In "Competition when consumers have switching costs" (1995), Klemperer puts forward an example with 2 periods, 2 firms, switching costs and transport costs in a Hoteling model. He then shows the equilibrium prices in both period, with the equilibrium period 1 price a firm will charge being pushed down by the monopoly power the firm obtains from switching costs. The 2nd period price equals the reservation price of the consumer, again due to the monopoly power resulting from switching costs. He then states that the period 1 price is below that of period 2 price, which is logical enough (the monopoly power deriving from switching costs makes it attractive to build market share in the first period, which can be milked in the second period - it's a notion that occurs and is demonstrated throughout the paper). However, he makes the statement with an claim I just can't wrap my head around, arguing that $p^A_1 < p^A_2$ as long as the value a consumer puts in consuming a unit of the good, substracted by the transport cost, remains below the consumer's reservation price. This consumer value isn't part of the model of the example, so I can't understand how this would work mathematically, and also at an intuitive level I fail to grasph what he's saying. I'm posting the relevant section of the paper below, containing the mathematical framework. The example I described above is example 1, but the prior example is relevant to it, so I'm included that.
What I want to know is why the highlighted statement is true. Intuitively at a minimum.




