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Is the conventional self "conventional" in the same way as dharmas are?

So if the conventionality of dharmas means that they arise and disappear each moment, or that they don't exist from their own side, or that they leave no trace of themselves, or that they always have parts (etc., etc.) does the same apply to the conventional self?

I understand that both lack "substance": but does that mean the same thing here?

I'm interested in anyone having said "no".

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    There is no agreement as to what are Dharmas and a conventional 'self', if it is conventional & normal then what is the mystery. We have also had plenty of questions dealing with the words 'self' & 'emptiness', you should search for those because i doubt anybody will bother repeating the answers. It's very unclear what it is you are asking because you are mixing various methods of expression, eg notion of a 'conventional self' is entirely foreign to pali litterature. –  Aug 08 '21 at 16:13
  • likewise the notion of dhammas arising & ceasing every moment, this is also foreign to sutta and is actually reprimandable because it is said that what is called mind, consciousness or intellect arises as one thing & ceases as another. –  Aug 08 '21 at 16:22
  • "notion of a 'conventional self' is entirely foreign to pali litterature" @Letsbuddhism I agree I don't understand this question, but I think that "conventional" self is for example in the dialog of King Milinda -- where "conventional" is translated here as "the designation in common use". – ChrisW Aug 08 '21 at 16:28
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    I misunderstood what you meant by "dharmas" in the first paragraph -- I thought you meant "doctrines" but I guess you meant "things". – ChrisW Aug 08 '21 at 16:34
  • I think you're glossing "self" to mean "ultimate / substantial / unchanging / etc. self", etc.. it'a pretty standard, but has been pretty conclusively - I think - established as a mistake @Letsbuddhism –  Aug 08 '21 at 16:34
  • If you agree, maybe it would draw more attention by using the terms avijja and vijja instead of conventional self and dharmas, that's if I understand your meaning of dharmas. In Theravada, Avijja has a similar meaning to conventional self, and Vijja has a similar meaning to dharmas. Avijja - without the risk of sounding derogatory - is a kind of stupidity or living life with a closed mind. Vijja is the opposite: it's a desire to see the larger frame of reference where situational wisdom arises. –  Aug 08 '21 at 17:22
  • Does this answer your question? Does Theravada posit the selflessness of phenomena? –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:14
  • I think this question is possibly a duplicate of https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena and https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28709/if-theravada-doesnt-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena-then-how-to-interpret –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:14
  • @ChrisW as to conventional, i'll give you that but it's a stretch to say that The Buddha taught about the doctrine of self in this way. As to OP You will be surprised as to the amount of delusion in buddhist circles. Don't want to get into details much but afaik the word moment occurs like 1 time in the tipitaka and that in a book of abhidhamma. The conditioned is said to change as it persists and consciousness arising as one thing & ceasing as another. I only post this to show how difficult it is to interpret your question, i neither agree nor disagree with your assertions. –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:22
  • Afaik It is mostly after 11th century that the doctrine of things arising & ceasing very fast became a popular expression in Theravada due to the comy which is Abhidhammattha-sangaha. –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:26
  • I said there is a lot of delusion in Buddhist circles in regards to this "no it is not entirely foreign to the pali sutras, not unless lots of monks have been entirely misunderstanding the sutras". I was just using your proposition of monks having a lot misunderstanding [delusion] if that expression is indeed foreign to Sutta and it obviously isn't in the canonical texts, i already explained the origin. I think that you will be surprised to learn how much disagreement there is among monks and commentators if you study more. –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:52

2 Answers2

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OP: "Is the conventional self "conventional" in the same way as dharmas are?"

In extent Mahayana traditions the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons is of the same nature and both are posited. They differ only in the object of focus. Further, it is considered critical to understand the selflessness of phenomena in order to achieve the soteriological ends of the Buddha.

In the Theravada, the selflessness of phenomena is not posited and it is treated by some as not germane to the soteriological ends of the Buddha while others insist that positing the selflessness of phenomena is actually a hindrance in that it denies the reality of the objectively existing world. However, it should be noted that some Theravada practitioners here on the site seem to have more or less the same understanding of the two selves as Mahayana.

OP: "So if the conventionality of dharmas means that they arise and disappear each moment, or that they don't exist from their own side, or that they leave no trace of themselves, or that they always have parts (etc., etc.) does the same apply to the conventional self?"

In Mahayana: yes. In Theravada: see above.

OP: "I understand that both lack "substance": but does that mean the same thing here?"

Again see above.

Also, these questions and answers might be helpful.

  • can you please provide a reference for your first paragraph, ideally a very catholic one –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:21
  • You can find a reference to a Geshe Lharampa stating essentially the same thing in the first link I posted in the answer above. Cheers. –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:24
  • ok well I was primary interested in more sinitic forms of buddhism cheers –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:24
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    Yeah, that's hard to give a reference for. I think most of the sinitic traditions would agree, but it will be hard to find a detailed description written in an academic fashion. The Tibetan traditions are the most academic in this sense. –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:27
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    dwai, I will ask a Tendai monk or scholar. your answer was helpful, thanks –  Aug 08 '21 at 18:28
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Regarding self as a convention:

If you sit down, you have a lap. When you stand up, where is the lap? Where has it gone to?

What a "lap" is, is just a convention, just a like a "fist".

Similarly, a being (satta), a person (puggala), a chariot (ratha) are all conventions. See SN 5.10.

The self (atta) can be seen in two forms.

In the first case, when am unenlightened person clings to it, it's simply a mental idea (Snp 4.14) in the mind that one clings to.

In the second case, when an enlightened one says "me", "I", "we", "our", "mine", he is just using conventions (SN 1.25).

Even in the first case, it's just a convention too. Why? What you call "self" is somehow pegged to some other concept like your body or your mind or your personality.

So, imagine if you go to the beach and spend a lot of time and effort to build a sand castle. Then someone comes and smashes it. You feel angry and say "why did you smash my sand castle?" "You", "my" and "sand castle" are all conventions. The anger appeared because of clinging.

Regarding emptiness:

The concept of "substance" (svabhava) comes in the Madhyamaka philosophy of Mahayana. Madhyamaka states that everything is empty of substance, which means it is empty of the meaning that is given to it by the mind. It's not what you think it is.

Anatta is the notion that everything is not self. The body, the mind, the five aggregates, mental ideas etc. are all not self.

Anatta is a specialized form of emptiness (i.e. everything is empty of a self - SN 35.85), while the Madhyamaka emptiness is a more generalized form (i.e. everything is empty of the meaning given to it by the mind). Both types of emptiness are covered in MN 1. So, Theravada has both too, in fact.

The Madhyamaka emptiness is explained by the Pali term papanca. If papanca is the process of baking, then svabhava is the cake. Please see this answer.

In his commentary to Snp 4.14, Ven. Thanissaro explained that the objectification and classification (papanca) of the mental idea of the self vs. non-self objects, lead to craving, clinging and suffering. He also explained papanca in his commentary to MN 18.

A detailed explanation can be found in this answer.

ruben2020
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  • yes, similarly. I made that point in the question, and asked if they are in the same way empty. are they? –  Aug 08 '21 at 17:08
  • @unknown_buddhist The concept of "substance" (svabhava) comes in the Madhyamaka philosophy of Mahayana. Madhyamaka states that everything is empty of substance, which means it is empty of the meaning that is given to it by the mind. It's not what you think it is. – ruben2020 Aug 08 '21 at 17:11
  • oh, I have definitely heard that anatta means the self lacks a "substance". certainly, anatta has been glossed before as "emptiness of self", just as sunyata has as "lack of self existence" –  Aug 08 '21 at 17:13
  • Anatta is the notion that everything is not self. Your body, your mind, the five aggregates, mental ideas etc. are all not self. – ruben2020 Aug 08 '21 at 17:14
  • so you seem to think "no" they are just similar, not the same, emptiness. that's cool... I'm out of questions now anyway! –  Aug 08 '21 at 17:16
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    @unknown_buddhist Anatta is a specialized form of emptiness (i.e. everything is empty of a self), while the Madhyamaka emptiness is a more generalized form (i.e. everything is empty of the meaning given to it by the mind). Both types of emptiness are covered in MN 1. So, Theravada has both too, in fact. – ruben2020 Aug 08 '21 at 17:20
  • they mean different things (in Mahayana and Theravada) I believe, but ymmv - legitimately I mean ha! –  Aug 08 '21 at 17:24
  • @ruben2020 this answer says that Theravada also has selflessness of phenomena according to MN 1... does that mean you've changed your mind? Do you now regard the selflessness of phenomena as important to the goals of liberation? –  Aug 08 '21 at 23:52
  • @YesheTenley What you call "selflessness of phenomena" is called papanca (reification or conceptualization or objectification-classification) in Theravada. The mental idea of the self is a type of papanca and non-self objects are also papanca. Craving is also habit of papanca. Snp 4.14 is very clear that to end suffering, we must end papanca by putting an end to the root of papanca, which is the thought "I am the thinker" (i.e. the self). Ven. Thanissaro explains this in his footnote. – ruben2020 Aug 09 '21 at 13:53
  • see https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/45625/what-is-the-difference-between-theravada-papanca-with-regard-to-objects-and-ma –  Aug 09 '21 at 17:16