To see that exponential discounting is (more or less) the only time consistent manner to discount the future, consider a decision maker obtaining a utility (payoff) level at period $t$ and at period $t+1$. Assume the total value of these is evaluated according to the value of:
$$
\alpha(t) u_t + \alpha(t+1) u_{t+1},
$$
where $u_t$, $u_{t+1}$ are the utilities obtained in periods $t$ and $t+1$ and and $\alpha(t), \alpha(t+1)$ are the periods $t$ and $t+1$ discount rates. Note that this assumes additive separability over time and multiplicative separability of utility and discounting (time preference).
Assume that the consumer is indifferent between the different payoffs $(u_t, u_{t+1})$ and $(v_t, v_{t+1})$ (say, for example say $u_t > v_t$ and $v_{t+1} > u_{t+1}$).
Then:
$$
\alpha(t) u_t + \alpha(t+1) u_{t+1} = \alpha(t) v_t + \alpha(t+1) v_{t+1}.
$$
Now assume that one period has passed. If the decision maker is time consistent, she still thinks $(u_t, u_{t+1})$ is equally good as $(v_t, v_{t+1})$, so:
$$
\alpha(t-1) u_t + \alpha(t) u_{t+1} = \alpha(t-1) v_t + \alpha(t) v_{t+1}.
$$
Using these two conditions, we find that:
$$
\frac{\alpha(t+1)}{\alpha(t)} = \frac{\alpha(t)}{\alpha(t-1)} \left(= \frac{u_t - v_t}{v_{t+1} - u_{t+1}}\right).
$$
We can generalize this (by waiting more periods) and show that this condition must hold for any value of $t$. In other words, the ratio $\frac{\alpha(t)}{\alpha(t-1)}$ should be a constant independent of $t$. Let's call this number $\delta$.
Then we have:
$$
\begin{align*}
\alpha(t) &= \frac{\alpha(t)}{\alpha(t-1)} \frac{\alpha(t-1)}{\alpha(t-2)} \ldots \frac{\alpha(1)}{\alpha(0)} \alpha(0),\\
&= \underbrace{\delta\, \delta \ldots \delta}_{t \text{ times }} \, \alpha(0),\\
&= \alpha(0) \delta^t.
\end{align*}
$$
Normalizing $\alpha(0) = 1$, we obtain that $\alpha(t) = \delta^t$, giving exponential discounting.