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I have read here argumentation for the continuity of mind, coming from a Geshe in Tibetan Buddhism.

From what I have learnt it is asserted that:

  • Consciousness could not arise from matter (could not have matter as its substantial cause).
  • It could not arise from nothing.
  • It could only arise from another moment of consciousness.

Note: the definition of "substantial cause" above comes from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika.

Has anyone come across a Buddhist argument why something could not have nothing as its substantial cause? What faulty logical consequences would follow?

More specifically, I have in mind a situation when due to a higher being's act/wish, something comes into being. What comes into being is not transformed from another previous entity, but emerges "from nothing" merely due to the higher's act/wish.

I would like to understand whether there are logical contradictions that would follow from the asserting this to be possible.

Sam
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  • Now that I properly understand the question I'll note that I once asked a similar question. https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/26081/what-is-the-substantial-cause-of-an-instance-of-consciousness This question here is much better than my old question. –  Jun 07 '21 at 14:00

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The origin of this whole line of reasoning in Tibetan Buddhism comes from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika. There have been extensive commentaries and teachings on this from numerous great masters of Tibetan Buddhism. You can find commentaries on it from all the extant schools of Tibetan Buddhism. For an extensive set of discussions on this line of reasoning see this accomplished Tibetan master here.

Let's look at some of the verses in the Pramanavarttika where Dharmakirti sets out his definitions and arguments:

Without a transformation of the substantial cause
The substantial result would be unable to change.
[This is] like, [for] example, without the transformation [61]
Of the clay [there would be no transformation of a clay] vase, and so forth.

Without the transformation of some functioning entity [of the cause]
It is not reasonable that [the cause which] transforms some functioning entity
[Of the result] is the substantial cause of that [result]
It is like an ox and a wild ox. [62]
The mind and the body are also like that.

Verses 61 and 62 of the Pramanavarttika

How should we understand this? I'm no expert so the following comes with a big warning that I might be entirely wrong. This is how I make sense of it...

Things necessarily arise from the transformation of a substantial cause into a substantial result. The example given is of unformed clay (the substantial cause) transforming into a clay vase (the substantial result). The nature of unformed clay is matter and the nature of a clay vase is also matter. That is... the transformation from unformed clay into a clay vase is the transformation of matter from one thing into another.

The second verse is a bit harder to read, but it is basically saying that if we notice that the result has undergone some transformation - say the clay vase has broken apart - then it is necessary to say that some functioning entity of the substantial cause also transformed - ie., the matter of the clay vase that was part of the functioning entity of the unformed clay.

Both of these are intuitive and in accord with how I perceive the world to work. With the arising of things there is generally a transformation that occurs. Unformed steel and glass and rubber transform into a car. Cars rust and break apart and transform back into unformed steel and glass and rubber. Glass breaks apart and transforms back into silica, et cetera, et cetera.

What's important for showing that the body cannot act as the substantial cause for the mind is that the latter can transform without a corresponding transformation of the body. Similarly, the mind cannot be the substantial cause of the body since the latter can transform without a corresponding change of the mind. Sometimes changes in the two coincide, but it is not necessarily so.

I'll leave the discussion about a higher being to others, but note that it is said in Tibetan Buddhism (and in many other traditions) that God's and so forth do eventually die and transform into beings of the lower realms.

Finally, I'll mention that I do have some qualms with this whole line of reasoning as it seems to be bound up with notions of the hypostatic existence of mind and matter. That is, if the reasoning is valid it can only be a conventional truth with the nature of illusion.

I hope this is helpful.

  • You assert that the mind can transform without a corresponding transformation of the body, and vice versa. Can you give example\s for these? – Sam Jun 08 '21 at 14:50
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nothingness is nonexistent so there is the absurdity of referring to it as a functioning thing and an existing thing.

also from the pov of substantial causes, mental factors such as intention are not main minds ie. consciousness/mind itself, meaning they cannot function as substantial cause for the production of a mind.

bw tho
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  • The non-existence of square circles is an existent fact (square circles do not exist, but their non existence does). The non existence of square circles can be validly known. Imho, in just the same way, non-existence/nothingness in general does exist as it can be validly known. – Sam Jun 12 '21 at 11:37
  • We say that it is the mental conception of the absurdity of a square circle that is an existent and can be validly known. Therefore it is not true that the non-existence of the square circle exists. That would be contradictory and absurd. –  Jun 12 '21 at 13:33
  • Further, the existence of the mental conception of the absurdity of a square circle is a thoroughly dependent one. That is, it is only in dependence upon the thought that apprehends that mental conception that it exists. Thus the existence of the mental conception of the absurdity of a square circle cannot be inherently existing. It is just a conventional truth. –  Jun 12 '21 at 13:36
  • facts exist like the ones you gave, but what would they have to do with nonexistents – bw tho Jun 13 '21 at 10:53
  • @YesheTenley At least the Gelug position is that the non-existence of certain things can be validly known, and thus is an existent. "We can also know that there is no dog in this room. We are seeing an absence of something and know that that something is not here. That is a negation. The absence of a dog in the room is validly knowable negation phenomenon. The absence exists." https://studybuddhism.com/en/tibetan-buddhism/mind-training/handling-the-challenges-of-life/impermanence-as-a-resource-for-healthy-relationships – Sam Jun 13 '21 at 12:31
  • @YesheTenley Also, you have not given a reason why the non-existence of square circles is contradictory and "absurd". You have just asserted that (strongly). – Sam Jun 13 '21 at 12:33
  • Hi Sam, I am giving the presentation according to Tsongkhapa. There is a difference between a dog not being found and the abscence of the square circle. Some negations are internal and some external. –  Jun 13 '21 at 14:58
  • The non-existence of the square circle is a non-affirming negation. When you say it implies the actual existence of an utterly non existent thing you are implying that a square circle itself somewhere exists. That is a paradox and this by def. absurd or contradictory. The subtle point you’re missing is the difference between an affirming negation and a non-affirming one. Both Tsongkhapa and Chandrakirti wrote extensively emphasizing the difference between these two negations and why it is important not to confuse them. –  Jun 13 '21 at 15:01
  • It will be hard to illustrate the difference properly in the comment sections here. If you would like to know more I suggest reading Tsongkhapa or Chandrakirti or opening a new question. –  Jun 13 '21 at 15:03
  • the absence of a dog is a lack of an existing thing. the meaning of the berzin quote is not that nonexistents are absences – bw tho Jun 13 '21 at 20:41
  • @YesheTenley I beliecve the conundrum arised because I said in the OP explicitly "why something could not have nothing as its substantial cause?". I could have phrased it differently - Why could not something arise without a substantial cause? This way, I feel your critique would be answered but my question would still hold. – Sam Jun 19 '21 at 12:58
  • Exactly, and that is why I reformed my answer to address that. The difference between the absence of a dog and square circle is orthogonal to your question in the OP. –  Jun 19 '21 at 13:15
  • Anyway, if you want to know more about the difference between the mere absence of an existing thing and a square circle maybe this will help: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/29190/13375 –  Jun 19 '21 at 13:18
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    if a produced thing didnt need a substantial cause it means it would arise from itself – bw tho Jun 19 '21 at 15:21
  • @bwtho It would not arise from itself because the contributing conditions would not always be there (e.g. sometimes a higher being would wish for its arisal and sometimes he would not) – Sam Jun 20 '21 at 04:32
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    produced things are made up of parts. that is what is dependent on substantial causes, and if they did not they would arise from themselves. contributing conditions are secondary and its not even clear what purpose they would serve to a functioning thing that could arise from itself without depending on substantial causes – bw tho Jun 20 '21 at 05:22
  • @bwtho But why would produced things arise of themselves had not they being dependent on substantial causes? – Sam Jun 27 '21 at 14:43
  • @bwtho if you want to convert your comments on this to a separate answer, I will accept it as the one answering the question (took some time to nail it). – Sam Jun 28 '21 at 03:05
  • because produced things are dependent things. if the thing doesnt arise from its substantial cause the only other causally related thing we might say it interacts for its production is thru the power of itself. it cant be something causally unrelated such as a nonexistent. is that helpful? its good to keep chasing it till u fill up all the gaps in ur reasoning – bw tho Jun 29 '21 at 22:56