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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.10, Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control, establishes the techniques and procedures used by individuals, teams, and units of United States (U.S.) Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces, as well as planners of civil-military operations (CMO) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The techniques and procedures prescribed in this manual are used when engaging other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other military and nonmilitary entities in support of conventional and special operations (SO) missions. This manual elaborates on doctrine contained in Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

The principal audience for ATP 3-57.10 is the Army Civil Affairs force, officers, and noncommissioned officers who support joint and Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders of operations at all levels of war. It is also an applicable reference for the interagency. As with all doctrinal manuals, ATP 3-57.10 is authoritative but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude CA personnel or units from developing their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). The techniques and procedures presented in this manual should not limit CA forces from using their civilian-acquired skills, training, and experience to meet the challenges they face while conducting CA operations and providing support to CMO. This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.)

ATP 3-57.10 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). The preparing agency is the Doctrine Division, Civil Affairs Branch Directorate, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC. Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-CAD (ATP 3-57.10), Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by electronic mail to: AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.

Introduction

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.10, Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control, expands the doctrinal discussion of the role of civil affairs (CA) forces supporting populace and resources control (PRC) operations that resides in FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations. Publication of ATP 3-57.10 replaces civil affairs PRC doctrine previously found in FM 3-05.401/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33.1A Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

Support of PRC is one of the five core tasks of CA forces. PRC consists of populace control and resources control, both of which are normally the responsibility of civil government. Commanders, for practical and security reasons, employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the range of military operations.

ATP 3-57.10 consists of three chapters and three appendixes:

Chapter 1 provides the historical foundation for the execution of PRC. A number of techniques used in the administration of conquered land and populations by ancient civilizations are still a basis for present day PRC planning and execution. The discussion further describes the types of authorities necessary for the imposition of PRC.

Chapter 2 describes the types of populace control measures that may be executed across the range of military operations. The discussion provides civil affairs operations planning considerations that describe a common framework for populace control planning and execution. The chapter also discusses two sub-categories of populace control: noncombatant evacuation operations and dislocated civilian operations.

Chapter 3 discusses the types of resource control measures that must be considered as either an occupying force or a force in support of a host nation. The chapter describes the authority of an occupational force commander, under international law, regarding public and private property. A description of resources control areas and the various types of control measures that may be implemented are provided.

Appendix A details the procedures for the completion of Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control [PRC]) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations [CAO]) to include TAB A (Dislocated Civilian [DC] Operations) and TAB B (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations [NEOs]).

Appendix B details the techniques CA forces employ in supporting the planning and execution of dislocated civilian operations.

Appendix C details the techniques CA forces employ in supporting the planning and execution of noncombatant evacuation operations.

ATP 3-57.10 does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for any terms.

Chapter 1

Historical Populace and Resources Control Measures

Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by actions of the indigenous populace. Whether it is uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment or the illegal activities of sectors of the population, combatant commanders must consider populace and resources control (PRC) measures in the planning and execution of operations.

PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the range of military operations. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

Planning PRC measures occurs for every mission and in all environments. The extent of PRC measures that may be implemented is based on the operational environment in which military forces are employed. When U.S. forces are deployed in support of a HN, the sovereignty of the legitimate government to govern over the people and resources within its borders is upheld and strengthened by U.S. PRC policy. In the absence of a sovereign government, implementation of PRC policy begins with the establishment of an interim governing plan that is executed through the host nation (HN), military, or a transitional government. PRC measures implemented at the operational and tactical levels result from policy developed at national strategic and theater strategic levels.

HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS

The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.

Winston Churchill

1-1. Combatant commanders have employed PRC operations since the first recorded history of military conquest. Military government techniques developed by the Persians, the Greeks (during the reign of Alexander the Great), and, later, the Romans were the basis for the administration of occupied territory by military forces in the 19th and 20th centuries. U.S. Army forces have a long history of imposing PRC in occupied territory. The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848), the American Civil War (1861–1865), and the Spanish-American War (1898) provide historical examples of Army military governors proclaiming and enforcing PRC measures over occupied territory.

PRIOR TO THE 19TH CENTURY

1-2. Examples of various military conquests and the development of empires based on controlling territory, populations, and resources can be found in the millennia before the Common Era (B.C.E). The earliest occupations were conducted mainly to secure trade routes and commerce. The exercise of political control through native rulers was common until the time of the Assyrians in the first millennium B.C.E. The Assyrians were the first conquerors to organize occupied areas into provinces influenced by military governors. Perhaps the first real instance of military government, before the Romans, occurred under the Persians. They adopted and improved upon the Assyrian system of organizing the occupied areas into provinces. In twenty provinces, the Persians employed native personnel for the general administration and the collection of taxes under the supervision of Persian military officials.

1-3. The momentum that the Persians gave to the practice of occupation administration received tremendous movement from the Greeks under Alexander the Great, who practiced several military government techniques that are still employed today. He retained the Persian governors as the officers in charge of civil administration because they knew the country and local customs. He assigned key posts, such as financial officers, to Greeks. Not only did he insist upon respect for private property, including reimbursement for the debts and requisitions of his troops but also upon the continuity of local laws, officials, and customs. Alexander the Great encouraged the development of local resources and promoted the merging of human progress in all occupied areas.

1-4. From the founding of Rome in 753 B.C.E until the 4th century C.E., the Romans conquered and occupied all the lands bordering on the Mediterranean–Asia Minor, North Africa, and Europe, west of the Danube and Rhine rivers. Rome’s administration of occupied areas was a synthesis of all prior occupation practices. It soon became customary to entrust the government of such territories to a single Roman magistrate. Thus, by a natural transition, the word province became a technical term for conquered territory ruled by a Roman governor. The word provincials became a technical term for the inhabitants of such a conquered territory.

1-5. The objective of the Roman system of military government was not to restore the conquered provinces to a local or independent native government but to make all provinces an integral and indistinguishable part of the Roman Empire. One practice of Roman provincial government was in marked contrast with the modern era. Sovereignty over foreign territory was considered as passing to the Roman Empire by the fact of conquest.

1-6. Although, in theory, the Roman provincial governor had absolute power, this power was limited by customs, traditions, and written and unwritten laws. The primary mission of the governor was to restore and maintain law and order within his province by all necessary means, to include military force. Obedient subjects were allowed and encouraged to develop their own governmental responsibilities and to develop their own commerce and industry. It was a basic policy of the Romans to carry on governmental business of both supervision and operation by means of existing indigenous agencies consisting of desirable native personnel. The Roman military government staff was limited to the functions of supervision and technical counseling or troubleshooting.

1-7. Roman provincial administration was divided into two types—senatorial and imperial. Senatorial provinces included those areas considered pacified and secured that were controlled and managed by the Roman Senate. Imperial provinces, controlled by the Emperor, included areas that were geographically isolated or where the attitude of the inhabitants was uncertain, which required the presence of large numbers of troops to maintain order. Likewise, revenues from the provinces in the form of taxes were directed to either the Senate or the Emperor. There were exceptions, but taxes from the provinces were mainly used to maintain the military government system in the provinces and to fund the Roman general budget.

1-8. The imperial conquests of the great ancient civilizations had several objectives in common. While not all-inclusive, among these were the control of indigenous populations, protection of commerce and trade routes, and access to natural and produced resources. Through both established bodies of law and imposed proclamations (orders, edicts, and military force when necessary), provincial governors of the conqueror attempted to maintain order over the indigenous populace and manage resources.

1-9. There were few major occupations in the period after the Romans up to the 19th century, other than racial or religious movements and the colonial expansion of European nations into the New World, Africa, and Asia. In the few instances of occupation during this period, the impress of the Roman tradition was dominant. In the period after the Romans, the major advances concerning belligerent occupations were in the field of law. These advances, however, were more in the abstract or philosophical plane than in the practical conduct of nation-states.

19TH CENTURY U.S. ARMY OCCUPATIONS

1-10. The Mexican War brought about the first occupation of foreign territory by U.S. forces. Among his very first acts, Major General Winfield Scott put his views of conduct for occupying troops and inhabitants of the occupied country into the form of an order. He knew that an occupying power would be judged by the manner in which its troops treated the occupied population. Major General Scott declared “martial law” that supplemented the then-current U.S. law known as the Rules and Articles of War of 1806.

1-11. Major General Scott’s declaration addressed the conduct of both U.S. forces and the civilian population of areas of occupation. The order had the effect that General Scott desired. He felt that his first mission was to restore and maintain law and order. It was his conviction that he could not maintain law and order unless his troops and the Mexican citizens understood their duties and the punishment if they did not fulfill their responsibilities. General Scott believed in military government as an indispensable aspect of the occupying authority’s task.

1-12. Through general orders and proclamations during the campaign, Major General Scott addressed areas of civilian government administration. Populace controls were his main priority in order to maintain law and order, to protect unoffending inhabitants and their property, and to secure his extended lines of communication. Public health, education, and finance were addressed during the occupation of Mexico. A number of economic reforms were also instituted as a part of an overall resources control strategy that included revision to tax and tariff collection and the breakup of certain production monopolies.

1-13. The Spanish-American War resulted in the U.S. forces occupying Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Military governors, under the direction of an Army general officer, administered the rights of occupancy. The initial proclamations to the civilian populace had common themes regarding the intentions of the occupying force. In all cases, control of the indigenous populations and the resources of the islands were a priority of the occupying forces. Each of the proclamations addressed—

Maintaining the current laws and customs of the population.

Overthrowing the Spanish armed-authority rule of the population.

Providing physical protection to the civilian population and private property.

Promoting civilian prosperity.

1-14. Military governors administered Puerto Rico until May 1, 1900, when President William McKinley appointed the colony’s first civilian governor. Presidential appointees as governors continued until Puerto Rico was granted commonwealth status during the administration of President Harry Truman. Cuba remained under military government administration until independence was granted in 1901 and Major General Leonard Wood transitioned control to the civil administration of Cuban president-elect Tomás Estrada Palma.

1-15. Military governors administered the Philippines until the first civilian Philippine Commission was appointed by the President in 1900. Military governors were designated in specific provinces within the Philippines to deal with various tribal insurgencies on an intermittent basis until 1908. Populace control measures were a mission priority in dealing with these insurgencies. The Philippines were granted full independence in 1946.

20TH CENTURY APPLICATIONS

1-16. Historical applications of PRC operations in liberated territory and administration of occupied territory by military government both during and after World Wars I and II and the Korean War are well documented. Managing large populations of dislocated civilians (DCs), controlling black market activities, and implementing border security measures are examples of PRC operations executed by commanders to secure indigenous populations and enable protection.

1-17. One of the most valuable and successful elements during the Vietnam War was the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program, which was the Civil Affairs operations (CAO)/CMO aspect of American forces. In mid-1968, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam commander and his civilian deputy used CORDS as the implementing mechanism for an accelerated pacification program that became the priority effort for the United States.

1-18. The effectiveness of CORDS was a function of integrated civilian and military teams at every level of society in Vietnam. Success in meeting basic needs of the populace led to improved intelligence that facilitated an assault on the Viet Cong political infrastructure. PRC measures implemented denied the Viet Cong access to the population. Denial of access adversely impacted the insurgents’ ability to sustain operations by removing their ability to obtain supplies and other resources.

1-19. The post-Vietnam era up to Operation DESERT STORM saw relatively few short-term interventions by U.S. forces. After the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein turned against his own people. Dissident Shiites in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq were emboldened by Hussein’s defeat and revolted against his regime, but Hussein withheld or evacuated forces sufficient to secure his hold on power in Iraq. Hussein first crushed the Shiite rebellion in the south and then the Kurds in the north, which caused a major refugee crisis.

1-20. The Kurds in northern Iraq were particularly hard hit, and over a half million of them streamed north into the mountains of southern Turkey. Kurdish people in Turkey were in a desperate plight, facing disease, cold, and hunger. Kurds were dying by the hundreds and quickly overwhelmed the capacity of relief agencies to support them in the border areas. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded by initiating Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

1-21. The operation was based on three sequential mission imperatives:

Stop the dying and suffering in the mountains.

Resettle the refugees in temporary camps.

Return the refugees to their original homes.

1-22. The initial phases of the operation combined humanitarian relief and populace control measures to stabilize the Kurdish refugee situation in southern Turkey. United States European Command responded with Air Force assets and special operations forces (SOF). These resources were soon reinforced with CA and other forces awaiting redeployment in Saudi Arabia as the task organization matured. SOF’s organizational and reachback capabilities proved of great value in facilitating the integration of NGOs into the overall relief effort. Over time, useful working relationships developed among SOF, the NGOs, other allied soldiers in the encampments, and the Kurdish family and clan leadership.

1-23. As the humanitarian situation improved, attention shifted to returning the Kurds to their homes in northern Iraq. This required, in effect, yet another invasion of Iraq. The Kurds would not return to homes the Iraqi Army occupied, which meant coalition forces would have to provide a security envelope within Iraq into which the Kurds could resettle. U.S., British, and French forces entered northern Iraq with little opposition. Trusting the security situation, the Kurds left the mountain camps and returned to their ancestral homes. Civilian relief agency volunteers accompanied the return, and international efforts to replant, rebuild, and refurbish soon followed the returning refugees.

1-24. During the 1990s, the United States intervened militarily in a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that emphasized civil security and populace control. Operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti reflected changing policies with respect to military intervention on the part of both the United Nations (UN) and the United States. Even when led by the United States, operations normally transitioned to a multinational force under UN command. Peacekeepers found themselves providing humanitarian aid and attempting to enforce cease-fire agreements in failed states.

1-25. The United States found itself heavily involved in multinational efforts to bring peace to the Balkans, especially Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Yugoslavia had been a post-World War I construct that artificially conglomerated Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, and others into a single state. After the death of Yugoslavia’s communist leader, Tito, ethnic rivalries again emerged and the former nation of Yugoslavia disintegrated. Ethnic conflict ensued with Slovenia and Croatia successfully winning wars of independence during 1991. The Muslim plurality of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s attempt at independence was met with internal strife from Bosnian Serbs with support from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army. The Serbs pursued a campaign of “ethnic cleansing,” forcing Croatian and Bosnian Muslims from areas they wanted to control by means of intimidation and mass murder. This resulted in the dislocation of over a million people.

1-26. The UN deployed a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 to enforce agreed-upon cease-fires and to provide humanitarian relief. This force proved no match for the heavily armed Serbs. The Bosnian conflict continued to escalate with the Serbs laying siege to Sarajevo. In August 1995, NATO responded with a sustained air campaign against Serbian guns and heavy equipment surrounding Sarajevo, while the United States deployed forces to Macedonia to ensure that the conflict did not widen. A combination of international sanctions, NATO military action, and Serbian defeats by allied Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces resulted in the Serbs’ ratification of the Bosnian Peace Agreement (also known as the Dayton Accords).

1-27. The agreement authorized the deployment of a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) that was not sanctioned by a UN resolution at the time of employment. IFOR was charged with:

Compliance with the cease-fire.

Separation of the forces.

Withdrawal of forces out of zones of separation into their respective territories.

Collection of heavy weapons into agreed cantonment sites.

Safe withdrawal of UN forces.

Control of Bosnian airspace.

1-28. IFOR assisted in humanitarian efforts and the repatriation of refugees. Crime was rampant, and in the absence of a capable and reliable police force, allied soldiers soon found themselves deeply involved in law-and-order issues. PRC measures were a priority mission in the separation of forces and protection of the various ethnic populations from intimidation and reprisals. IFOR was followed by an unsanctioned, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), supported by U.S. forces that continued operations well into the 21st century.

1-29. Serbian nationalist aggression then turned on its province of Kosovo, whose population was overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian. Again, a campaign of ethnic cleansing atrocities was executed to change the demographics of the province and bring about a Serbian majority. Serbian actions caused another humanitarian crisis by forcing Kosovar Albanians to flee to the mountains, Macedonia, and Albania. The sheer mass of the refugee crisis threatened to overwhelm those countries. The UN and NATO responded with economic sanctions against the Serbian government and an air campaign targeting Serb forces and strategic infrastructure. Serbia eventually signed a military technical agreement with NATO that led to the deployment of a multinational peace enforcement military contingent.

1-30. Under Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, NATO divided Kosovo into five multinational brigade (MNB) sectors: MNB-North (French), MNB-Central (British), MNB-West (Italian), MNB-South (German), and MNB-East (United States) (see Figure 1-1, page 1-6). Other UN member states provided troops to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), including Russia and several former Soviet Union countries.

1-31. The mission priorities of KFOR included the following:

Establish a secure presence in Kosovo according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia.

Verify and enforce the terms of the military technical agreement.

Establish a safe and secure environment for refugees and displaced persons.

Establish a secure environment to permit international organizations to operate, for interim administrations to function, and for humanitarian aid to be delivered.

Help achieve a self-sustaining, secure environment to transfer public responsibilities to civil authority.

1-32. As Serbian security forces withdrew, ethnic Albanians initiated a wave of destruction against indigenous Serbs that equaled in method what they had experienced earlier during the Serbian ethnic cleansing of the province. Anything Serbian was destroyed or vandalized. In the absence of an effective police force, PRC measures dominated daily KFOR operations to establish law and order. Curfews, restrictions on assembly, crowd and riot control, movement controls, and border security were all used to institute order. KFOR soldiers also supported humanitarian relief efforts, repatriation of refugees, and liaison with allies, NGOs, and local officials.

1-33. By 2000, United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was adequately staffed at local levels to assume many of the civil administrative responsibilities. The UNMIK was established to promote the commercial development of the province, rebuild the economy, oversee local elections, develop a civilian police force, and generally improve the quality of life for all Kosovars while KFOR provided continued security. UNMIK is still active today.

RECENT OPERATIONS

1-34. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) (Afghanistan) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have dominated Army and Marine Corps deployments since 2001. Both operations’ strategic imperative was regime change—the former to remove the Taliban and its support to international terrorist organizations and the latter to remove Saddam Hussein and the Baathist party’s grip on power in Iraq and its destabilizing influence in the Middle East.

1-35. With the fall of Baghdad early in OIF, Iraq’s security apparatus collapsed and coalition forces proved too few to police the country and maintain law and order. The impoverished sections of the population saw their chance to seize something—anything—for themselves. Palaces were stripped of furniture, doorknobs, and electrical wire. Hospitals were stripped of diagnostic equipment and medical supplies. Power-transmission lines were toppled and the copper and other metals in them melted down for resale abroad. Government buildings were left as empty shells. There was no particular rhyme or reason for most of the looting, and the world viewed this through the media embedded with front-line organizations.

1-36. After these regimes fell, the Army inherited security requirements that were complex, arduous, and of indeterminate duration. As operations moved into the stabilize phase, forces became extensively involved in peacekeeping, occupation duties, and reconstruction. Counterinsurgent operations focused on securing and controlling the population, resources, borders, and critical infrastructure of the countries while conducting combat operations against indigenous insurgents and foreign terrorist fighters.

1-37. Reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations continue in both Afghanistan and Iraq today. Coalition forces continue to organize, train, and equip both police and military forces to assume internal security missions. Civil security remains a priority, while interagency partners work to reinstitute governance, rule of law, and the economy.

AUTHORITIES

1-38. A commander’s authority to institute PRC measures in a foreign country stems from an inherent command responsibility to protect the force and the indigenous civilian population—and may originate from a number of different sources, to include—

International law.

Intergovernmental resolution.

Diplomatic agreement or treaty.

Operation orders (OPORDs).

Rules of engagement (ROE).

1-39. The conduct of armed hostilities by U.S. forces is regulated by the law of armed conflict, U.S. statutory law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The law of armed conflict has two main sources: customary international law and treaty law (see FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

1-40. International law addressing the conduct of warfare is inspired by the desire to diminish the destructive effects of war by—

Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.

Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians.

Facilitating the restoration of peace.

1-41. Lawmaking treaties agreed to by nation-states, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, are one principal source of international law regarding warfare. Another principal source is known as customary law, which is unwritten law firmly established by the customs of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. A significant portion of international humanitarian law is considered customary. A third source of international law comes from intergovernmental resolution; for example, a UN Security Council resolution. Full-text versions of existing treaties, conventions, and protocols may be obtained from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (http://www.icrc.org/ihl).

1-42. With regard to PRC, international law identifies the necessity to protect noncombatants, public and private property, and cultural property during both international and noninternational armed conflicts. An occupying power is specifically charged by Article 43 of the Hague Convention to “...take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Coalition forces, in the initial phases of OIF, were considered occupying forces.

DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENT OR TREATY

1-43. Agreements negotiated by the Department of State (DOS), in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), and a foreign government where U.S. forces are forward-deployed delineate the legal status, actions, and authorities of those forces while stationed within the country. Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) provide the legal framework for day-to-day operations of U.S. personnel while in a foreign country. A SOFA is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement and is often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement. The SOFA may be unique in that it may contain authorization by the host government for U.S. forces to engage in military operations within the country.

1-44. Mutual defense or security cooperation treaties ratified by the United States and an allied nation also provide another source of authority for U.S. commanders to conduct military operations within a foreign country. In times of crisis, U.S. commanders may be authorized by a CA agreement with the allied government to exercise limited authority, when the local government is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its civil administration. The exercise of inherently governmental functions by U.S. forces may be established as part of a provisional authority or as an interim measure. This authority may extend to the conduct of PRC operations to facilitate the return of public order and security to the area.

OPERATION ORDERS

1-45. OPORDs contain the authority for the execution of military operations. Dependent on the mission, planned PRC actions are addressed in Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) of the order (see paragraph A-13, Appendix A). Planned PRC actions are coordinated with the staff protection cell and incorporated with the overall operational area security plan. Specific areas of PRC, such as DC operations, are coordinated with the various staff cells and integrated with the overall plan.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1-46. ROE are directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Standing ROE are published as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction to provide guidance to commanders on the development of theater- or mission-specific ROE. OPORDs tell troops what they should do, while the ROE instruct them what they can do.

1-47. The ROE authorized for a mission typically include specific instructions regarding the use of force. In addition to self-defense, ROE reflect multiple components, including guidance from higher authorities, the tactical considerations of the specific mission, and international law. Succinct and unambiguous rules are essential. Planning considerations for ROE with regard to PRC include—

Protection of freedom of movement of persons.

Search and detention of persons.

Use of force to protect property.

Inspection, seizure, and destruction of property.

Crowd and riot control.

Use of force in assistance to HN civil authorities, including law enforcement.

1-48. ROE must be continuously reviewed to ensure that they are clear and lawful, that they are sufficient to address the requirements of the mission, and that they provide the commander with the necessary powers to deal effectively with the threat and security environment.

Chapter 2

Populace Control

Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies access to the populace by the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include, but are not limited to, curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. DC operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

OVERVIEW

2-1. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. Control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability through unity of effort.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-2. Joint doctrine defines an operational environment as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Operational concepts describe the future operational environment as “uncertain and complex” in an era of persistent conflict. The operational environment evolves over time and changes due to military operations. Operational environments vary across the range of military operations based on a number of factors. Situational understanding develops with detailed analysis of the operational and mission variables of the environment. A component of this analysis is population-centric.

2-3. The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly with the type of mission and the operational environment. The operational environment includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the operational environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile further impacts the planning for and the execution of populace control measures.

2-4. Determining what populace control measures to employ requires a framework that applies across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. Measures are planned and integrated, reflecting the execution of a wide range of civil security and civil control tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational environments, such as—

Support of a partner nation as part of security cooperation.

Actions after a natural or man-made disaster as part of a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) limited intervention.

Peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.

Support of a legitimate HN government during irregular warfare.

Combat operations to meet the requirements of international law with respect to the indigenous population and establishing conditions that facilitate postconflict activities.

A postconflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities.

2-5. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment includes the development of information critical to the planning of populace control measures. While not all-inclusive, the following CAO planning considerations provide a common framework for populace control planning and execution:

What is the characterization of the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile)?

What is the status and character of the indigenous civil government?

Do the civil government public safety authorities have the capability and capacity to maintain public order within the area of operations (AO)?

What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, religious affiliations, and concentrations of the indigenous population within the AO?

Does a significant DC population currently exist?

What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, points of origin, directions of movement, and modes of transportation of the DC population?

What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the population (political, religious, economic, and private sector)?

What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, or hostile)?

What is the assessment of key IGOs and NGOs operating in the area of operation?

What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the civil government, particularly in medical, transportation, public utilities, and communications infrastructure?

What authority exists for the implementation of populace control measures?

Do the existing ROE address populace control, such as crowd and riot control, criminal activity, and looting?

CATEGORIES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

2-6. Joint doctrine describes types of joint operations within three categories. Although each type of operation is not doctrinally fixed to a specific category and could shift between categories, characterizing types of joint operations helps to describe the operation’s focused task or mission. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity.

2-7. The three categories of joint military operations are—

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations.

Major operations and campaigns.

2-8. The probability is that the execution of some form of populace control measures exists within all joint operational categories. In fact, a number of joint operations are population-centric, such as NEO or FHA.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE

2-9. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater campaign plan. Activities within this operational category encourage regional stability by shaping the security environment in peacetime in conjunction with allied or coalition military partners. National strategic policy, U.S. and international law, DOD directives, regulations, and the theater campaign plan frame the activities executed in this operational category.

2-10. The populace control measures that CAO planners consider during mission analysis in support of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities include—

Indigenous populace access control measures to areas and facilities occupied by U.S. forces during multinational exercises and training events.

Theater policies regarding the interactions of U.S. forces and the indigenous populace.

ROE regarding crowd and riot control measures.

Populace control authority granted by bilateral agreement with a partner nation in support of counterdrug operations.

Populace control advisory and assistance requirements in support of a HN in the execution of nation assistance missions.

2-11. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. As outlined in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), irregular warfare operations grouped within the military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence categories include—

Stability operations.

Counterterrorism.

Counterinsurgency.

Foreign internal defense.

Unconventional warfare.

2-12. SOF core activities directly correspond with these operations. Most irregular warfare operations are executed by SOF and supported by conventional forces. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, provides additional information on SOF core activities.

2-13. Populace control measures are a key enabler of the SOF core activities executed in support of irregular warfare operations. FM 3-57 provides additional information on CAO support to SOF core activities.

CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

2-14. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis (such as a NEO) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex campaign or major operation. Restrictions placed on the types of supporting operations, the size of force, and the duration of operations are characteristic of crisis response and limited contingency operations. The most common joint operations requiring detailed populace control planning and execution within this operational category are peace operations, NEOs, and FHA.

2-15. CAO planning considerations with regard to populace control measures in support of crisis response and limited contingency operations include—

CAO planning considerations for populace control (see paragraph 2-5 above).

DC planning considerations (see Appendix B) in support of FHA and CM.

NEO planning considerations (see Appendix C).

Mission specific ROE regarding populace control actions.

Legal authority to execute populace control measures.

Mission restrictions regarding the interactions of U.S. forces with the indigenous populace.

2-16. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement, and conflict prevention efforts (Joint Publication [JP] 3-07.3, Peace Operations). The character of each peace operation is unique, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the operational environment. Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the UN, another IGO, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

2-17. Populace control measures implemented during peace operations directly support the reestablishment of a safe and secure environment to set the conditions for progress toward long-term political settlement. The authority to impose populace control measures originates from the political mandate that establishes the force and is refined by mission-specific ROE. Most prevalent during peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, populace control measures may include—

Control measures for urban and rural areas, to include identification cards, biometric measures and databases, and barrier systems.

Establish and enforce curfews.

Control measures supporting the separation and neutralization of belligerent forces.

Establish indigenous population movement restrictions, to include travel passes, control points, licensing, and registration of vehicles.

Control the borders to prevent external support to a conflict.

Place restrictions on civilian assembly.

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

2-18. Successful combat operations defeat or destroy the enemy’s armed forces and seize terrain. The impact on the indigenous population of the operational environment in which combat operations occur can be devastating. Interruption of civilian supply activities, dislocation of civilian populations, and numerous casualties are just a few of the detrimental effects that major operations and campaigns involving combat may impose on an indigenous population.

2-19. Populace control measures executed during major operations and campaigns are designed to support the commander’s concept of operations (CONOPS) by—

Fulfilling the commander’s responsibilities under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.

Controlling and coordinating movement of DCs in the environment to support freedom of maneuver of the force.

Relocating the population as necessitated by military operations.

Controlling the movement of civilians in the environment where legitimate activities are conducted.

Minimizing civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

2-20. The term dislocated civilian, or DC, refers to several categories of civilians, such as a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Legal and political considerations define these categories. DCs are removed from or leave their homes or places of habitual residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or man-made disasters, or economic privation. Categories of DCs include—

Displaced person. A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively (JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance).

Refugee. A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (JP 3-29).

Evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations).

Stateless person. A person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law (JP 3-29).

War victim. A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

Internally displaced persons. Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (JP 3-29).

Migrant. A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution (JP 3-29).

Returnee. A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence (JP 3-29).

Resettled person. A refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement (JP 3-29).

2-21. DC operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) pertain to those actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard a displaced population in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, as in combat operations, social or political strife, or a hazardous material emergency, such as a chemical, biological, or radiological spill. DC operations may occur across the range of military operations or be the focus of a limited contingency operation, such as FHA.

2-22. Typically, the UN or other IGOs and NGOs build and administer DC camps, if needed, and provide basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when the U.S. military is requested to provide support, DC support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical treatment, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of DCs is the use of the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination can be accomplished. DC operations are often long-term and require resourcing that is normally not immediately available through DOD sources.

2-23. DC operations are the most basic collective task planned and supported by CA forces. The goals of DC operations are to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes, collection points, assembly areas, and camps in support of the efforts of the HN, NGOs, and IGOs. DC operations also include FHA support to the affected populace. The military police (MP) are a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations. The protection staff should be involved early in the planning process.

2-24. In rare instances, Army forces may be called upon to establish DC camps. In these cases, the force must take into account any legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for camps; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; security and crime prevention with the DC camp; and possible contracting requirements for construction. In planning DC operations, the primary factor is transition planning for the care and transfer of responsibility for the DC population to a controlling agency. Controlling agencies (for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], International Organization for Migration, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ICRC, or HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs—food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and for the supporting military forces.

2-25. DC plans support the commander’s operation plan (OPLAN) and require extensive coordination among operational, legal, logistics, interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.

Minimum standards of care.

Status and disposition of all DCs.

Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.

Cultural and dietary considerations.

Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

2-26. The CA tasks in DC operations support the commander’s CONOPS and administer DC control measures. Generally, CA forces’ tasks include—

Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.

Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.

Advising on the implementation of DC control measures.

Publicizing control measures among the indigenous population.

Assessing measures of effectiveness.

Participating in the execution of selected DC operations and activities, as needed or directed in coordination with internationally mandated organizations (for example, UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and ICRC).

Providing liaison to controlling agencies.

Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from implementing DC control measures.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

2-27. By Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, the DOS, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense (SecDef) and Health and Human Services, is responsible for the protection or evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. During NEOs, the U.S. Ambassador—not the combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander (JFC)—is the senior United States Government (USG) authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate an American Embassy and the order to execute a NEO is political.

2-28. Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity; large-scale evacuations of American citizens are rare. In recent years, evacuations have occurred on a regular basis—over the period 2002–2006, DOS authorized or ordered evacuation on an average of one overseas post every 3 weeks. According to data compiled by DOS, DOD provided assistance on only four occasions during this same period.

2-29. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat operations, NEOs can also include evacuations in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country and when evacuation is warranted to safe havens or to the United States because of civil unrest.

2-30. DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including—

Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.

Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.

Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered) by competent authority to evacuate, including—

Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to be evacuated.

Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.

Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.

Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

2-31. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in a HN to safe havens or to the United States. The United States uses military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request assistance from DOD in conducting evacuations to—

Protect U.S. citizens abroad.

Minimize the number of U.S. citizens at risk.

Minimize the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.

2-32. The CA supporting tasks in NEOs are of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. Generally, CA tasks include—

Advising the commander of the CAO aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including writing the CAO annex to the OPLAN.

Performing liaison with the embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area.

Conducting an initial CAO assessment of the AO to validate information and assumptions of the CAO running estimate and advising the commander of CAO-related issues affecting the NEO.

Supporting the operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.

Assisting in the identification of U.S. citizens and other evacuees.

Assisting in the receiving, screening, processing, briefing, and debriefing of evacuees.

Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.

Assisting in safe haven activities, as required.

Note: JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and FM 3-05.131, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, provide additional information on NEOs.

Chapter 3

Resources Control

Resources control provides security for the indigenous natural and man-made materiel resources of a nation-state, mobilizes economic resources, denies access to resources by the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy and criminal activity. Resources control measures include, but are not limited to, licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security, to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

OVERVIEW

3-1. Resources control directly impacts the economic system of a HN or territory occupied and governed by U.S. forces. Resources control measures regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of materiel resources. Controlling a nation’s resources is normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

3-2. Resources control, to include control of public and private movable and unmovable property, is most prevalent during a U.S. forces’ occupation of a foreign territory. However, control measures may be implemented across the range of military operations based on specific authorities granted to a commander for a particular mission. Effective resources control requires the combined efforts of all instruments of national power. The Hague Conventions of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) for the protection of civilians in time of war set forth rules relating to property in occupied territories. Territory is considered occupied when it is taken over by a sovereign power following a military intervention. In most cases, the period of occupation is temporary pending the signing of a peace treaty or the formation of a new government. Examples of occupied territory include the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II and the coalition occupation of Iraq after the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. International law recognizes five basic powers that a military commander of an occupation force possesses in relation to property in enemy territory:

Destruction.

Confiscation.

Seizure.

Requisition.

Control.

Note: The authority of an occupational force commander in the area of public and private property is situation-dependent. The treatment by the occupier of real and personal property is analyzed under a number of factors, including the nature of the property, the needs of the occupier, and whether it is owned by the State or privately. Legal review by the supporting staff judge advocate prior to the execution of any of the authorities granted to an occupational force is strongly recommended. For further information, refer to FM 27-10 and the Operational Law Handbooks available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-handbooks.html.

3-3. Destruction is to damage an item or system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition. Article 23 of the Hague Convention provides in part that it is forbidden to destroy the enemy’s property unless such destruction is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Damage may lawfully result from such activities as combat operations, movements, or activities of the military force such as constructing field fortifications, clearing fields of fire, or other necessary measures.

3-4. Confiscation is the taking of property for direct military use. No payment is required and the title to the property passes to the occupying government. As a general rule, only public movable property may be confiscated; however, the specific rules depend upon where the property is found on the battlefield or in the occupied territory:

On the battlefield, all public movable property may be confiscated—even if not for direct military use.

In occupied territory, only public movable property that is susceptible to military use may be confiscated.

3-5. Seizure is the taking of property for direct military use, but unlike confiscation, title to the property does not pass to the occupying government. Payment for the property is required at the end of occupation. Three types of private movable property may be seized:

Communications equipment adapted to the transmission of public information.

Transportation equipment.

Depots of arms and all ammunition.

3-6. Requisition is the acquisition of property needed for use by the occupation forces without regard to the willingness of the owners to provide it, as distinguished from normal procurement. Requisition requires payment of fair value for the property. It differs from seizure in four respects:

The items taken may be used only in the occupied territory.

Practically everything may be requisitioned that is necessary for the day-to-day maintenance of the occupation force.

Private immovable, as well as private movable, property may be affected.

The owners are to be compensated as soon as possible without having to wait for the restoration of peace.

3-7. In determining what property may be requisitioned, commanders must consider the sustainment needs of the indigenous population. Careful consideration of requisitioning expendable commodities—specifically, foodstuffs (including water, medical supplies, and clothing)—are necessary to reduce the detrimental impact on the population. Civilian relief supplies provided by a third-party organization receive special protection under international law.

3-8. Control encompasses the measures executed by the occupation force to prevent the use of property for the benefit of enemy forces or in a manner that may be harmful to either the indigenous population or the occupying force.

3-9. Resources control measures may be implemented in collaboration with a HN government during military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major operations. Authority for the execution of such measures originates from a formal agreement negotiated by the DOS, such as a SOFA, mutual defense treaty, or security cooperation treaty ratified by the U.S. and the HN government. In times of crisis, U.S. commanders may be authorized by a CA agreement with the allied government to exercise certain authority, which is normally the function of the local government. Civil administration is normally required when the indigenous government of the area concerned is either unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. Common resources control areas and measures are shown in Table 3-1.

HOST-NATION POLICY

3-10. The laws and regulatory policies of a HN are the basis for resources control measures implemented by U.S. or multinational forces during operations, especially during missions other than occupation. Formal diplomatic agreements and detailed ROE define the authorities of a commander in the execution of resources control measures. While these authorities may be limited by both HN and U.S. policy, commanders must be prepared to plan and execute resources control measures in support of an allied or partner nation. Examples of types of operations that may require implementation of resources control measures include—

Counterdrug operations in support of a partner nation during military engagement.

Consequence management as part of a FHA limited intervention.

Border security during peace enforcement operations.

Counterinsurgency operations support of a legitimate HN government during irregular warfare.

Support of a legitimate HN government during postconflict in a foreign internal defense environment.

3-11. Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced justly and firmly by the HN. U.S. forces will not execute these measures unless the requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the HN’s security forces, the HN has requested assistance, and appropriate U.S. authorities (to include the U.S. Ambassador) have granted such assistance. U.S. forces support the HN’s lead normally by facilitating interagency and HN government coordination and by providing advice, assistance, training, and security for HN forces executing these missions.

3-12. Implementing effective resources control requires the HN government to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. The HN’s message to the population must clearly convey that the control measures are necessary due to the security threat the HN is experiencing. Enforcement of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so the government establishes and maintains legitimacy among the populace. A well-crafted PRC plan limits control measures to the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the operational environment measures the effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population toward the government, and the impact the restrictions have on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.

NATIONAL RESOURCES

3-13. A nation’s resources include not only those properties and enterprises owned wholly or in part by the government but also those that are licensed, regulated, and leased. National resources include—

Public real property, government buildings, and facilities.

Public utilities, corporations, or monopolies.

Extractive property—petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and precious metals and stones.

Agricultural, forest, and fishing property.

Publically owned transportation and communications property.

Fiscal property used to deal with monies, securities (bonds, stocks, and so forth), and negotiable instruments.

3-14. Key to the control of national resources is the primary stability task: establish civil security. An essential task of establish civil security is border control and boundary security of the nation’s borders and points-of-entry and embarkation (FM 3-07, Stability Operations). Border controls regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials.

3-15. Understanding the operational environment is vital for the development of an executable operational plan. Resources control operations are conducted among the people, where military interaction with the local populace is inherent to the mission. Detailed civil considerations analysis provides the required information necessary for the supported commander to develop the CONOPS that drive the planning process. With regard to resources control operations, the commander’s CONOPS should address the following:

What are resources control measures attempting to accomplish?

What conditions, when resources control measures are established, constitute the desired end state?

What resources control measures are most likely to attain these conditions?

How will the force implement the resources control measures?

What military assets are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish enforcement of resources control measures?

What risks are associated with enforcement of resources control measures, and how can they be mitigated?

3-16. Effective resources control measures are attained through unity of effort by the HN government, interagency, HN security forces, and U.S. military forces. Control of national resources is attainable only through the unified actions of all instruments of national power at the strategic level with execution down to the tactical level.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

3-17. The term “food and agriculture” includes the production, processing, storage, and distribution of food, fiber, and wood products, plus the development and management of resources essential to these activities. Food and agriculture responsibilities are not limited to the planting and harvesting of crops but include every activity necessary to place agricultural commodities into the hands of the consumer.

3-18. There are two types of agriculture—subsistence and commercial. Both types of agriculture may exist in a country simultaneously:

Subsistence agriculture is the type of farming where farmers produce only enough food to support their own families and livestock. This type of farming is usually limited to geographically or historically isolated areas. A chronic shortage of food is, to some degree, a common occurrence in these developing countries.

Note: More common in developing countries is semisubsistence agriculture in which small farms are worked primarily to feed the farmers’ families but to also produce a small surplus. This surplus is sold at the local market to provide money to obtain certain items the families cannot produce and to meet other financial obligations.

In commercial agriculture, farmers concentrate on producing crops for the market, either domestic or foreign. Family food is produced simultaneously or purchased from the local market. Production for the market may be specialized or diversified.

3-19. Food and agriculture production and distribution directly impact the economic condition of a country based solely on the numbers of people employed either directly or indirectly. This includes businesses that provide farms with production inputs (seeds, fertilizer, and equipment), as well as industries that market, handle, process, store, and distribute agricultural products. In less-developed countries, the percentage of the population involved in agriculture production may range between 70 and 90 percent. In more industrialized countries, this percentage may range between 10 and 40 percent.

3-20. Resources control measures in the area of food and agriculture may impact civilian agriculture production, the means of production, and the processing, storage, and distribution of foods, to include the importation of food. Control measures may also extend to humanitarian organizations providing foodstuffs during a crisis or emergency. Objectives of food and agriculture resources control measures may include—

Denying access to food resources by enemy combatants.

Redistributing food resources to meet indigenous population humanitarian needs.

Organizing efficient processing, storage, and distribution facilities for food and agricultural products.

Maximizing local agricultural production capacities.

Disrupting illegal activity relating to food and agricultural resources.

Stabilizing market prices and rationing food and agriculture resources to meet the nutritional demands of the indigenous population.

3-21. The identification of effective food and agriculture resources control measures is a result of the information collected during mission analysis of the civil component of the operational environment and preparation of the CAO running estimate. While not all-inclusive, examples of information requirements include—

The dietary habits of the indigenous population based on tradition, custom, and religion.

The nutritional requirements of the indigenous population.

Estimated numbers and demographics of the population requiring special diets, such as—

Hospital patients and the elderly or infirm persons.

Pregnant and nursing mothers.

Children under the age of 5 years.

DCs.

Estimates of food stocks in storage.

Areas of production, collection, processing, control, storage, and distribution of food and other agricultural products.

Estimates of food and agricultural production capacity.

Knowledge of planting and harvest seasons.

IGOs and NGOs providing humanitarian food relief in the area of operation.

Prevalence of food and agriculture black market activities and hoarding.

Identification of food and agriculture civil authorities.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

3-22. Resources control measures in the area of critical infrastructure play a significant role in the functioning of civilian societies and institutions. Examples of critical infrastructure include—

Government facilities, to include records storage facilities and archives.

Medical treatment facilities.

Fiscal property—the central bank, national treasury, and integral commercial banks.

Cultural sites, such as monuments, religious shrines, libraries, and museums.

Facilities with practical applications, such as detention facilities and warehouses.

Power generation and transmission facilities.

Transportation grids and port, rail, and aerial facilities.

Water purification and sewage treatment plants and distribution systems.

Public safety and emergency management facilities and equipment.

Telecommunications production and transmission facilities.

Fuel production and distribution systems.

3-23. The long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of military forces to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Critical infrastructure resources control measures directly support the primary stability task—establish civil security. One essential task within this sector is “Protect Key Personnel and Facilities.” The initial response aim is to establish a safe and secure environment in order to enable the HN and other actors to sustain and further develop infrastructure capability.

3-24. Infrastructure control measures may extend beyond security to the regulation, production, and distribution of services. This is especially true in the area of public utilities (power, water, sewage, and telecommunications) and privately owned facilities (fuel, transportation, and medical). Based on the resources control authority granted to the commander, U.S. forces facilitate interagency and HN government coordination and provide advice, assistance, training, and security to the HN in the management of critical infrastructure. The restoration of essential services to the indigenous population is dependent on infrastructure resources control measures enacted by the HN and supported by military forces.

3-25. Planning of effective infrastructure resources control measures is a result of detailed mission analysis of the civil component of the operational environment. Analysis of the size of the population served, the criticality of the service, and alternate means of service influence the identification of security priorities and the degree of control required. The development of information critical to the security and management of critical infrastructure includes the following:

Size, location, primary function, and condition of—

National, provincial, and local government buildings and facilities.

Government records and archives storage facilities.

Cultural sites, monuments, religious shrines, libraries, and museums.

Public safety and emergency management facilities.

Location, ownership, equipment, capacity, and facility and equipment maintenance condition of—

Rail terminals, maritime ports, and airfields.

Public conveyance systems.

Road networks.

Utilities (power, water, sewage, fuel, and telecommunications).

Health services.

Location, capacity, and condition of border control points, points of entry, and embarkation.

3-26. Continuous analysis of the civil component of the operational environment is required to determine the effectiveness of infrastructure resources control measures and the impact on the population. Critical is the identification of second- and third-order effects of control measures having a detrimental impact on the population, such as—

Actual or perceived gaps in delivering essential services to a particular sector of the population.

Inefficiencies in the distribution of essential services.

Interruptions in the provision of essential services.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

3-27. Planning of resources control measures must consider illegal activity and the impact of such activities on the management of resources within the operational environment. Black market activities, smuggling, theft, and corruption of HN officials are examples of criminal activities that may cause a detrimental impact on the availability of critical resources. Criminals dealing in contraband items, such as arms and ammunition, pose a security threat to the population, the HN government, and the deployed military force.

3-28. Rule of law cannot expand or be sustained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their safety due to criminal activity. Resources control measures, specifically targeted to deter criminal activity, contribute toward building the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government or provisional authority.

3-29. An essential element in controlling criminal activity in the area of resources is border security and control. Border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings deters smuggling, movement of irregular forces into HN territory, and uncontrolled flow of DCs. Border security forces monitor, detect, and prevent crime in border areas, including illegal entry and the illicit trafficking of goods, services, and human capital.

3-30. Ineffective border control and management systems can frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized criminal activity. This often results in increased trafficking of illegal arms, goods, and human capital and impacts the ability of the HN to generate revenue through duties and import and export fees. Conventional military forces may be able to provide immediate border security; however, unless they are acting as an occupying force, they are an inappropriate law enforcement force.

3-31. Whether in a transitional military authority role or supporting a legitimate HN government, commanders plan for mitigating the impact of criminal activity through resources control measures. These actions may include—

Securing stocks of critical commodities from theft or pillage.

Supporting border security and customs enforcement.

Identifying and mitigating black market activities dealing in critical commodities.

Securing stockpiles of natural resources.

3-32. Satisfying information requirements pertaining to criminal activity relies mainly on threat and police intelligence. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment enhances understanding by—

Identifying areas of criminal enclave activity.

Detailing the culture, traditions, and means of operations of criminal organizations based on tribal or clan affiliations.

Identifying sectors of the population that traditionally support criminal organizations based on culture, tribal, or clan affiliations.

Identifying chronic shortages of critical commodities openly traded through black market activities.

Appendix A

Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations)

The PRC appendix serves three primary purposes:

The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a PRC perspective.

The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction needed to focus the effects of the PRC measures.

The assessment matrix displays the information needed to assess PRC measures.

The PRC appendix, Figure A-1, pages A-6 through A-13, also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the PRC appendix is derived from the CA area study or area assessment and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the appendix can be written directly from the CAO running estimate.

OVERVIEW

A-1. The PRC appendix succinctly describes the PRC measures that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command’s stated mission and the commander’s intent. The appendix organizes the information developed from the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The appendix also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement PRC measures.

A-2. The PRC appendix, together with its associated tabs and exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; and tabs expand appendixes. The G-9/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the PRC appendix and its attachments, when required.

A-3. Details of PRC support to the commander’s intent and CONOPS not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the PRC appendix. The appendix also describes the command’s CAO linkage to the next-higher command’s plan and its support of the overall joint force’s PRC objectives.

APPENDIX FORMAT

A-4. The PRC appendix follows the five-paragraph format of the base order—Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Signal. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the appendix. The following discussion provides doctrinal guidance for completing the PRC appendix.

SITUATION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-5. The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a PRC perspective. The situation paragraph of the PRC appendix does not repeat the OPLAN or OPORD situation paragraph. It is tailored to aspects of the operational environment that affect PRC. The situation paragraph describes how the PRC environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how PRC would influence friendly operations. Discussion of the subparagraphs of the situation paragraph follows:

Area of interest. Describe the PRC specific components of the area of interest defined in Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

Area of operations. Refer to Appendix 1 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

Terrain. List all critical terrain aspects that impact PRC. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. Critical PRC terrain includes borders, border crossing points, and ports of entry.

Weather. List all critical weather aspects that impact PRC. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

Enemy forces. List enemy maneuver and other capabilities that impact friendly PRC. State expected enemy courses of action and employment of enemy PRC assets. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

Friendly forces. Outline the higher headquarters’ plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designations, locations, and outlines of plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on interagency, IGOs, and NGOs that may impact PRC.

Other elements. List other elements in the AO that may impact the conduct of PRC operations or implementation of PRC-specific equipment and tactics. This section provides the PRC analysis of the civil component of the area of operation developed during mission analysis. This subparagraph includes a description of the general civil situation as it relates to PRC. It lists the major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how they relate to the overall PRC mission. When developing this information, it is important to think in terms of nodal interaction that ultimately leads to supporting the overall joint force PRC strategy, with its inherent measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. This information is normally recorded in the “civil considerations” subparagraph of the Characteristics of the Area of Operations paragraph [2.b.(5)] of the CAO running estimate. FM 3-57 provides a detailed discussion of the CAO running estimate.

Civil considerations. Using the memory aid ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events), identify critical civil considerations that impact PRC. Refer to paragraph 1.f. of the base plan or order as required. Subsequent subparagraphs under the civil considerations subparagraph contain discussions, in terms of ASCOPE, as analyzed in the CAO running estimate and area assessments of the nodes and relationships essential for success of the commander’s mission. (For further information regarding ASCOPE civil considerations analysis, refer to FM 3-57.)

Areas. This subparagraph lists the key civilian areas in the supported commander’s operational environment as they relate to PRC, and it approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the PRC mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are defined by political boundaries (districts within a city; municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

Structures. This subparagraph lists the existing civil structures, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams (traditional high-payoff targets). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that need to be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. This section identifies structures or infrastructure targeted for specific PRC measures.

Capabilities. This subparagraph lists civil PRC capabilities of the HN by assessing if the legitimate HN government is capable of sustaining itself through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture. It should also include whether the HN needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.

Organizations. This subparagraph lists civil organizations directly involved with the implementation of PRC measures. These organizations may or may not be affiliated with either USG or HN government agencies. They can be church groups, ethnic groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs.

People. This subparagraph lists civilian and nonmilitary personnel encountered in the supported commander’s operational environment directly involved with PRC measures. The list may extend to those outside the area of operation or area of interest whose actions, opinions, and/or influence can affect the supported commander’s operational environment.

Events. This subparagraph lists the categories of civilian events that may affect military missions. These events include harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications directly related to PRC measures.

Attachments or detachments. If not covered in the task organization, all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in civil-military operations center (CMOC) operations and PRC should be included (for example, in support of reconnaissance and surveillance plans; CA assets detached for liaison duties; and so on).

Assumptions. This paragraph includes—

Only part of an OPLAN, not an OPORD.

Critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments.

A statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the AO through PRC.

MISSION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-6. Cite the approved restated PRC mission resulting from mission analysis. Provide a short description of who (unit or organization), what (task), when (by time or event), where (AO, objective, grid location), and why (purpose, mission objective, end state). For example, The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division (who) plans, coordinates, and executes PRC measures (what) in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) GOLD in AO EAGLE (where) to accomplish foreign internal defense objectives (why) commencing upon receipt of this order (when) to support “country x” in executing their internal defense and development program (why/end state).

EXECUTION PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-7. The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of PRC and related CMO addressing the scheme of support, subordinate unit tasks, and any additional coordination instructions not addressed elsewhere. It outlines the effects the commander wants PRC to achieve. It describes the activities of the force executing PRC in enough detail to synchronize them by means of incorporating PRC tasks into the CAO execution matrix. The CAO execution matrix is normally Appendix 1 to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) of the supported unit’s OPLAN or OPORD.

A-8. The matrix shows when each PRC task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G-9/S-9 representative in the current operations integration cell (COIC) of the command monitor and direct PRC during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to execute PRC effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. PRC tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G-3/S-3 execution matrix contained within Annex C. The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The PRC tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the PRC appendix or in the appropriate tabs. Paragraph 3 includes these subparagraphs:

Scheme of support. Describes how PRC supports the commander’s intent and the command’s CONOPS. This discussion details the PRC CONOPS supporting the approved course of action that comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This discussion includes the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate unit(s), and how the principal tasks complement each other. This paragraph should include a discussion of PRC objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, and transition for each phase of the operation and a general timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in detail in the appendixes, where the key nodal relationship is further defined. The PRC discussion here must be finitely detailed in this paragraph.

Tasks to subordinate units. This paragraph lists the specific PRC tasks to the elements listed in the task organization and attachments or detachments subparagraphs of the task organization. The measures of performance for each task should be stated along with their corresponding measures of effectiveness. The measures of performance and measures of effectiveness detailed in this paragraph come from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate, which is referred from the Assessment Matrix appendix. Assessment of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are synchronized with the overall assessment plan of the G-3/S-3 contained at Annex M (Assessment).

Coordinating instructions. This subparagraph provides instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by SOP. This includes civil component-related commander’s critical information requirements and/or essential elements of friendly information, policy statements, special reporting procedures, protection guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the appendix, coordinating authority, and so on.

A-9. PRC support of the command’s identified primary stability tasks are detailed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an AO must execute the below-listed tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable. Per FM 3-07, primary stability tasks include—

Civil security.

Restoration of essential services.

Civil control.

Support to governance.

Support to economic and infrastructure development.

SUSTAINMENT PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-10. This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the PRC elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment for PRC key tasks and specify additional instructions as required for—

Logistics: Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

Personnel: Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

Health Service Support: Refer to Appendix 3 (Health System Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL PARAGRAPH INFORMATION

A-11. This paragraph details specific PRC instructions and information that are not covered in the base order. Specify additional instructions as required for—

Command.

Location of key PRC HN leaders.

Location and alternate locations of the supported command’s PRC point of contact.

Liaison requirements.

PRC liaison requirements to military organizations or Services.

PRC liaison requirements to HN agencies.

PRC liaison requirements to civilian organizations (NGOs, IGOs).

Communication and information networks.

PRC-specific communications requirements or reports.

Primary and alternate means of communicating with participating PRC civilian organizations.

Instructions regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management database.

TAB INFORMATION

A-12. Tabs include task-related plans, diagrams, synchronization matrixes, and civil overlays relating to specific aspects of PRC. The following are possible tabs for the PRC appendix:

DC plan.

Noncombatant evacuation plan.

A-13. Figure A-1, pages A-6 through A-13, shows an example of the PRC appendix.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS (TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K)

A-14. Tab A (Dislocated Civilian Operations) to Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) serves as the primary planning and execution document for addressing a dislocated indigenous population. DC populations may occur across the range of military operations but are most prevalent during FHA missions, peace operations, and combat operations.

A-15. The DC operations tab also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects directly related to the task that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the DC operations tab is derived from CAO mission analysis and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the tab can be written directly from a detailed CAO running estimate.

OVERVIEW

A-16. The DC operations tab succinctly describes the DC control measures that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command’s stated mission and the commander’s intent. The tab organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The tab also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement DC control measures.

A-17. The DC operations tab, together with its associated exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. The G-9/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the DC operations tab and its attachments, when required.

A-18. Details of DC operations support to the commander’s intent and CONOPS not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the DC operations tab. The tab also describes the command’s CAO linkage to the next-higher command’s plan and its support of the overall joint force’s DC objectives.

TAB FORMAT

A-19. The DC operations tab follows the five-paragraph format of the base order (Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Signal). Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the tab. Figure A-2, pages A-15 through A-22, shows an example of the DC operations tab.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K)

A-20. Tab B (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations) to Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) serves as the primary planning and execution document for addressing the care, handling, and disposition of a NEO population from the initial assembly area to arrival at a safe haven. NEOs may occur across the range of military operations but are most prevalent during FHA missions, crisis action missions, and combat operations.

A-21. The NEO tab also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects directly related to the task that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the NEO tab is derived from CAO mission analysis and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the tab can be written directly from a detailed CAO running estimate.

OVERVIEW

A-22. The NEO tab succinctly describes the actions that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command’s stated mission and commander’s intent. The tab organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The tab also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement NEO control measures.

A-23. The NEO tab, together with its associated exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. The G/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the NEO tab and its attachments, when required.

A-24. Details of NEO support to the commander’s intent and CONOPS not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the NEO tab. The tab also describes the command’s CAO linkage to the next higher command’s plan and its support of the overall joint force’s NEO objectives.

TAB FORMAT

A-25. The NEO tab follows the five-paragraph format of the base order (Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Signal). Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the tab. Figure A-3, pages A-24 through A-31, shows an example of the NEO tab.

Appendix B

Techniques in Dislocated Civilian Operations

DC operations are a special category of PRC and the most basic collective task planned and supported by CA forces. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from the effects of combat operations, natural, or man-made disasters. DC operations are part of the JFC’s CMO plan, but because of expertise, CA forces need to be prepared to be the lead elements in DC operations. This appendix addresses techniques for meeting those goals.

INTRODUCTION

B-1. People may become dislocated from their homes or villages for a variety of reasons across the range of military operations. The following are some examples:

Destructive forces (both natural and man-made) cause people from a devastated area to pursue sources of basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, security, and health care:

Anticipation or expectancy that basic needs will not be met by the existing government or infrastructure in an impending disaster cause voluntary or forced evacuation.

Political or ethnic persecution force portions of a population to seek a safer environment.

Movement based on a need for economic improvement.

B-2. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the JFC provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. The operational force commander integrates the JFC’s guidance with the ground tactical plan. At division and other subordinate command levels, the DC plan must—

Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.

Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher headquarters.

Guide the subordinate commands in handling and routing DCs.

Synchronize and integrate with the commander’s intent and selected COA.

B-3. DC plans support the commander’s OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational, legal, logistics, interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.

Minimum standards of care.

Status and disposition of all DCs.

Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.

Cultural and dietary considerations.

Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN TEMPLATING

B-4. Given the unique factors that characterize any population, it is impossible to create a template to determine how many people of a certain area may leave their homes in response to actual or perceived threats and disasters. In the absence of a template, DC planners conduct comprehensive civil considerations analysis using the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) to analyze the DC situation. They consider the centers of gravity, decisive points, and stability lines of effort in their analysis.

B-5. DC planners use this analysis to create a series of civil situation templates. The first of the civil templates describes civil dispositions under normal conditions and circumstances. The remaining civil templates describe the possible COAs that a populace, or portions of a populace, may take given certain criteria or stimuli. Ideally, the templates indicate the anticipated speed, direction, and flow pattern of DC movements, which are described later in this appendix.

B-6. DC templating is more of an art than a science. Planners often need to call on knowledgeable representatives of various CA specialties to fully understand the civil environment. Examples of additional information requirements that may result from initial mission analysis are—

What is the status and resiliency of the civilian support infrastructure in the area?

What is the level of preparedness for this type of situation (for example, how effective are the emergency management or civil defense plans and resources in the area)?

Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may leave their homes?

Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may remain in or near their homes?

What conditions or actions might mitigate a DC problem and how can the realization of those conditions or actions be influenced?

B-7. DC planning must be integrated across the staff. DC planners must make the DC templates available to other operational planners during problem-solving and decisionmaking processes. They must also coordinate with interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners as the situation and operational security requirements permit.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN MOVEMENT PLANNING FACTORS

B-8. DC planners must consider several variables, or factors, when creating a situation template for DC movements. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all DC movements regardless of type or size. Planners assess values for the variables, based on logical assumptions, until verified by observation. For DCs moving through denied areas, planners should consider requesting unmanned aircraft system support to determine actual values. DC movement planning factors include—

Distance factors:

DC road space (DCRS): Used in determining time length of the DC column.

Note: DCRS consists of two parts: (1) the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another DC, and (2) the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total DCRS = road space [individual DC] + DCRS column distances).

DC column gap: The space between two organized DC elements following each other on the same route.

DC traffic density: The average number of DCs that occupy 1 kilometer—expressed in DCs per kilometer (DC/km).

Length of DC column: The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps, measured from front to rear inclusive.

Road gap: The distance between two DC march elements.

Rate factors:

Speed: The actual rate of speed at a given moment.

Pace: The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.

Rate of march: The average number of kilometers traveled in any given period of time, including short delays or periodic halts—expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).

Time factors (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):

Arrival time: The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.

Clearance time: The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.

Completion time: The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated point.

Extra time allowance (EXTAL): Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass time.

Pass time: Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass a given point.

Road clearance time: The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section of road.

Time distance (TDIS): The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march.

Time gap: Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move past any given point.

Formulas:

Distance = Rate × Time.

Distance/Time= Rate

Distance/Rate = Time (or TDIS).

EXAMPLE: Determine TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h. Answer: TDIS = 20 km ÷ 4 km/h = 5 hours.

Note: An EXTAL of 3 hours is added based on assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly) composition of the DC column and weather conditions. It is anticipated that the head of the DC column will arrive at completion point in approximately 8 hours.

Completion Time = SP (Start Point) + TL (Time Length) + Scheduled Halts + EXTAL.

Time Length, Foot Column (Rate Formula) (Table B-1, page B-4, shows an example of individual space factors for day and night DC movement):

0 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0150.

3.2 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0187.

2.4 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0250.

1.6 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0375.

Note: The DC movement rate of 4 km/h during the day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. The cross-country DC movement rate of 2.4 km/h during the day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.

Table B-1. Individual dislocated civilian road space factors

DC Movement | Meters Per DC (Day) | Meters per DC (Night)
Formation | 2 | 5
Single File | 2.4 | 5.4
Column of Twos | 1.2 | 2.7
Column of Fours | 0.6 | 1.3

Note: Distance between DCs during the day is 2 to 5 meters—50 meters between columns. Distance between DCs at night is 1 to 3 meters—25 meters between columns.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN MOVEMENT GRAPH

B-9. A DC movement graph (Figure B-1) is a time-space diagram that visually depicts DC movement from start point to completion point. It is used during the DC movement-planning phase to integrate, coordinate, prevent congestion along the route-of-march, and deconflict route usage with the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road movement table. It shows the relative time and location of the lead and trail elements of each DC march-column at any point along the route, arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points, and restrictions and congestion in the network.

B-10. DC planners transfer information derived from march-formulas or obtained from DC march-tables directly to the graph. To complete the DC movement graph, planners must determine time-distance, arrival time, and pass time for each identified DC column based on data collected on organized DC columns.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN MOVEMENT TABLE

B-11. A DC movement table (Figure B-2) is a convenient way of transmitting time schedules and other essential details of a DC move. The following guidelines are used to assist in the completion of the DC movement format:

Only the minimum number of headings should be used. Any information common to two or more movements under general data paragraphs of the DC movement plan should be included.

Because the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. Including dates and locations may not be desirable.

If the table is issued by itself and not as an exhibit to a detailed order, the table must be signed and authenticated by the proper authority.

A critical point is a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions, coordinating for required support, and deconflicting, as required. It includes start points, completion points, and other points along a route where interference with military movement may occur or where timings are critical.

The DC movement number (column) identifies a DC column (or element of a column) during the whole movement.

To obtain due times for DC columns, DC planners transfer directly from the road movement graph or calculate using a time-distance table and strip map.

To obtain DC column clear times, DC planners add march-unit pass time to due time.

To complete the schedules for successive DC columns, DC planners add pass time plus graph time to due time.

MITIGATING THE DISLOCATED CIVILIAN PROBLEM—DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL TECHNIQUES

B-12. Once DC planners have identified the parameters of the expected DC situation, they must determine how to deal with the DC problem. Potential COAs include—

Prevention or decrease of dislocations.

DC avoidance.

DC movement control.

Any combination of the above.

PREVENTION OR DECREASE OF DISLOCATIONS

B-13. This COA involves executing populace control measures, such as a stay-put policy, curfews, and controlled evacuations. Each measure requires detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, NGO and IGO partners. Public information and military information support (MIS) assets increase the chance of success.

Stay-Put Policy

B-14. A stay-put policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes, communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stay-put policy requires citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food, water, shelter, security, and health care) during and after the period the policy is in effect (according to accepted international standards; for example, the Sphere Project). Mitigation measures conducted during pre-disaster emergency services programs (building individual and community survival shelters, stockpiling food and medicines, and conducting preparedness exercises) should enhance the willingness of citizens to abide by stay-put policies. Emergency response operations, such as the airlift of disaster relief into the populated area, may also be required.

B-15. The policy is designed to minimize civilian interference with military operations and, just as importantly, to minimize civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stay-put policy whenever possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations and the appropriate military command. This stay-put policy section below provides guidance on what such agreements should or could contain.

Stay-Put Policy Agreement—General Provisions

B-16. This agreement should state that, in matters concerning population movements, military commanders always deal through and with the appropriate national commanders or authority.

B-17. “Stay put” means that civil authorities do everything in their power to stop DCs in their own country—especially preventing them from passing from one country to another. Neighboring countries should cooperate closely to help in the implementation of this policy within common frontiers. If, for whatever reason, some movement does take place, the receiving country should do all in its power to hold DCs in appropriate areas and return them to the country from which they were dislocated as soon as circumstances permit. Any such movement might gravely prejudice national, multinational, or coalition operations and the possibility of civilian survival.

B-18. In crisis and wartime, indigenous national authorities retain full responsibility for their populations, institutions, and resources unless otherwise arranged for by a special agreement.

B-19. Evacuations of populations in times of crisis short of war may become a necessity to ensure the survivability of the population and, no less, to ensure freedom of military operations.

B-20. During crisis or wartime, civilian populations may start to move of their own choice and thus become DCs. Unless fully controlled by proper authorities and agencies, these movements may lead to chaos. National authorities shall take all possible steps—

To prevent unauthorized population movements.

To control and organize DCs should such movement occur.

B-21. Should refugee movements occur, commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. National law normally dictates whether and under what conditions a command can take control of DC movements. This may be necessary for the achievement of their operational mission and for the protection and safety of the population. If such control has been granted to commanders, it will be handed back to the proper national authorities as soon as possible.

B-22. All actions taken with respect to DCs must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and other rules of the International Law of War, especially the Hague Land Warfare Conventions.

Details of the Agreement

B-23. Commanders and national authorities must consider the overall problem of population movements against the background of the circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Panic and fear among the civilian population caused by weapon effects—including weapons of mass destruction—may induce large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and take to the roads. Should this happen, DCs would use all means of transport available. Unless controlled, they may—

Interfere with military operations.

Increase the risk to their safety.

B-24. All commanders must know—

The responsibilities of national authorities. The responsibility for all planning and implementation measures concerning population movement rests with the national authorities.

Their own responsibilities. Commanders will—

Contact and assist national authorities to coordinate military planning with national planning and national implementation of measures concerning the evacuation of the civilian population and the control of refugee movements, as appropriate.

Assist, on request, national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, as long as they are compatible with the existing operational situation.

Assume control of population movements if so granted as described in paragraph B-22, above.

Keep the appropriate national authorities advised of the development of operations.

Provide appropriate national authorities with information concerning the adverse effect of the refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the military forces under their command.

Work with national authorities to obtain information concerning the population movement situation and associated matters, which could have adverse effects on the preparation and conduct of operations.

B-25. In the event the military assumes direct control of the population, which is the last resort to ensure the safety of the population and the conduct of operations, military commanders will inform higher headquarters of the following:

Period of assistance.

Composition of military forces to be provided.

Mission command of these forces.

Powers granted to the commanders of these forces (should be the same as those held by equivalent national authorities and must in any case ensure the security of the military forces).

Any restrictions on the employment and conduct of military forces.

Logistic support for the assistance of military forces where special measures are necessary.

Curfews

B-26. Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during certain times or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal, practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures, including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.

Controlled Evacuations

B-27. Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or should not stay where they are. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat operations, as well as impending natural disasters, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may be appropriate to protect military operations (as in the evacuation of civilians from port areas or areas adjacent to main supply routes), to promote the efficiency of logistics operations, and to minimize the possibility of sabotage.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN AVOIDANCE

B-28. Some military operations may dictate that DCs can or must be ignored or bypassed to ensure military success. An example is rapid offensive actions in which maintaining momentum is required. Commanders should consider the use of MIS leaflets or loudspeakers to instruct or bolster the morale of bypassed DCs.

B-29. The decision to bypass or ignore DCs depends on the factors of METT-TC and may require the approval of the chain of command. Bypassed or ignored DCs must eventually be controlled by some military or civilian organization in the area of operations. Since bypassed groups of DCs may include enemy infiltrators attempting to pass through friendly lines, the military or civilian organization must be prepared to take the necessary security and protection measures when assuming this control.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN MOVEMENT CONTROL

B-30. DC movement must often be controlled to minimize interference with planned or ongoing military operations. Planners may use several techniques to control the movement of DCs. These techniques require detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, NGO and IGO partners. These measures used to control civilians include blocking, clearing, and collecting techniques (Table B-2).

Table B-2. Measures to control civilians

Control Measure | Effectiveness of Measure | Special Requirements | Personnel Resource Intensity
Blocking | Medium–High | Conducive Terrain | Low–Medium
Clearing | Low–Medium | Dedicated Vehicle(s) | Low–Medium
Collecting | Low–High | Special Training | High–Very High

Blocking

B-31. Roadblocks may be supported by checkpoints to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position.

B-32. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:

What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)

Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?

Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?

Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

Clearing

B-33. Clearing directs DCs from main supply routes, alternate supply routes, and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small-unit level by assigned Soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may be the shoulder of the road.

B-34. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for large-scale DC operations. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to channel or direct DCs in specified directions away from military operations, installations, or encampments until assimilated by more-organized DC operations, such as collecting.

B-35. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

The clearing technique is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or direct new or returning DCs.

External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs understand.

DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, potential for terrorist acts, such as car or suicide bombings).

A unit’s resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

Collecting

B-36. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource-intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Whenever possible, existing HN facilities should be considered for use as collection points.

B-37. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and NGO and IGO partners that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are collection points, DC routes, assembly areas, and DC camps.

Collection Points

B-38. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than 1 day to 3 or 4 days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).

Dislocated Civilian Routes

B-39. DC routes are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of military, logistics, or humanitarian assistance operations.

Assembly Areas

B-40. Assembly areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief, such as food, intermediate medical care, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war, hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division security areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps to allow them to continue to their intended destination or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

Dislocated Civilian Camps

B-41. DC camps are semipermanent, carefully planned facilities where administrators prepare DCs for the return to their homes, resettlement, repatriation, or other disposition. HN authorities, NGOs, or IGOs normally administer DC camps. U.S. forces may temporarily administer camps or provide humanitarian assistance when necessary. Designated personnel continue to detect hostile civilians who should be interned. Camp administrators also begin examining and monitoring the DC population for disease. DCs should receive identification cards, personnel records, food, clothing, and medical care in the camp. Camps are generally located in the division or corps security area or theater security area.

B-42. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans. Figure B-3 shows a typical DC collection plan.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN ROUTE PLANNING

B-43. Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

Selection of routes. All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movements, CA forces must consider the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.

Identification of routes. After designating the movement routes, CA forces mark them in languages and symbols that civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. MIS units, HN military, and other allied military units help mark the routes.

Control and assembly points. After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G-9 or S-9 coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G-4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.

Emergency rest areas. CA forces set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services.

Local and national agencies. Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons:

Conserves military resources.

Allows the use of civilian authorities, who normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people.

Reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

B-44. When routing DC movements, CAO planners should consider three fundamentals and four principles that govern routing. The three fundamentals that govern routing are—

Balance. The process of matching DC column characteristics with route characteristics. Balance ensures that DC traffic never routinely exceeds the most limiting features of a route. Balancing also identifies requirements for upgrading routes or ordering cautions for certain areas along the route. Route characteristics are identified during the planning process.

Separation. The process of allocating road space for movements to ensure that movements do not conflict. The goal of separation is to reduce the potential for congestion.

Distribution. The process of allocating as many routes as possible to reduce the potential for congestion. Distribution also promotes passive security by distributing and separating traffic.

B-45. The four principles that govern routing are as follows:

Assign highest-priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.

Consider sustainability of route network when assigning movements.

Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.

Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

B-46. Effective routing of DCs requires a detailed understanding of the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. Route classification and traffic control measures currently in use by military movement control agencies are applicable during the planning and execution of DC operations. These measures include—

Open routes.

Supervised routes.

Dispatch routes.

Reserved routes.

Prohibited routes.

B-47. Operational security considerations are important, because planned DC routes may be an indicator for the location of the main effort in the attack or defense. By attempting to minimize interference by DCs with military operations, planners may inadvertently disclose the location of the main effort. Because opposing forces seek to discover seams and boundaries to exploit them, DC planners should not consistently move DCs along seams or unit boundaries.

EXAMPLE OF DC ROAD SPACE USAGE CALCULATIONS

1. TASK. Visualize, describe, and direct DC operations.

2. FACT. The city of An Nasiriyah is key to the Corps’ river crossing operation. The population of An Nasiriyah is approximately 400,000.

3. VISUALIZE DC FLOW. Will DCs displace north as opposing forces move north? Will DCs displace south into path of friendly forces moving north? Will DCs displace east or west? Assess likelihood of DCs moving south into a fight or away from a fight. Assess percentage of DCs that will move north, south, east, or west. Divide the area of operations into zones based on operational phase for ease of computation and assessment.

4. DESCRIBE. Apply concept of elasticity to determine approximate DCs. Concept of elasticity states that 50 percent of an urban area must be destroyed before 20 percent of a given population departs the area.

a. Concept of Elasticity. Total population of An Nasiriyah is estimated at 400,000. If 50 percent of An Nasiriyah is destroyed, then we can expect 20 percent of the population to depart the area. Additionally, concept of elasticity states that food is less elastic than housing. A food shortage will cause people to depart an area in search of food.

b. Formula. 400,000 × 20% = 80,000 expected DCs departing the An Nasiriyah metropolitan area.

NOTE: Subtract percentage of total estimated number of DCs assessed to move north, east, west, or south. Out of 80,000 expected DCs to depart An Nasiriyah, 40 percent are assessed to depart with opposing forces displacing north, 20 percent to move east due to affiliation with co-religionists, 10 percent west, and 30 percent south to search for food.

c. Calculations.

80,000 × 40% move north = 32,000 DCs

80,000 × 20% move east = 16,000 DCs

80,000 × 10% move west = 8,000 DCs

80,000 × 30% move south = 24,000 DCs

d. Assessment. The 320,000 persons remaining in An Nasiriyah will be engaged with inform and influence activities to support the stay-put objective. Concept of elasticity suggests that availability of food is less elastic than housing and, if food is supplied in a timely manner, it will assist in keeping the population in place. Coordination for delivery of food and medical supplies forward into the vicinity of An Nasiriyah supports enforcement of a stay-put policy.

e. DC Column Description. Depict what DC columns will look like and the amount of road space the columns will use. Apply road usage formula in DC model using these three steps:

(1) Step 1. Determine optimum size of DC column (packet) based on control and sustainability (DC road network) considerations. Divide 24,000 by number of DCs determined to be optimum size of a DC column for control and sustainability.

Example: If 2,000 DCs is optimum size, then 24,000/2,000 DCs = 12 DC columns; if 1,000 DCs, then 24,000/1,000 DCs = 24 columns; if 500, then 24,000/500 DCs = 48 columns; if 250, then 24,000/250 DCs = 96 columns.

(2) Step 2. Determine road space usage of DC columns. Measurement is based on a 2- to 5-meter distance between DCs during the day and 50 meters between columns, and a 1- and 3-meter distance between DCs at night and a 25-meter distance between columns.

Example: To determine the road space requirement for 12 × DC columns of 2,000 (4 × 5,000 DCs) during the day, multiply:

(a) 4 × DC columns × 2 meters = 8 meters wide.

(b) Divide 2,000 DCs by 4 (column of four): 2,000/4 = 500 DCs per file × 2 meters separation between DCs = 1000 meters for one DC column.

(c) DC column of 2,000 DCs is approximately 8 meters wide and 1,000 meters long.

(d) Multiply DC column length x number of columns: 1,000 meters × 12 = 12,000 meters long, divided by 1,000 meters = 12 km.

(e) Add 50 meters between columns during day moves: 12 columns × 50 meters = 600 meters.

(f) Total road space requirement of all DC columns = 12.6 km.

(3) Step 3. Determine TDIS rates of DC columns.

Example: To determine TDIS rates, divide the distance between stops by the rate of march of the DC column in kilometers per hour (km/h). DC column movement rate is 4 km/h during the day.

(a) The TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h = 20 kilometers/4 = 5 hours. Add EXTAL if assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly, medical condition) composition of DC column and weather conditions warrant.

(b) Compute DC moves for all columns for total DC operations timeline.

(c) Multiply 5 hours × 12 DC columns = 60 hours or 7.5 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 5 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 3 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(d) Multiply 5 hours × 24 DC columns = 120 hours or 15 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 10 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 7 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(e) Multiply 5 hours × 48 DC columns = 240 hours or 30 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 20 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 13 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(f) Multiply 5 hours × 96 DC columns = 480 hours or 60 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 40 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 27 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

5. DIRECT DC MOVEMENTS. Based on the various DC operation timelines above, coordinate and direct DC movements on established DC route networks according to routing fundamentals. Apply a combination of blocking, redirecting, clearing, or collecting DCs, as appropriate. Coordinate, integrate, and regulate DC operations with inform and influence activities, movement control, medical command, maneuver enhancement brigade, and G-2. Coordinate and integrate IGOs and NGOs, as required.

COMBINED DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL METHODS

B-48. An analysis of METT-TC may indicate that several of the DC control methods may be required simultaneously or sequentially. In a port city, for example, the people in a predominantly neutral area may be ordered to stay in their neighborhoods and conform to such restrictions as curfews. Meanwhile, civilians in a hostile section of the city may be quarantined (no one may enter or leave without permission and escort), and those in the areas closest to critical port facilities and adjoining the main inland supply routes may be selectively evacuated.

TASK FORCE DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL

B-49. One technique for controlling DCs in a tactical area of operations is to organize organic forces into a task force specifically tailored for this mission, which is known generically as task force DC control. This task force has four imperatives:

Implement an integrated system of control.

Help provide lifesaving and life-sustaining care, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and water.

Help process civilians to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.

Transition control operations in an orderly manner.

B-50. Generic TF DC control is a combined arms force revolving around combined arms teams of infantry with MP, MIS specialists, and CA specialists or CA-trained personnel. Teams control civilians by the basic techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting as described earlier. Table B-3 depicts the basic equipment the various teams should have to perform their tasks.

Table B-3. Basic equipment of combined arms teams

Equipment | Block/Collect Team | Clear Team
Vehicles | MP vehicle and infantry or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support. | MP vehicle.

Control Materials

Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.

Captor spray riot control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.

Flash bangs, riot batons (riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.

Flex cuffs and cable ties.

Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.

Captor spray RCA with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.

Flash bangs, riot batons (riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.

Care Materials

Water and cups for thirst and RCA flushing.

ORT mixes and ingredients.

Emergency medical kits.

Humanitarian rations (emergency only).

Water and cups for thirst and RCA flushing.

ORT mixes and ingredients.

Local Security | Lethal weapons (organic). Magic wand metal detector. Undercarriage inspection device. | Lethal weapons (organic).
Barrier Materials | Concertina wire and gloves. |
Information | Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages. | Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.

B-51. The basic action element for blocking and collecting is the same:

A combined arms block or collect team of one infantry squad with organic armored vehicle (if mechanized).

One MP team with organic vehicle.

One tactical MIS team.

One tactical CA team or several CA-trained personnel.

B-52. The basic action element for clearing is the combined arms clearing team, consisting of one MP team with organic vehicle and one tactical MIS team. TF DC control may modify one or more combined arms teams based on the civil-military situation and/or its tasks, the terrain, and the assets available (for example, using an MP squad instead of an MP team as a basic building block of all combined arms teams and/or augmenting the teams with combat engineers).

B-53. Generic TF DC control may be augmented by any of five special purpose teams based on mission requirements. Each team is designed to accomplish particular missions requiring special training and/or equipment. The five special purpose teams are as follows:

Negotiation team. The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in intense negotiations that have a potential for creation or expansion of unrest or may result in highly adverse public perceptions beyond the battlefield. Negotiations include meetings with civil leaders but not hostage incidents—hostage rescue and similar means of resolving a hostage situation are beyond the scope of generic TF DC control. Instead, the goals of negotiation are to contain the incident or issue so that the populace is not adversely or unduly influenced by it and, if possible, to resolve it peacefully so that civilian lives are not unduly jeopardized, and to ensure the incident does not become a focus of the local or international news media.

Special reaction team (sniper). The primary purpose of the special reaction team (sniper) is to neutralize special threats effectively and safely as they arise in blocking, clearing, and collecting operations. Another purpose is to support the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by a team assigned to remove them from a crowd. However, apprehending a suspect in other circumstances is beyond the scope of generic TF DC control.

Special reaction team (armored vehicles). The primary purpose of the special reaction team (armored vehicles) is to conduct show-of-force operations (especially at roadblocks), protect task force elements and any civilians in their charge, and assist the task force, as needed, to include the execution of apprehensions in crowds.

Medical care team. The primary purpose of the medical care team is to respond quickly to civilian mass casualties, to begin triage and coordinate further medical response with the parent unit’s surgeon and medical operations center, or the equivalent, and to provide medical care above the level of emergency first aid, as needed by the task force.

Counterintelligence (CI) team. The primary purpose of the CI team is to exploit the potential for military and civil-military information from civilians encountered by the task force. CI agents are often fluent in the primary language of the area of operations or come with a translator. Moreover, there is a synergy to be gained when CI and CA work together. CA, CI, and MIS forces form a strong triad within TF DC control and for the parent higher headquarters.

PLANNING DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL MEASURES

B-54. The senior commander in the area of operations provides guidance pertaining to the designation of DC control measures. Typically, this guidance provides for bottom-up or top-down planning.

BOTTOM-UP PLANNING

B-55. In bottom-up planning, each subordinate unit commander selects routes for movement of DCs and tentative DC collection points within his designated unit boundaries. His staff sends this information up to the next-level commander for consolidation into his DC plan. The senior commander’s staff deconflicts duplication and sends the approved plan back to subordinate commanders for implementation.

TOP-DOWN PLANNING

B-56. The senior commander may designate and assign specific routes and collection points to subordinate units for implementation based on METT-TC. This action does not preclude the subordinate commander from adding to the plan as he sees fit. The subordinate commander’s staff forwards additional control measures to the senior commander to allow the senior commander’s staff to refine his plan.

B-57. Whatever the planning method, commanders responsible for implementing DC control measures ensure the measures are known to all participants and, as applicable, are fully resourced for their intended purpose. Commanders also ensure those military forces and civilians who staff DC collection points, areas, and camps are trained and rehearsed to perform their tasks.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COMMUNICATION

B-58. Persuading people to comply with the terms of a DC plan is often a difficult endeavor. HN public information programs and MIS assets may be helpful by providing mass media broadcasts, loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, signs (with culturally correct graphics), and leaflets.

B-59. The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the area of operations, are useful for controlling civilians in tactical situations:

Standard roadblock recording:

This is a roadblock.

For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.

Return to your homes.

Standard clearing recording:

Stay off the road or leave this area.

If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.

Return to your homes.

Standard recording for a DC collection point:

This is a civilian collection point.

You will not be harmed.

Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for everyone’s safety.

Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.

If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.

B-60. These words should also be printed in English and the predominant language of the area of operations on 3 × 5 cards, which can be used to “point and talk” by number. A well-prepared DC control site should have the same words in the same order on a large sign.

B-61. There are 10 words or phrases that every Soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of the area of operations. The 10 words or phrases are—

Go.

Stop.

Hands up.

Right.

Left.

Stand.

Sit.

Yes.

No.

Water.

Note: “Put down your weapon” and other phrases are also important, but “hands up” is a simpler way to express surrender, control, and related concepts.

TECHNIQUES FOR DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COLLECTION POINTS

B-62. The quadrant method is a technique used for designating hasty sites to control noncombatants and other groups. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose, as depicted in Figure B-4. In this example, West is designated as a civilian collection point; Northeast is designated as an enemy prisoner of war or detainee site; Southeast is designated as a casualty collection point; and Southwest as a multipurpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.

B-63. Each control point is located 50 to 100 meters from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. This distance improves the safety and security of each group, minimizes work force requirements, and reduces potential for terrorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including water cans or water bottles and large quantities of chemical lights, facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DC collection point.

B-64. Upon activation of a hasty DC collection point, designated personnel transform the site into a deliberate DC collection point. Five key tasks must be accomplished at a deliberate DC collection point. These tasks are illustrated in Figure B-5, page B-18, and the tasks are explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

LOCAL SECURITY

B-65. The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security should be established to protect the occupants, persons operating the collection point, and friendly troops adjacent to or passing by the collection point. Guards should be posted at the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.

PHYSICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE COLLECTION POINT—VEHICLE SEARCH AND DISLOCATED CIVILIAN SEARCH

B-66. This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain procedures. CA forces—

Ensure that all private automobiles, public conveyances, and the like (including livestock and carts) are parked outside or on the fringes of the collection point in the vehicle search area until they have been searched, and make all passengers dismount.

Direct passengers to the DC search area.

Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel search the vehicle. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it is used. When the search is over, the driver and the searchers together move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle holding area.

B-67. Many vehicles may contain household goods, suitcases, and other items. These vehicles should be searched for bombs and other dangerous items if the vehicle holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding area. Searching for contraband is not standard procedure, but it may be mandatory under the OPORD or if given special orders. Searchers inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will be secured and placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to retrieve any of the items in the vehicle. Searchers communicate as described in paragraph B-59 above. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles and pets as livestock if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. Designated personnel—

Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.

Vary search methods. A quick pat down is used for some people. A more invasive search is done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, it should be used to expedite the searches. Any property taken under the searcher’s control should be tagged and a copy given to the owner. A field property control card should be used, as well as an explanation card, as necessary.

Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, female Soldiers are used to search females, infants, and little boys. If a female Soldier is not at the collection point but is close enough to get there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The unsearched people are held separately until then so that they do not pose a potential danger to others. If a female Soldier cannot be obtained, a trained male Soldier should do the search using the back of the hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and if special security concerns require a search.

Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an over watcher (armed). They must be trained in these skills and to work together.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN PROCESSING AND PROPERTY CONTROL

B-68. This part of operating a deliberate DC collection point may be deferred for a while, but full waiver is not advisable as a general practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All persons go through stage one. Stage two may be deferred or delayed, reserved for certain people, or may not take place at all.

Stage One Processing

B-69. This is the quick screen to identify enemy prisoners of war and others (civilian internees and detainees) that must be segregated immediately from everyone else. This processing may be done without a translator. Searchers should be mindful of irregulars and infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and detainees are placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Normally, anyone who is causing a problem at the collection point is detained. Although civilian internees and detainees should be further segregated from enemy prisoners of war, there is rarely the time or resources available to do this.

B-70. Consistent with orders, searchers take control of all items that may cause harm to the team, friendly forces passing the collection point, or the DCs. In addition, searchers confiscate and tag all items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy.

B-71. If available, a Field Property Control Card is affixed to the vehicle or animal. The Field Property Control Card contains, at a minimum, the following information: the DC collection point number, the date, the seized item quantity, the seized item description, and a signature block for the collection point officer in charge (OIC) or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). A copy of the card is given to the driver.

Stage Two Processing

B-72. This stage is intended to help more finely categorize DCs (for example, determining if anyone is a U.S. citizen), to reunite families within the collection point, to identify persons of influence, and to obtain information (from equipment, weapons, papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. This processing is done when the time and resources are available—it is not a high priority. A translator is usually required.

LIMITED SERVICES (MEDICAL, FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, AND SANITATION)

B-73. Services at a DC collection point may range from immediate care (attention to life-threatening conditions) to ancillary care (including food), depending on need and resources. However, only the provision of water and immediate medical care are necessary to comply with international law. Services are not provided to a DC until after he has undergone the quick-screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed to prevent loss of life (death imminent). CA forces should—

Treat life-threatening emergencies, such as first aid for traumatic injuries and ORT for dehydrated infants.

Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available for this purpose.

Allow occupants to relieve themselves. CA forces should provide one place for males, and one for females, and basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine screen expedients) to permit and encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Occupants must be supervised.

Give out food only to occupants who have been at the collection point 24 hours or more. Food handed out more generously can become a “pull factor.” CA forces should also be aware that certain meal, ready to eat items might be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or culture, or may be too rich for malnourished people and possibly cause immediate sickness. (Yellow-packaged international humanitarian rations are safe.)

Provide other services consistent with the commander’s legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and requirements.

B-74. The following historical example discusses sanitation and is taken from notes of a CA Soldier who served in Operation DESERT STORM.

Lesson Learned During Operation DESERT STORM

When disposing of waste, the burning procedure used in Vietnam would not work because the Muslim population has the habit of cleaning themselves with water. Therefore, instead of waste, there was a high level of water or waste liquid. This material would not burn. Consequently, it was recommended to have a deep hole where the waste could be disposed of and allowed to dry out. This was usually followed by burning or burial.

ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY

B-75. Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), especially of infants, the elderly, and the sick or injured, is a constant threat. People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diarrhea, bleeding, and hot weather. CA forces must be aware of this threat and be prepared to respond to it effectively, especially when operating a DC collection point.

B-76. CA forces operating a DC collection point must be especially aware of—

Infants.

Nursing mothers.

Very thin people with sallow eyes.

Persons who are heavily bandaged.

Persons on litters.

The elderly.

B-77. People suffering from dehydration require more than just water. CA forces should consider the following information when providing ORT:

World Health Organization ORT formula:

1 quart of water.

3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt).

2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (for example, Arm & Hammer).

1.5 grams of potassium chloride (for example, Morton Lite Salt).

20 grams of sugar.

U.S. military field expedients for ORT:

Meal, ready to eat salt pack = 4 grams of table salt.

Meal, ready to eat beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar.

Meal, ready to eat cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium.

Water is most important, next is salt, then potassium, then sugar:

Water and salt alone are acceptable as an expedient.

In extreme cases, do not “load up” the patient with fluids, especially if the water is cold; the patient could vomit and lose even more fluid. Small amounts of room temperature water should be given frequently.

Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Ice chips or a wet, porous rag should be used.

Dehydration causes the blood pressure to be low. The patient should get in the shade with feet up, if possible.

Pedialyte® is a brand name ready-mix ORT formula for infants.

RESOLUTION OR DISPOSITION OF EACH DISLOCATED CIVILIAN

B-78. Once a DC collection point is operational, there are four possible outcomes for the collection point operators:

Retain control of the collection point, recognizing that moral obligations to DCs at the collection point increase with time.

Close down the collection point by releasing the DCs, if warranted by the tactical situation and other factors.

Arrange for movement of the DCs to another holding area, such as a civilian assembly area.

Hand off collection point operations to other operators (such as a support unit or the HN), which is the most likely outcome for combat units on the move.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COLLECTION POINT HANDOFF

B-79. As a unit moves out of an area, it must be prepared to hand off (transition) any active DC collection point to follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces may or may not include trained CA forces. In either case, the outgoing unit must be prepared to fully brief the follow-on forces on the operation of the collection point.

BRIEFING

B-80. The DC collection point OIC or NCOIC should personally brief the OIC or NCOIC of follow-on forces. He should note the date-time group of the handoff; the name, rank, and position of the person to whom the handoff was made; and a summary of the information provided. The transition briefing should cover—

Enemy prisoners of war.

U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers.

Civilian internees and detainees.

Civilians who are U.S. citizens or contractors.

Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence.

The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed information) as they concern threats to the DC collection point.

Medical emergencies.

Controlled property.

Any special, additional information peculiar to the DC collection point.

CONTROLLED PROPERTY

B-81. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, hand it over to other forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of the DC collection point), or a combination of all three. Unit commanders act according to their moral and legal obligations, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

Retaining Control

B-82. If units take the property with them (it must be taken if no one signs for it and return is not an option), they should give the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In), explain the unit’s intention for the property, and explain the owner’s rights and procedure requirements for compensation. This reiteration of rights is intended to reassure the owners and may be needed to ensure a smooth handoff.

Transferring Control

B-83. To transfer control of the property, units must fill out a property control register listing all the items controlled and have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items and a copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161.

EVACUATION PLANNING

B-84. Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be considered as a last resort. U.S. doctrine states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, CA planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include—

Transportation. CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.

Security. CA forces assist the G-2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.

Documentation. In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing, as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique, CA forces may prepare a manifest that lists evacuees for movement.

Briefings. Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement schedules.

Rations. For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.

Health care. The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The public health team or surgeon’s staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Return. Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees’ eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMP CONSIDERATIONS

B-85. Successful camp operations depend upon many considerations that CA forces must consider. These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

FACILITIES

B-86. When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on a semipermanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units may assist establishing camps. HN personnel or mandated NGOs or IGOs usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include—

Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.

Security.

Supply.

Transportation.

Information dissemination.

Liaison with other agencies.

CAMP CONTROL

B-87. Control of the DC population is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations under international law, CA forces ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA forces must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp administrators serve as the single point of contact, coordinating all camp matters within the camp and with outside organizations or agencies. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMP LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION

B-88. The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control measures. It also allows for the efficient administration of the camp and its population. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials are necessary when camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable—for example, hotels, schools, halls, theaters, vacant warehouses, unused factories, or workers’ camps. CA forces must avoid those sites near vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution, and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

B-89. The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or to separate compounds for ease of administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp headquarters, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA forces must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.

B-90. CA forces must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the—

Local climate.

Anticipated permanency of the camp.

Number of camps to be constructed.

Availability of local materials.

Extent of available military resources and assistance.

B-91. Whenever possible, the DCs, local agencies, or government employees should construct the camp. Local sources provide materials whenever possible according to legal limitations. The supporting command’s logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

ADMINISTRATION OF DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMPS

B-92. Because of the large number of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, the use of HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA forces organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general lawlessness because of their destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by—

Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.

Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).

Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.

Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.

Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.

Quickly establishing contact with civilian agencies for aid and family reunification.

SCREENING

B-93. Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA forces can perform this function. They must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration—for example, police officers, schoolteachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

B-94. The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

SUPPLY

B-95. The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water, clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and security assistance officers can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. IGOs and NGOs may also be useful. Support from U.S. military stocks should only be considered as a last resort, however, and supply specialists should not rely upon that support.

SECURITY

B-96. The camp security officer provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a detention facility.

TRANSPORTATION

B-97. The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever possible.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

B-98. In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. An example of barracks rules is shown in Figure B-6, page B-26. CA public information teams and area MIS units may be able to assist.

LIAISON

B-99. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. USG and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and charitable organizations may help in relief and assistance operations.

DISPOSITION

B-100. The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority coordinated with HN authorities, NGOs, and IGOs having mandated authority.

Appendix C

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Techniques

INTRODUCTION

C-1. Executive Order 12656 delegates responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens to the DOS and directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing plans. The Chief of Mission (COM), normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS OIC, has primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every American Embassy must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP), of which one section covers the U.S. military NEO plan.

C-2. DOS evacuates staff, dependents, private American citizens, and designated other persons or categories of persons in response to various crises, including civil strife, enemy incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity and can involve—

Authorized departure of embassy staff and dependents.

Ordered departure of embassy staff and dependents.

Assisted departure of American citizens.

Assisted departure of authorized other persons (HN nationals or third-country nationals).

C-3. When authorizing departure, DOS grants permission to nonemergency embassy staff and all dependents to voluntarily depart the country at U.S. government expense. In contrast, when DOS orders departure, DOS directs nonemergency embassy staff and all dependents to leave the country. The number and type of embassy staff and dependents actually departing a country can vary greatly depending on the size of the embassy, the nature of the crisis, and the type of departure. For example, evacuations can range from massive, complex events like the safe extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and family members from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, to the relatively small-scale evacuation from Conakry, Guinea, in February 2007 during a period of civil strife. The latter involved flying a few dozen people (dependents of American Embassy staff, DOS employees temporarily deployed to the embassy, and private American citizens) to a nearby city in another West African country.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

C-4. The geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are tasked to maintain contingency plans for the support of DOS should such assistance be ordered by the SecDef. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. CA planners assigned to the GCC staff, CA planning teams augmenting these staffs, and civil-military support elements deployed to various embassies throughout the GCC’s area of responsibility contribute to the planning process. NEO planning at the GCC level may be a consideration within a directed contingency plan, a directed separate NEO contingency plan for a specific country, or conducted during crisis action.

C-5. Coordination and integration with the American Embassy EAP is critical in the development of an executable NEO plan. CAO planning considerations include the analysis of several key aspects of the NEO, specifically—

The assessment of the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, hostile).

The country or area designated as an intermediate staging base (ISB) for the operation (if used).

The country or area designated as a temporary safe haven (if required).

C-6. The development of the CAO running estimate and its maintenance throughout the operation is a critical task. The CAO staff’s mission analysis of the various NEO designated areas concentrates on the civil component and with those aspects of the indigenous population the joint force will interact. Determination of the type of operational environment and the root causes (man-made or natural) driving the NEO shape the analysis. The following CAO planning considerations provide a common framework for evacuation planning and operations:

What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, hostile)?

Who are the key HN personnel and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?

What is the availability of indigenous material and labor to support military operations?

What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, point of origin, direction of movement, and modes of transportation of prospective evacuees?

What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the HN, particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications infrastructure?

What is the status and character of the HN civil government?

What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the population (political, religious, economic, and private sector)?

What is the assessment of key IGOs and NGOs operating in the area of operations?

Do the ROE require development of a “no-strike list” and “restricted fire area” that includes cultural and traditionally protected sites and high-density civilian population centers?

What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the evacuation force to avoid confrontation with the indigenous population?

What is the ability of HN public safety authorities to maintain public order?

Has information regarding helicopter landing zones, concentration of U.S. citizens, air terminals, port facilities, and landing beaches been verified?

Have the screening and processing areas been identified?

What HN religious events, holy days, festivals, celebrations, or other significant cultural activities occur during the evacuation that could adversely impact the operation?

What HN religious or cultural sites, shrines, buildings, facilities, or other locations does the evacuation force need to know to avoid desecrating them and antagonizing the populace?

What civil liaison requirements exist?

What is the role of assigned or attached CA forces?

PREDEPLOYMENT

C-7. The GCC may decide to create a JTF to conduct a NEO or may task a subordinate Service component commander. As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party may consist of two elements—the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE is normally inserted before any evacuation site parties. The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and HN authorities (when authorized by the DOS) and establishes a communication link among the JFC, supported GCC, and DOS. Additionally, the supported GCC may want direct representation with the ambassador during a NEO.

C-8. The size and composition of the advance party is mission-dependent. The number of advance party members allowed and the insertion method is coordinated with, and subject to the approval of the COM. JP 3-68 details specific tasks the FCE and evacuation site party accomplish before the deployment of the evacuation force. Critical to the mission success of the advance party are—

Establishing liaison with the American diplomatic mission.

Establishing a forward command post that can be expanded to the JTF headquarters staff.

Providing a collaborative planning capability with the country team and reachback capability to the JFC.

Categorizing the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile).

C-9. CA staff members of the advance party, whether supporting the FCE or evacuation site party, normally execute the following tasks:

Conduct an initial assessment of the operational area to validate information and assumptions of the CAO running estimate and advise the OIC of CMO related issues affecting the NEO.

Recommend measures to minimize indigenous population interference with evacuation operations.

Maintain close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and essential tasks.

Identify and establish contact with IGOs and NGOs present in the operational area.

Identify sources of indigenous material and labor to support military operations.

Assist in ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, helicopter landing zones, airports, and ports.

Assist in the initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites.

Conduct civil reconnaissance to collect essential CAO planning information.

Identify the JTF requirements for supporting evacuee screening and processing.

C-10. The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, establishes the assembly areas, evacuation sites, and the evacuation control center (ECC). Site preparations are completed in coordination with the embassy’s country team and EAP. In the event that reconnaissance determines the proposed assembly areas and evacuation sites are unsuitable, recommendations to move preplanned sites are coordinated for approval by the ambassador.

DEPLOYMENT

C-11. The composition of the evacuation force is mission-dependent. The size of the main body depends on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation. Upon arrival of the main body, the advance party rejoins the headquarters. Deployment of the evacuation force may be executed directly to the HN or to an ISB before insertion to the HN. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under U.S. control. Ideally, the ISB also functions as a temporary safe haven, if one is required. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country.

C-12. The evacuation force (Figure C-1, page C-4) may consist of a headquarters, marshalling element, security element, logistic element, joint communications support element, and SOF. The command group normally executes direct supervision over a liaison team and the ECC.

C-13. CA forces assigned or attached to the evacuation force may be employed in a number of supporting roles. Based on CA’s core capabilities, the force is best used when tasked in support of the marshalling force, liaison team, or the ECC.

C-14. When assigned to the marshalling team, CA tasks in support of an assembly area may include—

Recording the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee.

Identifying evacuees not on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy.

Briefing each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the embassy, positive identification requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be transported according to embassy instructions to evacuees.

Completing a “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” for evacuees who refuse to leave.

Escorting evacuees to the ECC.

Providing liaison to HN security forces and government officials.

C-15. When supporting the liaison team, CA forces continue liaison activities with the embassy, HN, IGOs, NGOs, multinational forces, third-country officials, or other private sector organizations as required.

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER OPERATIONS

C-16. The ECC supports the DOS, which executes processing, screening, and conducting selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. The JTF should, however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required. Evacuee processing may take place at an in-country fixed facility, an air terminal, onboard ship, or at a temporary safe haven site. Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for reception and care of evacuees is implemented. The evacuation force commander’s primary responsibilities include providing overall security, maintaining order at the evacuation site, and supporting the ambassador’s efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees.

C-17. The ECC’s purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or to the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify identification, ensures that documentation is accurate, and verifies all information provided is current. Representatives from the embassy’s consular affairs section are present in the ECC to help determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees.

C-18. Evacuees may arrive directly at the ECC or be escorted to the site by the marshalling force from assembly areas. If evacuees arrive without escort, processing personnel verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation before allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. Figure C-2 provides a recommended ECC flow chart.

C-19. Control of evacuees is paramount for the ECC to operate efficiently. The processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation. Very important persons (designated by the ambassador and the on-scene commander) and emergency medical cases are provided individual escorts when available.

C-20. When assigned to the ECC, CA tasks in support of evacuee processing may include the following:

Within the reception station—

In conjunction with DOS representatives, receive, search, segregate, and brief incoming evacuees.

Maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact in the United States for notification.

Escort evacuees as required.

At the registration station—

Assist in the positive identification of U.S. citizens and the nationalities of other evacuees according to DOS guidance.

Refer evacuees with questionable identification to the DOS representative for final determination of evacuation eligibility.

Note: Foreign nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy or post or secure approval from the DOS staff before they can continue processing. The ambassador or designated representative is the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification.

Supervise foreign nationals until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC.

Assist evacuees in completing administrative paperwork required to evacuate.

Provide each evacuee or family group a copy of DD Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet, which should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center. (Refer to Appendix G, JP 3-68.)

Other duties as assigned within the ECC.

C-21. During the course of an evacuation, nationals of the HN or third-country nationals may request political asylum or temporary refuge. It is the policy of the United States to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in imminent danger the life or safety of a person. Until determination is made by DOS, U.S. forces safeguard those requesting political asylum or temporary refuge. The on-the-scene commander decides which measures can prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge. The DOS handles requests for political asylum on an individual basis through appropriate channels.

TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS

C-22. A temporary safe haven, designated by DOS, is a location in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require a temporary safe haven. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. If a temporary safe haven is required, the DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required.

C-23. The temporary safe haven force operates under the control of the JFC in coordination with the appropriate DOS representative. The force is organized like the ECC’s processing section. The force should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require the force to deploy earlier.

C-24. CA forces assigned or attached to the temporary safe haven force may be employed in a number of supporting roles. The CA force is best used when tasked in support of the reception and processing teams.

C-25. When assigned to the reception team, CA tasks include the following:

Maintaining liaison with local DOS representatives and other agencies that may be involved with the operation.

Briefing the evacuees on their arrival regarding—

Current political situation in the HN.

Description and operation of the temporary safe haven.

Further traveling options and arrangements.

Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.

Projected departure times for flights to the United States.

Restrictions applicable to evacuees at the temporary safe haven.

C-26. The processing team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC but should verify that all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct. CA forces normally are assigned supporting tasks within the administration section of the processing team. These tasks may include—

Receiving and registering incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives.

Maintaining a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. The roster should identify the nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact in the United States for notification.

Providing escorts for groups of personnel, very important persons, and emergency medical cases.

Providing assistance as needed for locating separated family members.

C-27. Movement of evacuees from temporary safe havens normally concludes at repatriation centers within the United States. Under emergency conditions, the Department of Health and Human Services is the lead Federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States and their onward movement. Ultimately, each Federal agency is accountable for assistance to its own noncombatant personnel.

C-28. DODD 3025.14, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, designates the Secretary of the Army as the DOD executive agent for repatriation planning and operations of DOD personnel. The Army is responsible for repatriation of DOD noncombatants. Upon formal request and authorization, the Army may also provide repatriation services to non-DOD personnel.

Glossary

SECTION I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AO | area of operations
ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP | Army techniques publication
CA | Civil Affairs
CAO | civil affairs operations
CI | counterintelligence
CIM | civil information management
CMO | civil-military operations
CMOC | civil-military operations center
COIC | current operations integration cell
COM | chief of mission
CONOPS | concept of operations
CORDS | Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
DC | dislocated civilian
DCRS | dislocated civilian road space
DOD | Department of Defense
DODD | Department of Defense directive
DOS | Department of State
EAP | emergency action plan
ECC | evacuation control center
EXTAL | extra time allowance
FCE | forward command element
FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance
FM | field manual
GCC | geographic combatant commander
HN | host nation
ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR | Implementation Force
IGO | intergovernmental organization
IPI | indigenous populations and institutions
ISB | intermediate staging base
JFC | joint force commander
JP | joint publication
JTF | joint task force
KFOR | Kosovo Force
km/h | kilometers per hour
km/hTL | kilometers per hour time length
MDMP | military decisionmaking process
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations
MIS | military information support
MNB | multinational brigade
MP | military police
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOIC | noncommissioned officer in charge
NEO | noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO | nongovernmental organization
OEF | Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OGA | other government agency
OIC | officer in charge
OIF | Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OPLAN | operation plan
OPORD | operation order
ORT | oral rehydration therapy
PRC | populace and resources control
RCA | riot control agent
ROE | rules of engagement
SecDef | Secretary of Defense
SFOR | Stabilization Force
SO | special operations
SOF | special operations forces
SOFA | status-of-forces agreement
SOP | standard operating procedure
SP | start point
TDIS | time distance
TL | time length
UN | United Nations
U.S. | United States
UNHCR | United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK | United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR | United Nations protection force
USAJFKSWCS | United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USG | United States Government

SECTION II—TERMS

civil administration

(DOD) An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

Civil Affairs

(DOD) Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations

(DOD) Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations

(DOD) Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

country team

(DOD) The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. Also called CT. (JP 3-07.4)

dislocated civilian

(DOD) A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 3-29)

foreign humanitarian assistance

(DOD) Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)

host nation

(DOD) A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

indigenous populations and institutions

A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its population (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (FM 3-57)

joint task force

(DOD) A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1)

operational environment

(DOD) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

permissive environment

(DOD) Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-0)

populace and resources control

Operations which provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, road blocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of PRC measures. Also called PRC. (FM 3-57)

stability operations

(DOD) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

uncertain environment

(DOD) Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (JP 3-0)

References

REQUIRED REFERENCES

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbols, 31 August 2012.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html>.

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army, 18 March 2013.

FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 1 December 2010.

FM 3-05.131, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 16 November 2009.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008.

FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations, 1 April 2008.

FM 3-39.40, Internment and Resettlement Operations, 12 February 2010.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011.

FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956.

ARMY FORMS

DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site <www.apd.army.mil>. DD forms are available on the Defense Technical Information Center Web site <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms>.

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In.

DD Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS

Most DOD Directives and Instructions are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html>.

DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, 27 June 1994.

DODD 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, 9 May 2006.

DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), 1 December 2008.

DODD 3025.14, Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens From Threatened Areas Abroad, 26 February 2013.

DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16 September 2009.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND OTHER PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 November 1988.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2 May 2007.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011.

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012.

JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 June 2007.

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007.

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 March 2009.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, August 2013.

JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 December 2010.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003, Center of Military History Washington, D.C., 1 June 2005.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents, 11 January 2008.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01D, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program, 30 April 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook for Emergencies, Third Edition, February 2007.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees, January 1992.

United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters No. GAO-07-893R, State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon, 7 June 2007.

United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters No. GAO-08-23, State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved, October 2007.

Index

A

areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), A-2, A-8, A-11, A-17, A-26

C

civil administration, 1-2 and 1-3, 1-8

Civil Affairs forces, 2-5 and 2-6, B-1, B-10 and B-11, B-18, B-20 through B-24, C-2, C-4, C-7

Civil Affairs operations (CAO), 1-3, 2-2 and 2-3, 2-7, 3-5, A-1 and A-2, A-3 and A-4, A-6 through A-31, B-11, C-1 through C-3

civil information management (CIM), A-5 and A-6, A-15, A-24

civil-military operations (CMO), 1-3, A-3, A-9 and A-10, B-1, C-3

country team, A-12, A-21, A-29, C-2 and C-3

D

Department of Defense (DOD), 1-8, 2-2, 2-5 through 2-7, A-7, A-16, A-25, C-7

Department of State (DOS), 1-8, 2-6 and 2-7, 3-2, C-1 through C-3, C-5 through C-7

dislocated civilian (DC), 1-8, 2-1 through 2-6, A-5, A-9, A-10 and A-11, A-14 through A-22, B-1 through B-25

F

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 2-1 through 2-3, 2-5, 3-3, A-14, A-23

G

G-9, A-1, A-3, A-10, A-14, A-19, A-28, B-11

geographic combatant commander (GCC), C-1 and C-2

H

host nation (HN), 1-9, A-7, A-16, A-25

I

interagency, 1-7, 2-6, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-6, A-2, A-7, A-9, A-12, A-16 through A-18, A-21, A-25, A-27, A-30, B-1 and B-2, B-9, C-3

intergovernmental organization (IGO), 2-3, 2-6, A-21, A-30, B-1 and B-2, B-6, B-8 and B-9

L

law and order, 1-2 and 1-3, 1-7

M

military government, 1-1

N

noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), 2-2 and 2-3, 2-6 and 2-7, A-23 through A-31, C-1 through C-3

O

operational environment, 1-1, 2-1 through 2-4, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-6 and 3-7, A-1 through A-3, A-6, A-8 through A-10, A-14 and A-15, A-17 and A-18, A-23 and A-24, A-26 and A-27, C-1 and C-2

P

populace and resources control (PRC), 1-1, 1-3 through 1-5, 1-7 through 1-9, 3-3, A-1 through A-13, A-15 through A-20, A-24 through A-31, B-1

R

refugee, 1-4 and 1-5, 2-4, B-7

rules of engagement (ROE), 1-7 through 1-9, 2-2 through 2-4, 3-3, A-11, A-20, A-29, C-2

S

stability, 3-1, 3-4, A-4, A-11, A-20, A-29, B-1

status-of forces agreement (SOFA), 1-8, 3-2

T

transitional military authority, 3-7

U

unity of effort, 2-1, 3-4

ATP 3-57.10

6 August 2013

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1319708

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.