This article introduced me to the source: Point 6, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Chapter XXXI, Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas by John Locke.
But yet this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight, and hardness, than that colour or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences.
The bolded subordinate clause confuses me.
Is that an ellipsis of 'the fact that'?
What is the antecedent of sorts of things? To which sorts of things does Locke refer?
1600s; if you're specifically asking about a usage you suspect to be archaic, use that tag instead, but otherwise the date is almost certainly irrelevant to proper tagging. (As here.) – Nathan Tuggy Sep 15 '15 at 20:57