that this is the case. can you elaborate or not? –  Sep 11 '23 at 00:15
  • oh right i think i get you @DoubleKnot you mean that without moral values and limits to meaning, we can truly enjoy other values (practical and epistemic). i think that is too quick to assert. e.g. people who think that some apparent meaning is not meaningful are not obviously less able to practice epistemic virtue etc. –  Sep 11 '23 at 03:03
  • I simply meant moral error theory doesn't necessarily mean any attitude can ground meaning as if humans can have their nature within nature or kingdom within kingdom, on the contrary, often their meaning is use determined by external causes for moral error theorists or moral nihilists. If one inherits a company to run on one's shoulder, typically the said company's future is meaningful by any attitude, not absurd or meaningless at all, for most people... – Double Knot Sep 11 '23 at 05:33
  • still not getting your inference @DoubleKnot so i don't see why moral error theory rules out anything goes wrt the meaning of life (collecting lots of string etc.) –  Sep 11 '23 at 05:43
  • Maybe you could contemplate the metaphor of intentionality as a similar error theory which too rules out anything goes wrt meaning of externally encountered realities... – Double Knot Sep 11 '23 at 05:50
  • oh i get it. you think that @DoubleKnot because moral claims are false, lives based on morality are vacuous and meaningless? but nevertheless, if i want to be moral i may well have a meaningful life. what's to stop me having a pro attitude to helping people (or collecting balls of string in an honest way)? –  Sep 11 '23 at 05:54
  • indeed, most error theorists @DoubleKnot are moralists or rather "shmoralists". mackie urges (all) people to live moral lives; he just thinks they are not morally wrong if they do not –  Sep 11 '23 at 05:59
  • The same was already taught by the ancient Vajra sutra more than 2000 years ago: All conditioned phenomena are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, shadows, like dew drops and a lightning flash: Contemplate them thus... – Double Knot Sep 11 '23 at 06:04
  • i don't think you're right @DoubleKnot about moral error theory, let alone Mahayana Buddhism. anyway, suffice to say that if moral error theory is indeed a missing ingredient to counter examples for subjectvism about the meaning of life, then either show it or quote someone who does. –  Sep 11 '23 at 06:07
  • Have you really thought through about the reason for your insist to pin down a quote in the end of a string thread? Which philosophical (first) principle you're invoking?... – Double Knot Sep 11 '23 at 06:44
  • i thought i was invoking the philosophical principle that not everything goes @DoubleKnot it's fine if you disagree, but this is all just noise now, and someone should delete it –  Sep 11 '23 at 06:54
  • i have (see above) tried to interpret you and what you are adding to the question. but i guess i failed. if you cannot write more clearly than you are, then just stop @DoubleKnot i am unwilling to keep trying at this point –  Sep 11 '23 at 18:19
  • it doesn't help that when i suggest an interpretation you add more cryptic and rhetorical comments @DoubleKnot it's unhelpful. try to help others. –  Sep 11 '23 at 18:22
  • so what exactly do you want me to change about the question @DoubleKnot ? –  Sep 28 '23 at 06:16
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    Nothing is required to change, just hope my composition is not more cryptic and rhetorical... – Double Knot Sep 28 '23 at 06:20

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Nietzsche, Nietzsche may well be a moral error theorist

it was only early in the nineteenth century that writers began to write directly about “the meaning of life.” The most significant writers were: Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Tolstoy. Schopenhauer ended up saying that the meaning of life is to deny it; Kierkegaard, that the meaning of life is to obey God passionately; Nietzsche, that the meaning of life is the will to power...

But it looks like the counter examples fail, and pro attitudes (admiring the hairs on my head) cannot ground silly examples of meaningful lives: not everything expresses (not every subject position possesses) the will to power quite as much.

Likewise, while Buddhas may be in some sense past morality, they all live the same life, which has a meaning (however that could apply, to others?) not from trivial self involvement but compassionately helping all sentient beings to reach enlightenment.

If you need an argument for why it may not even by possible (which is just silly speculation):

  1. the meaning of life is either propositional or not
  2. if it is propositional then it is "queer": so no lives are meaningful for Mackie
  3. if it is not propositional then reasons to think a life is meaningful are internal: so for Mackie "are not the only or the main source of such a [sociocultural] framework-relative authority"