These two papers seem relevant. The large Indian wage premium for English language fluency suggests that there would be significant returns at the margin to providing services through trade instead of locally, but they are limited by the supply of foreigners with the right language skills. However, these premiums are largest among the skilled workers, suggesting that the benefits of a universal language would also accrue disproportionately (in absolute wage premia) to the most skilled.
Recent studies have shown that trade liberalization increases skilled
wage premiums in developing countries. This result suggests
globalization may benefit elite skilled workers relatively more than
poor unskilled workers, increasing inequality. This effect may be
mitigated, however, if human capital investment responds to new global
opportunities. A key question is whether a country with a more
elastic human capital supply is better positioned to benefit from
globalization. I study how the impact of globalization varies across
Indian districts with different costs of skill acquisition. I focus on
the cost of learning English, a relevant qualification for high-skilled
export jobs. Linguistic diversity in India compels individuals to
learn either English or Hindi as a lingua franca. Some districts have
lower relative costs of learning English due to linguistic
predispositions and psychic costs associated with past nationalistic
pressure to adopt Hindi. I demonstrate that districts with a more
elastic supply of English skills benefited more from globalization:
they experienced greater growth in both information technology jobs
and school enrollment. Consistent with this human capital response,
they experienced smaller increases in skilled wage premiums.
Human Capital Response to Globalization: Education and Information Technology in India
India's colonial legacy and linguistic diversity give English an
important role in its economy, and this role has expanded due to
globalization in recent decades. It is widely believed that there are
sizable economic returns to English-language skills in India, but the
extent of these returns is unknown due to lack of a microdata set
containing measures of both earnings and English ability. In this
paper, we use a newly available data set - the India Human Development
Survey, 2005 to quantify the effects of English-speaking ability on
wages. We find that being fluent in English (compared to not
speaking any English) increases hourly wages of men by 34%, which is
as much as the return to completing secondary school and half as much
as the return to completing a Bachelor's degree. Being able to speak a
little English significantly increases male hourly wages 13%. There is
considerable heterogeneity in returns to English. More experienced and
more educated workers receive higher returns to English. The
complementarity between English skills and education appears to have
strengthened over time. Only the more educated among young workers
earn a premium for English skill, whereas older workers across all
education groups do.
The Returns to English-Language Skills in India
Here is a natural experiment that provides an example of the negative effect of the opening of labor markets on the existing population the new workers will compete with (in this case, the arrival of Russian mathematicians on Western mathematicians' wages and job prospects).
The fall of the Iron Curtain in late 1991 ended nearly 70 years of
isolation of Soviet mathematicians from the world mathematical
community. Suddenly free to travel and emigrate, approximately 1000
Soviet mathematicians, mostly highly productive researchers, relocated
to other countries. Three-hundred-thirty-six scientists came to the
United States.
During the decades of scant contact with foreign colleagues, Russian
mathematicians, for political reasons that Borjas and Doran explain,
concentrated on certain fields that tended to get much less attention
in the West. American mathematicians, meanwhile, had moved ahead in
areas that Russians largely ignored. When the émigrés arrived in
America, therefore, they had a great impact on certain mathematical
fields but much less on others.
These differential impacts allow Borjas and Doran to compare what
happened in fields heavily and lightly affected by the influx and to
analyze what a large infusion of new talent and ideas does to a field
of research. Combining information from several large databases, they
track the productivity and affiliations of the Russian and American
mathematicians. Their inquiry concentrates on two major effects; the
“knowledge shock” from all of the new approaches and insights suddenly
available to American mathematics, and the “labor market shock” from
all the new people suddenly on the American mathematics job market.
What they found does not support what Borjas calls the conventional
“rubbing-off” theory, which holds that if “we get all these highly
skilled immigrants, … somehow there’s a rubbing-off effect that makes
you and me more innovative.”
Since the fields with heavy Russian influence had “incredibly bright
new mathematicians coming in, with all these new theorems, all these
new techniques flooding the market, you would expect that people
working in those areas are going to learn quite a lot from them,”
Borjas says. “At the same time, the number of academic jobs where
mathematical research is actually done is really not increasing all
that much. So something has to give.”
That something, the study found, was the career prospects and
productivity of many of the mathematicians already here. “When you
increase the number of very smart people in a field by a substantial
amount,” Borjas says, “… not everybody benefits. The typical
pre-existing American mathematician actually lost out.”
That’s because “a generation of American mathematicians at the very
peak of their mathematical efficiency by luck just happened to
graduate at the same time these Russians [were] coming in,” Borjas
explains. The people of that young generation lost the most. Faculty
members protected by tenure kept their jobs, but mathematicians who
had not yet attained it found themselves facing sharply heightened
competition, which produced an “unprecedented 12 percent unemployment
rate for new American mathematics PhDs” and “a dramatic decrease in
the probability of obtaining a position in research universities,” the
article says. The overall unemployment rate for college graduates,
meanwhile, was dropping rapidly, from 3.2% to 2.2% between 1992 and
1996. Many of the young mathematicians in heavily affected fields ended up moving to lower-ranking institutions or leaving academic
mathematics altogether.
The situation “drove a lot of American mathematicians into Wall
Street,” Borjas says. There, in their new role as “quants”
(quantitative analysts), they turned their talents to inventing
intricate financial instruments. Ironically, one of Borjas’s
colleagues has joked, the migration from the formerly communist
country probably helped to fuel the 2008 economic crisis that nearly
> brought down American capitalism.
Taken for Granted: Foreign Invasion