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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.70 provides techniques for Civil Affairs operations (CAO) planning, training, and execution of doctrinal guidance for commanders and their staff and for leaders who are responsible for establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to conduct CAO. These doctrinal principles are intended to be used as a guide and are not to be considered prescriptive. This manual portrays a framework in which a CMOC supports commands from the tactical to strategic level.

This publication includes doctrine discussions that are applicable to all Civil Affairs (CA) units supporting the ever-changing civil component of the operational environment (OE). The CMOC provides supported commanders with the control instrument that plans CAO. It assists commands with coordination of civil-military operations (CMO) by providing cultural awareness military-to-host nation (HN) advisory activities and civilian professional skills that parallel governmental functions facilitating stability-oriented unified land operations.

This publication is designed primarily for the CA company-, battalion-, brigade-, and Civil Affairs command (CACOM)-level chain of command with an authorized force structure designated to be employed as a standing CMOC. Doctrinally supported commands, from brigade combat teams (BCTs) to theater Army and geographic combatant commands, can obtain insight on how the designated CA forces will support them.

The principal audience for ATP 3-57.70 is CA Soldiers and leaders that plan, interact with, are supported by, and operate a CMOC. This publication is also an applicable reference to the civilian leadership of the United States (U.S.) interagency. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters (HQ) serving as joint task force or multinational HQ should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, HN laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual [FM] 27-10.)

ATP 3-57.70 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-57.70 is the proponent publication are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 3-57.70 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. The current update to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 publishes these terms and their definitions.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. The publication is applicable for joint operations as it applies to Army CA forces organized, trained, and equipped to support commanders at the joint level and in accordance with the Army rules of allocation. By virtue of their structure, CA units at brigade and CACOM level are designated to support joint force commanders.

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

Joint operations recognize that military forces alone are not the only actors in an OE. Commanders must leverage the interests and capabilities of the civil component to achieve unified action. Unified land operations are conducted to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity of effort. The CMOC is the doctrinal solution that facilitates unity of effort during unified land operations between the civil environment and military forces conducting operations within a given area of operations (AO).

The Army conducts unified land operations. Unified land operations represent the Army’s contribution to joint operations and the requirement to achieve unified action.

This publication is a new publication that illustrates techniques that Army CA forces utilize to establish a CMOC in order to integrate, coordinate, and/or synchronize with unified action partners. CA forces support the manning of a CMOC at all Army echelons from BCT to combatant command.

Chapter 1 describes how CA forces form a CMOC to support unified land operations and the decisive action necessary to successfully achieve unity of effort. Stability as one component of decisive action is specifically emphasized because stability is the culmination of offensive and defensive tasks. The CMOC has its greatest impact when supporting stability tasks.

Chapter 2 explains how the CMOC is designed to support mission command by reducing the command post’s (CP’s) scope of responsibility and synchronizing, integrating, and/or coordinating with governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). The CMOC helps develop the commander’s situational understanding by integrating civil information with the joint information preparation of the environment.

Chapter 3 depicts how the CMOC executes the operations process as it pertains to achieving unified action with the civil component.

Chapter 4 explains the civil information functions of the CMOC that enhance the commander’s common operational picture (COP).

Chapter 5 explains the support relationships that exist from BCT to theater Army, as well as with joint forces.

Chapter 6 explains the table of organization and equipment composition of the CMOC found in the CA company through the CACOM.

Chapter 7 illustrates conceptually how the CMOC operates by protecting itself, achieving internal mobility, and communicating with its supported HQ and unified action partners.

Chapter 1

Operations

Joint operations recognize that military forces alone are not the only actors in an OE. Commanders must leverage the interests and capabilities of the civil component to achieve unified action. Army forces conduct unified land operations to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity of effort. The CMOC is the doctrinal solution that facilitates unity of effort during unified land operations between the civil environment and military forces conducting operations within a given AO.

GENERAL

1-1. The CMOC provides a place where stakeholders can coordinate their activities as unified action partners. FM 3-57 states that the CMOC serves as the primary coordination interface for U.S. forces and unified action partners (IPI, humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], NGOs, multinational forces, HN government agencies, and other civilian agencies of the United States Government [USG]). CMOCs may be established at multiple command levels to facilitate unity of effort at different echelons.

1-2. The term command and control has been historically embraced throughout the Army. Command and control as a warfighting function has been replaced by mission command. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 fully explains what commanders must do to achieve mission command.

1-3. The Army establishes working groups, cells, and centers of different varieties to support the various functions that process specific types of information necessary to support mission command. These centers may include fire direction centers to control fires, intelligence operations centers (OCs) to control the influx of information for intelligence, or air OCs to control aerial support. These centers relieve the burden of specific control requirements from the main CP and its tactical OC or joint OC. A center is a mission command facility established for a specific purpose. A center is similar to a CP in that it is a facility with staff members, equipment, and a leadership component. However, a center has a narrower focus and is normally formed around a subordinate unit HQ. For example, a supporting logistics organization may establish a movement control center, and a CA unit, under its supported HQ, may establish a CMOC. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CAO from local levels to international levels within a given AO. The CMOC develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the COP under the oversight of the S-9 or G-9.

1-4. JP 1-02 defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. The art of command consists of authority, decisionmaking, and leadership. Commanders exercise these elements to get their forces to accomplish the mission.

1-5. As warfare has become more complex, the concept of command has evolved into command and control—two separate functions of mission command. Commanders establish the CMOC to extend control measures, through collaboration and cooperation, to entities not under their authority or command. The civil component of an OE—which includes IPI, NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and the interagency—relies on control instruments, such as the CMOC, to collect, process, and share information; synchronize actions; and produce unified action within an OE. The CMOC supports mission command by affording commanders with an integrating venue where military planners can gain a shared understanding of the civil component of an OE. This integrating venue allows commanders to interface, inform, and influence the various elements of the civil component.

1-6. Successful mission command requires an understanding of an OE and the role of the Army in unified action. Army procedures define how Soldiers, leaders, and units accomplish missions through decisive action. Unified land operations and decisive action necessitate that commanders at every level conduct CMO. The CMOC assists commanders with conducting CAO and shaping events that affect the civil component. Chapter 2 of this ATP contains an in-depth discussion of the CMOC’s support to mission command.

1-7. ADRP 3-0 establishes the Army’s operational concept under which Army units function. ADP 5-0 lays out those processes and procedures used by Army units and the command or control instruments required to carry out mission command and the operations process. Chapter 3 of this ATP describes how the CMOC supports the operations process.

1-8. All Army OCs exist to support the operations process, as well as mission command. Some functions of an OC are common no matter what warfighting function or staff requirement the OC supports. CMOCs at every level manage information. Civil information management (CIM) is a CA core task. To conduct CIM, the CIM cell within the CMOC must collect, collate, analyze, produce, and disseminate civil information. In a larger context, the CMOC must receive, analyze, disseminate, and make recommendations on information products, as well as integrate and synchronize the activities of others to achieve unified action. Chapter 4 of this ATP explains how the CMOC performs these functions to achieve unified action in unified land operations.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-9. Unified land operations is the Army’s operational concept. The central idea of unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). This is the Army’s contribution to unified action. The goal of unified land operations is to apply land power as part of unified action to defeat the enemy and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end state. The complexity of today’s OEs requires commanders to combine offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) tasks simultaneously to reach this goal. Commanders direct the application of these decisive tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Figure 1-1, page 1-3, illustrates the Army’s operational concept.

DECISIVE ACTION

1-10. Army forces conduct decisive action (offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks) simultaneously during unified land operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to achieve the commander’s desired results and end states. Army forces employ synchronized action of lethal and nonlethal effects proportional to the mission and informed by an understanding of an OE. Mission command that conveys the commander’s intent guides the adaptive use of Army forces.

1-11. Offense and defense have historically occupied the conceptual division of thinking regarding military operations in general. In today’s OE, the range of military operations may include conditions that require commanders to utilize alternative methods and procedures to successfully conduct stability tasks or achieve stability-oriented objectives. Stability tasks are continuous, as are offensive and defensive tasks. In a population-centric environment, stability tasks may deserve the preeminent allocation of resources given the tempo and conditions within an OE. Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.05 recognizes that the USG has obligations under international law that it must fulfill while conducting offensive and defensive tasks. The USG must be prepared to support stabilization efforts by conducting stability tasks. Whether offense, defense, or stability is the dominant activity, CMOCs are organized, resourced, and equipped to enable commanders with civil information that promotes greater understanding and achievement of stability-oriented objectives. Figure 1-2, page 1-4, depicts the Army’s concept of decisive action when conducting unified land operations.

1-12. Army forces use offensive and defensive tasks to defeat the enemy on land. They simultaneously execute stability tasks or DSCA to interact with the populace and civil authorities. In most domestic operations, Army forces perform only DSCA tasks. However, in an extreme emergency, such as an attack by a hostile foreign power, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and DSCA tasks may be required. Stability tasks typically dominate peace operations, peacetime military engagements, and some limited interventions. For example, foreign humanitarian assistance (HA) operations primarily involve stability tasks with minor defensive tasks and no offensive element.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

1-13. During conditions that primarily favor offensive tasks, CMOCs remain highly mobile and confine the majority of their activities to recommending populace control measures that limit the harmful effects of combat on society. In addition, the CMOC provides information on resources within an OE that can assist the commander to achieve stated goals and end states. CMOCs can only generate general information regarding the civil component, which commanders use to develop understanding of their OE. CMOCs may be in a position to recommend to commanders actions that can alleviate human suffering where it exists because of combat operations. The ability to coordinate with local civil government is usually limited to the tactical level, primarily to initiate populace and resources control measures and HA. Coordination with the civil component—such as IPI, IGOs, NGOs—the private sector, and the interagency, is minimized given the urgency of defeating lethal threats.

DEFENSIVE TASKS

1-14. During conditions that favor primarily defensive tasks, CMOCs become static, much like the units they support. When static, CMOCs are able to focus on the civil conditions within a specific area. The longer that a CMOC remains static, the more it contributes to increasing the amount of civil information gleaned from ground forces operating in the area. Mobile defense characteristics may disrupt the ability to perform functions of CIM because of the CMOC’s heavy reliance on communication systems that connect to civil entities and that are often difficult to establish or maintain during major combat operations. CMOCs may be in a position to recommend to commanders foreign HA operations that can alleviate human suffering where it exists because of combat operations. During defensive tasks, the ability to coordinate with local civil governments is usually limited to immediate populace and resources control measures and HA. Coordination with civil components—such as IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and interagencies—are only marginally improved given the continued urgency of defeating lethal threats.

1-15. Stability tasks is an overarching term that encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside of the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

1-16. During conditions where stability tasks prevail, a combination of offensive and defensive tasks will continue but in lesser proportion than support to stabilization. In such conditions, CMOCs gain the time necessary to establish relationships within the civil component. CMOCs orchestrate assessments and recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to implement populace and resources control measures, support to civil administration, foreign HA, and nation assistance to achieve stability in the civil component of an OE. The CMOC obtains the latitude and freedom of action necessary during stability-oriented tasks to exercise all of its capabilities. When fully operational, the CMOC provides commanders with greater visualization of the civil component within an OE to achieve essential stability objectives through unified land operations.

1-17. During unified land operations, the transitions from offense to defense and then to predominantly stability tasks require greater rigor on the part of the CMOC to enhance the visualization of an OE and the COP through increased awareness of the civil component. This increased fidelity allows commanders to better transition the nature of operations from lethal to nonlethal and from enemy-centric to population-centric. As operational conditions transition, commanders change their visualization of an OE based primarily upon the estimates provided by their staff and supported by functional OCs, such as the CMOC.

1-18. DOD Instruction 3000.05 establishes stability tasks as a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to that of combat operations. In addition, DOD Instruction 3000.05 requires DOD components to have the capability and capacity to conduct stability task activities that fulfill DOD component responsibilities under national and international law. Military forces are required to integrate their activities and collaborate with civilian counterparts with the USG to conduct stability tasks. Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other USG agencies, foreign governments, and security forces to ensure that, when directed, the department can—

Establish civil security and civil control.

Restore or provide essential services.

Repair critical infrastructure.

Provide HA.

1-19. In ADP 3-0, the Army illustrates decisive action in which ground forces are required to conduct stability tasks with the same rigor as offensive and defensive tasks. The Army published ADRP 3-07 to illustrate its emphasis on the Army’s ability to support the USG’s greater stabilization efforts. During stability tasks, DOD components, such as the Army, must focus on the greater USG interests with the HN. Army forces shift their efforts during stability toward engaging local and national civil entities, which rapidly increases the requirement to coordinate and collaborate with these agencies. The CMOC is the critical control node where such coordination and collaboration takes place.

1-20. ADRP 3-07 explains stability. Stability leverages the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. Through stability, military forces help to set the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict transformation. Providing security and control stabilizes the AO. These efforts then provide a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and, eventually, to the HN. Stability tasks are usually conducted to support a HN government. However, stability tasks may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. The critical skills needed for commanders to implement stability are not readily available and are even more difficult to train.

1-21. In general, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the HN government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When this is not possible, military forces provide essential civil services to the local populace until a civil authority or the HN can provide these services. In this capacity, military forces perform specific functions as part of a broader whole of government response effort, supporting the activities of other agencies, organizations, and institutions. The CMOC applies available functional specialists where they can coordinate with civilian functional specialists to achieve unified action between these critical functions.

1-22. The CMOC is instrumental in providing timely civil information for the development of the supported commander’s COP. Information enhances flexibility, innovation, and adaptability in the modern, complex OE. As commanders’ knowledge increases, they can readily seek and obtain unified action among the multitude of civilian enterprises. Commanders and staffs within today’s complex OE must continually collaborate with the interagency, as well as with IPI, to meet operational objectives.

1-23. Army forces prepare for operations by learning about the country in which they plan to operate. Forces must understand the political, military, economic, cultural, social, information, and infrastructure variables within the physical space and within the context of time of the given objective country. This includes understanding the order of the relevant hierarchies and structures of the local society. Such understanding can assist commanders in addressing factors that may lead to instability or in identifying areas that can be exploited to support the overarching goals of the United States. CMOCs are an asset that the commander employs to facilitate greater awareness of an OE, as well as promote collaboration that facilitates unified action. The CMOC structure, although varying in size and composition depending on the level of command it supports, is available to support commanders at all levels of war.

CIVIL AFFAIRS CORE TASKS

1-24. CMOCs assist commanders at all levels of command in coordinating and synchronizing CAO in support of the commander’s plan. The essence of CAO is the conduct of CA core tasks synchronized and integrated with the supported commander’s intent and operational concept. In most cases, those tasks will be aligned with primary stability tasks. Stability tasks integrate the civil component of an OE, including IGOs, NGOs, the interagency, IPI, and the private sector, with military forces conducting operations in a specific area or region. CA core tasks are primary tasks that CA forces are capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through and with outside actors to mitigate or defeat threats and vulnerabilities to civil society.

1-25. Implementation of CA core tasks enhances the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present and involves the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, which enhances the conduct of CAO. FM 3-57 elaborates in detail on the core tasks. FM 7-15 has established Army universal tasks that provide the task condition and standard for their conduct. There are ATPs that illustrate the tasks referenced in this publication. The five CA core tasks are illustrated in Figure 1-3.

SUPPORT AT ALL LEVELS OF WAR

1-26. ADP 3-0 defines the varying levels of war as tactical, operational, and strategic. The Army has organized its forces in mission command structures that implement operations at these various levels of war.

1-27. Civil Affairs teams (CATs), companies, and battalions are designed to support tactical formations. CA brigades and commands are structured to support operational-level HQ. At the strategic level, CMO are primarily civilian- or interagency-led; therefore, CA personnel are more likely to fall in on interagency structures that facilitate many of the same functions as the CMOC. Chapter 5 of this ATP more clearly defines the support relationships that CA units have with various levels of military command that are supported with CMOCs from diverse CA unit structures.

1-28. The CMOC is not a newly structured entity. Over the years and during many operations, CMOCs were task-organized from available assets to facilitate specific functions regarding planning for and coordination with the civil component within an OE. However, only since 2006 has the table of organization of CA units codified the existence of the CMOC within the unit organizational structure from company to CACOM level. Historically, CA units have integrated at varying degrees with combat formations to support planning in both offensive and defensive tasks. CMOCs have been most practical following major combat operations when dialogue with a multitude of civil entities has an opportunity to increase unified action to promote stabilization. Chapter 6 of this publication explains the organization of the CMOC structure.

1-29. Chapter 7 of this ATP explains how the CMOC integrates into supported organizations to ensure protection, conduct movement, and communicate. Chapter 7 details the ways in which the CMOC integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes CA tasks.

Chapter 2

Supporting Mission Command

ADP 6-0 defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Mission command is commander-led. It blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.

2-1. Exercising mission command is a dynamic process in which the staff supports commanders throughout the operations process. The speed and accuracy with which the staff plans, prepares, executes, assesses, and contributes to the commander’s situational understanding will enhance the commander’s ability to make decisive and informed decisions on current or future mission requirements. Commanders use the following processes to solve problems:

Army design methodology.

Military decisionmaking process.

TLP.

Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process.

The staff integrates risk management throughout all of the processes listed above.

2-2. Commanders rely on information, knowledge, and mission command systems and staff activities to support the execution and assessment of operations. The staff provides relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking.

2-3. Effective mission command relies on the commander’s ability to understand the civil component of the OE and to convey this understanding through mission orders that synchronize all elements operating within the OE to meet his intent. Commanders that have achieved a high level of situational awareness regarding the civil component recognize the resources and capabilities within it, as well as vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries. The CMOC assists the operational staff and the commander to synchronize activities and prioritize available resources to enable the civil component in stabilizing their environment.

2-4. The overarching mission requirements of the CMOC are to—

Develop information that enhances the commander’s understanding and visualization of an OE.

Develop civil information and actionable tasks that achieve stability-oriented results or facilitate offensive and defensive tasks.

Disseminate information to the civil component in order to promote shared understanding.

Integrate and synchronize the capabilities within the civil component with Army operations to facilitate unity of effort within the commander’s AO.

DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING AND VISUALIZATION

2-5. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability. A commander’s situational understanding evolves as an operation progresses. The acquisition of relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative. Greater understanding enables commanders to make informed decisions. It allows commanders to focus their intuition on visualizing the current and future conditions of the environment and to describe conditions to subordinates. The CMOC develops the commander’s understanding and visualization by collecting and collating information through constant collaboration with the civil component. The CIM cell of the CMOC performs this function, and the CMOC civil liaison teams (CLTs) and subordinate CATs collaborate with civilian entities.

2-6. The CMOC’s operations and intelligence (O&I) section performs analysis of the civil information collected. The analysis forms the basis of situational understanding. Commanders consider the current situation and perform a mission analysis that assists in their initial visualization. CMOC personnel collect and present relevant civil information enabling the commander to develop his visualization. Commanders draw on several sources of knowledge and relevant information. These include the—

Elements of operational art.

Input from the staff and other commanders.

Principles of joint operations.

Related doctrine.

CA running estimates.

COP.

Commander’s experience and judgment.

Subject-matter experts.

2-7. Visualizing the desired end state requires commanders to clearly understand an OE and analyze the situation in terms of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). Understanding an OE requires an understanding of civil considerations. Civil considerations reflect how the man-made infrastructure; civilian institutions; and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO influence the conduct of military operations. Commanders and their staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). Commanders also use operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) to analyze an OE.

2-8. Civil considerations help commanders develop an understanding of the social, political, and cultural variables within an OE and the way in which these variables affect the mission. Understanding the relationship between military operations and civilian culture and society is critical to conducting unified land operations. Civil considerations provide vital information to forces interacting with the local populace, enhancing understanding of an OE, and assisting commanders to visualize a desired stable end state.

2-9. Civil considerations are essential to developing effective plans for all operations—not just those dominated by stability tasks or DSCA. Unified land operations involve stabilizing the situation, securing the peace, building HN capacity, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace, infrastructure, and the force’s ability to transition to HN authority. The degree to which the populace is expected to support or resist Army forces also affects the design of offensive and defensive tasks.

2-10. Commanders use personal knowledge, area studies, intelligence, and CA running estimates to assess social, economic, and political factors. Commanders consider how this information may relate to potential lawlessness, subversion, insurgency or other conditions that can destabilize the civil component. The goal of commanders is to develop their understanding to a level of cultural astuteness. At this level, commanders can estimate the effects of friendly actions across the entire set of civil considerations and direct their subordinates with confidence. By increasing their knowledge of civil considerations and operational variables in an OE, commanders and their staffs improve the force’s ability to accomplish their missions. Cultural awareness improves how Soldiers interact with the populace and deters their false or unrealistic expectations. The force then has more knowledge of the society’s common practices, perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values, giving better insight into the intent and decisionmaking process of individuals and groups.

DEVELOPING STABILITY-ORIENTED TASKS

2-11. Military operations involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning battles and engagements while shaping the civilian situation is critical to long-term success. Stability tasks are usually conducted to support a HN government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning HN government exists. Stability tasks do not necessarily aim to reduce the military presence quickly but to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations.

2-12. Stability tasks consist of the five primary tasks corresponding to the five stability sectors adopted by the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The primary stability tasks are fundamental to executing decisive action across the range of military operations, from peace to war. They may be executed before, during, or after conflict. The five primary stability tasks include—

Establishing civil security (including security force assistance).

Establishing civil control.

Restoring essential services.

Supporting governance.

Supporting the economic and infrastructure development.

2-13. While civil information builds the commander’s understanding and visualization, the S-9 or G-9, supported by the CMOC, helps the commander identify tasks that promote stability based upon vulnerabilities in the civil society. These tasks must be identified, tasked, synchronized, and integrated into the commander’s plan.

DEVELOPING ACTIONABLE TASKS

2-14. The CMOC assists the S-9/G-9 in developing actionable tasks that achieve stability-oriented results or facilitate offensive and defensive tasks. Developing actionable tasks involves the processing of critical or relevant information as it arrives from various sources to the CMOC. This information is analyzed and presented to the commander. The information details possible courses of action (COAs) combined with branches and sequels of probable outcomes of chosen COAs. In addition, the information provides possible outcomes within the civil component if a certain COA is not taken. Finally, the information can determine if current operations are achieving the necessary results that meet the commander’s end state.

2-15. FM 7-15 is a comprehensive, but not all-inclusive, list of Army tasks, missions, and operations. The Army Universal Task List divides the six warfighting functions into Army tactical tasks (ARTs): ART 1.0 (Movement and Maneuver), ART 2.0 (Intelligence), ART 3.0 (Fires), ART 4.0 (Sustainment), ART 5.0 (Mission Command) (Figure 2-1, pages 2-3 and 2-4) ART 6.0 (Protection).

2-16. The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). It includes those tasks associated with acquiring friendly information, managing relevant information, and directing and leading subordinates. Through mission command, commanders integrate all warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.

2-17. CMO are the inherent responsibility of commanders at all levels. CMO may be performed by designated CA or other military forces or a combination of CA and other forces. If the operations are of such scope that they involve large segments of the population or other civilian entities, commanders may elect to establish tasks to subordinate units in plans and orders developed by the staff, integrated by the S-9/G-9, and issued through the S-3/G-3. The CMOC coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes the tasks, resources, and capabilities of entities not under their command (for example, IPI, NGOs, international organizations, and the interagency).

INTEGRATING AND SYNCHRONIZING CIVILIAN EFFORTS

2-18. Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with the populace, the force, and each other. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistical support. Some organizations may be indigenous to the area. These may include church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. Other organizations may come from outside the AO. Examples of these include multinational corporations, United Nations (UN) agencies, USG agencies, and NGOs, such as the International Red Cross.

2-19. Operations often require commanders to coordinate with international organizations, IGOs, and NGOs. Commanders remain familiar with all organizations operating in their AO. Relevant information is gained and disseminated from liaisons with these organizations. Relevant information includes information about organizational activities, capabilities, and limitations. Situational understanding includes understanding how the activities of different organizations may affect military operations and how military operations may affect these organizations’ activities. From this understanding, commanders can determine how organizations and military forces can work together toward unified operations.

2-20. The CMOC is able to integrate and synchronize through its liaison with the civil component. The CMOC uses two primary methods to coordinate. The first method is through establishment of a "storefront" enterprise where IPI, NGOs, and interagency officials can identify and establish contact with military forces. The second method is to identify entities and establish contact with them through the employment of the CMOC’s organic CLTs or assigned functional specialists. Communications and liaison are at least as important and widely used in stability tasks and support operations as in offensive and defensive tasks. In addition to their normal functions, commanders use communications and liaison to achieve unity of effort, trust, and shared understanding with organizations not subordinate to military authority. Commanders ensure that force-wide communications link the command with other organizations in the AO, such as NGOs. Many of these organizations can affect military operations but may have goals and operations significantly different from those of the commander. The information systems of these organizations may not be compatible with those of the military. Using information systems to provide accurate and timely information dissemination during CMO is vital to maintaining the commander’s situational understanding.

2-21. Traditional military power achieves success in offense and defense, but military power has its limitations in terms of influencing the populace. The emotions of the populace are built on grievances and even the desperation of their situation. Commanders that have achieved success in offense must then go beyond the military engagement and address the stability of an OE. Commanders decide to establish CMOCs to extend outreach to the civil component and the functional specialists residing within to support stabilization. FM 3-57 depicts an OE and the development of measures of effectiveness to achieve desired objectives among the populace. To develop actionable tasks that stabilize, the commander must access functional specialists usually found in the civil component and on CA functional specialty teams. This interaction by civilian and military stakeholders promotes unified action. Stabilization of the society occurs when governance addresses the complex web of systems that bind a society or a nation together.

2-22. These systems individually are PMESII-PT. These systems are operational variables that the commander must consider in the decisionmaking process, as well as the physical environment and time in which events must occur. These operational variables are inherently associated with the societal structure that the civil component is best equipped to address. It is the CMOC’s responsibility to research and to build a database of information to inform the COP and commander’s decisionmaking process and to produce a shared understanding with the civil component.

2-23. The systems are studied separately by functional specialists that have the training and education to understand them. Figure 2-2 illustrates the complex composition of economic subsystems as an example. Functional specialists, whether they are civilian or military, apply their knowledge and experience to the commander’s operations process to assist in the identification and framing of the military problem. Functional specialists recommend solutions through the development of tasks that address vulnerabilities and gaps in the systems that contribute to instability. These tasks are linked together by the commander to establish his operational approach. As an example, the economic system is made up of subsystems that are not habitually considered in military staff analysis in tactical operations.

2-24. CA functional specialists can address the viability of some of these subsystems. Civilian functional specialists are contacted through liaisons or are part of the CMOCs civil engagement.

Chapter 3

Supporting the Operations Process

The Army has established the operations process in support of unified land operations and mission command. ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 detail the operations process in depth. The CMOC supports the operations process to facilitate successful CAO in unified land operations.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

3-1. The operations process consists of the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the progress of an operation. Figure 3-1 illustrates this activity. The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). Through the mission command warfighting function, commanders and staffs integrate the other warfighting functions into a coherent whole to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. CPs, such as tactical OCs, joint OCs, intelligence OCs, air OCs, or CMOCs, support the activities of mission command to facilitate staff synchronization.

3-2. Commanders drive the operations process through mission command. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their OE; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. All activities of mission command occur in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment but vary in emphasis throughout the operations process. CMOCs facilitate mission command by enhancing the commander’s ability to understand, visualize, describe, and direct efforts that mitigate vulnerabilities within the civil component that cause instability. The CMOC receives, analyzes, and disseminates civil information, as well as makes recommendations on how to plan operations that promote stability. The CMOC does this by integrating and synchronizing the HN and interagency entities that are active in the AO.

PLANNING

3-3. The CMOC supports planning by providing relevant information to the commander and staff that promotes understanding of the civil environment. This information is combined with the planning efforts of the other warfighting functions to develop a complete picture of an OE. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Based on Army operational design, planning continues with the development of a fully synchronized operation plan or operation order that arranges potential actions in time (synchronization), space, and purpose (integration) to guide the force during execution. Information provided by the CMOC is crucial for synchronization of execution, especially as it relates to activities performed by the civil component or for stabilization of the populace. ADRP 5-0 includes further discussion of operational planning.

INITIAL COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-4. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations. The single, unifying idea that provides direction for the entire operation is the commander’s intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. This guidance from the commander provides the basis for the staff to develop the concept of operations. Commanders can adjust the concept of operations throughout the operation as subordinates develop the situation or conditions change. Often, subordinates, acting on the higher commander’s intent, develop the situation in ways that exploit unforeseen opportunities. Clear commander’s intent allows subordinates to develop the situation and act within the commander’s intent, leading to decisive action during unified land operations.

3-5. Commanders use a visualization process that helps develop their intent. This mental process assists with developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. The commander’s initial intent succinctly describes his visualization of the entire operation, listing what he wants to accomplish. It links the operation’s purpose with the conditions that define the desired end state. Usually, the intent statement evolves as planning progresses and more information becomes available. Commanders express their visualization in terms of—

Commander’s intent.

Planning guidance, including operational approach.

Commander’s critical information requirement.

Essential elements of friendly information.

3-6. The initial commander’s intent statement focuses the staff during the operations process. The staff uses this statement to develop and refine COAs. These COAs help establish how to arrive at the defined end state. Planning may involve developing lines of effort that link the execution of tactical tasks to end state conditions. A clear initial commander’s intent drives this effort. The CMOC supports the commander’s inform and influence activities by engaging the civil component of an OE to achieve CMO or other stated U.S. objectives. The CMOC formulates actionable tasks that support stabilization of an OE through the application of functional specialists that understand critical systems within the civil component.

PLANNING GUIDANCE

3-7. Commanders provide planning guidance to their primary staff with their initial intent statement. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. Effective planning guidance is essentially an initial concept of the operation that prioritizes each warfighting function. It reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders maximum latitude; it lets proficient staffs develop flexible and effective options. The CMOC supports the S-9/G-9 with analysis of the civil component.

3-8. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing them the latitude necessary to explore different options. The commander’s guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations without dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.

Concept of Operations

3-9. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and that establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the desired end state. The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principle tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and the manner in which the principal tasks complement one another. Commanders and staffs may use the following operational frameworks to help conceptualize and describe the concept of operations:

Deep-close-security.

Decisive-shaping-sustaining.

Main and supporting effort.

Plans and Orders

3-10. Plans and orders are key tools used by commanders in directing operations. Under mission command, commanders direct with mission orders. Mission orders emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). They provide maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions. Mission orders synchronize subordinates’ actions only as required for mission success. Constraints are appropriate when mission success requires closely synchronized action by multiple units. Even then, commanders establish constraints in a manner that least limits individual initiative. Commanders ensure that orders prepared by the staff follow the precepts of mission orders to facilitate decentralized execution and maximum flexibility of subordinates. It is difficult to impose restraints on entities upon which the commander exercises no authority. Civilian and HN entities have their own command structure, but CMOCs support mission command by drafting plans that include awareness of activities conducted by the civil component of an OE. By initiating coordination and collaboration with civilian entities, commanders achieve unified action. ADP 5-0 contains more information regarding the operations process.

3-11. Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the population (stability tasks or DSCA), as well as those tasks focused on enemy forces (offensive and defensive tasks). Military operations involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning battles and engagements while shaping the civilian situation is critical to long-term success. Because of this, commanders continually consider and combine stability tasks focused on the population with offensive and defensive tasks focused on the enemy during planning and execution. The CMOC plays a critical role in this function. While the main CP and intelligence cell focus on the enemy, the CMOC focuses on the civil component. By increasing the awareness of the civil component and the factors that can increase instability, the CMOC enhances the commander’s ability to conduct operations that promote stability even while the main CP can continue to focus on enemy-centric tasks.

3-12. While performing the operations process, the CMOC plans by maintaining a CA running estimate. The CA running estimate produces the ASCOPE for identifying civil considerations during mission analysis. When combined with operational variables analysis, a comprehensive snapshot of the civil component at a specific point in time is produced. The multinational operations and ASCOPE analysis are created by conducting a comprehensive PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analysis. This analysis integrated awareness and understanding of the civil component into the COP. Table 3-1, page 3-4, is a graphic illustration of PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analysis. This analysis integrates awareness and understanding of the civil component into the COP and, when supporting joint operations, supports the joint information preparation of an OE prepared by the G-2/S-2.

3-13. The main CP convenes planning groups in anticipation of transitions during the operations. Planning groups can include ad hoc assemblies of subject-matter experts that provide insight to problems. Examples of such groups are the inform and influence working group and CAO working group. Transitions could be based upon time, conditions, or an introduction of variables that cause a commander to reframe the problem. When developing a plan, the CMOC provides the S-9/G-9 with available civil information, the CA running estimate, and additional analysis that could affect COA development or wargaming.

3-14. Once a COA is adopted and a concept of operations prepared, the CMOC assists the S-9/G-9 in preparing plans that address the essential stability tasks necessary for the commander’s intent to be fulfilled within the context of the concept of operations.

3-15. Civilian and military functional specialists found in or liaising with the CMOC are adept at identifying civil vulnerabilities and those stability objectives that must be accomplished along specific stability lines of effort. Objectives and tasks are linked together using an operational approach, which supports joint operations campaign planning.

PREPARING

3-16. During preparation, S-9/G-9s may realize that the initial understanding they developed during planning may be neither accurate nor complete. As such, the S-9/G-9s strive to validate assumptions and improve their situational understanding as they prepare for operations. Civil information collection helps improve understanding of the civil component of an OE. Through the liaison processes and interaction with the interagency and IPI, forces collect information that the CMOC further collates and finalizes for the S-9/G-9. The CMOC then provides the civil information to the S-9/G-9 to provide a clearer picture of the civil component and its impact on the planned operation. The CIM process produces civil information products that are relevant to the commander’s stated end state and operational goals. Operations are often carried out in phases based on conditions instead of time. Figure 3-2, page 3-5, illustrates conditions-based phases.

EXECUTION

3-17. Mission command has replaced the function of command and control. Because of the complex, uncertain, and ever-changing nature of operations, mission command is exercised in coordination with numerous civilian entities. When operating with the HN, IGOs, NGOs, and the interagency, commanders may not be in a position to fully exercise mission command over entities that are not organic to their organization. The CMOC enhances the commander’s ability to achieve unity of effort through unified action by conducting coordination and collaboration and building a shared understanding with the HN, interagency, and other entities over which the commander has no authority to impose mission command. Unified action is critical when an OE shifts from enemy-centric to population-centric operations and commanders rely on the cooperation of civilian entities. Chapter 2 of this ATP discusses CMOC support to mission command.

3-18. A challenge in building teams among civilian and military efforts stems from differing capabilities and cultures in the civilian and HN organizations compared to those of the HQ. To help build partnerships, commanders strive to have partners that—

Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.

Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.

Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.

Work for unity of effort toward achieving common goals.

3-19. As Army forces conduct operations with various joint and other USG agencies, leaders integrate Army and interagency capabilities to accomplish specific operational objectives. Interagency cooperation seeks to balance and combine the capabilities that the Army and those agencies bring to the operation. To effectively integrate complementary interagency capabilities, commanders follow policy guidance and the higher commander’s concept of operations. Army leaders apply their understanding of the different cultures and agencies involved to place military efforts in context and to serve on civil-military teams.

ASSESSMENT

3-20. Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and adaptation throughout the conduct of operations. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt. Plans are based on imperfect understanding and assumptions on how the commander expects a situation to evolve. Continuous assessment helps commanders recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in an OE. Commanders rely on subordinate units to provide information through reporting that can change the variables under which the situation is being assessed. In some cases, the visualization can be changed through the shared vision achieved through interaction with IPI and the interagency. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the commander’s visualization, commanders may adjust plans. In those instances when assessment reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization, commanders may reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan. These variances may be glaring or sometimes subtle. The CMOC must be able to emphasize the PMSEII-PT variables that provide the context for the complex problem. The CMOC analyzes the operational variables using civil considerations of ASCOPE just as the tactical commander would use these same civil considerations when analyzing the mission variables of METT-TC. As information is continually collected, collated, and collaborated, the CMOC establishes a clearer picture of potential action it may recommend to the commander to reframe the problem.

Chapter 4

Civil-Military Operations Center Tasks

The CMOC’s purpose is to assist in visualizing an OE and to promote unified action through the analysis, monitoring, planning, coordinating, synchronizing, integrating, and influencing of the civil component of an OE. CA units from company to CACOM level are required to have a CMOC capability. The CMOC exercises several common functions that OCs execute when supporting mission command in execution of tasks across the range of military operations. These common tasks must be performed during domestic disasters that occur naturally or after foreign conflicts. The CMOC director and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) fulfill these functions by utilizing O&I, CIM, and communication and sustainment specialty cells. Combined, these elements perform operations and the operations process and support mission command, as well as conduct limited internal control by performing tasks common to all OCs. The CMOC conducts numerous tasks to achieve its stated purpose and functions. These tasks are as follows:

Receive civil information.

Analyze/develop/manage civil information.

Disseminate civil information.

Make recommendations/influence the civil component.

Integrate resources/capabilities.

Synchronize/coordinate resources/capabilities.

Conduct transitional operations.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

4-1. Tasks required of the CMOC should not be confused with the functions of the CIM cell or other internal functions conducted within the CMOC. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and then internally fused with the supported element. The supported elements include the higher HQ, IGOs, NGOs, and other USG and DOD agencies. The CIM cell manages civil information as an element of the CMOC. The CIM cell supports the CMOC functions, and the CMOC supports mission command and promotes unified action. The CMOC functions as a center in support of mission command, while the CIM cell supports the CMOC with civil information that is—

Collected.

Collated.

Analyzed.

Processed.

Disseminated.

RECEIVE CIVIL INFORMATION

4-2. Civil information is received through multiple sources. Much of the information is received from standardized reports and orders from subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. CATs send daily reports to the CMOC for augmentation with other reports to be processed and sent to the supported HQ, higher HQ, and other unified action partners as required. Information is received through the establishment of a civil information grid and the execution of CIM. CIM is a CA core task. FM 3-57 includes more information on the CIM process. CIM supporting tasks include the following:

Collect civil information within the CIM architecture.

Receive messages, reports, and orders from maneuver units, CA elements supporting the maneuver force, functional specialists, CLTs, IPI, the interagency, and other entities in the civil component.

Monitor the tactical situation.

Track the battle and assess the impact on the civil component.

Monitor the location and activities of friendly units, relevant civil entities, and the interagency.

Update the civil situation and heads-up displays that support the CAO running estimate.

Update maps and overlays.

Maintain a CMOC journal.

Collate the information for ease of access in conjunction with the CIM process (Figure 4-1) and consideration in accordance with a PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analysis.

4-3. The information received by the CMOC is critical to the commander’s understanding of the civil component of an OE. The importance of the information received can range from immediate concern to something that will need to be observed and reported on further for possible action. The CMOC is the clearinghouse for all of this information, and the CMOC must be prepared to receive the information and collate the information according to importance. The level of importance will be established by the commander’s critical information requirement. Once the information is received and the entity that reported the information is annotated, the information is collated and prepared for analysis and input into the running estimates provided to the supported command’s OC.

ANALYZE, DEVELOP, AND MANAGE CIVIL INFORMATION

4-4. Information analysis includes consolidating collected and collated information from reports and the conduct of CIM. Analysis of the information is critical to identify which information is to be reported and where the information is allowed and needed to flow. Those who are analyzing the incoming information must realize that the information might not be authorized for release to certain unified action partners based upon the current situation and mission requirements. CIM supports battle staff analysis as part of the operations process through the continual updating of the civil component running estimate to the operation plan. To analyze information, the CMOC must—

Conduct and support the military decisionmaking process.

Process consolidated and collated reports in conjunction with the CIM architecture.

Produce CIM products that facilitate greater awareness and provide an actionable measure of performance.

Conduct link analysis using collected civil information.

Conduct predictive analysis using collected civil information.

Develop a timeline.

Conduct the military decisionmaking process and annex production process via the S-9/G-9.

Develop a staff estimate for the S-9/G-9.

4-5. The CMOC should have established current standard operating procedures (SOPs) to process the incoming information, collate the information into a prioritized analysis, and manage the flow of the information to the proper entities. Information received from different unified action partners throughout the AO will be regarded as important based on the entity that reported the information. It is the CMOC’s personnel that are responsible for establishing a priority based of the commander’s critical information requirement. It is also important to understand that each entity operating within in the AO will have different priorities, requirements, and end states based on internal desires and competing ideas. In addition, information that is reported by one entity may not be useful to another entity working within the same AO. The CMOC staff must decide upon the process for dissemination and the recipients of the information.

DISSEMINATE CIVIL INFORMATION

4-6. The CMOC controls information distribution within the civil information grid. The CMOC reports information to subordinate, higher, adjacent units, and other unified action partners as necessary. The CMOC makes relevant civil information available to IPI, NGOs, and IGOs. Personnel within the CMOC must be fully aware of the commander’s critical information requirement, current status of the civil component, and any future operations that may affect the civil component to properly assimilate and disseminate civil information. Civil information that is received is used to update the CA running estimate so that the commander has the necessary information to make timely decisions on possible COAs affecting overall operations. To disseminate information, the CMOC must—

Submit reports.

Control message traffic flow.

Conduct retransmission operations.

Conduct communications relay operations.

Publish and distribute orders.

Conduct shift change, command, and information briefings.

4-7. Dissemination of information takes place through various means. One important avenue for information to be disseminated is through the numerous meetings conducted by the CMOC. These meetings are conducted to facilitate information flow, coordination of capabilities and resources, negotiation for the usage of resources, and information sharing. Information meetings are conducted to gather information on entities operating within the AO and the resources, capabilities, requirements and assets available to support the commander’s mission goals. Coordination meetings occur with interagency, interorganizational, and other groups to synchronize efforts and reduce redundancy issues within the AO. Negotiation meetings occur to negotiate projects and programs with IPI and the private sector to provide services within or influence the civil component of an OE. Finally, information-sharing meetings are established for the common synchronization of all entities working within the civil component of an OE to keep all players informed on current and future operations. It is important to establish regular contact with all entities conducting operations within the civil environment to facilitate the coordination, synchronization, and utilization of all assets that can influence the civil component. This contact will help the commander facilitate unity of effort and reach desired end states.

MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS

4-8. The CMOC submits recommendations to the S-9/G-9, as well as the CA commander, based on the analysis of information collected. Recommendations are submitted through a variety of products. The CMOC assists in the development of the CA annex (Annex K) to the operations order for current and future operations. The CMOC provides the civil input to establish branches and sequels to the operational plan based on civil trends and outcomes based on current or future operations. These recommendations assist the commander and staff with visualizing the civil component of an OE and enabling the establishment of decision points at which the commander will make decisions during current operations. Recommendations also assist in collaborative planning with all unified action partners, interagency, and interoganizational entities within the operational area. Recommendations to the commander and staff enable decisions on requests of support from or assistance to IPI or the private sector, organizing the interagency or interorganizational to synchronize DSCA. These recommendations establish the priority for civil efforts and ways to influence the civil component, plan for required meetings, and provide a strategy for transition of operations to the HN. When making recommendations, the CMOC must—

Prepare information papers.

Prepare decision briefs.

Conduct CAO project management.

Provide branches and sequels to the operational plan.

Update the running estimate.

Provide analysis of civil component events.

Identify viable COAs for the commander’s CMO plan.

INTEGRATE RESOURCES/CAPABILITIES

4-9. The CMOC integrates the unit’s activities within the civil component with those of the supported command and subordinate and adjacent units, as well as IPI, the interagency, and intergovernmental partners. Integration of resources and capabilities to support the civil component is critical to the overall success of the commander’s plan. Correctly identifying and locating these resources or capabilities will prevent duplication of effort and underuse of available assets and will assist in unity of effort. Once civil resources and capabilities within the operational area are identified, they can be coordinated and integrated into the operational planning. To effectively integrate resources, the CMOC must—

Conduct support or implement tactical CAO, such as projects and programs at the district and provincial level through and with the civil component.

Produce annexes for the higher HQ order supporting S-9/G-9 and the operations planning process.

Receive and integrate civilian partners and CMO enablers (for example, engineers, military police, medical personnel, the United States Department of Agriculture, the USAID, the Department of State, NGOs, the HN, or IPI).

Promote unified action.

Conduct meetings to provide and gain information for the integration of all capabilities within the civil component to meet the commander’s end state.

Record, archive, and duplicate civil information for unified action partner coordination and synchronization of efforts.

Provide data that will assist in future transitional operations to the HN.

SYNCHRONIZE RESOURCES/CAPABILITIES

4-10. The CMOC, using its CLTs, synchronizes the unit’s activities with those of subordinate, higher, and adjacent units, as well as the civil component. The CMOC is also a physical place where the civil component can coordinate directly with U.S. or coalition forces. The coordination accomplished through liaison or through the CMOC’s storefront activity makes the CMOC a synchronizing tool for the commander. By informing and influencing entities within the civil component, the CMOC promotes unified action and facilitates unified land operations.

4-11. In summary, the S-9/G-9 coordinates with supporting CA forces and the CMOC to conduct interagency collaborative planning, coordination, and integration of nonmilitary stakeholders with the staff to synchronize operations. The CMOC leadership combines its resources to implement these functions and develops SOPs in support of mission command. Ultimately, the synchronization of resources and capabilities provides synergy within the operational force that will greatly assist in the accomplishment of the commander’s plan. Toward that end, the CMOC has the following capabilities to perform, if necessary:

Develop CAO annexes, running estimates, and area studies.

Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian requests for support from the U.S. military.

Request HN support from civilian organizations.

Organize outside agency support to reduce or eliminate redundancy and prioritize relief efforts.

Act as a coordination center during transitional operations.

TRANSITIONAL OPERATIONS

4-12. The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. Termination or transition occurs when U.S. forces accomplish their mission or the President or Secretary of Defense directs that the mission be completed. Leaders may base the criteria for termination or transition on events, measures of effectiveness and success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity against the operation are examples of measures of effectiveness that may prompt the end of U.S. forces’ involvement. There are three types of transitional operations: terminated, transferred, and transitioned. Terminated denotes when the operations have come to an end for various reasons. Transferred is when the operation is given to follow-on forces. Transitioned is when the HN, IPI, NGO, or government organization takes control of the current operations. The CMOC should be prepared to execute the following in support of transitional operations:

Conduct coordination meetings.

Provide information on critical aspects of CA project management.

Ensure all information is archived in a way that is accessible and usable by the HN.

Provide the commander with recommendations on transfer of operations to IPI, the private sector, and HN entities.

Transition CMOC operations over to the HN.

Provide liaison with all unified action partners as necessary to provide seamless transition.

Conduct after action reviews and collate data for future usage or requirements.

FM 3-57, Appendix A, includes a greater discussion of transitional operations.

Chapter 5

Support Relationships

The CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA units from the company to the CACOM level. Army CA units are organized to provide the supported commander the manpower and equipment, to include a robust communications package, to form the nucleus of the CMOC. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission and is normally augmented by assets (engineer, medical, transportation) available to the supported commander. Figure 5-1 shows habitual support relationships.

LEVELS OF SUPPORT

5-1. The primary function of all Army CA units is to provide the supported commander, from the geographic combatant commander (GCC) and below, with the capability to engage the civil component of an OE. To accomplish this broad function, CA units are organized to support operations at all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. This capability is especially important in the employment of CA functional specialists. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC, and more than one CMOC may be established in an AO.

5-2. The operational scope of the CMOC varies with echelon of employment. The CMOC established at the theater strategic level in support of the GCC concentrates efforts at the HN national to international level; at the operational level in support of the corps, division, or joint task force, the CMOC’s activities are focused on provincial to national level; and at the tactical level, the CMOC’s focus ranges from the village or city to the provincial level.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMANDS

5-3. The CACOMs are regionally aligned with the geographic combatant commands. The CACOM’s primary mission is to provide theater-level CAO planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of the GCC’s regional CMO strategy and stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. The CACOM may deploy a theater-level CMOC to coordinate, analyze, and enable policies, programs, and CMO capabilities in support of the GCC or joint force land component command and to develop and manage the strategic-level civil inputs to the COP. The CACOM has the capacity to employ CA staff augmentation to the Service component commands of the geographic combatant command, interagency teams, and multinational forces in order to provide a CAO planning, advisory, and synchronization capability. CACOMs are authorized only in the USAR.

5-4. A CACOM is comprised of a HQ and HQ company, five CA planning teams, and a CMOC capable of split operations in support of the geographic combatant command’s HQ elements, with three functional specialty cells, two CLTs, and a CIM cell. The CA functional specialty cells contain specialists with technical expertise (normally acquired by civilian education and career experience) in all six of the CA functional areas: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information. (FM 3-57 includes a complete discussion of the CACOM’s functions and capabilities.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADES

5-5. Regular Army and USAR CA brigades are organized to provide support to both special operations and conventional forces. The brigade assigned to United States Army Special Operations Command provides habitual support to special operations forces. This brigade may support the theater special operations command, the theater special operations command forward, or a joint special operations task force, as required. Special operations forces missions may require the employment of the brigade’s CMOC operating at the operational to theater strategic level supporting the joint special operations task force, GCC, or a U.S. ambassador.

5-6. Support of conventional forces at the operational level is provided by both Regular Army and USAR CA brigades of the global force pool. CA brigades are organized and equipped to provide the theater Army, corps, or equivalent joint task force commander the core capability to establish a CMOC. Organic CA functional specialists have a limited capability for intermediate-level assessment of threats to the civil component of the environment at the regional to national level. The brigade CMOC may be augmented by functional specialists assigned to the CACOM to meet mission requirements. The brigade’s CA planning team provides a staff augmentation capability to the supported commander in order to plan, coordinate, and synchronize CAO and assigned CMO tasks. All CA brigades are organized and equipped to form the nucleus of a joint CMO task force.

CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALIONS

5-7. The Regular Army CA battalions designated as special operations forces are regionally aligned with the five geographic combatant commands and provide habitual support to the theater special operations command. The CMOCs of these battalions may be employed in support of the theater special operations command, joint special operations task force, or a U.S. ambassador operating at the tactical to operational level. Regular Army and USAR CA battalions provide conventional forces support to divisions or equivalent joint task forces at the tactical or operational level dependent on the mission. CA battalions are capable of providing CAO staff augmentation and establishing a CMOC within the supported commander’s AO.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANIES

5-8. Special operations forces’ designated CA companies support the special operations task force or other special operations forces elements operating in a joint special operations area. The company is organized to provide a CMOC capability to the special operations task force commander. CA companies supporting conventional forces provide the BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade commander a CMOC capability and an enhanced capability to interact with the civil component of the AO and unified action partners.

STAFF RELATIONSHIPS AND DUTIES

5-9. The supported unit G-9 or S-9 conducts detailed CAO or CMO analysis and planning and provides staff oversight of the supporting CA unit. The supporting CMOC executes, assesses, and provides feedback relating to the effects of the operation.

5-10. The BCT S-9 has staff oversight and is responsible for the overall function of CMO for the BCT commander. Typically, the S-9 of the BCT, along with the CA company commander, ensures the timely and efficient employment of the company’s CMOC Soldiers. The CMOC provides the S-9 with planning augmentation support and manages ongoing CMO within the BCT’s AO. Based on METT-TC, the establishment of subordinate CMOCs within the BCT’s AO may be required. This is normally accomplished by the tasking of an organic CAT with the mission by means of a fragmentary order.

5-11. The HQ element consists of the CA unit G-3 or S-3, operations sergeant major or operations sergeant, and a CA noncommissioned officer. The HQ element provides detailed supervision of the CMOC operation and manages the execution of the overall CMO effort within the supported commander’s AO.

5-12. The O&I section consists of the combined G-2 and G-3 or S-2 and S-3 assets of the supporting CA unit. The O&I section is the nexus for planning, coordinating, and integrating the various CMOC sections and capabilities with the supported unit staff sections. The supported commander’s objectives are the focus of support for the CMOC and the supporting CA unit.

5-13. The CMOC CIM cell acts as the repository for AO-wide data. It is the focal point for all CIM policy, analytical algorithms, predictive models, and validation of subordinate CA element CIM programs. The CIM cell collects civil information, enters it into a central database, and internally fuses civil information with the supported element, higher HQ, other USG agencies, and other agencies/organizations, as appropriate. It develops civil inputs to the COP, in conjunction with the CMOC, while linking civil information to the appropriate military and civil (HN, other government agency, IGO, NGO, IPI, and private sector) systems via geospatially referenced data.

5-14. The CLT extends the outreach of its parent CMOC into multiple areas. It provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information between IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and other government agencies and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT is a stand-alone CAT that responds to the operations section of the CMOC. It provides the supported-level CMOC with a storefront for CAO and CMO coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions.

5-15. The functional specialty cell resides only in the USAR CA force structure within the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion. The functional specialty cell provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO. The number of cells and types of functional specialists found within the structure vary with type of unit, but the roles are the same and the modular design allows for augmentation across the operational spectrum.

5-16. The CACOM provides three CA functional specialty cells that contain specialists in all six of the CA functional areas (rule of law, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, economic stability, and public education and information). The functional specialty cells are made up of Soldiers (officer and enlisted) with technical expertise in the civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO.

5-17. The brigade and battalion organizations have one functional specialty cell with limited capabilities in four (rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public health and welfare) of the six functional areas. Each CAO that a cell supports may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition. Depending on mission requirements, augmentation by specific technical CA functional specialists from anywhere within the deployed CA assets may be necessary for mission accomplishment.

5-18. The sustainment section consists of the combined G-1 and G-4 or S-1 and S-4 assets of the CA unit. In addition to the normal functions necessary in providing personnel and logistics support to the organic CA unit, the sustainment section provides administrative support to the CMOC.

5-19. The communications section consists of the G-6 or S-6 assets of the CA unit and includes signal system technicians and maintainers and computer network information technicians, managers, and maintainers. The section’s communications technicians maintain the radios and satellite systems supporting unit communications systems, direct network communications to functional specialty cells, and CMOC reachback to their respective continental United States (CONUS) organic HQ networks.

Chapter 6

Organization

The CMOC is organized to facilitate continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CAO from local levels to international levels within a given AO. The CMOC is made up of representatives of various entities within the joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community. These entities integrate and synchronize efforts promoting unified action. DOD is the lead agency when establishing a CMOC. In some cases, the CMOC functions are required but organized under the Department of State as the lead USG agency; in still other cases, CMOC functions will be established by a HN or IGO, such as the UN. When established by a HN, the CMOC is sometimes referred to as a HA coordination center, and when organized under the UN, the same functions are referred to as a humanitarian OC. Regardless of what it is called, the same functions are being implemented by the lead authority to integrate and synchronize efforts or achieve unified action. CMOCs can be organized from elements of the civil component as illustrated in Figure 6-1.

6-1. The military component of the CMOC is primarily made up of CA Soldiers from CA units. CA units are normally task-organized to perform CMOC functions when deployed, as presented in Chapter 3 of this publication. CA units are trained and equipped to perform CMOC functions from the capability residing in unit tables of organization and equipment. CA units from company to CACOM level have similar organizational capabilities to establish CMOC functions that increase with the level of unit.

6-2. Typical CMOC organization includes a sustainment section, O&I section, CIM cell (battalion level and higher), functional specialty cell (battalion level and higher), CLTs (battalion level and higher), and a HQ company element (battalion level and higher). Figure 6-2 illustrates the typical CMOC task organization from a CA unit. CMOCs can be tailored and task-organized depending on the requirements of the supported unit. Although CA units possess many common capabilities, Active Army CA units differ from their USAR counterparts in that the functional specialty cell consists of USAR CA functional specialists and only resides in USAR CA units. The CACOM CMOC organization differs from the CA brigade and CA battalion in that the CACOM has three functional specialty cells and two CLTs. The CACOM has the capability to task-organize its forces to establish two separate CMOCs.

HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT

6-3. The HQ element provides detailed supervision of the CMOC operation and manages the execution of the overall CAO or joint force commander’s CMO effort within the AO. CMOCs are established to support unified land operations or joint force operations as needed. Multiple CMOCs can be established within a specific AO if necessary.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER CHIEF

6-4. The CMOC chief—

Possesses overall responsibility for CMOC operations and delivery of products, assessments, and recommendations to the supported command.

Ensures all reports are timely, accurate, and incorporated into running estimates for the supported command COP.

Synchronizes all efforts and sections within the CMOC to ensure unity of effort.

Ensures all efforts within the CMOC are coordinated and synchronized with the G-9/S-9 and other staff sections as necessary.

Maintains responsibility for day-to-day operations and support to the CMOC.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER IN CHARGE

6-5. The CMOC NCOIC—

Ensures all aspects and sections of the CMOC are supported and are synchronized with one another on priorities of work.

Ensures all Soldier and equipment support requirements are met in a timely manner.

Provides subject-matter expert support to the chief and acts as the chief in his absence.

Ensures all messages, reports, products, assessments, and recommendations are timely and delivered to the appropriate staff sections.

Ensures daily operations are coordinated and supported by necessary assets or special requirements; for example, security and meeting or coordination activities in support of the CMOC.

SUSTAINMENT SECTION (SUPPLY SERGEANT)

6-6. The sustainment section consists of the combined G-1 and G-4 or S-1 and S-4 assets of the CA unit. In addition to the normal functions necessary in providing personnel and logistics support to the organic CA unit, the section contributes to the CMOC mission by—

Maintaining a database of all points of contact and HN resources that can be used for military or humanitarian purposes (facilities, transportation assets, goods, and services).

Coordinating and tracking logistics activities in support of CMO.

Maintaining adequate levels of supplies for use in CMOC operations (for example, office supplies, fuel, batteries, and lightbulbs).

Managing operator-level maintenance on vehicles, communications, and generator equipment.

Maintaining the current status of routes used in CMO.

Producing records and reports, as required.

Managing the orders process for the attachment of augmenting CA Soldiers.

OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SECTION (OPERATIONS SERGEANT)

6-7. The O&I section consists of the combined G-2 and G-3 or S-2 and S-3 assets of the supporting CA unit. The O&I section is the nexus for planning, coordinating, and integrating the various CMOC sections and capabilities with the supported unit staff sections. The supported commander’s objectives are the focus of support for the CMOC and the supporting CA unit. The responsibilities of the O&I section include—

Integrating the battle rhythms of the supported unit and the CMOC.

Coordinating and integrating logistics reporting with CAO needs and resources.

Ensuring the supported commander’s COP has updated CIM inputs.

Battle-tracking all CAO to ensure that the supported staff possesses situational understanding of CAO and that they understand the effect of CAO on the AO.

Supervising and directing the tasks of the CIM cell and CLTs.

Supervising, directing, and integrating the capabilities of the functional specialty cells.

Providing intelligence analysis products regarding the civil environment.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CELL

6-8. The CIM cell receives assessments, spot reports, after action reviews, lessons learned, and intelligence reports from the supporting CA element, as well as additional information from other government agencies, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs in the AO. The CIM cell then collates and processes the information. The military police, engineers, CA forces, Military Information Support forces, and other U.S. forces collect information on civil considerations for the CIM cell to process and integrate. Proper coordination with non-CA forces must be done to ensure these they are able to perform civil reconnaissance and act in that capacity.

6-9. The CIM cell collects civil information and enters it into a central database through the knowledge management system. The CIM cell analyzes the information internally and with the supported unit, higher HQ, USG and DOD agencies, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate. Coordination among other elements ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of raw and analyzed civil information to all levels throughout the AO.

6-10. The CIM cell director is responsible for supervising the network and communications specialists organic to the cell. The CIM product is deliverable in several forms to the O&I section director, as well as to the S-9 of the BCT.

6-11. The CIM product is a—

Textual compilation of information and data that includes an analysis from the integrated collection management director of the supported unit’s G-2 or S-2 and the CMOC intelligence analysts.

Graphical compilation of data and information placed as a geographic information system layer on the COP.

Web site for information management and collaboration.

Briefing or running estimate contribution to the supported commander’s daily updates and targeting process.

6-12. The CIM cell NCOIC is a networking specialist. As a networking specialist, the NCOIC is directly responsible for maintaining the connectivity for all input and the personnel that send information and data to the CIM cell. Elements of civil information include the following:

Typography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain, including landforms, drainage, vegetation, and soils.

Census, location, ethnic composition, and health factors of the population.

Attitude of the population, including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.

Government structure, including forms, personalities, existing laws, and political heritage.

Educational standards and facilities.

Important cultural activities and repositories.

Communications, transportation, utility, power, and natural resources.

Labor potential, including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.

Economic development, including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, extent and nature of agricultural production, and accustomed population dietary habits.

Cores of resistance movements.

Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.

Hostile activities, including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

6-13. The CMOC CIM cell acts as the repository for AO-wide data. It is the focal point for all CIM policy, analytical algorithms, predictive models, and validation of subordinate CA element CIM programs. The CIM cell conducts collation and analysis of civil information. It develops civil inputs to the COP in conjunction with the CMOC while linking civil information to the appropriate military and civil (other government agency, IGO, NGO, and IPI) systems via geospatially referenced data. CIM cell key tasks include—

Collecting relevant information (open source and classified).

Processing relevant information to create the COP.

Displaying the COP tailored to unit needs.

Storing relevant information.

Disseminating the COP and other relevant knowledge products to higher, lower, adjacent, and supported organizations.

Communicating information to outside agencies.

Supervising collecting, analyzing, processing, and disseminating of operational and tactical civil information.

Assisting in the conduct of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Analyzing current civil reconnaissance to identify gaps and subsequent information collection requirements.

Conducting quality control reviews of analysis performed by subordinate CA elements.

6-14. CIM cell mission requirements include the following:

On an ongoing basis, the CIM cell monitors reporting by subordinate CA and supported unit elements to identify information for addition to the COP. It provides pre-mission base data (such as digital mapping, historic files, and current operations) to deploying elements. It conducts analysis of ongoing operations to provide the supported G-9 or S-9 with recommendations on force utilization.

During mission analysis, the CIM cell provides products that depict the civil terrain. The cell also illustrates key personnel linkages that will affect the mission. In coordination with the O&I cell, the CIM cell identifies important nodes that may be targeted by use of CAO. The cell further assists in the identification of civil-related centers of gravity.

6-15. When the CIM cell is deployed as part of a CMOC, it receives all assessments, spot reports, after action reviews, lessons learned, intelligence reports, and comments from supported units, IPI, NGOs, and other partners in the AO. The CIM cell then collates and processes the information. Sources of information may include reports from supporting forces (such as the military police; engineers; and CA, Military Information Support, and other U.S. forces) that perform formal civil reconnaissance to acquire information for the CIM cell’s processing and integration.

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY CELL

6-16. The functional specialty cell resides only in the USAR CA force structure within the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion. The functional specialty cell provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO. The number of cells and types of functional specialists found within the structure vary with type of unit, but the roles are the same and the modular design allows for augmentation across the range of military operations.

6-17. Area of concentration 38G (Military Government) has been approved and implementation will occur in fiscal year 2016. All CA (38A) functional specialists positions identified in the USAR will be recoded to 38G. The new area of concentration has the ability, through the use of criteria for degree-of-proficiency coding, to distinguish between competence levels corresponding to strategic, operational, and tactical employment. Proficiency levels are determined by experience, education, and certifications and will identify four levels of proficiency: basic, senior, expert, and master. The current functional specialist cells are being redesigned to better align with future Army requirements along the stability sectors.

6-18. The CACOM provides three CA functional specialty cells that contain specialists in all six of the CA functional areas (Figure 6-3, page 6-6). The functional specialty cells are made up of Soldiers (officer and enlisted) with technical expertise in the civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO.

6-19. The brigade and battalion organizations have one functional specialty cell with limited capabilities in four (rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public health and welfare) of the six functional areas (Figure 6-4, page 6-6). Each CAO that a cell supports may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition. Depending on mission requirements, augmentation by specific technical CA functional specialists from anywhere within the deployed CA assets may be necessary for mission accomplishment.

RULE-OF-LAW SECTION

6-20. Close coordination between the rule-of-law section and the governance section for synchronization and synergy between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal and public safety systems is critical. The rule-of-law specialists discern the most effective and supportable actions to establish or reestablish rule-of-law sectors within the AO. The rule-of-law specialists—

Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military operations.

Provide for reestablishing routine police functions, such as controlling the population, preventing crime, investigating crimes, and arresting those who commit crimes.

Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, to include vetting and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, legal advisors, and administrators and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities.

Restore and reform the HN civil and criminal legal system, to include reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards, as well as adopting transitional measures for the immediate administration of justice.

Provide for an effective corrections system that complies with international standards, to include selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials and constructing or renovating appropriate facilities.

GOVERNANCE SECTION

6-21. The governance section provides assistance to HN ministries and local government officials. The section consists of functional specialists in public administration and services who—

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems.

Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.

Coordinate with HN government administrators and agencies.

Advise on and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.

Advise on and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on the supported commander’s mission.

Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

6-22. The public health and welfare section provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of its people. Some personnel required in this section include doctors, dentists, hospital administrators, nurses, public health specialists, cultural relations specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and archives.

6-23. The public health and welfare section specialists—

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing IPI public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems.

Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

Coordinate the use of IPI government and private health resources for military use.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.

Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems.

Advise and assist IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and U.S. agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on HN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on the social and mental well-being of the society.

Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the HN social, cultural, religious, and ethnic characteristics; codes of behavior; and language.

Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.

Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.

Assist in environmental management by—

Providing technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determining the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems.

Developing plans and providing operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

Coordinating HN government and private environmental management resources for military use and in support of government administration to mitigate the effects of, prepare for, respond to, and recover from environmental activities.

Advising on and assisting in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).

Advising on and assisting in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government environmental management services.

Advising, assisting, and supporting the coordination of IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).

Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.

Assist in employing public safety resources.

INFRASTRUCTURE SECTION

6-24. The infrastructure section assesses the municipal and public infrastructure needs of the civilian population in the AO. The infrastructure section consists of functional specialists in public works, transportation, utilities, and communications. The section conducts assessments of the indigenous public infrastructure and systems. Using these assessments and their civilian skills, the team determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, architecture, and systems required to support transportation, water, communications, and power. The infrastructure section provides recommendations and direction for maintaining, sustaining, and improving the indigenous public systems and services, when appropriate. The infrastructure section specialists—

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.

Facilitate the coordination of government and commercial transportation resources for military use.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.

Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.

Assist in employing and (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration.

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and systems.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.

ECONOMIC STABILITY SECTION (CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND ONLY)

6-25. The economic stability section consists of functional specialists in economic fields and business administration, such as—

Economists.

Bankers.

Supply technicians.

Business administrators.

Agricultural and food specialists and technicians.

Marketing and distribution specialists.

6-26. The economic stability section assesses government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using these assessments, the section determines how to assist in the efficient management of resources, goods, and services to enhance the viability of the society’s economic system. The economic stability section specialists—

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agricultural systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Develop plans, policies, and procedures for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems and agencies for producing, processing, storing (especially perishables), transporting, distributing, and marketing commodities.

Coordinate the use of indigenous government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.

Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Develop plans, policies, and procedures for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.

Advise on and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.

Advise on and assist in price control and rationing programs.

Develop and implement plans to prevent black market activities.

Conduct liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.

Advise on and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.

Advise on and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).

Advise on ways to rapidly boost the local economy within the AO.

Advise on and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.

Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.

Advise and assist the Staff Judge Advocate and contracting officials in indigenous cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding the use of labor and acquisition and use of local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).

Provide technical expertise on, advice on, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Determine the availability of local supplies.

Identify private and public property available for military use.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.

Facilitate the coordination of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.

Advise on and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation; storage; distribution, including rationing; and the use of captured and salvaged items).

Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION SECTION (CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND ONLY)

6-27. The public education and information section consists of functional specialists in education and information services, including educators at all levels, education specialists, school administrators, public relations personnel, and media specialists. This section provides technical expertise in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. The public education and information section specialists—

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and postsecondary educational systems).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.

Advise on and assist HN institutions in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support government administration and the “single voice” message.

Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

6-28. The HQ element consists of the CA unit G-3 or S-3, operations sergeant major or operations sergeant, and a CA noncommissioned officer. The HQ element provides detailed supervision of the CMOC operation and manages the execution of the overall CMO effort within the supported commander’s AO.

SUPPLY SERGEANT

6-29. The supply sergeant—

Ensures systems are in place to account for all equipment, supplies, and materials to support operations.

Assists in the execution of the command supply discipline program and accountability of all assigned equipment.

Ensures timely repair of equipment, vehicles, weapons, and support items.

Ensures appropriate inventories and accountability requirements are met on a timely basis.

Supports field ordering officer or purchasing officer activities in support of ongoing operational requirements.

OPERATIONS SERGEANT

6-30. The operations sergeant—

Supports the commander and first sergeant in daily operational requirements.

Supports the G-9/S-9 and the CMOC in the integration and synchronization of all CMO planning and execution efforts.

Ensures necessary reports and communications are complete and accurate with the supported HQ.

Participates in targeting meetings to ensure synchronization of efforts.

CIVIL LIAISON TEAM

6-31. The CLT extends the outreach of its parent CMOC into multiple areas. It provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information between IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and other government agencies and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT is a stand-alone CAT that responds to the operations section of the CMOC. It provides the supported-level CMOC with a storefront for CAO and CMO coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions.

6-32. The CLT provides connectivity and interface to the IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational agencies and organizations to ensure a constant and accurate flow of information from and to the civil components of the AO. The CLT has the capability to liaise between civil, military, HN, and humanitarian elements within the AO at the local, provincial, and national levels of the civil environment dependent on the mission of its parent CMOC.

6-33. The primary task of the CLT is fostering cooperation between the various civil organizations and agencies and the CMOC. The CLT accomplishes this task by identifying and directly engaging the various civil components within the AO. In addition, the CLT may be directed to conduct—

IPI assessments, as directed by the CMOC.

Civil reconnaissance, as directed by the CMOC.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6-34. The communications section consists of the G-6 or S-6 assets of the CA unit and includes signal system technicians and maintainers and computer network information technicians, managers, and maintainers. The section’s communications technicians maintain the radios and satellite systems supporting unit information systems, direct network communications to functional specialty cells, and the CMOC’s reachback to its respective CONUS organic HQ networks. The section is responsible for establishing and maintaining signal connectivity via multiple communications means. The nature of CMOC operations presents communications requirements that are more extensive than the average tactical OC. The CMOC’s network is set up and maintained as a persistent tactical local area network and telecommunications system at a home station within CONUS and is prepared for deployment. It is used in CONUS by the CMOC for training, mission planning, and communications support to specialty teams not collocated at the CMOC’s home station.

Chapter 7

Protection, Mobility, and Communications

To support unified land operations, the CMOC must be prepared to protect, move, and communicate independently or as part of its supported element. When the supported force is engaged in decisive action, the CMOC monitors and reports on the stability of the civil component within the AO. The CMOC provides actionable information for the commander to engage the civil component. During an offensive task, the CMOC will be mobile with short periods of static operations. During a defensive task, the CMOC will be static and will likely operate as part of the larger HQ that it supports. When stability tasks become the predominant activity of the force, the CMOC may be positioned away from the supported HQ to gain greater access to the civil component of the AO.

COMMON REQUIREMENTS

7-1. The CMOC has common requirements that should be addressed during the planning, execution, and transition of CMOC operations. These requirements include protection, configuration, organization, and focus of operations. Operational and mission variables affecting the CMOC can change with each mission. Changes can occur during current operations that will also affect the CMOC configuration. The following discussion will provide insight into specific areas and the critical aspects that should be identified and acted upon when establishing a CMOC in support of the current operations.

SECURITY AND PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

7-2. Because of the nature of activities that occur at the CMOC, there are many physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity-of-operations issues to consider. Before initiating operations, the CMOC security officer conducts a site and situation threat and vulnerability assessment to determine CMOC security requirements. He considers and advises the CMOC director on security and protection issues, such as—

Defensibility (for example, fighting positions, safe rooms, multiple exits, or shelters).

Communications with a quick-reaction force.

Twenty-four-hour access control systems and procedures (restricted areas, restricted hours, parking areas, barriers, and security in depth).

Business-hour access control systems and procedures (passes, metal detectors, or escorts).

Security of vehicles and equipment before and during meetings.

Guidance for security and protection of visitors and civilian members of the team.

Coordination with local law enforcement for—

Patrols.

Full-time, on-site security presence (gate security).

Periodic threat updates.

Background checks of full-time staff members, especially local hires.

Alternate power supply or uninterrupted power supply for computers and communications equipment.

Emergency destruction procedures for classified materials and equipment.

7-3. The security manager may extend this situation threat and vulnerability assessment to areas and locations supported or frequented by the CMOC, such as HN, IPI, and NGO facilities. The security manager must periodically review and update this assessment. In addition, he must update the assessment when changes in an OE dictate a change in the protection measures of the CMOC.

MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

7-4. CA capabilities are aligned to support Army conventional force structure while maintaining special operations forces support to execute CAO across the range of military operations. The redesign of CA force structure standardized the organizational structure of both Regular Army and USAR CA units. The documentation of the resulting tables of organization and equipment identified the various elements of the units with unique standard requirement codes that allow for more efficient mobilization and deployment of forces. Although some differences in the number of unique elements documented within a particular organization exist, Figure 7-1 depicts the standard structure of CA units (battalion through CACOM).

7-5. Mobility requirements of the various types of CA units and elements are based on the types of units that they support and the supported unit mission requirements. Table 7-1, page 7-3, identifies CA mobility requirements.

DISPLACEMENT

7-6. The CMOC must be prepared to move with the CP it supports. If operating outside the security umbrella of a supported CP, it must be prepared to move at a moment’s notice for security reasons. The CMOC at the tactical level must, therefore, maintain an exfiltration plan.

Note: Exfiltration is defined as the removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.

Table 7-1. Mobility requirements

Unit | Element | Mobility (Percentage)
Civil Affairs Command
Command Section | 100
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) | 50
Functional Specialty Cell (3 each) | 100
Civil Liaison Team (CLT) (2 each) | 100
Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) (5 each) | 100
Civil Affairs Brigade
Command Section | 100
CMOC | 50
Functional Specialty Cell | 100
CLT (2 each) | 100
Civil Affairs Planning Team | 100
Civil Affairs Battalion
Command Section | 100
CMOC | 100
Functional Specialty Cell | 100
CLT | 100
Civil Affairs Planning Team | 100
Civil Affairs Company
Company Headquarters, Civil Affairs (CA) Company (Tactical) | 100
CMOC, CA Company (Tactical) | 100
Civil Affairs Team (5 each) | 100

7-7. When the mission or the enemy situation dictates a displacement, a warning order designating a movement time (displacing the CP) is issued to all personnel in the CMOC. The following actions occur upon receipt of the warning order:

The quartering party departs, carrying the main CP personnel’s rucksacks and duffle bags aboard two vehicles. (Members of the quartering party include the battalion S-6, main CP NCOIC, and a 3- to 5-man security element.)

All personnel who are off shift are alerted, and all non-mission-essential equipment is packed.

The main CP officer in charge notifies the tactical CP that the main CP is preparing to displace. The CP officer in charge then ensures that the tactical CP or alternate CP is ready to assume control of operations.

The officer in charge then issues the command to move the main CP. The standard for displacing the main CP is 45 minutes from the time the command to move is issued until the first vehicle hits the start point.

Figure 7-2, pages 7-3 through 7-5, shows an example of a load plan.

COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS

7-8. Once it is established, the CMOC must be able to communicate with other civil affairs forces and the supported unit. The CMOC must—

Be able to enter secure tactical digital networks and nonsecure civilian networks via the internet.

Be able to communicate over secure and nonsecure military radio and telephone systems, nonsecure NGO radios, and nonsecure commercial telephone systems for voice and data transmission.

Be able to monitor other open sources of information, such as commercial television and radio, including indigenous media.

Have redundant systems to enable it to operate in split operations.

COMMUNICATING SHARED UNDERSTANDING

7-9. Commanders use the Army’s communication architecture built upon Army Battle Command System to obtain information dominance. The CMOC uses its various communications systems within the Army communications architecture to glean information necessary to develop shared understanding with the IPI, NGOs, and the interagency with which it coordinates, informs, and influences. It also uses that information to shape the COP for the commander’s visualization by clearly depicting the civil component of an OE. The CIM cell collects, collates, analyzes, produces, and disseminates information for that purpose. The CMOC must be able to synthesize and display relevant information to all entities.

COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

7-10. The COP can be displayed manually or virtually. Visual displays are used to depict the relevant information. Visual displays can be displayed with a map board or graphically using a storyboard in Microsoft PowerPoint. Digitally prepared visual displays are optimal because they can be easily transmitted through various means, including systems used by commanders to maintain mission command. Various systems, such as CPs of the future, can be used to provide updates to the commander. The CMOC must also coordinate with and disseminate information to intergovernmental, interagency, and NGO partners who have access to the global information grid. These contacts are generally not secure communications; therefore, information cannot be classified. Information transmitted through reporting systems is generally classified; therefore, transmission of critical civil information from military reporting systems must be cleared by a foreign disclosure office before transmission to IGOs, interagency, NGOs, or HNs. Normal communication can occur through civilian e-mail accounts on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network. Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network users generally have access to the global information grid and can access preferred networks, such as the Asia-Pacific Area Network. CMOCs can establish continual contact with the civilian component through the Asia-Pacific Area Network.

7-11. The Asia-Pacific Area Network is an unclassified, non-dot-mil network providing interoperability and connectivity among partners over a common platform. The Asia-Pacific Area Network fosters information exchange and collaboration between the DOD and any external country, organization, agency, or individual that does not have ready access to traditional DOD systems and networks.

7-12. The Asia-Pacific Area Network enables professional networking and communication; increases situational awareness; establishes predefined communications channels, relationships, and information work flows; and provides a forum for sharing lessons learned and best practices in a wide variety of contexts, including crisis response, HA, disaster relief, training, and exercises. Benefits include decreased response times, greater coordination, information transparency, and broader cross-organizational knowledge visibility. While encouraging the open and easy exchange of information, the Asia-Pacific Area Network also seeks to ensure the protection of sensitive information like users’ identities and personal communications.

VISUAL DISPLAYS

7-13. Information can be displayed in the CMOC with map boards or digitally with storyboards. The paragraphs below contain brief discussions on both.

7-14. Two standard sheets of plywood (4 feet by 8 feet) are normally sufficient for use as a map board or situation board (Figure 7-3). If space is insufficient to display two boards, maps and overlays can be posted on each side of one board—one side for the military and the other side for everyone to see. Critical information should be posted on the board to ensure all parties are receiving the same information. Figure 7-4 shows examples of CMO critical information graphics.

7-15. Storyboards can be created digitally using graphic design software. Information graphically displayed can then be transmitted digitally over the CP of the future or on the global information grid to the Asia-Pacific Area Network or other appropriate venues once disclosure clearances have been obtained. Storyboards facilitate the transmission of vast information in one graphic display.

LAYOUT CONSIDERATIONS

7-16. The layout of the CMOC must be conducive to continuous, productive communication flow. The CMOC is usually organized into four general sections: the director, operations, administration and logistics, and civilian representatives. As a minimum, the CMOC should have the following areas:

Meeting area (determined by the officer in charge).

Military work areas (operations security, controlled, and classified areas).

Map boards (graphics and overlays) and briefing boards.

Access points (physical security and protection).

Information management and control.

7-17. The following tasks relate to the overall operation of the CP and support all six basic OC functions:

Identify the task or purpose of each CMOC.

Set up and dismantle the CMOC.

Establish mission-dependent CMOC configurations.

Establish guard, sleep, and shift-manning plans.

Monitor communication systems.

Provide life support for CMOC personnel.

7-18. After identifying essential supporting tasks, personnel should outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to execute each task based on doctrine and the unit’s way of doing business. If the unit has no established method for executing an identified supporting task, personnel should brainstorm a method and commit it to paper. Since this is a working document, it is okay to try new things. However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed should not conflict with established SOPs for the unit or with those of the supported maneuver unit. Once tactics, techniques, and procedures for each supporting task have been identified, they are organized into a logical sequence to develop the layout of the CMOC.

PROTECTION

7-19. The CMOC has different protection requirements based upon the threat level present in the AO and the concept of operations under which it is employed. In permissive environments, fewer resources are required to maintain a heightened security level. CMOCs can be vulnerable immediately following major combat operations or when facing an active irregular threat. The security arrangements may also vary based upon the CMOC’s operating techniques.

7-20. Although the CMOC has a set CA structure, it retains the capability to expand, conduct mobile operations, and contract to meet the demands of the operation. It must be able to accommodate the various agencies that unite or depart during different phases of an operation.

7-21. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC, and more than one CMOC may be established in an AO. The supported commander establishes the CMOC early in an operation to—

Address the nonmilitary threats, distractions, and interference that can adversely affect the military mission.

Foster successful interagency coordination inherent in all operations.

7-22. A CMOC should be given a specific task and purpose, such as those in an operation order. A METT-TC analysis of the task and purpose will determine the structure, equipment, manning, location, and operational requirements to accomplish the mission of the CMOC.

7-23. Those teams that operate a CMOC for limited intervention contingency operations may be required to deploy without certain items of equipment, such as vehicles, trailers, generators, or tents, to conserve limited transportation space. The CA force composing the nucleus of the CMOC must be prepared to palletize mission-essential items of equipment based on METT-TC (laptops, radios, video cameras, and other team equipment). The CMOC staff must coordinate the movement of their remaining equipment via follow-on transportation by air, rail, or surface ship. The CMOC staff must plan and coordinate to obtain transportation and billeting in the AO while its own vehicles, tents, and so forth are in transit.

7-24. At every level, the CMOC must be flexible enough to expand and contract as mission requirements change; for example, incorporating members of military and nonmilitary organizations to meet short- or long-term projects. It must also be appropriately located, staffed, and equipped to perform the vital functions of analyzing, planning, recording, coordinating, monitoring, and influencing the joint force commander’s CMO objectives in a secure and sometimes less-than-secure austere environment.

7-25. The CMOC must be prepared to conduct echelon operations. These operations can be conducted inside or outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ. These operations can be conducted in a mobile fashion or collocated with an interagency or IPI partner—often simultaneously. The parent CA unit must have redundancy in its manning, organization, and equipment to perform CMOC operations as a distributed network in support of all units with which it has a coordinating association.

7-26. When operating in support of an operational or tactical unit during joint, conventional, or special operations force missions, the CMOC must establish a relationship with the unit J-9/G-9/S-9, G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6, and G-2/S-2. The CMOC’s normal relationship with the—

G-9/S-9 is similar to that of a direct support field artillery unit with the fire support coordinator. The G-9 or S-9 monitors the daily operations of the CMOC and advises the commander on CAO and the employment of CA assets. The CMOC provides the G-9 or S-9 with the status of CAO and assists in planning and development of branches and sequels to support the future CAO.

G-3/S-3 is that of a functional center specializing in a specific aspect of the overall military operation. The CMOC, in conjunction with the S-9 or G-9, keeps the G-3 or S-3 advised of how CAO are providing the desired effects in support of the military operation. The CMOC routes requests for assistance through the G-3 or S-3 for approval and ultimate tasking.

G-6 or S-6, as well as the G-9 or S-9, is critical for the connectivity of the CMOC with the rest of the supported command. The G-6 or S-6 obtains network connectivity into the supported unit and permission to virtual private network through the supported unit network back to CONUS with the bandwidth to meet the CMOC requirements for information management and collaboration. The G-6 or S-6 must find a location for the communications and network center with an antenna field to set up high-frequency satellite communications and very high-frequency antennas. The G-6 or S-6 requests high-frequency, very high-frequency, and satellite communications frequencies, channels, and cryptographic requirements for tactical and CONUS network reachback communications systems used by CA forces in the theater.

G-2/S-2 provides intelligence activities for the commander. As the commander’s nerve center for civil-military engagement, the CMOC ensures that the G-2 or S-2 is aware of the CAO situation. The CMOC coordinates with the G-2 or S-2 as the CMOC develops, synchronizes, synthesizes, and recommends civil information and considerations analysis products in support of current and future operations. The G-2 or S-2 fuses civil information from the G-9/S-9 with intelligence information to inform the COP.

7-27. One important consideration when establishing a CMOC is whether local, national, or international coordination mechanisms for civil-military interface already exist. If the UN, HN, or some other organization or agency already operates a facility to coordinate CMO in the AO, it may be best to establish a liaison or augmentation cell within that facility. Such a COA legitimizes the efforts of the lead organization and facilitates the disengagement of U.S. forces during transition and redeployment from the operation.

7-28. Another important consideration when establishing a CMOC is the creation of continuity books. The continuity books are digital. Continuity books are maintained on local systems and the CIM and knowledge management system central database. A continuity book facilitates continuity of operations during periods of potential disruption; for example, routine or emergency personnel turnover, expansion and contraction of the CMOC, and transition operations. Although there is no doctrinally specified format for a continuity book, there are some proven techniques to make the book as beneficial as possible. These techniques are as follows:

Arrange the book chronologically with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars showing essential tasks.

Provide enough detail (who, what, where, why, when, and how) for each task to eliminate guesswork by the replacement organization.

Include a journal to record actions taken and points of contact for ongoing projects or programs.

Take photographs of projects and name points of contact, meeting facilities, and other items (for example, funding) pertinent to conducting CAO. Be sure to include copies of any clippings or flyers from newspapers (whether negative or positive publicity).

TECHNIQUES FOR EMPLOYMENT

7-29. The location of the CMOC is the commander’s decision, but the location is typically based on the mission variables of METT-TC analysis. The location has to be integrated with the supported unit’s security operations and to provide workspace for all of the CA elements. The four basic options for employing a CMOC are as follows:

Inside the security perimeter.

Outside the security perimeter.

Mobile.

Combination.

Note: If the location of the CMOC is not predetermined, it must be approved by the commander.

7-30. Each location option has merit depending on the situation and mission requirements. During the course of operations, the CMOC must be flexible and ready to shift from one option to another based on changes in the security situation, protection, or mission requirements.

INSIDE THE SECURITY PERIMETER

7-31. CMOCs can be located behind a security perimeter, which may be collocated with its supported HQ to provide the commander and main CP with the maximum amount of available civil information and to afford the CMOC with the greatest amount of protection in an uncertain or hostile OE. When establishing operations as part of the main CP or collocating with it, the CMOC will be required to conform to the SOPs of the supported unit. These SOPs are usually referred to as unit readiness SOPs, or field SOPs. Figure 7-5, page 7-10, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC inside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC inside the perimeter should be considered when—

CMO is planned and coordinated at the strategic (geographic combatant command) level.

The security environment at the operational (joint task force and corps) level permits nonmilitary individuals to enter freely or with limited inconvenience.

The primary mission of the military force is stability tasks, such as during HA or disaster relief operations.

Resources are limited and must be shared with other military units.

7-32. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CAO- and CMO-related issues and as a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, the CMOC operates on the periphery of a security perimeter to maximize its ability to interface with IPI while taking advantage of the security afforded by the supported HQ.

7-33. The CMOC and its associated parking area should be in a location that offers convenient access to visitors and that does not interfere with the internal operations of the supported HQ. The CMOC will receive extensive traffic. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. If possible, the facility should include space for supported organizations to conduct business.

OUTSIDE THE SECURITY PERIMETER

7-34. CMOCs can operate outside of a defensive or security perimeter. Figure 7-6, page 7-11, illustrates a CMOC outside of the security perimeter. When operating remotely, the CMOC must be supported with security augmentation (for example, attached military, barrier material, contract personnel, and electronics). Consideration needs to be given to the control and release of classified information to nonassigned elements.

7-35. The CMOC may establish an outpost with its own security perimeter in or near a population center. Employment in this way affords the CMOC maximum access to the local populace, facilitating crosscultural communication and support to civil administration.

7-36. Storefront operations give the CMOC the flexibility and added benefit of utilizing existing structures and HN assets for protection. Storefront operations allow the CMOC to operate within the populace, providing an information center with maximum access to civil information, as well as providing the populace with optimal access to military, interagency, NGO, and local governmental entities. Controlled access is still recommended for this type of CMOC. Figure 7-7, page 7-12, illustrates the storefront concept.

7-37. Locating the CMOC outside the perimeter should be considered when the—

Security environment at the supported military HQ restricts access to nonmilitary individuals and access procedures cause major inconvenience to those individuals.

CMOC is planning and coordinating CAO or CMO at the tactical level.

Primary customers are the IGOs, NGOs, government officials, and the local populace.

CMOC is tasked to form the nucleus of a humanitarian OC under UN auspices or a HA coordination center in support of the GCC.

7-38. The less-secure, external CMOC may be active 24 hours a day or only during set business hours. If the external CMOC is active for 24-hour operations, it must be equipped to operate as an extension of the internal CMOC. (This arrangement requires some redundancy in communications and automatic data processing equipment.) If the CMOC is active only during set business hours, the internal CMOC may be required to manage administrative and logistical operations when the external CMOC is not operational.

7-39. CMOC storefront operations require that the CMOC NCOIC identify security requirements. Observation post positions may be necessary to observe the avenues of approach and to provide early warning to the CMOC. Positions are identified surrounding the CMOC that have interlocking fires and provide 360-degree security. When the CMOC establishes its site, observation posts are immediately emplaced (observation posts must have communications with the supported tactical CP or main CP.) The CMOC NCOIC will prepare an observation post shift schedule (duty roster) in conjunction with the watch NCOs and provide overall supervision of CMOC security operations.

Storefront Civil-Military Operations Center in Baghdad

Following the 2008 surge in Iraq, conditions were set to establish civil-military and government interaction with the population. Within the districts of Baghdad, CMOCs were established to facilitate stability tasks with cooperation between the coalition forces, government of Iraq ministries, Iraqi army, and local authorities, as well as NGOs, international organizations, and private organizations. The CMOCs were established in each Baghdad district. Some were established as storefronts on the periphery of forward operational bases and some as stand-alone facilities within the populace. The focus of these CMOCs was on governance, economic development, rule of law, health, and education, and they provided current information to the population. Iraqi assistance centers were established in conjunction with the CMOC to help the Iraqi people by paying property damage and condolence claims, as well as helping families locate relatives that were detained. In addition to these services, microloan offices were established to provide small loans to Iraqi entrepreneurs trying to start their own businesses. The CMOCs helped to coordinate cooperative medical engagements in which Iraqi doctors and medical personnel provided medical assistance to residents for treatment and HA distribution. HA distribution typically consisted of prepackaged food and water that would feed a family of five for one meal. CMOCs provided the opportunity for effective interaction with the people living within the districts and allowed the district advisory councils to interact with Iraqi ministers on a daily basis. This interaction resulted in faster responses to the critical security, infrastructure, and medical concerns of the people by the Iraqi government and coalition forces. The CMOC promoted considerable goodwill and mutual trust by sharing the risk of living within the population. While working together to solve common problems and to stabilize the districts under Iraqi government control, these CMOCs enabled coalition forces to stabilize the local AO.

Reference Public Affairs Office Multinational Force Iraq

7-40. When inside or on the periphery of a secure perimeter, the CMOC director coordinates directly with the S-9 or G-9 while the CMOC NCOIC coordinates directly with the main CP NCOIC (usually the operations sergeant major) or a base defense OC under the area support group. It is incumbent upon the CMOC NCOIC to integrate the CMOC’s security into the overall security plan of the supported unit’s perimeter. In conjunction with a perimeter defense plan, the CMOC NCOIC assigns each Soldier associated with the main CP a fighting position. Each position is a 2- or 3-man position. Positions should be assigned to the personnel who work opposite each other on a shift or by section. The fighting positions will be prepared when personnel are not on shift. Enhancement of fighting positions will continue for the duration of time the main CP is set up in that location. Each position will be assigned a sector of fire by the NCOIC. The NCOIC prepares a sector sketch and provides a copy to the main CP officer in charge. The sector sketch will be posted in the main CP. All positions will be manned at a minimum of 50 percent every day for stand-to and stand-down. The NCOIC will incorporate the security force designated in the operations order (normally an infantry platoon or squad) into the security plan for the main CP.

7-41. The main CP NCOIC enforces appropriate noise and light discipline in the main CP. All radio operators should practice short transmissions to guard against enemy electronic warfare efforts. The preferred COA for security of the main CP is to identify a threat early and displace. Defense is planned in the event that circumstances do not allow a displacement. The main CP NCOIC will designate a signal to occupy defensive positions and prepare for imminent ground attack. All personnel will occupy their fighting positions with the exception of the fire support noncommissioned officer, S-2, main CP officer in charge, and one radio-telephone operator. On the order of the main CP officer in charge, the S-2 is responsible for protecting (destroying if necessary) all classified or sensitive materials. CA personnel will zero out all communications security and sanitize displayed information as directed.

7-42. To assist in protection from indirect and direct fires, the main CP NCOIC will coordinate to have the main CP dug in whenever possible. He will coordinate with the brigade engineer for engineer assets to construct the survivability positions at primary and alternate main CP sites.

7-43. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and its use as a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, the external CMOC will receive extensive traffic by those participants and visibility from local officials and the media. The CMOC should be in a location that offers convenient access to those partners and participants. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. The CMOC staff should clear interagency work and meeting areas of classified, unclassified, and sensitive materials, written or otherwise.

7-44. There are instances when nonmilitary organizations cannot participate in the activities of the CMOCs mentioned above. Such instances may occur during fluid combat operations, in hostile environments, or because of political or cultural considerations. CLTs or CATs may be required to accomplish the daily interface with those organizations.

7-45. CLTs or CATs might be operating on foot (dismounted) or from a team high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle under the operational control of a CMOC. These teams generally conduct assessments and pass the results to the controlling CMOC for incorporation into running estimate or posthostility plans.Assessment teams may also be task-organized CA functional specialists that travel on a set schedule (circuit-rider arrangement) to visit civilian organizations or agencies throughout a specified region. When detached from the main CMOC to perform such activities, these teams are conducting echelon-based operations.

MOBILE

7-46. During large-scale combat operations when offense and defense prevail, the CMOC may need to operate in a mobile configuration. When doing so, CA forces should utilize basic convoy procedures, moving independently or integrating movement with other organizations to share the mutual benefits of protection. Regardless of whether they move independently or integrate with others, CA forces must be prepared to utilize fire, to maneuver for protection, and to break contact with the enemy. When mobile, the CMOC functions by monitoring communications with other elements to maintain situational awareness.

FACILITY CONSIDERATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

7-47. The CMOC cannot fully depend on its supported unit HQ to provide the facilities it requires to operate efficiently and effectively. A CMOC should be self-deployable and operational using organic vehicles and equipment to the extent possible. CMOCs at the CA brigade and CACOM level may require multiple lifts with organic assets. The organic vehicles and equipment must be compatible with those of the unit with which the parent CA unit has a planning association, to include shipping containers or trailers, generators, tents, and so on. The CMOC has access to a subordinate sustainment section within the CA unit tables of organization that can be task-organized under the CMOC. The sustainment section connects the CMOC to its supported unit’s sustainment system.

7-48. CA units should consider placing their CMOC’s equipment in two shipping containers or trailers to facilitate movement and to ensure facilities can be established wherever deployed. One shipping container should hold the secure equipment that will remain within the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ. The other shipping container should hold the nonsecure equipment for split operations outside the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ. In addition, the units should employ several high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles with trailers to transport CMOC Soldiers and their personal equipment and to perform as mobile CMOCs.

7-49. Depending on the environment, situation, and available existing structures, a CMOC can set up operations and work out of—

Civilian or military trailers or vehicles.

Suites in office buildings.

Emergency OCs (municipal or otherwise).

Separate buildings, such as storefronts.

7-50. Whether operating from organic facilities or civilian structures, the CMOC must contain sufficient space for work areas, meeting areas, parking areas, living quarters, break areas, and other areas required based upon the mission. The CMOC must provide a healthy and safe environment for its personnel (for example, proper ventilation, fire protection, weather protection, and sanitation).

7-51. When the CMOC is established, it is important to identify and publicize its location. CMOC personnel should provide a local telephone access number and an internet-accessible e-mail address that the community can use to contact the CMOC. When necessary, adjustments should be made if a high proportion of the population is illiterate and signs would be inappropriate.

7-52. CMOCs’ components can be tasked out to support other unified action partners’ operations. This action subordinates the CMOC’s internal protection capability to that of the supported interagency or multinational partner. When operating as part of an interagency network, the Department of State is usually the lead USG entity. Components of the CMOC, such as the CIM cell, may work for one entity while the CLT and functional specialty cell may work for different entities (for example, CA functional specialists may work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers district established for the operations).

7-53. The CMOC director has overall responsibility for the development of CMOC SOPs and the establishment of operational priorities. The general priorities follow internal security, communications with higher HQ, and sustainment. Recommended changes to CMOC SOPs will be submitted to the CMOC director. CMOC SOPs require continuous review based upon constantly changing variables. The CMOC director also—

Establishes collaborative relations with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, other government agencies, and private sector organizations.

Publicizes the location, purpose, and operating hours of the CMOC.

Identifies other agencies that require workspace within the CMOC, including NGOs, IGO, IPI, other government agencies, and private sector organizations.

Conducts an enemy risk assessment based upon an OE.

Establishes CMOC priorities of work.

7-54. The CMOC should be constantly seeking ways to improve its security, coordination, information development, information dissemination, and internal support mechanisms to facilitate unity of effort of all civil entities within the operational area. The CMOC is an integral part of developing the civil component of the operational environment. The work accomplished within the CMOC assists the commander in achieving his end state and goals. In addition, the information gathered and processed by the CMOC through the civil information process helps develop branches and sequels to current operations and provides input to the civil running estimate, Civil Affairs annex to the operations order, and updates to the country study.

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AO | area of operations
ART | Army tactical task
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP | Army techniques publication
BCT | brigade combat team
CA | Civil Affairs
CACOM | Civil Affairs command
CAO | Civil Affairs operations
CAT | Civil Affairs team
CIM | civil information management
CLT | civil liaison team
CMO | civil-military operations
CMOC | civil-military operations center
COA | course of action
CONUS | continental United States
COP | common operational picture
CP | command post
DA | Department of the Army
DOD | Department of Defense
DSCA | defense support of civil authorities
FM | field manual
G-1 | assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 | assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 | assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 | assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-6 | assistant chief of staff, signal
G-9 | assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations
GCC | geographic combatant commander
HA | humanitarian assistance
HN | host nation
HQ | headquarters
IGO | intergovernmental organization
IPI | indigenous populations and institutions
JP | joint publication
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available–time available and civil considerations
NCOIC | noncommissioned officer in charge
NGO | nongovernmental organization
O&I | operations and intelligence
OC | operations center
OE | operational environment
PMESII-PT | political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
S-1 | battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer
S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 | battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 | battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6 | battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9 | battalion or brigade Civil Affairs operations staff officer
SOP | standard operating procedure
UN | United Nations
U.S. | United States
USAR | United States Army Reserve
USG | United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

Civil Affairs

Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations

Actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

civil consideration

The influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (ADRP 5-0)

civil information

Relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment used to support the situational awareness of the supported commander. (JP 3-57)

civil information management

Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into knowledge products, and disseminated. Also called CIM. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated Civil Affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization, normally comprised of Civil Affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 3-57)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment, such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (JP 3-57)

common operational picture

(Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Also called COP. (ADRP 6-0)

effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

host nation

A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

indigenous populations and institutions

The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, dislocated civilians, and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 3-57)

insurgency

The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

joint task force

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1)

knowledge

Information that has been analyzed to provide meaning or value or evaluated as to implications for the operations. (FM 6-01.1)

link

1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 3-0)

nation assistance

Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 3-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

populace and resources control

(Army) Operations that provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations, or guidelines; checkpoints (for example, road blocks); ration controls; amnesty programs; and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of populace and resources control measures. Also called PRC. (FM 3-57)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

special operations

Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05)

stability operations

An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. (FM 3-57)

threat

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0)

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 24 September 2013.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at www.apd.army.mil.

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011.

FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations, 16 July 2012.

FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, 27 February 2009.

FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956.

Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat, 26 November 2010.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16 September 2009.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011.

JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 November 2013.

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 3 January 2014.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

None.

REFERENCED FORMS

Most Army forms are available online at www.apd.army.mil.

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

Index

C

civil administration, 1-4, 7-11

Civil Affairs, ii, iv, 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 1-7, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-3, 3-4, 4-1 through 4-5, 5-1 through 5-4, 6-1 through 6-5, 6-10, 6-11, 7-1 through 7-4, 7-8, 7-9, 7-14, 7-15

Civil Affairs operations, ii, 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 3-1, 3-4, 4-2, 4-4, 4-5, 5-2, 5-3, 6-1 through 6-3, 6-5, 6-11, 7-1, 7-8 through 7-10, 7-12

civil considerations, 2-2, 3-3, 3-6, 6-3

civil information, iv, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 2-1 through 2-3, 3-1, 3-4, 4-1 through 4-4, 5-3, 6-3 through 6-5, 7-6, 7-9, 7-10, 7-12

civil information management, 1-2, 1-4, 2-1, 3-4, 4-1 through 4-3, 5-2, 5-3, 6-2 through 6-5, 7-6, 7-9, 7-15

civil reconnaissance, 6-3 through 6-5

civil-military operations, ii, 1-2, 1-6, 2-4, 2-5, 3-2, 4-4, 5-2, 5-3, 6-1 through 6-3, 6-5, 6-7, 6-9 through 6-11, 7-6, 7-8 through 7-10, 7-12, 7-14

civil-military operations center, ii, iv, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4 through 1-7, 2-1 through 2-5, 3-1 through 3-6, 4-1 through 4-5, 5-1 through 5-4, 6-1 through 6-5, 6-10, 6-11, 7-1 through 7-3, 7-5 through 7-16

common operational picture, iv, 1-1, 1-5, 2-2, 2-5, 3-3, 5-2, 5-3, 6-2 through 6-5, 7-5, 7-6, 7-9

D

defense support to civil administration, 1-2, 1-3, 2-2, 3-3, 4-4

E

effect, 1-2, 1-4, 2-2, 3-1, 5-3, 6-3, 6-7, 7-8

F

foreign humanitarian assistance, 1-3, 1-4

H

host nation, ii, 1-1, 1-5, 2-2, 3-1, 3-3, 3-5, 4-4, 4-5, 5-1, 5-3, 6-1, 6-3, 6-5 through 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, 7-1, 7-9, 7-12

I

indigenous populations and institutions, iv, 1-1, 1-4 through 1-6, 2-4, 3-4, 3-6, 4-2 through 4-5, 5-3, 6-3 through 6-5, 6-7, 6-9 through 6-11, 7-1, 7-5, 7-8, 7-10, 7-15

insurgency, 2-2

J

joint task force, ii, 5-1, 5-2, 7-10

K

knowledge, 1-5, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 6-3, 6-4, 7-6, 7-9, 7-16

L

link, 2-5, 3-2, 4-3, 5-3, 6-11

N

nation assistance, 1-4

O

operational environment, ii, iv, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4 through 1-7, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 3-1 through 3-6, 4-1 through 4-4, 5-1, 7-1, 7-5, 7-10, 7-15

P

populace and resources control, 1-4

S

situational awareness, 2-1, 7-6, 7-14

situational understanding, iv, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 3-2, 3-4, 6-3

special operations, 5-2, 7-1, 7-5, 7-8

support to civil administration, 1-4

T

threat, 1-4, 1-6, 4-5, 5-2, 7-1, 7-8, 7-13, 7-15

ATP 3-57.70

5 May 2014

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1411104

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.