This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html). To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp

*ATP 3-21.21 (FM 3-21.21)

*Army Techniques Publication
No. 3-21.21 (FM 3-21.21)

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 18 March 2016

SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION

Contents

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: ORGANIZATION

Section I – Operational Overview

Unified Land Operations

Operational Environment

Threat

The Six Warfighting Functions

Law of War and Rules of Engagement

Section II – Organization

SBCT Infantry Rifle Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)

Section III – Role of the SBCT Infantry Battalion

Section IV – Duties and Responsibilities

Battalion Commander

Command Sergeant Major

Executive Officer

Battalion Chaplain

Manpower and Personnel Staff Officer (S-1)

Intelligence Staff Officer (S-2)

Operations Staff Officer (S-3)

Assistant Operations Officer

Operations Sergeant Major (SGM)

CBRN Officer

Master Gunner

Battle Captains

Logistics Staff Officer (S-4)

Signal Staff Officer (S-6)

Special Staff

Chapter 2: MISSION COMMAND

Section I – Battalion Level Mission Command

Personnel

Networks

Information Systems

Processes and Procedures

Facilities and Equipment

Other Information Systems

Section II – Command Posts

Battalion Command Posts

SBCT Tactical Command Posts

Combat Trains Command Post

Field Trains Command Post

Facilities

Survivability

Operations

Communications

Systems

Section III – Information Operations

Military Deception

Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

Section IV – Planning

Commander’s Intent

Military Decision-Making Process

Military Decision-Making Process in Time-Constrained Environments

Troop Leading Procedures

Preparing for Operations

Executing Operations

Chapter 3: RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

Section I – Information Collection

Roles and Responsibilities

Other Information Collection Assets

Information Collection Process

Section II – Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance Fundamentals

Reconnaissance Organizations

SBCT Habitual Attached Reconnaissance Units

Reconnaissance Planning

Reconnaissance Handover

Reconnaissance Techniques

Forms of Reconnaissance

Section III – Security

Fundamentals

Security Tasks

Chapter 4: OFFENSE

Section I – Basics of the Offense

Characteristics of Offensive Tasks

Offensive Tasks

Forms of Maneuver

Combat Formations

Offense in Restrictive Terrain

Section II – Movement to Contact

Organization of Forces

Control Measures for a Movement to Contact

Planning a Movement to Contact

Preparing for a Movement to Contact

Executing a Movement to Contact

Search and Attack

Cordon and Search

Section III – Attack

Organization of Forces

Control Measures for an Attack

Planning an Attack

Preparing an Attack

Executing an Attack

Special Purpose Attacks

Section IV – Exploitation and Pursuit

Section V – Transitions

Transition to Defensive Tasks

Transition to Stability Tasks

Chapter 5: DEFENSE

Section I – Basics of the Defense

Characteristics of Defense

Defense Tasks

Forms of the Defense

Defense in Restrictive Terrain

Section II – Area Defense

Planning an Area Defense

Preparing an Area Defense

Executing an Area Defense

Section III – Mobile Defense

Section IV – Retrograde

Section V – Transitions

Consolidation

Reorganization

Continuing Operations

Transition to Retrograde

Transition to Offense

Transition to Stability Tasks

Chapter 6: STABILITY

Section I – Overview of Stability

Sources of Instability

Stability Principles

Phases of Stability

Stability Tasks

Section II – Planning Considerations

Situational Understanding

Planning

Operational Approach

Organization

Warfighting Function Considerations

Section III – Executing Stability Tasks

Establish Civil Security

Establish Civil Control

Restoration of Essential Services

Support to Governance

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

Section IV – Transitions

Transition to Offensive Tasks

Transition to Defensive Tasks

Chapter 7: SUSTAINMENT

Section I – Sustainment Functions

Conduct Logistics

Provide Personnel Services

Brigade Support Battalion

Sustainment Staff Responsibilities

Executive Officer

S-1 and Human Resources Support

S-4 and Logistics

Unit Ministry

Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Section II – Conduct Logistics

Organization of Forces

Plan

Prepare

Execute

Assess

Section III – Maintenance

Plan

Prepare

Execute

Assess

Section IV – Provide Health Service Support

Army Health System

Force Health Protection

Casualty Procedures

Section V – Provide Personnel Services

Personnel Management and Strength Reporting

Postal Services

Casualty Operations

Unit Reporting

Medical/Personnel Accounting

Chapter 8: AUGMENTING COMBAT POWER

Section I – Air Defense Artillery

The Threat

Passive Air Defense

Section II – Aviation

Air-Ground Team

Airborne Operations

Air Assault Operations

Army Personnel and Aircraft Recovery Operations

Aerial Reconnaissance and Security Tasks

Close Air Support

Close Combat Attack

Airborne Electronic Warfare Tasks

Air Movement

Air MEDEVAC

Planning

Preparing

Executing

Assessing

Respond to Downed Aircraft

Section III – Fires

Fires Cell

Fire Support Planning and Coordination

Field Artillery

JSEAD/SEAD

Section IV – Unmanned Aerial Systems

Chapter 9: ENABLING TASKS AND ACTIVITIES

Section I – Assembly Area Operations

Quartering Party Employment

Linkup

Section II – Battle Handover

Section III – Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Section IV – Combined arms Breaching

Breaching

Breaching Tenets

Breaching Organization and Execution

Gap Crossing

Wet Gap-Crossing

Dry Gap-Crossing Operations

Section V – Passage of lines

Forward Passage of Lines

Rearward Passage of Lines

Section VI – Relief in Place

Planning

Sequential Relief

Simultaneous Relief

Section VII – Site Exploitation

Section VIII – Troop Movement

Tactical Road March

Approach March

Appendix A: SNIPER EMPLOYMENT

GLOSSARY

REFERENCES

INDEX

Figures

Figure 1-1 SBCT Infantry battalion organization chart

Figure 2-1. Example rehearsal script

Figure 3-1. Information requirements

Figure 3-2. Information collection matrix

Figure 3-3. Information collection tasking matrix

Figure 3-4. UAS platoon

Figure 3-5. SBCT Infantry battalion scout platoon

Figure 3-6. SBCT Cavalry troop

Figure 3-7. CBRN Recon platoon

Figure 3-8. Reconnaissance handover

Figure 3-9. SBCT Infantry battalion zone recon

Figure 4-1. Organization of movement to contact

Figure 4-2. Establishment of a cordon

Figure 5-1. SBCT Example of a reverse slope

Figure 5-2. Forward defense

Figure 5-3. Defense in depth

Figure 6-1. Stability principles and tasks

Figure 7-1. Forward support company

Figure 7-2. Sample Stryker combat load

Figure 7-3. Sample Infantry platoon combat load

Figure 7-4. Battalion trains operations

Figure 7-5. Categories of evacuation precedence

Figure 8-1. Airspace coordination measures

Figure 8-2. Airspace management

Figure 8-3. Grid line method

Figure 8-4. Attack-by-fire method

Figure 9-1. SBCT Infantry battalion assembly area

Figure 9-2. SBCT Infantry battalion breach in open terrain

Figure 9-3. SBCT Infantry battalion forward passage of line

Figure A-1: The SBCT Infantry battalion sniper squad

Tables

Table 8-1. Command responsibility of air-ground operations

Table 8-2. Classes of UAS

Table 9-1. Linkup responsibilities

Table 9-2. Relationship between breaching organization and breaching fundamentals

Table 9-3. Stationary and passing unit responsibilities

Table A-1. Performance data for the M24 and M107 sniper rifles

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution will be unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-21.21, 08 April 2003.

Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.21 provides doctrinal framework for techniques for the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) Infantry battalion. This ATP provides employment of the SBCT Infantry battalion in decisive action.

This publication provides doctrinal guidance for commanders, staff, and leaders who are responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations of the SBCT Infantry battalion. This publication serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing, materiel and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures (SOP) for SBCT Infantry battalion operations. This publication supplements the doctrinal material found in Field Manual (FM) 3-96.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATPs contain techniques that are nonprescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. ATPs are intended to be used as a guide to supplement doctrinal material published in active field manuals. This publication outlines the framework that the SBCT Infantry battalion will operate separately or as part of a combined arms team. The publication includes discussions of doctrine that applies to all battalions.

Defined terms are identified in the text. Definitions for which this publication is the proponent are printed in boldface. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision of Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Terms for which this publication is the proponent are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. This ATP applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR), unless otherwise stated.

Unless this publication states otherwise masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing agency is the United States (U.S.) Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). Comments and recommendations can be sent by any means—U.S. mail, e-mail, fax, or telephone—using the format of Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Point of contact information follows:

E-mail: usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil

Phone: COM 706-545-7114 or DSN 835-7114

Fax: COM 706-626-2323 or DSN 835-2323

U.S. Mail: Commanding General, Maneuver Center of Excellence

Directorate of Training and Doctrine

Doctrine and Collective Training Division

ATTN: ATZB-TDD

Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410

Introduction

ATP 3-21.21, The SBCT Infantry battalion of the Stryker brigade combat team, discusses the techniques used by the Infantry battalion while conducting missions. These are techniques and are not prescriptive. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) condition will dictate how the battalion commander accomplishes his tasks. This manual provides the commander and his subordinates with an array of methods that can be used or modified.

ATP 3-21.21 has nine chapters and one appendix. The chapters consist of an organizational chapter and a chapter on offense, defense, and stability operations. Defense support to civilian authorities and defense support of civil authority (DSCA) is not covered. Throughout the chapters, tactical enabling operations are included in the discussions. The chapters and the appendix use examples and illustrations to show techniques that can be used. Doctrine is included only to the extent of understanding the context and relationships between techniques.

The following table compares the table of contents of ATP 3-21.21 and FM 3-21.21. The chapters and sections of FM 3-21.21 are organized based on the ATP. For parts of FM 3-21.21 that have no corresponding discussion in the ATP, the applicable FM is listed in parenthesis.

ATP 3-21.21: The SBCT Infantry Battalion | FM 3-21.21: The SBCT Infantry Battalion
Chapter 1 Organization | Chapter 1 Overview of the SBCT Infantry Battalion
Section I – Operational Overview | Section I. Mission and Key Operational Capabilities
Section II – Organization | Section II. Organization and Capabilities
Section III – Role | Section III. Battlefield Operating Systems
Section IV Duties and Responsibilities |
| Chapter 2. Battle Command
Chapter 2. Mission Command | Section I. The Art of Command
Section I – Battle Level Mission Command | Section II. Command and Control
Section II – Command Posts | Section III. Planning for Operations
Section III – Information Operations | Section IV. The Military Decision-Making Process
Section IV – Planning | Section V. Preparing for Operations
| Section VI. Execution
Chapter 3. Reconnaissance and Security | Chapter 3. Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance Operations
Section I – Information Collection | Section I. Overview of the ISR Function
Section II – Reconnaissance | Section II. ISR and the Decision-Making Process
Section III – Security | Section III. Integration with the SBCT’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets
| Section IV. Supporting the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Chapter 4. Offense | Chapter 4. Offensive Operations
Section I – Basics of the Offense | Section I. Fundamentals of Offensive Operations
Section II – Movement to Contact | Section II. Forms of Maneuver
Section III - Attack | Section III. Forms of Tactical Offense
Section IV – Exploitation and Pursuit | Section IV. Offensive Planning Considerations
Section V - Transitions | Section V. Transition Operations
Chapter 5. Defense | Chapter 5. Defensive Operations
Section I – Basics of the Defense | Section I. Fundamentals of the Defense
Section II – Area Defense | Section II. Types of Defensive Operations
Section III – Mobile Defense | Section III. Defensive Planning Considerations
Section IV – Forms of the Defense | Section IV. Sequence of the Defense
Section V – Retrograde | Section V. Techniques of Defense
Section VI – Transitions | Section VI. Countermobility, Mobility, and Survivability Integration
Chapter 6. Stability | Chapter 6. Urban Operations
Section I – Overview of Stability | Section I. Introduction
Section II – Planning Considerations | Section II. Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC)
Section III – Executing Stability Tasks | Section III. Controlling Operations
Section IV – Transitions | Section IV. Offensive Operations
| Section V. Defensive Operations
Chapter 7. Sustainment | Chapter 7. Tactical Enabling Operations
Section I – Sustainment Functions and Organization | Section I. Security Operations
Section II – Maintenance | Section II. Relief Operations
Section III – Army Health System Support | Section III. Battle Handover and Passage of Lines
Section IV – Human Resources Support | Section IV. Linkup Operations
| Section V. River Crossing Operations
| Section VI. Combined-Arms Breaching Operations
Chapter 8. Augmenting Combat Power | Chapter 8. Stability Operations
Section I – Air Defense Artillery | Section I. Stability Operations
Section II – Aviation | Section II. Types of Stability Operations
Section III – Fires | Section III. Planning Considerations
Section IV – Unmanned Aerial Systems | Section IV. Specific Considerations by BOS
| Section V. Techniques
Chapter 9. Enabling Tasks and Activities | Chapter 9. Support Operations
Section I – Assembly Area Operations | Section I. Characteristics of Support Operations
Section II – Battle Handover | Section II. Planning Considerations
Section III – CBRN | Section III. Pattern of Operations
Section IV – Combined Arms Breaching | Section IV. Sequence of Operations
Section V – Passage of Lines | Section V. Training Considerations
Section VI – Relief in Place | Chapter 10. Combat Support
Section VII – Site Exploitation | Section I. Fires and Effects
Section VIII – Troop Movement | Section II. Close Air Support
| Section III. Maneuver Support
Appendix A. Sniper Employment | Section IV. Air Defense Support
| Section V. Signal
| Section VI. Intelligence
| Chapter 11. Combat Service Support
| Section I. CSS Planning Considerations
| Section II. Trains
| Section III. CSS in the SBCT
| Section IV. Supply and Transportation Operations
| Section V. Maintenance Operations
| Section VI. Health Service Support
| Section VII. Reorganization and Weapons Replacement
| Section VIII. CSS from outside the SBCT
| Appendix A. Integration of Special Operations, Mechanized, and Light Forces
| Appendix B. Command Post Operations
| Appendix C. Sniper Employment
| Appendix D. Digital Division Supplement
| Appendix E. Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance
| Appendix F. Environmental Concerns and Compliance
| Appendix G. Road Marches and Assembly Areas
| Appendix H. Aviation Support of Ground Operations
| Appendix I. Air Assault Operations
| Appendix J. Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Conditions
| Appendix K. Media Considerations
| Appendix L. Continuous Operations

Chapter 1

ORGANIZATION

The primary mission of the SBCT Infantry battalion is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. The SBCT Infantry battalion can be deployed rapidly and can be sustained by an austere support structure for up to 72 hours of independent operations. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts operations against enemy forces in all types of terrain and weather conditions. The SBCT Infantry battalion must be ready to adapt to various environments. This requires bold, aggressive, resourceful, and adaptive leaders who are willing to accept prudent risks to accomplish the mission. This chapter will emphasize the role, organization, and capabilities as well as duties and responsibilities within the SBCT Infantry battalion.

SECTION I – OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

1-1. Complex environments shape the nature and affect the outcome of military operations. An understanding of the operational environment in which the unit fights, how the Army fights, and how commanders lead their units is required. The section briefly covers the key doctrinal concepts on how and why the Army fights. (Refer to Army doctrine publication (ADP) 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-2. Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations. This is done through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations are the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. The four foundations of unified land operations are initiative, decisive action, Army core competencies (wide area security and combined arms maneuver), and mission command (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

1-3. An operation is a series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (Joint Publication (JP) 1). A tactical action is a battle or engagement, employing lethal or nonlethal actions, designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include widely varied activities such as an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-4. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). The operational environment of the Infantry battalion includes all enemy, adversarial, friendly, and neutral systems across the range of military operations. The operational environment includes an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture of the local population. The operational environment for each operation is different, and it evolves as the operation progresses. The battalion must develop agile and adaptive leaders who can understand, adapt, and successfully operate within the current operational environment.

1-5. When the Infantry battalion is alerted for deployment, redeployment within a theater of operations, or assigned a mission, its assigned higher headquarters provides an analysis of the operational environment. That analysis includes the operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT).

1-6. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. Leaders use the mission variables to analyze missions. This analysis enables them to combine operational variables and tactical-level information with knowledge about local conditions relevant to their mission. The mission variables are: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations. Refer to ADRP 6.0 for more information.

THREAT

1-7. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies (ADRP 3-0). It is critical that the SBCT Infantry battalion understands the threat in their operational environment. To understand the threat the battalion must fight for information, conduct combined arms maneuver and security over wide areas.

1-8. In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend. An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). An adversary becomes an enemy when friendly forces take action against them. A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces. Land operations often prove complex because a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another. The SBCT Infantry battalion must understand which category the various actors fit into. Building relationships and trust is key to having neutral and adversaries from moving towards the enemy. The battalion must engage all of these actors.

HYBRID THREAT

1-9. The term hybrid threat has evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their targets. These may involve nation-state actors that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or nonstate actors using operational concepts and high- end capabilities traditionally associated with states. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities, making them particularly effective. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

1-10. Today and in the future, the SBCT will be called upon to fight and win against regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and criminal elements that employ unconventional and terrorist tactics, and hybrid threats that combine conventional, unconventional, and terrorist capabilities and methods to meet their strategic goals and political aims.

THREAT CAPABILITIES, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES

1-11. Current and future enemies and adversaries will seek to counter U.S. advantages in information collection capabilities, long-range precision fires, armor protection and mobility, communications, and combined-arms integration by employing a series of integrated tactical and technical countermeasures. Enemy tactical countermeasures will consist of deception operations, dispersion, concealment, and the intermingling with civilians in urban terrain. Complementing these tactical techniques, the enemy will employ technological countermeasures such as cyber-attacks and global positioning system jamming to evade and disrupt U.S. forces’ ability to develop the situation, seize the initiative, and consolidate tactical gains into favorable political outcomes.

UNIFIED ACTION

1-12. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). As military forces synchronize actions, they achieve unity of effort. Unified action includes actions of military forces synchronized with activities of other government agencies, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations through engagement. The Army’s contribution to unified action is unified land operations.

1-13. Army forces coordinate operations with unified action partners. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments (ADRP 3-0).

FOUNDATIONS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-14. Commanders can achieve strategic success by integrating the four foundations of unified land operations initiative, decisive action, core competencies, and mission command. The foundations of unified land operations begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative.

INITIATIVE

1-15. All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise (ADRP 3-0). Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. It originates in the principle of war of the offensive. This principle goes beyond simply attacking. It requires action to change the situation on the ground. Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To seize the initiative, commanders evaluate and take prudent risks as necessary to exploit opportunities. Initiative requires constant effort to control tempo and momentum while maintaining freedom of action. This offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to the Army’s operational concept and guides all leaders in the performance of their duty. It emphasizes opportunity created by developing the situation through decisive action, whether in offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authority’s tasks (refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information).

DECISIVE ACTION

1-16. Decisive action requires continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks. SBCT Infantry battalions are prepared to conduct any combination of these elements independently, or as part of a larger force. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.) The SBCT Infantry battalion is optimally designed to conduct decisive action through its equipment capabilities, task organization, and its Soldiers in every theater of conflict.

Offensive Tasks

1-17. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). They impose the commander’s will on the enemy. Seizing and retaining the initiative requires executing offensive tasks at some point even when conducting defensive tasks. They accomplish this through using mission command to direct and coordinate tasks that allow them to see the threat first, maneuver to a position of tactical advantage and finish decisively.

Defensive Tasks

1-18. A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). Successful defenses are aggressive and commanders use all available means to disrupt enemy forces. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses the defense to occupy territory and initiate the mass the effects on enemy forces to repel their assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

Stability Tasks

1-19. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief (ADRP 3-07). The SBCT Infantry battalion supports stability tasks by performing missions, tasks, and activities that support a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

1-20. Defense support of civil authority (DSCA) is defined as support provided by Department of Defense (DOD) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. DOD provided assistance include federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status). Civil authorities typically request assistance only DSCA tasks are conducted within the U.S. and DOD forces are always subordinate to civilian control. Army forces support civil authorities in a DSCA situation by performing four primary tasks (refer to ADRP 3-28):

• Provide support for domestic disaster.

• Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents.

• Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.

• Provide other designated support.

1-21. The Stryker vehicle is capable to support defense support of civil authority due to its mobility and platform specifications. It provides the ability to carry the support for its personnel and partnered forces. It can operate in the same areas as many of the vehicles the civil authority operate in.

CORE COMPETENCIES

1-22. Although distinct by definition, combined arms maneuver and wide area security are inseparable and simultaneous. Combined arms maneuver and wide area security provide the Army a focus for decisive action as well as a construct for understanding how Army forces use combined arms to achieve success in this contest of wills. As core competencies, combined arms maneuver and wide area security uniquely define what the Army provides to the joint force commander (JFC). The Army is organized and equipped to support the JFC through combined arms to cover vast distances for extended periods. The Army works to integrate all available instruments to unified action partners to achieve the desired outcome (ADRP 3-0).

Combined Arms Maneuver

1-23. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative (ADRP 3-0). It is using all available assets possible to keep the enemy off balance and to have a better situational understanding of your operational environment (OE).

Wide Area Security

1-24. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative (ADRP 3-0). Successful wide area security allows the battalion commander to better understand the operational environment and to better protect the local population and the unit. As with combined arms maneuver, successful wide area security must involve all available assets, resources, and services synchronized in partnership with other organizations facilitated by the battalions ability to provide security.

Mission Command

1-25. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADRP 6-0) Mission command has six fundamental principles:

• Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.

• Create shared understanding.

• Provide a clear commander’s intent.

• Exercise disciplined initiative.

• Use mission orders.

• Accept prudent risk.

1-26. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Mission command allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action.

Art of Command

1-27. Command is an art that depends on actions only humans can perform. It is a skill sharpened by experience, study, and observation. Commanding is more than simply leading Soldiers, units, and making decisions. Commanders strive to understand all aspects of the operational environment. They understand that operations affect and are affected by human interactions. Effective commanders must create a positive command climate that instills a sense of mutual trust throughout the command. The art of command comprises—

• Authority.

• Decision making.

• Leadership.

1-28. Authority refers to the right and power to judge, act, or command. It includes responsibility, accountability, and delegation. Decision making refers to selecting the most favorable course of action (COA) to accomplish the mission. Commanders apply knowledge to the situation, thus translating their visualization into action. Leadership refers to the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Commanders lead through a combination of personal example, persuasion, and compulsion. Through their decisions and actions, they serve as a role model to their units.

Science of Control

1-29. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission following the commander’s intent. Control is fundamental to directing operations. Commanders exercise control over forces in their area of operation (AO). Control is the process by which the commander follows up a decision and minimizes deviation from his concept. It entails supervision of all aspects of the operation, including synchronization of all systems and activities.

1-30. The commander’s mission command system, especially the staff, assists the commander with control. However, the commander remains the central figure. The science of control comprises—

• Information.

• Communication.

• Structure.

• Degree of control.

1-31. Commanders use the science of control to manage information. Information must be relevant to mission command: accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable. Relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative.

1-32. Commanders disseminate and share information among people, elements, and places. Communication is more than the simple transmission of information. It is a means to exercise control over forces. Effective commanders conduct face-to-face talks with their subordinates to ensure they fully understand and to receive feedback from them. Commanders use face-to-face communication to assess the mental and physical state of subordinates expressed in nonverbal means. Nonverbal means may include gestures, sighs, and body language. They may provide indictors on the effectiveness of the communication.

1-33. Organizational structure helps commanders exercise control. Structure refers to a defined organization that establishes relationships and guides interactions among elements. It includes procedures for coordinating among an organization’s groups and activities. Structure is both internal (such as the organization of the command post) and external (such as the command and support relationships among subordinate forces).

1-34. A key aspect of mission command is determining the appropriate degree of control imposed on subordinates. The proper degree of control depends on each situation and is not easy to determine. Different operations and phases of operations require tighter or more relaxed control over subordinate elements than other phases require

THE SIX WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

1-35. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADRP 3-0). All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. No warfighting function is exclusively decisive, shaping, or sustaining, but may contain elements of more than one type of operation. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.) Commanders use the following warfighting functions to help them exercise mission command.

MISSION COMMAND

1-36. The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). Mission command uses mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations.

1-37. In the SBCT Infantry battalion, the battalion commander is the central figure in mission command. He does this through his intent statements and enabling his subordinate commanders and leaders to accomplish their tasks in accordance to the intended purpose within the intent. Mission command invokes the greatest possible freedom of action to subordinates, facilitating their abilities to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively through disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. It focuses on empowering subordinate leaders and sharing information to facilitate decentralized execution. (Refer to Section III, Duties and Responsibilities, for more information on mission command.)

1-38. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander is provided with a full suite of networked-enabled, mission command capabilities that allow them to gain and maintain situational awareness of friendly units and enemy activity, in near-real time, and allows them to synchronize assets and warfighting functions at their echelon of command. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander has access to secure elements of information from the brigade through the squad level, allowing for situational awareness of their organic assets, adjacent units, and echelons above battalion level. This networked-enabled capability enables the commander with a reach- back capability for product, preformatted reports, information, and staff analysis support from echelons above the battalion level. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander has a mobile, command capability at the short halt from his Stryker command variant (CV) via secure voice, data, and network-enabled processes. Combined with the CV in the S-3 (battalion or brigade operations staff officer) section the battalion commander with various members of the battalion staff can form a tactical command post (TAC) that has the ability to exercise command and remain mobile. The commander has the capability to establish tactical operations center (TOC) command post and perform mission command and intelligence support team activities.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

1-39. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-0). The battalion commander concentrates combat power using movement and maneuver to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. Effective maneuver for SBCT units requires close coordination with fires and synchronization with Infantry operating in front of their Stryker vehicles.

INTELLIGENCE

1-40. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations (ADRP 3-0). These tasks are interrelated, require the participation of the commander and staff, and are often conducted simultaneously. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commander’s visualization and understanding of the threat, terrain, weather, civil considerations and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. The S-2 (battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer) section assists the commander in the conduct of mission analysis and with analysis of information. The collaboration between mission analysis and analysis of information provides better combat information that can be disseminated simultaneously throughout the SBCT often laterally and vertically.

The Intelligence Process

1-41. The design and structure of the intelligence process support commanders by providing Intelligence needed to support mission command and the commander’s situational understanding. The commander provides guidance and focus by defining operational priorities and establishing decision points and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

1-42. This process provides a common framework for Army professionals to guide their thoughts, discussions, plans, and assessments. The Army intelligence process consists of four steps (plan and direct, collect, produce, and disseminate) and two continuing activities (analyze and assess). Just as the activities of the operations process overlap and recur as the mission demands, so do the steps of the intelligence process. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information.)

FIRES

1-43. The fires warfighting function comprises tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires and joint fires through the targeting process. It includes tasks that integrate and synchronize the effects of these types of fires with the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). The SBCT Infantry battalion leadership must integrate direct and indirect fires in conjunction with one another from varying echelons of direct and indirect fire systems from organic, attached, and augmented assets.

SUSTAINMENT

1-44. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). The sustainment warfighting function includes the following tasks:

• Conduct logistics.

• Provide personnel services.

• Provide health service support.

1-45. SBCT Infantry battalion conducts sustainment in coordination with the logistical elements from the brigade support battalion (BSB) to include its habitual forward support company or its forward logistical element to ensure that sustainment needs are met.

PROTECTION

1-46. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatant and noncombatant), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational partners. It includes the following task areas:

• Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).

• Conduct survivability operations.

• Coordinate air and missile defense.

• Apply antiterrorism measures.

• Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

• Conduct personnel recovery.

• Conduct operational area security.

• Implement operations security.

• Provide explosive ordnance disposal and protection support.

• Provide force health protection.

• Provide intelligence support to protection.

• Conduct police operations.

• Conduct detention operations and resettlement.

LAW OF WAR AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1-47. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate following the law of war. The law of war, also called the law of armed conflict, is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 1-04.) Purposes of the law of war include:

• Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.

• Safeguarding prisoners of war, the wounded, the sick, and civilians.

• Making the transition to peace easier.

1-48. Each operational environment has specific rules of engagement. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Rules of engagement are a commander’s tool to focus Soldiers on mission accomplishment while complying with the law of war and acting consistent with national political objectives. Refer to FM 27-10 for more information.

SECTION II – ORGANIZATION

1-49. The SBCT Infantry battalion is comprised of three Infantry rifle companies, and headquarters company, and normally has a Forward Support Company (FSC) attached from the BSB. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-9.) Its combat power resides mostly with its three rifle companies—each with three rifle platoons, MGS (Mobile Gun System) platoon, mortar section, and sniper team. The battalion supports its combat power with its Scout platoon as the primary reconnaissance and security element, its mortar platoon to provide indirect fire support, its sniper squad, its communications sections, and it can be augmented with a FSC from the BSB to conduct sustainment.

Figure 1-1 SBCT Infantry battalion organization chart

1-50. The SBCT Infantry battalion has the ability to task-organize within itself to meet specific missions based on METT-TC. It can attach platoons to different companies to support main efforts, split its battalion mortar platoon into two sections, and attach the sniper squad to a subordinate company are some examples.

Capabilities and Limitations

1-51. The SBCT combines the mobility aspect of mechanized units while emphasizing and exploiting where the Infantry fight occurs. The following list highlights the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT Infantry battalion.

1-52. Capabilities are as follows:

• Conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in all types of environments.

• Infantry capitalize on the mobility of the Stryker vehicles to facilitate the Infantry to engage in close combat with the enemy.

• Seizes, secures, occupies, and retains terrain.

• Destroys, defeats, neutralizes, suppresses, interdicts, disrupts, blocks, canalizes, and fixes enemy forces.

• Breaches enemy obstacles as a combined arms team.

• Feints and demonstrates to deceive the enemy.

• Reconnoiters, denies bypasses, clears, contains, and isolates. (These tasks might be oriented on both terrain and enemy.)

• Quickly accesses SBCT and higher intelligence databases while on the move.

• Maintains a clear picture of friendly force locations.

• Communicates over distance via line of site and nonline of sight systems.

• Quickly communicates orders without the need for face-to-face coordination.

• Can conduct initial entry by ground.

1-53. Limitations are as follows:

• Is vulnerable to enemy armor, artillery, and air assets when employed in open terrain.

• Is vulnerable to enemy CBRN attacks with limited decontamination capability.

• Not an air capable initial entry force; requires staging point before conducting operations.

• Is not designed to defeat a heavily armored force in a meeting engagement without significant increases in combat enablers.

SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

1-54. The SBCT Infantry rifle company has the ability to task-organize within itself to meet specific missions based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. It can attach a sniper team, fire support vehicle (FSV), or MGS to Infantry platoons.

1-55. The SBCT Infantry rifle company within the SBCT Infantry battalions can deploy rapidly and be sustained by a minimal support structure. The company’s composition and training uniquely equip it to conduct its mission against conventional and unconventional enemy forces in all types of terrain and climate conditions. The company can support offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authority tasks semi-independently or as a part of a larger force.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

1-56. The following list highlights the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT Infantry rifle company. Capabilities—

• Increased combat power from an Infantry rifle company with the addition of a fourth platoon (mobile gun system platoon) and Stryker Infantry rifle squads are eleven personnel equipped with an Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).

• Conducts strategic deployability.

• Increased tactical mobility for Infantry.

• Carries and employs assortment of weapons to the fight with a “mobile arms room” concept.

• Authorized an organic mortar section with two 120-mm (millimeter) and 60-mm mortars to the company.

• Authorized organic Sniper team to the company.

• Self-sustained for up to 72 hours of continuous operations (restricted by mission dependent fuel consumption rates).

• Conduct offensive, defensive, and operations focused on stability tasks in all types of environments.

• Seize, secure, occupy, and retain terrain.

• Destroy, neutralize, suppress, interdict, disrupt, block, canalize, and fix enemy forces.

• Breach enemy obstacles.

• Can conduct feints and demonstrations to deceive the enemy.

• Can conduct screens and guards for larger units.

• Reconnoiters, denies, bypasses, clears, contains, and isolates. (These tasks might be oriented on both terrain and enemy.)

• Operates in conjunction with special operations forces.

• Using company intelligence support team (COIST), develops situational understanding and intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain.

1-57. Limitations—

• Vulnerable to indirect fires while dismounted.

• Reduced company logistical systems.

• Has no organic maintenance section.

• Unable to conduct forced entry by air; requires preoperational staging point.

• Vulnerable to enemy armor, artillery, and air assets when employed in open terrain.

• Vulnerable to enemy CBRN attacks with limited decontamination capability.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (HHC)

1-58. The SBCT Infantry battalions’ company headquarters (HQ) section provides immediate leadership, supply, and human resources support to HHC personnel, including the battalion’s command group; coordinating, special, and personal staff; and specialty platoons and squads. It includes the HHC commander, first sergeant (1SG), executive officer (XO), and supporting supply and CBRN sections. The HHC commander, 1SG, and XO do not have a set location from where they conduct their duties; they can be placed where they can most effectively help the battalion to execute the mission. Other duties and responsibilities of the company HQ section include:

• Supervising the operations of the scout, medical, and mortar platoons, and the sniper section.

• In a tactical environment, providing flexibility to the battalion commander.

• Serving as combat HQ (for example, leading the battalion reserve with task-organized elements from different companies.).

• Providing support to the battalion’s tactical operations center to coordinate security and displacement operations.

• Supporting HHC elements with wheeled vehicles, including two small decontamination apparatuses for conducting operational decontamination for the subordinate units.

MEDICAL PLATOON

1-59. The medical platoon uses its organic capabilities to provide Role 1 Army Health System support. The battalion surgeon, or in his absence the physician assistant, is the medical advisor to the battalion commander and, at the commander’s discretion, the medical platoon leader. The medical platoon is dependent on the Army Health System for direct support and augmentation and reinforcement, when required. The medical platoon is described below. It has a headquarters section, a treatment squad, an ambulance squad with four ambulance teams, and a combat medic section. The medical platoon is assigned four medical evacuation vehicles (MEV). It normally operates under the direction of the combat trains command post (CTCP). (Refer to chapter 7 of this publication and FM 4-02 for more information.)

Treatment Squad

1-60. The medical treatment squad has two treatment teams. The Alpha team is led by the battalion surgeon or platoon leader. The Bravo team is led by the physician‘s assistant. Both are proficient in emergency medical treatment and advanced trauma management procedures. Duties of treatment squads include:

• Operating as the battalion aid station (BAS).

• Providing Role 1 medical care and treatment, including sick call, emergency medical treatment, and advance trauma management (ATM). The first medical care a Soldier receives occurs at Role 1 during tactical operations it starts with tactical combat casualty care.

• Ensuring that decentralized operations normally do not exceed 24 hours; otherwise, efficiency and capability of the teams are reduced.

• Employing treatment vehicles with the Tactical Combat Medical Care medical equipment set.

1-61. When the battalion is deployed, or at other certain times, a battalion surgeon (physician) is normally assigned to the SBCT using the Army Medical Department Professional Filler System (Army Regulation (AR) 601-142).

Medical Evacuation Squad

1-62. The medical evacuation squad has four ambulance teams. It provides medical evacuation and en route care from a Soldier’s point of injury or a casualty collection point to the battalion aid station.

Combat Medic Section

1-63. The allocation for company level medical support is one senior combat medic per company and one combat medic per Infantry rifle platoon. The senior combat medic normally remains with the company first sergeant. This basis of allocation is designed to place medical treatment assets as close to the point of injury as possible.

SCOUT PLATOON

1-64. The battalion scout platoon serves as the primary reconnaissance element for the commander. The platoon is organized into a platoon HQ and three squads of six men each with four reconnaissance vehicles (RV) carrying Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), or Infantry Carrier Variant Scout ICVV(S) in Double V Hull (DVH)-equipped SBCTs. The primary mission of the platoon is to conduct reconnaissance and security to answer CCIRs, normally defined in the battalion’s information collection plan. The platoon—

• Conducts route and area reconnaissance missions.

• Conducts limited screening operations.

• Participates as part of a larger force in guard missions.

1-65. The platoon sergeant assists and advises the platoon leader and leads the platoon in the platoon leader’s absence. Each squad leader is responsible for controlling his squad’s movement and reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. He reports critical combat information obtained by his squad to the platoon leader or battalion tactical operations center. The commander may deploy his platoon to conduct screening operations of the battalion’s front, flank, or rear in either offensive or defensive tasks. The platoon may occupy outposts from which it can relay critical information to a command post concerning enemy composition, disposition, and activities. (Refer to ATP 3-20.98 for more information.)

SNIPER SQUAD

1-66. The primary mission of the sniper squad in combat is to support combat operations by delivering precise long-range fire on selected targets. Snipers create casualties among enemy troops, slow enemy movement, frighten enemy Soldiers, lower enemy morale, and add confusion to enemy operations. They can engage and destroy high-payoff targets. The secondary mission of the sniper section is collecting and reporting battlefield information in addition to call for fire and close air support (CAS). The sniper squad is led by a SSG squad leader and is made up of two teams of 3 men each. Each team is led by a sniper qualified SGT, has an observer and a security member.

1-67. Snipers are organic to the SBCT Infantry battalion and rifle company. Well-trained snipers provide the commander accurate, discriminating, long-range small-arms fire, and direct observation of key terrain and avenues of approach. The two best uses of sniper fire or long-range precision fire are against key targets beyond the range of organic rifles and automatic weapons, or against any targets that other weapon systems cannot destroy due to range, size, location, visibility, or security and stealth requirements. Sniper tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) enables them to directly gather and relay critical, detailed enemy information. Sniper effectiveness is measured by more than casualties or destroyed targets. Commanders know snipers affect enemy activities, morale, and decisions. Knowing snipers are present hinders the enemy’s movement, and creates confusion and continuous personal fear. It disrupts enemy operations and preparations, and compels the enemy to divert forces to deal with the snipers.

1-68. The sniper squad is best employed where precision fire is delivered at long ranges. It includes combat patrols, ambushes, counter sniper operations, forward observation elements, military operations in urban terrain, and retrograde operations in which snipers are part of forces left in contact or as stay-behind forces. (See appendix A for more information.)

MORTAR PLATOON

1-69. Mortars are organic to all SBCT Infantry battalions and companies. The mission of mortars is to provide immediate and close supporting fires to the maneuver forces in contact. The primary role of the battalion mortar platoon is to provide immediate, responsive indirect fires in support of maneuver companies or the battalion. The battalion mortar platoon comprises the mortar platoon HQ, the mortar section with fire direction center (FDC), and four mortar squads. The platoon’s FDC controls and directs a mortar platoon’s fires. SBCT Infantry battalion four mortar squads are each equipped with mounted 120-mm and dismounted 81-mm mortars. (Refer to Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (ATTP) 3-21.90 for more information about mortars.)

1-70. Maneuver unit mortars provide close, immediately responsive fire support (FS) for committed companies. These fires harass, suppress, neutralize, and destroy enemy attack formations and defenses; obscure the enemy’s vision; and inhibit the enemy’s ability to maneuver. Mortars can be used for final protective fires, smoke, and illumination.

1-71. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander decides how and when to integrate mortars, as a key fire support asset, into his operations plan. However, since they are fire support assets, the battalion fire support officer (FSO) should give advice and make recommendations to the commander. The battalion commander may specify mortar support for subordinate units by changing the command relationship, assigning priority of fires, or assigning priority targets. The battalion commander and FSO should integrate their mortar platoon to cover targets to support in the scheme maneuver and engage plan targets that may not be covered by the Infantry rifle companies’ mortar section.

STAFF ORGANIZATIONS

1-72. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander uses his professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style to organize his staff for both home station and combat. The commander, assisted by the XO, organizes the various staff elements into functional teams to perform military decision-making process (MDMP) and support mission command through the science of control during execution phase.

1-73. Staff officers have two broad areas of responsibility during the planning, preparing, and executing of operations. The first is to provide information, assistance and recommendations to the commander throughout the planning and preparing process. The second is to supervise and assess the execution of the plan within their functional areas. Specific responsibilities include anticipating requirements, monitoring operations, taking action to support the plan, managing the information flow, making timely recommendations, conducting coordination, synchronizing operations, and maintaining continuity. The coordinating staff includes the battalion personnel staff officer (S-1), intelligence staff (S-2), operations staff officer (S-3), battalion logistics staff officer (S-4), and battalion communications officer (S-6). The SBCT Infantry battalion has a FSO who oversees the fires, effects, and coordination cell. In some instances, the SBCT Infantry battalion may also be authorized a battalion or brigade civil affairs operations officer (S-9) to aid in civil-military operations (CMO). (Refer to FM 6-0 for further information.) Knowledge of the commander’s intent guides specific decisions within the staff’s authority. The staff operates to carry out the commander’s intent functionally. Usually, the commander delegates authority to the staff to take final action on matters within command policy. Assignment of staff responsibility does not include authority over other staff officers or over any command element.

Command Group

1-74. The battalion command section consists of the battalion commander, battalion executive officer, battalion command sergeant major, and noncommissioned officers who command the Strykers, their drivers, radio/telephone operators and a rifleman. The commander locates where he can both observe and influence critical points and actions on a battlefield and communicate orders and guidance. The battalion command section has command variant Stryker vehicles (CV) to assist with command, control, coordination, and transportation of command section personnel.

Human Resources Section

1-75. The battalion S-1 is the principal staff advisor to the battalion commander for all matters concerning human resources support (refer to FM 1-0 for more information). The S-1 and his section plan, provide, and coordinate the delivery of human resources support, services, or information to all assigned and attached personnel within the battalion. The S-1 and an element of the S-1 section are normally located at the CTCP with the rest of the section located in the brigade support area. Alternatively, elements of the S-1 section can be located at the battalion main command post (CP). The section is normally organized into a leadership element and three teams responsible for personnel readiness, legal, and human resources services. Responsibilities include:

• Leadership element: supervision of the section and human resources planning and operations.

• Personnel readiness: personnel readiness management and strength distribution.

• Legal: A paralegal, under the direction and supervision of the brigade judge advocate is often located within the battalion’s human resource section to coordinate legal support with the brigade legal section.

• Human resources.

Intelligence Section

1-76. The intelligence section is capable of analyzing all forms of information and intelligence from each discipline, complimentary intelligence capabilities, and combat information. They develop their own intelligence to disseminate to subordinate, adjacent and higher units within the battalions' area of interests. The cell provides timely, accurate, usable, complete, precise, reliable, relevant, predictive and tailored intelligence analysis and products in support of the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The intelligence cell facilitates the commander's visualization and understanding of the threat and relevant aspects of the operational environment through a broad range of tasks—

• Intelligence support to force generation.

• Intelligence support to situational understanding.

• Intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities.

• Conduct planning requirements and assessing collection to support information collection planning.

1-77. The SBCT Infantry battalion intelligence cell provides information and intelligence that assists commanders in achieving battlefield visualization. The cell provides this information and intelligence by performing the tasks of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), indications and warning, and situation development. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for additional IPB information.) The intelligence cell does this through the continuous execution of the four steps of IPB for the commander:

• Defines the operational environment.

• Describes environmental effects on operations.

• Evaluates the threat.

• Determines threat COAs.

Provides Information to Counter the Threat

1-78. The battalion intelligence section provides the commander and staff information and intelligence support for targeting of the threat’s forces, threat organizations, units, and systems through lethal and nonlethal effects. It includes the TTP to deny or degrade threat-intelligence gathering capabilities to access and collect information on friendly forces. The battalion intelligence cell performs the tasks of—

• Targeting support by developing target systems, locating targets, and performing battle damage assessment (BDA) on engaged targets.

• Providing intelligence analysis and all-source production which outlines the capabilities and limitations of the threat, discusses the courses of action available to the threat, and provide recommendations to limit or eliminate these capabilities.

• Assist in information collection planning.

1-79. The battalion intelligence cell integrates information collection assets in an effort to produces intelligence, enabling the commander to gain situational understanding. The capabilities of collect, process, analyze, and report are critical to successful planning and conduct of operations. Information collection requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated; an information collection plan is developed and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

Produce Intelligence Products

1-80. Intelligence supports the commander’s and staff’s situation understanding and decision making process by informing them where and when to look for tactical advantages. Commanders use information collection resources that range from joint and national collection capabilities down to individual Soldier observations and reports to obtain information from which military intelligence organizations then analyze and produce intelligence.

Conduct Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection

1-81. The SBCT Infantry battalion S-2 staff (in collaboration with the commander and staff of the SBCT) receive and validate requirements for collection, prepare the planning requirements tools, recommends information collection assets and capabilities to the S-3 staff, and maintain synchronization as operations progress. These specific requirements are focused in time and space to support decision making. (See ATP 2-01 for more information.)

Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence

1-82. The SBCT Infantry battalion intelligence section provides intelligence concerning the area of operation by using various mission command networks. The cell provides intelligence via verbal reports, documents, textual reports, graphic products, softcopy products, and automated databases. The commander and staff integrate the intelligence to assist them in maintaining situational awareness. This function is supported by establishing communications networks and establishing knowledge and information management procedures. (Refer to FM 6-02.71 for more information.)

Support to COIST

1-83. The Army has identified that maneuver companies require an intelligence capability to support bottom up intelligence refinement during long term or extended operations. Establishing a COIST has proven effective to the intelligence cycle and commander’s situational awareness. The SBCT Infantry battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) staff supports this function by placing intelligence analysts into the company headquarters for extended periods of time. These analysts gain a greater understanding of the supporting companies operations by collecting first-hand information directly from the source and coordinating with the company leadership for further information requirements. Periodically these personnel return to the battalion S-2 staff to assist in further developing understanding of the area of operation.

Implement Operations Security

1-84. Operations security is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities (JP 3-13.3). It helps to—

• Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

• Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries or enemies.

• Execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy or adversary exploitation.

1-85. Operations security (OPSEC) applies to all operations. All units conduct OPSEC to preserve essential secrecy. Commanders establish routine OPSEC measures in unit standing operating procedures. The unit OPSEC officer coordinates additional OPSEC measures with the S-2, S-3, other staff and command elements, as needed. He synchronizes with adjacent units. The OPSEC officer develops OPSEC measures during the military decision-making process. The S-2 assists the OPSEC process by comparing friendly OPSEC indicators with enemy’s or adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities. OPSEC measures are published in the OPSEC appendix to the protection annex. (Refer to JP 3-13.3 for more information on OPSEC.)

Provide Intelligence Support to Protection

1-86. This is an intelligence warfighting function task that supports the protection warfighting function. It includes providing intelligence that supports measures which the command takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of threat activities. It provides intelligence that supports recovery from threat actions. It includes analyzing the threats, hazards, and other aspects of an operational environment and utilizing the IPB process to describe the operational environment and identify threats and hazards that may impact protection. Intelligence support develops and sustains an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that affect the operational environment.

1-87. Information collection can complement or supplement protection tasks. Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces. These forces collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and other intelligence requirements. When necessary, information collection assets (ground- and space-based reconnaissance and surveillance activities) focus on special requirements, such as personnel recovery. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 for additional intelligence information.)

OPERATIONS SECTION

1-88. The S-3 section is the commander’s primary staff for planning, coordinating, prioritizing, and integrating all battalion operations. The S-3 section also—

• Runs the battalion main command post; directs the effort of the plans cell under the battalion XO’s supervision.

• Serves as senior staff member of the tactical command post, if the commander employs one.

• Plans, prepares, and produces battalion operations orders, controls current operations, and coordinates critical support operations, as required, with other staff sections.

• Tasks and directs the information collection plan.

• Manages the critical information process, to include orders production; battle tracking, operations updates and briefings, rehearsals, receipt of reports, and reports to higher headquarters.

• Integrates fires into the tactical maneuver plan.

• Integrates and implements the risk management program.

Employ Safety Techniques

1-89. Safety techniques are used to identify and assess hazards to the force and make recommendations on ways to prevent or mitigate the effects of those hazards. Commanders have the inherent responsibility to analyze the risks and implement control measures to mitigate them. All staffs understand and factor into their analysis how their execution recommendations could adversely affect Soldiers. Incorporating protection within the risk management integrating process is key. It ensures a thorough analysis of risks and implements controls to mitigate their effects. Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer. All commands develop and implement a command safety program that includes fratricide avoidance, occupational health, risk management, fire prevention and suppression, and accident prevention programs focused on minimizing safety risks. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information.)

Fratricide Avoidance

1-90. Commanders, leaders and Soldiers are responsible for preventing fratricide. Commanders ensure that risk mitigation strategies and fratricide prevention methods are employed and trained to lessen the risk of fratricide on the battlefield. Prevention methods include fratricide prevention training, weapons control measures, rules of engagement training, assembly area procedures, reconnaissance, rehearsals, backbriefs, unexploded ordnance training and reporting procedures, field discipline, friendly troop marking procedures and, most importantly, awareness at all levels.

1-91. Leaders must lower the probability of fratricide without discouraging boldness and audacity. Good leadership that results in positive weapons control, the control of troop movements, and disciplined operational procedures contribute to achieving this goal. Situational understanding, friendly personnel identification methods, and combat identification methods contribute to fratricide prevention.

1-92. The SBCT mission command systems assist in situational awareness down to the squad level in the SBCT with Infantry Soldiers carrying Nett warrior systems and communicating locations to higher levels. Soldiers often dismount and move forward of their Stryker vehicles when conducting offensive or defensive tasks during stability operations. They often mass mounted and dismounted weapon systems simultaneously. Leadership enforces adherence to planning and control measures to prevent fratricide.

Risk Management

1-93. Risk management (RM) is the Army’s primary decision-making process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the range of army missions, functions, operations, and activities. Risk management is used to identify and mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Risk management is integrated into all army planning and operations. (Refer to ATP 5-19 for details on the risk management process.)

LOGISTICS SECTION

1-94. The logistics, S-4, section, led by the battalion logistics officer, provides logistical planning and support to the battalion and also operates the battalion’s combat trains command post. The S-4 also—

• Functions as the commander’s primary logistics planner, with assistance from the FSC commander.

• Provides timely and accurate logistical information required to support and sustain individual maneuver companies and specialty platoons with all classes of supply.

• Staffs the company trains command post in conjunction with elements of the S-1 section and FSC personnel.

• Anticipates the logistical requirements of the battalion.

• Ensures the executive officer is knowledgeable of the unit’s status.

• Coordinates with medical officer (MEDO)/surgeon for medical logistic requirements.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1-95. The communications section, led by the S-6 communications officer, is responsible for all communications for the battalion. The communications section also—

• Ensures proper setup and operation of all communications equipment within the command posts.

• Ensures all retransmission operations for the battalion are set up and operational.

• Monitors maintenance on communications equipment and performs field level maintenance when necessary.

• Plans and integrates defensive cyber tasks.

Liaison

1-96. The joint and multinational nature of operations requires that the Infantry battalion has a clear understanding of its AO. The liaison section normally is augmented with interpreter support when conducting multinational operations. It is comprised of one liaison officer and an enlisted assistant. The liaison section assists the commander in maintaining situational understanding within the battalion’s AO. The liaison section also—

• Facilitates and coordinates the operations of the battalion with other units or agencies as directed by the battalion commander.

• During combat operations, keeps other units informed of the status, disposition, and location of the battalion.

• Assists in deconflicting boundaries and fires with adjacent units.

1-97. During the conduct of stability tasks, the liaison officer also can act as the coordinator with the civil- military operations center, and governmental and non-governmental organizations, as required.

SECTION III – ROLE OF THE SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION

1-98. The SBCT Infantry battalion is optimized to conduct decisive action and can deploy worldwide to conduct unified land operations. The SBCT Infantry battalion can operate independently or as a combined arms force based upon mission variables. Its lethality is when augmented to include armored fighting vehicles, air support, artillery support, engineers, reconnaissance and security forces, information collection assets, and other support elements. Effective application of the SBCT Infantry battalion as a combined arms force can capitalize on the strengths of the battalion’s elements while minimizing their respective limitations.

1-99. SBCT Infantry units may be the dominant arm in operations because of their rapid strategic deployment and mobility capability. In such cases, they can gain the initiative early, seize and hold ground, and mass fires to stop the enemy. Infantry units are particularly effective in the urban environment, where they can maneuver rapidly to positions of tactical advantage against enemy positions. The SBCT Infantry battalion is optimized to conduct offensive and defensive tasks. It is also trained and can organize to conduct stability and defense support of civil authorities’ tasks.

SECTION IV – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

BATTALION COMMANDER

1-100. The commander leads by personal example and is responsible for everything the SBCT Infantry battalion does, or fails to do, in executing its assigned missions. The commander’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to leadership, training, tactical employment, and sustainment activities of his battalion. These duties require the commander to understand the capabilities of the battalion’s Soldiers and equipment, and to understand how to employ them to the best tactical advantage. At the same time, the commander must be well versed in threat organizations, doctrine, and equipment.

1-101. Using this knowledge, the commander prepares his unit for missions. Ultimately, he must know how to exercise the art and science of mission command effectively and decisively. He must be flexible and use sound judgment to make correct decisions at the right time based on the higher commander’s intent and the tactical situation. He must be able to visualize, describe, and direct his subordinate leaders in clear, complete combat orders. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander—

• Commands through his subordinate leaders.

• Employs his companies to accomplish its mission according to the brigade commander’s intent and concept.

• Drives the operations process through the activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.

• Selects the best scheme of maneuver through combined arms concept at the battalion level with the Stryker Infantry rifle companies, scout platoon, sniper squad, mortar platoon, and other elements.

• Maintains and expresses situation awareness and understanding.

• Resources the companies and other elements, and requests brigade support when needed.

• Provides a timely and accurate tactical picture to the brigade commander and subordinate units.

• Implements effective measures for security and accountability of forces and systems.

• Develops the leadership and tactical skill of his subordinate leaders.

• Develops teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners.

• Informs and influences audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

1-102. The commander’s personal staff group comprises the command sergeant major (CSM), and chaplain. The commander’s personal staff group can be adjusted to accommodate evolving mission requirements to include, for example, a personal security detachment, a legal advisor, or an interpreter.

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

1-103. The CSM is the senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the battalion. He is responsible for providing the commander with personal, professional, and technical advice on enlisted Soldier matters and the NCO corps as a whole. He focuses on Soldier welfare and individual training and on how well the battalion carries out the commander’s decisions and policies. The CSM administers the unit Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP), normally through written directives and the NCO support channel. As the senior NCO of the command, the CSM is the training professional within the unit, overseeing and driving the entire training program. The CSM assists the commander in determining leader tasks and training for NCOs.

1-104. The CSM can act as the commander’s representative in supervising aspects vital to an operation as determined by the commander. (For example, he can help control movement through a breach in a critical obstacle or at a river crossing, or he can help coordinate a passage of lines or quarter assembly areas.) He plays a key role in the sustaining effort as the sustaining troubleshooter for the battalion. The assignment of Soldiers in the battalion requires the CSM to step beyond his basic branch orientation and serve as advocate, mentor, and role model for every Soldier in the battalion.

1-105. The CSM’s specific duties include the following responsibilities:

• Execute and supervise routine tasks. The CSM’s duties may include enforcing the tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP); planning and coordinating training; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising supply, maintenance, communications, and field hygiene operations.

• The CSM and commander jointly coordinate and develop the unit’s mission essential task list (METL) and individual training tasks to create a team approach to battle-focused training.

• Use command information channels to inform, express concerns on enlisted issues and build esprit de corps.

• Supervise, inspect, or observe all matters designated by the commander. (For example, the CSM may observe and report on a portion of the battalion’s AO or zone).

• Plan, rehearse, and supervise key sustainment actions in support of the tactical mission. These activities include: resupply of Class I, III, and V products and materials; maintenance and recovery; medical support; casualty evacuation (CASEVAC); and detainee processing.

• Assist and coordinate with the XO in all critical functions.

• Conduct training and ensure proficiency in individual and NCO skills and small-unit collective skills that support the SBCT Infantry battalion’s METL.

• In conjunction with the commander, establish and maintain the foundation for discipline.

• Assist the commander in maintaining accountability.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

1-106. The XO is the principal assistant to the battalion commander. As the second in command, the XO must be ready to assume command immediately if the commander becomes a casualty. The XO transmits the commander’s intent for the battalion. His two main responsibilities are to direct the operational efforts of the staff and to sustain battalion readiness.

1-107. The XO is the commander’s chief of staff. He directs, coordinates, supervises, trains, and synchronizes the work of the staff, ensuring efficient and prompt staff actions. The commander usually delegates executive management authority (equivalent to command of the staff) to the XO for the coordinating and special staff. The commander usually retains responsibility for supervising the personal staff. Staff members inform the XO of any recommendations or information they pass directly to the commander, and of instructions they receive directly from the commander.

1-108. The XO must understand the commander’s intent and ensure the staff implements it. He monitors the combat status of all subordinate units, and ensures that status is provided to the commander. The XO synchronizes all the elements of combat power, including the information element, into Stryker Infantry battalion operations; the goal is to implement the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The duties of the XO include:

• Conducts the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess).

• Manage CCIR.

• Conduct knowledge management and information management (IM) within the Stryker Infantry battalion.

• Recommend organization of the staff.

• Determine liaison requirements and supervision of liaison officers (LNO).

• Supervise work quality from and crosstalk between staff officers and sections.

• Establish and maintain staff planning timelines.

• Synchronize information-related capabilities.

• Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

• Supervise the main command post, its operations, and its positioning.

• Integrate attached units according to the SBCT/Stryker Infantry battalion’s plan.

• Serve as officer in charge (OIC) of the main command post, if established.

• Coordinate and monitor maintenance status and reports.

BATTALION CHAPLAIN

1-109. The chaplain is the personal staff officer who serves as a confidential advisor to the commander on the spiritual fitness, ethical, and moral health of the command according to FM 1-05. Chaplains are assigned to U.S. military units to assist commanders in providing the right of free exercise of religion to all personnel. The chaplain’s specific responsibilities include the following:

• Advising the commander on issues of religion (and ethics and morals as affected by religion), including the religious needs of assigned and attached personnel.

• Providing the commander’s pastoral care, personal counseling, and the privilege of sacred confidentiality.

• Developing and implementing the commander’s religious support program.

• Helping the commander ensure all Soldiers have the opportunity to exercise their religious beliefs constructively.

• Informing the commander of the battalion’s overall morale and climate.

• Providing moral and spiritual leadership to the command or community.

• Advising the commander and staff of the impact of religious factors (physical, human, and ideological) within the area of operations that may impact mission accomplishment.

• When directed by the commander, supports civil-military operations by engaging with key local religious leaders.

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL STAFF OFFICER (S-1)

1-110. The S-1 is the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military and civilian). The S-1 provides technical direction to subordinate units in the areas of—

• Human resources (HR) planning.

• Personnel readiness management (PRM).

• Personnel accounting and strength reporting (PASR).

• Essential personnel services (EPS).

• Personal information management (PIM).

• Casualty operations.

• Postal operations.

• Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) operations.

• Reception, replacement, return-to-duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment (R5). The S-1 section generally operates from the CTCP; though it may have personnel at the field trains command post (FTCP), if it is constituted.

1-111. The S-1 coordinates the staff efforts of the battalion surgeon, and is the staff point of contact for equal opportunity, retention, inspector general, and public affairs activities. The responsibilities of the S-1 include:

• Military pay support.

• Liaison with the battalion family readiness group (FRG).

• Internal Army records information management system (ARIMS) compliance.

• Command interest programs.

INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER (S-2)

1-112. The S-2 is responsible for providing timely, tailored, predictive and accurate intelligence analyses and products in support of the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The S-2 supervises and coordinates collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence, and integrates this into the SBCT Infantry battalions MDMP. The S-2 is responsible for evaluating the enemy in terms of doctrine and or pattern analysis, order of battle, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. The S-2 section usually has representatives in both the main command post and the tactical command post (TAC CP).

1-113. The S-2 is responsible for intelligence readiness, intelligence training, support to MDMP and design, support to the integrating processes and continuous activities, and other intelligence support. Additionally, the S-2 plans for and executes any additional duties which they are appointed to, such as the physical security programs. The duties of the S-2 include:

• Management of the intelligence process.

• Management of IPB, including integration of input from other staff sections.

• Situation development, to include updating the enemy/threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations portions of the common operational picture (COP).

• Intelligence support to the targeting process, including participating in the targeting meetings, developing high-value targets (HVT), and tracking high-payoff targets (HPT).

• Integration of information operations (IO) considerations into the other intelligence tasks.

• Supporting COIST personnel training and operations.

• Synchronization of intelligence support with combat and information collection operations through close coordination with the XO and S-3.

• Analysis of CCIR. This includes priority intelligence requirements (PIR), friendly forces information requirements, and other information requirements (IR) to develop collection tasks and requests from higher and adjacent units.

• Synchronization of intelligence support and fire support through close coordination with the FSO and S-3.

• Management of site exploitation support through coordination with the operations section.

OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER (S-3)

1-114. The S-3 is the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning tactical operations of the SBCT Infantry battalion. The S-3 provides technical guidance to subordinate units in the areas of training, plans, and operations. The S-3 section runs the main CP, under XO supervision. Usually, the S-3 is the senior staff member of the tactical CP, commonly called the TAC, if the commander employs one.

1-115. The S-3 section manages the battle rhythm of the CP, which includes orders production, battle tracking, operations updates and briefings, rehearsals, receipt of reports, and reports to higher headquarters. The operations section develops and synchronizes the information collection plan and other duties—

• Synchronizing the effects of SBCT Infantry battalion units according to the commander’s intent.

• Developing the information collection plan.

• Identifying training requirements, recommending allocation of training resources, and preparing the commander’s training guidance.

• Participating in the targeting process.

• Reviewing orders, plans, and SOPs from subordinate units.

• Planning unit movements, to include deployments, air assaults, and ground convoys.

• Managing airspace control and terrain in the AO.

• Coordinating and integrating joint, interagency, and multinational assets into operations.

• Planning for dislocated civilian (DC) operations and detainee operations (to include civilian internees, and enemy prisoner of war [EPW]).

• Coordinating with the XO, S-6, and HHC commander on the location of CPs.

• Ensuring the required mission command staff tasks and additional tasks are accomplished:

◦ Conduct the operations process.

◦ Conduct knowledge management and information management.

◦ Synchronize information-related activities.

◦ Coordinate cyber electromagnetic activities.

ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER

1-116. The assistant operations officer serves as the unit movement and air movement planning officer in addition to assisting the battalion S-3 with maneuver planning.

OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR (SGM)

1-117. The operations SGM supervises the staff on the control of the main tactical command post. SGM supervision responsibilities include, the following:

• Ensure proper accountability and maintenance of equipment and vehicles.

• Supervise precombat inspections (PCI) and precombat checks (PCC).

• Oversee the timely and accurate posting of graphics and overlays.

• Monitor and supervise the distribution of messages and operational overlays (analog/digital) one organizational level up and two levels down.

• Coordinate and brief displacement (jump TOC (tactical operation center)) procedures including tear down, setup, and quartering party activities, and be responsible for the physical setup, arrangement, and breakdown of the main CP.

• Ensure accurate setup of TAC CP and all supporting vehicles to approved configuration.

• Supervise control over both the exterior and interior organization of the TOC to include personnel, vehicles, and tents.

• Leverage biometric capabilities to validate identity of all non-U.S. authorized visitors and locally employed workers or both to the TOC/CP.

• Supervise the TOC security plan and develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and OPSEC.

• Responsible for staff training and integrating functional teams across the staff.

• Monitor the security and procedures involved with operating a Task Schedule Change Form (TSCF).

• Assist the battle captain with rehearsals and executing battle drills.

• Give guidance and supervise the construction of the terrain board model during planning phases.

• Ensure all information within the TOC (coming and going) is disseminated, updated, collaborated, and managed properly.

• Monitor situations and ensure TOC maintains communications with attached, subordinate, adjacent units, and higher headquarters.

• Manage reports/battle tracking.

• Monitor and advise base operations if operating in an environment that warrants oversight.

• Solicit staff input and oversee the effectiveness of the battalion/brigade TOC SOP.

CBRN OFFICER

1-118. The battalion CBRN officer advises the commander on the impact of CBRN threats and hazards and in the operational environment. He monitors the SBCT CBRN reconnaissance platoon efforts. If necessary, he arranges for applicable CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination support.

MASTER GUNNER

1-119. The master gunner is responsible for certifying the crew evaluators. They assist the S-3 with training scenarios and forecast ammunition, ranges, and training aids. They train range safety personnel. During combat operations, master gunners advise the commander on the tactical capabilities of the weapons systems against threat systems and they assist with CP operations.

BATTLE CAPTAINS

1-120. The officers and NCOs of the operations section serve as battle captains and battle staff NCOs to assist the commander in controlling the SBCT Infantry battalion. They remain in the command post, keeping focused on the current operation, and continuously assisting the commander in controlling the fight to develop the situation, and anticipate future threats and combat operations. When operations deviate from the plan, they assist the commander with his decision-making. Their responsibilities include:

• Monitoring the status of CCIR.

• Conducting battle tracking by—

◦ Monitoring current location of friendly and enemy units, and groups of civilians.

◦ Assessing the activities and combat power of friendly and enemy units.

◦ Monitoring the status of adjacent and supporting units.

• Monitoring and synchronizing the COP displays in the main and TAC CPs.

• Ensuring that COP information and required status reports are provided to higher, subordinate, adjacent, and supported headquarters.

• Supervising the flow of information among staff cells within the SBCT Infantry battalion command posts.

• Providing current status to assist with MDMP and planning future operations.

• Enforcing CP policies according to the unit TACSOP and current operation order (OPORD).

• Continuing to perform their primary staff responsibilities as well as those of the battle captain.

LOGISTICS STAFF OFFICER (S-4)

1-121. The S-4 (logistics officer) is the coordinating staff officer for sustainment operations. The S-4 provides staff oversight to SBCT Infantry battalion units in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services. Usually, the S-4 is the OIC of the CTCP.

1-122. The S-4 is the SBCT Infantry battalion staff integrator for sustainment, who executes sustainment operations for the SBCT Infantry battalion. The duties of the S-4 include:

• Developing logistics plans and support annexes to support SBCT Infantry battalion operations.

• Coordinating with the supporting BSB on current and future support requirements and capabilities.

• Coordinating for all classes of supply.

• Designating supply routes and locations of logistical elements (in coordination with the S-3 and logistical element commander).

• Coordinating logistics package (LOGPAC) operations.

• Monitoring and analyzing the equipment readiness status of all SBCT Infantry battalion units.

• Planning transportation to support special transportation requirements (for example, CASEVAC).

• Recommending sustainment priorities and controlled supply rates (CSR) to the commander.

• Coordinating contract support and analyzing civilian and foreign military logistic capability.

SIGNAL STAFF OFFICER (S-6)

1-123. The S-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning communications, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and networks within the unit’s area of operations. The S-6 is responsible for information management usage procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. The S-6 provides technical oversight of SBCT Infantry battalion units in the areas of network operations (NetOps), information dissemination, and cyber security. The S-6 section establishes and operates the battalion radio, satellite, and line of sight and wire communications systems. The S-6 section provides retransmission nodes. The responsibilities of the S-6 include:

• Assessing SBCT Infantry battalion communications and computer vulnerability to enemy and civilian actions.

• Recommending SBCT Infantry battalion network priorities and constraints needed to accommodate bandwidth limitations.

• Advising the S-3 on CP locations based on communications capabilities.

• Integrating Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and other information systems (INFOSYS) with the war fighter information network.

• Arranging for communications and information systems maintenance.

• Monitoring communications security (COMSEC).

• Maintenance of INFOSYS and tactical local area network (LAN) management, including passwords and information security.

• Integrate cyber defense tasks.

SPECIAL STAFF

1-124. The SBCT Infantry battalion staff includes several special staff sections that assist the commander in providing professional or technical oversight of SBCT Infantry battalion units. The commander delegates each staff officer an appropriate planning and supervisory authority.

SURGEON

1-125. The battalion surgeon is responsible for advising the commander on the health of the command and other Army health system (AHS) issues. The surgeon receives assistance from a medical operations officer for administration, logistics, and planning of medical platoon operations; a physicians’ assistant for medical treatment; and a medical platoon sergeant for platoon operations. The surgeon is usually located in the battalion aid station (BAS) during combat operations. The surgeon’s responsibilities include:

• Oversight of medical treatment that medical platoon personnel provide.

• Supervision of health service support (HSS) and force health protection planning, maintenance, and training.

• Recommendations for casualty collection point and aid station locations; and the evacuation routes to support them.

• Coordination for ground and air ambulance support.

• Integration of required support elements AHS support plans into the brigade combat team (BCT) plan.

• Identifying health threats and medical-related CCIR.

• Ensuring that health threat and medical intelligence considerations are integrated into the MDMP and IPB process.

• Advising commanders on force health protection CBRN defensive actions, such as immunizations, use of chemoprophylaxis, pretreatments, and barrier creams.

• Monitoring occupational health surveillance in coordination with the preventive medicine (PVNTMED) team.

HABITUALLY ATTACHED STAFF OFFICERS

Fire Support Officer

1-126. The FSO is the special staff officer responsible for coordinating and synchronizing fire support, including organic assets through joint fires. He advises the commander and staff on all aspects of lethal and nonlethal effects planning, coordination, and execution in support of operations. He assists the S-3 to integrate fires into the maneuver commander’s concept of operation. The responsibilities of the FSO include:

• Management of the targeting process.

• Developing and recommending HPTs in coordination with the S-2.

• Recommending essential fire support tasks for fire support to the commander.

• Recommending fire support coordination measures (FSCM) to the commander.

• Coordinating the commander’s fire plan with the SBCT fires cell and the mortar platoon.

• Accompanying the commander or TAC CP to assist in the execution of tactical operations.

Air Defense

1-127. Short range air defense units are unlikely to be attached or placed in direct support or general support of SBCT Infantry battalions. Air defense units can require specific terrain within the battalion area of operations to accomplish their mission regardless of the availability or relationship. (Refer to chapter 8 of this publication and FM 3-01.7 for more information.)

Air Liaison Officer

1-128. The battalion air liaison officer (ALO) is usually a highly experienced enlisted Air Force joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) responsible for coordinating and controlling all close air support (CAS) and employment of Air Force assets in support of the combat aviation brigade. ALO responsibilities include:

• Supervising the tactical air control party (TACP).

• Advising the commander and S-3 in planning available air support.

• Coordinating the employment of air support with the S-2, S-3, FSO, and air defense element (if attached).

Engineers

1-129. The combat engineer leader task organized from the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) to the maneuver battalion (company or platoon) advises the SBCT Infantry battalion commander how to employ the capabilities within his unit. The combat engineer leader is an integral part of the battalion planning effort to develop their scheme of support aligned with the maneuver concept of the operation. Engineer efforts are constantly reported to the BEB’s commander so that he can assess all requirements across the brigade during the planning and preparation phases of tasks. (Refer to FM 3-34 for more information.)

Information Operations Officer or Noncommissioned Officer (S-3 IO)

1-130. An SBCT Infantry battalion does not have an assigned functional area 30 (IO) officer, but synchronizing information-related capabilities (IRC) to achieve desired information environment effects is a required staff task. A P4 skill identifier/additional skill identifier-qualified officer or NCO should be assigned to serve as the S-3 IO, responsible for synchronizing IRCs in order to affect threat decision-making, while protecting our own. Information-related capabilities include but are not limited to: military information support operations, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement and civil affairs operations. The S-3 IO also advises the commander on establishing the unit’s narrative and aligning words and images (themes and messages) with actions, in concert with the SBCT civil-military operations center (CMOC). (Refer to FM 3-13 for more information.)

Civil Affairs Operations Officer (S-9)

1-131. The SBCT Infantry battalion is not authorized an S-9. The battalion commander can assign this responsibility to an officer or senior NCO to assist him with relations between the civilian population and military operations during the conduct of stability tasks. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication and ATP 3-57.60 for more information.)

Chapter 2

MISSION COMMAND

Understanding the fundamental nature and philosophy of mission command is essential to the effective conduct of operations. Military operations are human endeavors conducted in complex and ever-changing operational environments. The commander’s ability to visualize relationships among opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations. Mission command is both a philosophy of command and a warfighting function. To account for the uncertain nature of operations, mission command (as opposed to detailed command) tends to be decentralized and flexible. This uncertain nature requires an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, subordinates, and partners. This chapter focuses on the fundamental nature and philosophy of mission command and using mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, and organizations for the SBCT Infantry battalion.

SECTION I – BATTALION LEVEL MISSION COMMAND

2-1. Mission command systems are the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0) These systems provide the Stryker Infantry battalion with the tools and the ability to receive, analyze, and distribute relevant information and orders rapidly. The Stryker Infantry battalion utilizes these multiple mission command systems, both analog and digital, to gain an information advantage to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.

PERSONNEL

2-2. Soldiers and leaders exercise disciplined initiative and accomplish assigned missions according to the commander’s intent, not technology. Therefore, commanders base their mission command system on human skills, knowledge, and abilities more than on equipment and procedures. Commander’s key personnel include seconds in command, command sergeants major, and staffs.

NETWORKS

2-3. Networks are a grouping of interconnected things that enable commanders to connect and communicate with individuals and organizations with a common interest or goal. Connecting people and organizations allow the ability to share information, ideas, and promote unit of effort. An example of a network is LandWarNet. This system allows the Army to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

2-4. An information system consists of equipment that collects, processes, stores, displays, and disseminates information. Information systems enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared understanding. (ADRP 6-0) An example is the Blue Force Tracker II/ Joint Capability Release (BFT II/JCR). This system allows the immediate ability to send reports, receive orders and graphic, and to synchronize enablers.

PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

2-5. Processes are a series of actions directed to an end state. Procedures are standard, detailed steps which describe how to perform specific tasks to achieve the desired end state. Together they minimize confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation while increasing organizational competence.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

2-6. A facility is a structure or location that provides a work environment and shelter such as, command posts, platforms, operation centers, and signal nodes for the other components of the mission command system. Facilities range from a command post composed of vehicles and tentage, to platforms, to hardened buildings. Examples of equipment needed to sustain a mission command system include vehicles, radio or signal equipment, generators, and lighting (ADRP 6-0).

OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS

2-7. In addition to ABCS, the Stryker Infantry battalion staff is equipped with several other information systems that support mission command.

COMMAND POST OF THE FUTURE

2-8. The command post of the future is a collaborative application that enables the commander and battle staffs to collect, collate, display, map, and analyze data. Command post of the future uses three monitors to display its various applications. It provides planning and mapping tools to support the commander’s battle management. Command post of the future is not a replacement for the ABCS, since it depends on ABCS for most of its data. Usually, the Stryker Infantry battalion has two command posts of the future terminals.

MEDICAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMBAT CASUALTY CARE

2-9. Medical communications for combat casualty care (MC4) is a computer system that unifies multiple software functionalities from the Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP) onto its MC4 platform. The combined hardware and software system provides the link between the battalion’s medical platoon to health care providers at all roles of care. The computer system receives, stores, processes, transmits, and reports medical mission command, medical surveillance, casualty movement and tracking, medical treatment, medical situational awareness, and medical logistics (MEDLOG) information onto designated medical data bases

PROPERTY BOOK UNIT SUPPLY-ENHANCED

2-10. The property book unit supply-enhanced (PBUSE) is a web-based system that operates on the Army Knowledge Online portal. The S-4 section uses PBUSE to help logistically support BCT units. PBUSE automates the process to account for, and order, all Class VII and other nonexpendable items in the battalion. PBUSE provides a responsive and efficient means to maintain accountable records for the Army’s inventory of property in the hands of modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and tables of distribution and allowance (TDA) units in the Regular Army, National Guard, Reserve, and on installations.

MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEM

2-11. The Movement Tracking System enables the Stryker Infantry battalion to examine radio frequency identification tags, identify position, track progress, and communicate with the operators of tactical wheeled vehicles. Movement Tracking System uses an L-Band, satellite-based system consisting of mobile units mounted in vehicles and base units in CPs. The Movement Tracking System includes a global positioning system (GPS), which enables the Movement Tracking System to send messages between base and mobile units; examine radio frequency identification tags on the payload to question or verify transportation control number, commodity/class of supply, consignee Department of Defense activity address code and status; and locate/track a vehicle position on a map background. Movement Tracking System can exchange text messages with BFT II/JCR and share situational awareness data. Usually, the S-4 section houses the Movement Tracking System.

TRANSPORTATION COORDINATOR’S AUTOMATED INFORMATION FOR MOVEMENT SYSTEM II

2-12. The Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II is a joint service system that automates the processes of planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling unit-related operations such as deployments, sustainment, redeployment, and retrograde operations. The S4 section uses it to—

• Maintain personnel and equipment lists.

• Build the unit deployment list.

• Create convoy and other movement plans.

• Document hazardous cargo.

• Build packing lists for containers and pallets of cargo.

• Schedule unit and cargo movements.

ARMY HUMAN RESOURCE WORKSTATION

2-13. The Army human resource workstation is a system of web-based, automated personnel systems. Army human resource workstation includes electronic military personnel office (eMILPO), a web-enabled application that users can access via the Army Knowledge Online portal to perform personnel actions and strength accounting.

PERSONAL COMPUTERS

2-14. MTOE does not authorize the purchase of personal computers; however, battalions may obtain authorization through TDA to purchase personal computers. These computers, once properly accredited, can be granted access to the battalion LAN. The systems architecture in the main CP includes data and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) access to the—

• Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).

• Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

SECTION II – COMMAND POSTS

2-15. The SBCT Infantry battalion normally organizes four command posts: the tactical command group, the main command post, the CTCP, and the FTCP. Echeloned mission command facilities control with varying levels of staff participation at each echelon. The battalion command group operates forward and consists of the commander and those selected to go forward to assist in controlling maneuver and fires during the battle. The command group normally includes the S-3, fire support officer, and air liaison officer but there is no requirement for these people to colocate. For example, the commander may be in one part of the AO while the S-3 is in a different area. The commander determines the composition, nature, and tasks of the command group based on METT-TC analysis. The commander and S-3 also monitor the battle, develop the situation, analyze course of action, and control subordinate units. As a minimum, the command group—

• Synchronizes combat assets in support of close operations.

• Controls close operations.

• Maintains the current operational situation.

• Provides close situation information to the main command post.

BATTALION COMMAND POSTS

2-16. The battalion commander organizes his staff within each command post to perform essential staff functions to aid him with planning and controlling operations. These components of the battalion‘s mission command system are normally positioned within the battalion’s area of operations to maintain flexibility, redundancy, survivability, and mobility. The battalion staff sections are normally distributed among four command post organizations: main, tactical, combat trains command post, and field trains command post.

MAIN COMMAND POSTS

2-17. The SBCT Infantry battalion has a main command post. A main command post is a facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.) A main command post is the battalion commander‘s principal operations center. The main command post operates from a stationary position and moves to maintain control of the operation. In contiguous areas of operation, the main command post locates out of enemy medium artillery range, if practical. In noncontiguous areas of operation, the main command post usually locates within a subordinate company’s area of operations. The main command post serves the same functions as the SBCT main command post.

2-18. Functions of the main command post include the following:

• Synchronizing all aspects of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.

• Monitoring the current fight.

• Coordinating fires and effects.

• Planning for future operations.

• Employing information collection assets to augment the reconnaissance and security operation.

• Anticipating and monitoring the commander‘s decision points and critical information requirements.

• Coordinating with higher headquarters and adjacent or lateral units.

• Informing higher headquarters and units of ongoing missions.

• Supporting the commander‘s situational understanding through information and knowledge management.

• Planning, monitoring, and integrating airspace users.

• Developing and implementing safety and occupational health, risk management, and accident prevention requirements, policies, and measures.

• The main command post is configured to fit the situation; a typical structure is a—

◦ Current operations cell.

◦ Plans cell.

◦ Movement and maneuver cell.

◦ Fires cell.

◦ Intelligence cell.

◦ Protection cell.

◦ Sustainment cell.

• Considerations for positioning the main command post include:

◦ Where the main command post can control operations best.

◦ Where the enemy can least affect main command post operations.

◦ Where the main command post can achieve the best communications (digital and voice).

SBCT TACTICAL COMMAND POSTS

2-19. The tactical command post is a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time. Commanders employ the tactical command post as an extension of the main command post to control execution of the current operation or a specific task, such as a gap crossing, a passage of lines, or an air assault operation.

2-20. Commanders can employ the tactical command post to direct operations of units close to each other. This can occur for a relief in place. The tactical command post can control a special task force or a complex task, such as the conduct of a breach or the establishment of camps for displaced persons. The tactical command post is fully mobile and has two Stryker command variants.

2-21. As a rule, the SBCT Infantry battalion tactical command posts includes only Soldiers and equipment essential to the tasks assigned and is task organized based on the factors of METT TC. The tactical command post relies on the main command post for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination. The battalion tactical command post typically performs the same functions as the SBCT tactical command post. Normal members for the command posts include S-2 or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), operations personnel to include the S-3, fire support officer, signal personnel, CSM, and an element for local security.

2-22. When the commander does not employ the tactical command post, the staff assigned to it reinforces the main command post. Unit SOPs should address the specifics for this, including procedures to quickly detach the tactical command post from the main command post.

2-23. When employed, tactical command post functions include the following:

• Synchronize warfighting functions within task organization capability.

• Monitoring and controlling current operations.

• Providing information to the common operational picture.

• Assessing the progress of operations.

• Monitoring and assessing the progress of higher and adjacent units.

• Performing short-range planning.

• Providing input to targeting and future operations planning.

• Providing a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals.

COMBAT TRAINS COMMAND POST

2-24. The CTCP, also known as the administrative and logistical operations center (ALOC), controls and coordinates administrative and logistical support for the battalion and consists of the battalion S-1 and S-4. The S-4 section, led by the battalion S-4, is responsible for providing logistical planning and support to the battalion and operates the battalion CTCP. The FSC commander is typically positioned with the supported battalion S-1 and S-4 at the CTCP. The CTCP may be colocated with the main CP or can operate separately.

2-25. The CTCP usually performs the following functions:

• Tracks the current battle and prepares to assume the functions of the main CP.

• Provides sustainment representation to the main CP for planning and integration.

• Forecasts and coordinates future requirements.

• Monitors main supply routes and controls sustainment traffic within the battalion’s AO.

• Coordinates the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and detainees.

FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST

2-26. The battalion’s field trains usually reside in the brigade support area (BSA); however, field trains may locate within the Infantry battalion AO. Field trains usually include a personnel administration center, elements of the S-4 section, elements of company supply sections, elements of the FSC, and are led by elements of the HHC command section. The battalion S-4 coordinates all unit supply requests and ensures logistics needs of his battalion are coordinated with the forward support company commander. This includes coordination of logistical packages (LOGPAC) moving forward into the battalion area of operation and satisfactory completion of all maintenance requests. The locations of the CTCP and the field trains command post are always mission dependent.

FACILITIES

2-27. Mission command facilities consist of the vehicles and locations where the commander, assisted by his staff directs the battle and sustains the force. The main, tactical, and combat trains command posts have the ability to track the battle and assume control of the current fight.

SURVIVABILITY

2-28. Command post survivability depends mostly on concealment and mobility. The best way to protect a command post is to prevent the enemy from detecting it. Good camouflage and proper noise, light, and signal discipline enhance the security provided by a good location.

LOCATION

2-29. The best location for command posts is determined by a METT-TC analysis. Built-up areas can be good locations for command posts because they provide cover and concealment, access to electricity and other services, and good access and regress routes. However, they also can put indigenous populations at risk and can provide enemy units covered and concealed positions to monitor and attack the command post. Locating a command post in built-up areas for longer periods tend to degrade its ability to displace quickly. A command post not in a built-up area should be located on a reverse slope with cover and concealment. Avoid key terrain features such as hilltops and crossroads. Locate command posts on ground that is trafficable, even in poor weather. Other actions when positioning command posts include—

• Ensure line-of-sight frequency modulation (FM) communications with higher, lower, and adjacent units.

• Use terrain to mask communications signals from the enemy.

• Use terrain for passive security, that is, for cover and concealment.

• Colocate with tactical units for mutual support and local security.

• Avoid possible enemy target registration points templated for enemy artillery and close air support.

• Locate the command post near an existing road network, out of sight from possible enemy observation.

ACCESS

2-30. Command posts should be near, but not next to, a high-speed avenue of approach with no more than one or two routes leading into the command post. These routes should provide cover, concealment, and access to other routes of communication. When possible, a helicopter landing zone should be nearby.

SIZE

2-31. The area selected must be large enough to accommodate all command post elements including liaison teams and attachments from other units, communications support, and eating, sleeping, latrine, and maintenance areas. Sufficient space must be available for positioning security and vehicle dismount points and parking.

SHELTER

2-32. Dryness and light are vital when working with maps, computers, digital systems and producing orders and overlays. Command posts should be sheltered from weather conditions and should have lights for night work while exercising proper light discipline. Buildings are the best choice but if none are available, command posts can operate from their organic vehicles or tents.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

2-33. OPSEC considerations for positioning command posts include—

• Avoid posting signs advertising command post locations. Disperse command post vehicles and thoroughly camouflage all vehicles and equipment. Maintain noise and light discipline.

• Employ a security force and provide communications between it and the command posts. Establish security force positions as in any defensive position, with a 360-degree perimeter and far enough out to prevent enemy fires on the command posts.

• Ensure the security force has available close combat missile systems and other weapons, based on the potential enemy threat. Establish a reaction force and rehearse the execution of the perimeter defense.

• Positioning command and control assets off major enemy avenues of approach reduces the probability of detection.

• Use an observation post to secure any remote antennas located outside the perimeter.

• Sound proof and dig in generators, if possible.

• Provide all subordinate units and elements of the command post with near and far recognition signals. Ensure the command post uses these signals, challenges, and passwords to control access into its perimeter.

• In case of artillery or air attack, designate a rally point and an alternate command post, and ensure all members of the unit know their locations.

Implement Physical Security Procedures

2-34. Physical security comprises physical measures that are designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The Army employs physical security measures in depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats through effective security policies and procedures. This total system approach is based on the continuing analysis and employment of protective measures, including physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (Refer to ATP 3-39.32 for more information.)

2-35. The goal of physical security systems is to employ security in depth to preclude or reduce the potential for sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism, espionage, or other criminal activity. To achieve this goal, each security system component has a function and related measures that provide an integrated capability for—

• Deterrence. A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be deterred from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with the aggressor’s sophistication, the attractiveness of the asset, and the aggressor’s objective.

• Detection. A detection measure senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of the detection, and communicates the appropriate information to a response force.

• Assessment. Assessment—through alarm systems, video surveillance systems, other types of detection systems, patrols, or fixed posts—assists in localizing and determining the size and intent of an unauthorized intrusion or activity.

• Delay. Delay measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or preventing an aggressor’s movement toward the asset or by shielding the asset from weapons and explosives.

• Response. Most protective measures depend on response personnel to assess unauthorized acts, report detailed information, and defeat an aggressor.

Apply Antiterrorism Measures

2-36. Antiterrorism (AT) comprises defensive measures that are used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. AT is a consideration for all forces during all military operations. (Refer to ATP 3-37.2 for additional information.)

2-37. AT is an integral part of Army efforts to defeat terrorism. Terrorists can target Army elements at any time and in any location. By effectively preventing and, if necessary, responding to terrorist attacks, commanders protect all activities and people so that Army missions can proceed unimpeded. AT is neither a discrete task nor the sole responsibility of a single branch; all bear responsibility. AT must be integrated into all Army operations and considered at all times. Awareness must be built into every mission, every Soldier, and every leader. Integrating AT represents the foundation that is crucial for Army success.

2-38. Typical Army AT programs are composed of several adjunct and information programs, including tasks for specialized, non-protection military occupational specialties. AT includes the following areas at a minimum:

• Risk management (threat, critical asset, and vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, and bases/base camps).

• AT planning (units, installations, facilities, and base camps).

• AT awareness training and command information programs.

• The integration of various vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, bases/base camps, personnel, and activities.

• AT protection measures to protect individual personnel, high-risk personnel, physical assets (physical security), and designated critical assets and information.

• Resource application.

• Civil and military partnerships.

• Force protection condition systems to support terrorist threat and incident response plans.

• Comprehensive AT program review.

DISPLACEMENT

2-39. Command posts may displace as a whole or, more often, by echelon. Displacement as a whole normally is reserved for short movements with communications maintained by alternate means and minimal risk of degrading command post operations.

2-40. A portion of the command post, called a jump command post, moves to the new location, sets up operations, and takes over operational control of the battle from the main command post. The remaining portion of the command post then moves to rejoin the jump command post. The jump command post consists of the necessary vehicles, personnel, and equipment to assume command post operations while the remainder moves.

2-41. The executive officer or S-3 selects a general location for the jump command post site. The jump command post can be accompanied by a quartering party, which may consist of a security element and personnel and equipment for quartering the remainder of the command post. The signal officer, who is usually part of the quartering party, ensures communications on all nets are possible from the new site. When the jump command post becomes operational, it also becomes the net control station for the unit. The remainder of the command post then moves to rejoin the jump command post.

2-42. Another technique is to hand off control to the command group or the CTCP and move the main command post as a whole. The command group also can split, with the commander moving with the decisive operations (or main effort) and the S-3 moving with a shaping effort.

OPERATIONS

2-43. Each command post must be organized to permit continuous operations and the rapid execution of the command and control process. SOPs for each command post should be established, known to all, and rehearsed. These SOPs should include at a minimum—

• Organization and setup of each command post.

• Plans for teardown and displacement of the command post.

• Eating and sleeping plans during command post operations.

• Command post shift manning, shift changes and operation guidelines.

• Physical security plans for the command post.

• Priorities of work during command post operations.

• Loading plans and checklists.

• Orders production.

• Techniques for monitoring enemy and friendly situations.

• Posting of command post map boards.

• Maintenance of command post generators, journals, and logs.

• Use of a planning SOP, if separate from the tactical standard operating procedure (TSOP).

COMMUNICATIONS

2-44. Command posts monitor communications nets, receive reports, and process information to satisfy commander needs or CCIR. This information is maintained on maps, charts, and logs. Each staff section maintains daily journals to log messages and radio traffic.

MAPS

2-45. Command posts maintain information as easily understood map graphics and charts. Status charts can be combined with situation maps to give commanders friendly and enemy situation snapshots for the planning process. This information is updated continuously.

2-46. For simplicity, all map boards should be the same size and scale, and overlay mounting holes should be standard on all map boards. This allows easy transfer of overlays from one board to another.

2-47. The following procedures for posting friendly and enemy information on the map will aid commanders and staff officers in following the flow of battle.

• All graphics should be posted on an overlay. Friendly and enemy unit symbols should be displayed on clear acetate placed on the operations overlay. These symbols can be marked with regular stick cellophane tape or with marking pen.

• Units normally keep track of subordinate units’ two levels down. This may be difficult during combat operations. It may be necessary to track locations of immediate subordinate units instead.

BATTLE CAPTAIN

2-48. The command post staff focuses on collecting the critical information the commander needs to fight the battle. Information flow is a constant challenge, especially since everyone in the command post must maintain a common operational picture. The battle captain’s essential function is like that of a conductor in an orchestra with regards to the common operational picture. The battle captain’s role is to plan, coordinate, supervise, and maintain communication flow throughout the command post to ensure the successful accomplishment of all assigned missions. The command post battle captain assists the commander, executive officer, and S-3 by being the focal point in the command post for communications, coordination, and information management. The battle captain is also the command post OIC in the absence of the commander, executive officer, and S-3.

2-49. The battle captain has the overall responsibility for the smooth functioning of the facility and its staff elements. This range of responsibility includes—

• Maintaining continuous operations of the command post while static and mobile.

• Battle-tracking the current situation.

• Ensuring communications are maintained with and between all stations, and that all messages and reports are routed and logged per SOP.

• Assisting the executive officer information management and coordination of command post staff functions to ensure a smooth and continuous information flow between the staff sections of the command post.

• Processing essential data from the incoming flow of information to ensure all tactical and logistical information is gathered and provided to the command post staff, S-3, and executive officer on a regular basis.

• Tracking commander’s critical information requirements and providing recommendations to the commander and executive officer.

• Approving fabrication and propagation of manual unit icons.

• Sending reports to higher and ensuring relevant information is passed subordinate units.

• Providing security for the command post, including its physical security and maintenance of noise and light discipline.

• Ensuring mobility of the command post, including configuration, equipment, and training, to facilitate rapid movement.

• Conducting command post battle drills and enforcing the command post SOP.

2-50. The battle captain ensures all staff elements in the command post understand their actions following the TSOP and OPORD, and provides coordination for message flow, staff briefings, updates to charts, and other coordinated staff actions. As a focal point in the command post, the battle captain processes essential information from incoming data, assesses it, ensures dissemination, and makes recommendations to the commander, executive officer, and S-3. Dissemination to the staff of important events is critical. In doing so, the battle captain assists in synchronization of staff actions.

2-51. Information management in the command post can include processing journals, message forms, reports, fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), and requests for information. The battle captain ensures the consistency, accuracy, and timeliness of information leaving the command post, including preparing and dispatching FRAGORDs and warning orders (WARNORDs). In addition, he monitors and enforces the updating of charts and status boards necessary for battle management and ensures this posted information is timely, accurate, and accessible.

2-52. To function effectively, the battle captain must have a working knowledge of all elements in the command post, understand unit SOP, and ensure the staff uses them. He must know the current plan and task organization of the unit and understand the commander’s intent. In addition, the battle captain must understand the limits of his decision making and action authority.

2-53. The battle captain is integrated into the decision making process and knows why certain key decisions were made. He must know the technical aspects of the battle plan and understand the time-space relationship to execute any specific support task. He must understand and enforce the battle rhythm; the standard events or actions that happen during a normal 24-hour period; and ensure that the command post staff is effective throughout the period. Battle captains use their judgment to adjust activities and events to accomplish the mission across different shifts, varying tactical circumstances, and changes in the command post location.

COMMUNICATIONS

2-54. Communications is the means by which the commander projects his mission command across the width and depth of the battlefield. Lines of communications must go up, down, and laterally. The commander—

• Provides for redundancy in communications means by having backups at key locations.

• Makes sure subordinates know what to do during interruptions in communications. Ensure SOPs specify immediate actions in case of jamming, including prearranged frequencies to switch to and code words.

• Avoids overloading the communications systems. Use them only when necessary. Practice disciplined communications procedures by eliminating nonessential conversations.

RESPONSIBILITIES

2-55. The sequential order of responsibilities for communications is—

• Senior to subordinate.

• Supporting to supported.

• Reinforcing to reinforced.

• Passing for forward passage of lines.

• Passed to passing for rearward passage of lines.

• Left to right.

• Rearward to forward.

2-56. All units take immediate action to restore lost communications. These responsibilities apply to establishing liaison between headquarters.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

2-57. All standard communications means are available to the SBCT Infantry battalion. These include digital mission command systems, wire, couriers, sound and visual signals, telephones, and radios.

RADIO TRANSMISSIONS

2-58. Radio transmissions should be brief to reduce the electronic warfare signature. Using secure operational and numerical codes reduces the chance of enemy detection. Use low-power transmissions and terrain to mask signals from enemy direction-finding equipment. Use couriers or wire for lengthy messages. Units must practice using SOP, operational terms and other common abbreviation techniques such as the terrain index referencing system.

INFORMATION STORAGE MEDIA

2-59. Modern electronic information storage systems are prolific on the battlefield. Compact disks, flash memory drives, thumb drives, and hard drives can store vast amounts of information. They are routinely used to store and transfer data, including classified information. Because of their small size, they are easy to misplace, duplicate, and even steal. Management of these devices poses a new but not unique problem for physical security personnel. Care, storage and inventory management must be addressed in unit SOPs and these devices should be considered sensitive items.

SYSTEMS

2-60. Communications currently available to the battalion fall under one of the subsets of the ABCS:

• Combat net radio.

• Army Common User System (ACUS).

• Army Data Distribution System (ADDS).

COMBAT NET RADIO

2-61. The primary means of communication for the maneuver battalion is combat net radio. This family of push-to-talk radios includes single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), improved high frequency radio (IHFR), and tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios (when authorized).

ARMY COMMON USER SYSTEM

2-62. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) provides the Army Common User System at echelon, corps, and below (ECB). The WIN-T provides the higher bandwidth and ABCS services required by maneuver commanders. Services range from secure internet protocol router (SIPR) and nonsecure internet protocol router (NIPR), to video teleconferencing (VTC). The equipment also enables both circuit switching and internet protocol-based networking. It works with mobile subscriber equipment through the “Vantage” switching technology. The Vantage provides seamless interface between voice over internet protocol (IP) and tactical networks through two dedicated mobile subscriber equipment trunks.

ARMY DATA DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

2-63. The ADDS provides rapid battlefield information dissemination of products up and down the chain of command and to adjacent units. Two critical components of the ADDS at the SBCT Infantry battalion level are the tactical internet and BFT II/JCR.

TACTICAL INTERNET

2-64. The tactical Internet is a collection of interconnected tactical radios and computer hardware and software providing seamless information system data exchange between movement and maneuver, sustainment, and mission command information system platforms. The tactical internet’s primary function is to provide a more responsive information exchange capability to exercise command at BCT level and below.

2-65. The tactical internet consists of BFT II/JCR computers, the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS) very high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC), the SINCGARS SIP, and other supporting communications equipment. It is an automated, router-based communications network using commercial Internet standard protocols to move data vertically and horizontally through the SBCT area and to higher- level echelons using the WIN-T. Automated network management tools provide tactical internet planning, monitoring, and reconfiguring capabilities.

BLUE FORCE TRACKER JOINT CAPABILITIES RELEASE

2-66. The BFT II/JCR hardware is a mix of commercial, ruggedized, and militarized computers installed in vehicles at SBCT level and below or issued to individuals as dismounted Soldier system units (DSSUs). When available, the BFT II/JCR can be connected to the global positioning system (GPS) and other embedded platform interfaces. BFT II/JCR is common to all aspects of the digitized battlefield; selected individuals in all platoons and companies have one. They are in most command and control information system platforms and command posts.

2-67. BFT II/JCR uses the variable message format to send and receive messages horizontally and vertically on the battlefield, irrespective of task organization. Variable message format improves current configurations in which the warfighting function automation systems do not communicate to each other. Digitization provides communication and processing capabilities to the warfighter, which yields significant advantages in two key areas.

Situational Understanding

2-68. Situational understanding is a state of understanding gained from knowledge based on accurate and real-time information of friendly, enemy, neutral, and noncombatant locations and terrain. It consists of a common operational picture of the battlefield scaled to specific levels of interest and needs.

Mission Command

2-69. A commander employs mission command functions as he plans, directs, and controls forces and operations to accomplish a mission. BFT II/JCR provides each echelon with the common operational picture two echelons up and down and one adjacent unit left and right. BFT II/JCR significantly improves the effectiveness of the force.

2-70. BFT II/JCR provides up-to-date combat situation information based on echelon and location of—

• Friendly and enemy positions.

• Air and ground unit positions.

• Maps, terrain, and elevation.

2-71. BFT II/JCR provides rapid generation and dissemination of messages and acknowledgments of—

• Orders and requests.

• Fires and alerts.

• Reports.

• Overlays on the situation picture.

• Semiautomatic exchange of selected mission-critical data between the BFT II/JCR and the ABCS component systems.

2-72. BFT II/JCR hosts must receive new initialization data for each task reorganization affected. Transfer of the modified initialization data to the ultimate users occurs through signal channels.

ENHANCED POSITION LOCATION REPORTING SYSTEM WITH VERY HIGH SPEED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EPLRS VHSIC)

2-73. Battalion mission command information system platforms employ EPLRS VHSIC as their primary data communications link to company and platoon platforms. It serves as a position location, navigation, identification, and communications system. Its primary components are the net control station and the radio sets. The net control system is the centralized control element used for system initialization, monitoring, and control. The radio sets are the radio receiver-transmitters provided to EPLRS VHSIC users. The battalion uses EPLRS VHSIC to provide wide area network connectivity down to platoon and up to the BCT. The antenna used with the system is an omnidirectional dipole. The planning range is 3 to 10 kilometers between radios, depending on power output settings and terrain.

DIGITAL MISSION COMMAND SYSTEMS AND ARCHITECTURE

2-74. The discussion below provides basic information on the digital mission command systems and architecture.

Army Battle Command System Components

2-75. The ABCS consists of the five ABCS subcomponents, the BFT II/JCR system, and the tactical Internet. The ABCS components traditionally have been stovepipe systems in their development, with limited interface capability to other digital systems. The ABCS components are the primary digital communication systems between command posts. BFT II/JCR is the primary digital system for communication and transmission of data at battalion level and below.

Distributed Common Ground Station–Army

2-76. Distributed Command Ground Station–Army (DCGS–A) supports intelligence operations, providing linkage to strategic and tactical intelligence sensors and sources. DCGS–A primary functions include—

• Data access, databasing, and correlation capabilities.

• Creation and dissemination of intelligence reports, templates, and annexes.

• Receipt of intelligence reports from a variety of sources (including BFT II/JCR and other digital systems and display and management of the enemy common operational picture).

• Collection management.

• Support of targeting functions.

2-77. The S-2 uses DCGS–A to receive intelligence reports from all sources and to create and manage the correlated COP, which the other ABCS components in the command post can access. Also, the S-2 routinely sends the DCGS–A picture he generates down to subordinate units through BFT II/JCR. He also sends it to the higher headquarters.

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

2-78. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) provides automated capabilities to control fire support operations. Located in the fire support element platform at the command post and in the supporting artillery battalion command post, the system provides the ability to—

• Create and disseminate fire support orders, graphics, and control measures.

• Receive and process calls for fire from other digital systems and target acquisition radars.

• Manage mission allocation.

• Monitor firing unit status and locations.

• Transmit and receive reports and free text messages.

• In conjunction with All Source Analysis System (ASAS), provide integrated fires and intelligence and electronic warfare management.

Air and Missile Defense Workstation

2-79. The air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS) is a collaborative battlefield awareness information management system that contributes to combat effectiveness by retrieving, fusing, and distributing time- sensitive information necessary to achieve decision-cycle dominance. AMDWS retrieves battlefield awareness information from many sources: joint headquarters, the ABCS network, national intelligence assets, all-source centers, and tactical and strategic sensors. AMDWS uses this information to provide an area-complete, combat-operations display that combines ground, air, and space-based sensor inputs and command and staff data with automated planning tools. Distribution is accomplished over tactical and special purpose communications in near-real time, while supporting concurrent interaction with joint command and control networks, sensor sources, and ABCS systems. The AMDWS is the force operations system of the forward area air defense command, control and intelligence network system supporting short-range air defense units. Some of the system capabilities include but are not limited to—

• Sending and receiving messages and defense plans.

• Maintaining human resource and logistics databases and status for the air defense unit.

• Developing and running air battle scenario.

• Maintaining situation awareness of the hostile air threat.

• Providing data required for aerial threat portions of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

• Maintaining situational awareness during ongoing air defense operations.

• Providing for the interface and data exchange between the tactical command system and other elements of the Army battle command system.

• Planning defense design.

Sustainment Systems Mission Command

2-80. Sustainment Systems Mission Command provides logistics status and information in support of sustainment planning and operations. The system receives subordinate unit logistical reports from BFT II/JCR and other Sustainment Systems Mission Command terminals, and transmits reports and requirements to echelons-above-brigade support elements. The S-1 and S-4 sections in the CTCP have a Sustainment Systems Mission Command terminal with BFT II/JCR. They use this terminal to receive digital logistical and situation reports from units within the battalion and to input data into the Sustainment Systems Mission Command network to conduct human resource transactions and to request, coordinate, and receive supplies.

2-81. Sustainment Systems Mission Command provides a logistics picture for warfighting function information in support of the ABCS common operating picture of the battlefield. The system provides information on all classes of supply, maintenance, medical services, (has limited in-transit visibility of Class VII this is a desired future capability), human resources, and movements to commanders and staffs. This information is consolidated and collated into situation reports and planning estimates for current and future operations. This capability provides a concise picture of unit requirements and support capabilities that commanders have deemed crucial to the success of an operation and will have joint application.

2-82. Sustainment Systems Mission Command integrates a common operational picture of the following key logistics mission areas:

• Arming the force.

• Fueling the force.

• Manning the force.

• Fixing the force.

• Moving the force.

Internet Controller

2-83. BFT II/JCR receives data across the tactical internet through the Internet controller. The Internet controller is a tactical router built into the SINCGARS radio system. The EPLRS data radio and the SINCGARS radio transmit and receive digital information between vehicles.

Digital Command and Control Techniques

2-84. This paragraph discusses considerations and techniques for digital command and control procedures and for integrating analog and digital units. The potential of these systems to contribute to battlefield lethality, tempo, and ability to dominate is enormous. Digital command and control systems bring a dramatic increase in the level of informational dominance units may achieve. They can significantly speed the process of creating and disseminating orders, allow for extensive collection of information, and increase the speed and fidelity of coordination and synchronization of battlefield activities. At the same time, achieving the potential of these systems requires extensive training, a high level of technical proficiency by both operators and supervisors, and the disciplined use of detailed SOPs. Communications planning and execution to support the digital systems is significantly more demanding and arduous than is required for units primarily relying on FM and WIN-T communications.

FM or Digital

2-85. Whether to use FM or digital means for communication is a function of the situation and SOPs. Some general considerations can help guide the understanding of when to use which mechanism at what time. FM is normally the initial method of communications when elements are in contact. Before and following an engagement, the staff and commanders use digital systems for disseminating orders and graphics and conducting routine reporting. During operations, however, the staff uses a combination of systems to report and coordinate with higher and adjacent units.

2-86. FM is the primary method of communications between battalion and the BCT when elements are in contact throughout the battalion. Before and following an engagement, the staff and commanders use digital systems for disseminating orders and graphics and conducting routine reporting. During operations, however, the battalion staff uses a combination of systems to report and coordinate with higher and adjacent units.

2-87. The SBCT Infantry battalion staff must remain sensitive to the difficulty and danger of using digital systems when moving or in contact. It should not expect digital reports from subordinate units under such conditions. Other general guidelines include the following:

• Initial contact at any echelon within the battalion should be reported on FM voice; digital enemy spot reports should follow as soon as possible to generate the enemy common operational picture.

• Elements moving about the battlefield (not in command posts) use FM voice unless they can stop and generate a digital message or report.

• Emergency logistical requests, especially casualty evacuation requests, should be initiated on FM voice with a follow-up digital report, if possible.

• Combat elements moving or in contact should transmit enemy spot reports on FM voice; their higher headquarters should convert FM reports into digital spot reports to generate the common operational picture. At company level, the executive officer, the first sergeant, or the company command post converts the reports.

• Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent on FM voice; fire support teams submit digitally to AFATDS.

• Plan calls for fire digitally and execute them by voice with digital back-up.

• Routine logistical reports and requests should be sent digitally.

• Routine reports from subordinates to battalion before and following combat should be sent digitally.

• Orders, plans, and graphics should be done face-to-face, if possible. If these products are digitally transmitted, they should be followed by FM voice call to alert recipients that critical information is being sent. The transmitting element should request a verbal acknowledgement of both receipt and understanding of the transmitted information by an appropriate Soldier, who usually is not the computer operator.

• Obstacle and CBRN-1 reports should be sent initially by voice followed by digital reports to generate a geo-referenced message portraying the obstacle or contaminated area across the network.

Friendly Common Operational Picture

2-88. The creation of friendly common operational picture is extensively automated, requiring minimal manipulation by command posts or platform operators. Each platform creates and transmits its own position location and receives the friendly locations, displayed as icons, of all the friendly elements in that platform’s wide area network. This does not necessarily mean that all friendly units in the general vicinity of that platform are displayed, because some elements may not be in that platform’s network. For example, a combat vehicle in a battalion probably will not have information on an above BCT level artillery unit operating nearby because the two are in different networks. The common operational picture generated from individual BFT II/JCR platforms is transmitted to command posts through the tactical operations center server. The other ABCS components can access the friendly common operational picture through BFT II/JCR.

Limitations

2-89. Commanders must recognize limitations in the creation of the friendly common operational picture which results from vehicles or units that are not equipped with BFT II/JCR. The following are two aspects to consider:

• Not all coalition and host nation forces will be equipped with all ABCS. It is likely analog units will enter the BCT and battalion area of operation.

• Most dismounted Soldiers will not be equipped with a digital device that transmits information.

Solutions

2-90. The following are ways to overcome these limitations:

• A digitally-equipped element tracks the location of specified dismounts and manually generates and maintains an associated friendly icon.

• The main command post tracks analog units operating within the area and generates associated friendly icons. Also, the main command post must keep the analog equipped unit informed of other friendly units’ locations and activities.

• A digitally-equipped platform acts as a liaison or escort for analog units moving or operating in the area. Battalion and higher elements must be informed of the association of the liaison officer icon with the analog unit.

• Do not use friendly positional information to clear fires because not all elements will be visible. Friendly positional information can be used to deny fires and can aid in the clearance process, but it cannot be the sole source for clearance of fires. This holds true for all ABCS systems.

Enemy Common Operational Picture

2-91. The most difficult and critical aspect of creating the common operational picture is creating the picture of the enemy. The enemy common operational picture is the result of multiple inputs (FM spot reports, airborne surveillance platforms, reports from BFT II/JCR -equipped platforms in subordinate units, electronic or signal intelligence feeds) and inputs from the S-2 section. Enemy information generation is a complex process that is partially automated but requires a great deal of work and attention to detail to get right.

2-92. Generation of the enemy common operational picture occurs at all echelons. At battalion level and below, the primary mechanism for generating information is BFT II/JCR. When an observer acquires an enemy element, he creates and transmits a spot report, which automatically generates an enemy icon that appears network wide. Only those in the address group to whom the report was sent receive the text of the report, but all platforms in the network can see the icon. As the enemy moves or its strength changes, the observer must update this icon. If the observer must move, he ideally passes responsibility for the icon to another observer. If multiple observers see the same enemy element and create multiple reports, the S-2 or some other element that has the capability must eliminate the redundant icons.

2-93. Unit SOPs must clearly establish who has the ability, authority, and responsibility to create and input enemy icons. Without the establishment of these procedures, it is highly probable that the enemy common operational picture will not be accurate.

2-94. BFT II/JCR spot reports must include the higher headquarters S-2 in the address group for the data to be routed through the command post server into DCGS–A to feed the larger intelligence picture. FM reports received at a command post can be inputted manually into the DCGS–A database by the S-2 section. BFT II/JCR and FM voice reports are the primary source of enemy information for fighting the close and rear battles.

2-95. The SBCT S-2 section and the supporting analysis control team support the SBCT Infantry battalion by receiving DCGS–A intelligence feeds from higher and adjacent units along with feeds from airborne surveillance platforms, and the common ground station. They enter enemy information from these sources into the DCGS–A database and send this information through BFT II/JCR to the battalion S-2s. These feeds, along with FM voice and BFT II/JCR reports, are the primary sources of the enemy common operational picture for executing the SBCT deep fight and providing battalions a picture of what is coming into their areas.

2-96. Fusion of all the intelligence feeds normally is done at SBCT and higher levels. The SBCT S-2 routinely (every 30 minutes to every hour) sends the updated enemy picture to subordinate units down to platform level. Since the fused DCGS–A database is focused on the deeper areas of the battlefield and its timeliness may vary, subordinate battalion elements and the reconnaissance units normally use only the BFT II/JCR -generated common operational picture. Companies should stay focused entirely on the BFT II/JCR -generated common operational picture. Battalion leaders and staffs refer occasionally to the BFT II/JCR -generated intelligence picture to keep track of enemy forces they might soon encounter, but that are not yet part of the battalion close fight.

2-97. As systems develop further in the future, the generation of the enemy common operational picture will be increasingly automated. However, the success of the intelligence effort depends primarily on the ability of staffs to analyze enemy activities effectively, to develop and continuously refine effective intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and to create and execute effective collection management plans.

2-98. Automation and displays contribute enormously to the ability to disseminate information and display it in a manner that aids comprehension; however, information generation must be rapid for it to be useful. Information also must be accompanied by analysis; pictures alone cannot convey all that is required nor will they be interpreted the same by all viewers. S-2s must be particularly careful about spending too much time operating a DCGS–A terminal while neglecting the analysis of activities for the battalion and subordinate commanders and staffs.

Graphics and Orders

2-99. All ABCS components effectively support the creation and transmission of doctrinal field orders. The staff sections normally develop their portions of orders and send them to the S-3 where they are merged into a single document. The S-3 deconflicts, integrates, and synchronizes all elements of the order. Once the order is complete, it is transmitted to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. In creating orders, remember that the tactical internet does not possess high transmission rates like civilian email. Orders and graphics must be concise to reduce transmission times. Orders transmitted directly to BFT II/JCR-equipped systems (as all subordinate leaders in the battalion have) must meet the size constraints of the order formats in BFT II/JCR. Graphics and overlays should be constructed with the same considerations for clarity and size.

Graphics

2-100. Digital graphics must interface and be transmittable. The interface and commonality of graphics will continue to evolve technologically and will require further software corrections. The following guidelines apply:

• Create control measures relative to readily identifiable terrain, particularly if analog units are part of the task organization.

• Boundaries are important, especially when multiple units must operate in close proximity or when it becomes necessary to coordinate fires or movement of other units.

• Intent graphics that lack the specificity of detailed control measures are an excellent tool for use with warning and fragmentary orders and when doing parallel planning. Follow them with appropriately detailed graphics, as required.

• Use standardized colors to differentiate units. This should be articulated in the SBCT SOP and established at SBCT level. For example, SBCT graphics may be in black, Battalion A in purple, Battalion B in magenta, and Battalion C in brown. This adds considerable clarity for the viewer. Subordinate company and team colors should be specified.

• Use traditional doctrinal colors for other graphics (green for obstacles, yellow for contaminated areas, and so forth).

Overlays

2-101. To accelerate transmission times when creating overlays, use multiple smaller overlays instead of a single large overlay. System operators can open the overlays they need, displaying them simultaneously. This technique helps operators in reducing screen clutter.

2-102. The S-3 should create the initial graphic control measures (boundaries, objectives, and phase lines) on a single overlay and distribute it to the staff. Label this overlay as the operations overlay with the appropriate order number.

2-103. Staff elements construct their appropriate graphic overlays using the operations overlay as a background but without duplicating the operations overlay. This avoids unnecessary duplication and increase in file size and maintains standardization and accuracy. Each staff section labels its overlay appropriately with the type of overlay and order number such as fire support, OPORD X-XX.

2-104. Before overlays are transmitted to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units, the senior battle captain or the executive officer checks them for accuracy and labeling. Hard copy (traditional acetate) overlays are required for the command posts and any analog units.

2-105. Transmit graphics for on-order missions or branch options to the plan before the operation as time permits. If time is short, transmit them with warning orders.

Acetate Maps

2-106. The advent of digitization does not mean that acetate and maps have no use and will disappear, at least not soon. Maps still remain the best tools when maneuvering and fighting on the battlefield, and for controlling and tracking operations over a large area. The combination of a map with digital information and terrain database is ideal; both are required and extensively used.

Standard Operating Procedure Considerations

2-107. This section contains information regarding digital operations that is relevant for the BCT and battalion tactical SOPs. Most of the digital operating procedures must be established at the BCT level to achieve standardization and effective command and control information systems. As units have different mission requirements and technical changes occur, they should experiment with these guidelines.

Filter Settings

2-108. To create a common picture, all BFT II/JCR platforms must have the same information filter settings. This is particularly important for the enemy common operational picture so that as icons go stale, they purge at the same time on all platforms. Standard filter settings based upon the nature of the enemy’s operation should be established in unit SOPs and be the same throughout the BCT. For enemy offensive operations, the filter setting times should be short; for enemy defensive operations, the setting times should be longer, reflecting the more static nature of the enemy picture.

2-109. The standardization of friendly and enemy situational filter settings is of great importance in maintaining a common operational picture throughout the force. BFT II/JCR provides three methods for updating individual vehicle locations: time, distance, and manually. When the system is operational, it automatically updates friendly icons using time, distance traveled, or both, based on the platform’s friendly situational filter settings. The unit should standardize filter settings across the force based on both the mission and the function of the platform or vehicle. Use shorter refresh rates for combat vehicles and vehicles that frequently move and longer refresh rates for static vehicles such as command posts. Tailoring the frequency of these automatic updates reduces the load on the tactical internet, freeing more capacity for other types of traffic.

2-110. The BCT node is probably the most effective place to standardize the situational filter settings using the BCT tactical SOP. There are no set rules for what these settings should be. The commander must establish them based on the unit’s experience using BFT II/JCR and the capacity of the tactical Internet. The battalion should use the capability to update a vehicle’s position manually only when a platform’s system is not fully functional and it has lost the ability to maintain its position within the system automatically.

Reporting and Tracking of Battles

2-111. Having all platforms on the battlefield send spot reports digitally may result in mass confusion. However, to eliminate confusion, there should be one designated person within the unit who is authorized to initiate digital spot reports. While the designated person will be somewhat removed from the fight, he can assist those who execute the direct fire fight by filtering multiple reports of the same event.

2-112. Another technique that can be used to eliminate reporting problems is to limit the creation of enemy icons through digital spot reports to reconnaissance elements and the company leadership (commander, executive officer, or first sergeant). Others report on FM to their higher headquarters, which creates and manages the icon. At company level, the executive officer, first sergeant, or command post personnel become the primary digital reporters. These assignments cannot be completely restrictive. Unit SOPs and command guidance must allow for and encourage Soldiers who observe the enemy and know they are the sole observer (because there is no corresponding enemy icon displayed in the situational common operational picture) to create a digital spot report. SBCT and battalion SOPs should define the schedule for report submissions, the message group for the reports, and the medium (digital system or verbal) to be used.

2-113. Battle tracking is the process of monitoring designated elements of the common operational picture that are tied to the commander’s criteria for success. Battle tracking requires special attention from all staff officers, and normally is done both digitally and manually with situation maps and boards. The executive officer and S-3 must continue to monitor the progress of the operation and recommend changes as required.

Updates

2-114. Establish a routine schedule of system updates. For example, the S-2 section should continuously update the ASAS database and should transmit the latest common operational picture to the network every 30 minutes during operations if the battalion commander, S-3, or reconnaissance elements need it. Also, staff sections should print critical displays on an established schedule. These printed snapshots of the common operational picture can be used for continuity of battle tracking if system failures and can contribute to after action reviews and unit historical records.

Orders and Overlays

2-115. SOPs should define the technical process for creating, collating, and transmitting orders and overlays, both analog and digital.

Filing System and Naming Convention

2-116. For interoperability and clarity, SBCT SOPs should define the naming convention and filing system for all reports, orders, and message traffic. This significantly reduces time and frustration associated with lost files or changes in system operators.

Databases

2-117. Command and control information systems will inevitably migrate to a web-based capability, allowing information to be entered into a database and then accessed by users as needed or when they are able to retrieve it. For example, the S-2 may transmit an intelligence summary to all subordinates, and inevitably some will lose the file or not receive it. The S-2 can simultaneously post that same summary to his homepage so users can access it as required. If this technique is used, there are a few key things to consider—

• Posting a document to a homepage does not constitute communications. The right people must be alerted when the document is available.

• Keep documents concise and simple. Elaborate PowerPoint slide briefings take longer to transmit, causing delays in the tactical internet.

• The amount of information entered in a database and personnel who have access must be carefully controlled, both to maintain security and to keep from overloading the tactical internet.

• Assign responsibility to the person who is authorized to input and delete both friendly and enemy unit icon information.

Integration of Digital and Analog Units

2-118. Procedures for integrating digital and analog units are essential and should consider the following:

• FM and WIN-T are the primary communications mediums with the analog unit.

• Hard copy orders and graphics are required.

• Graphical control measures require a level of detail necessary to support operations of a unit without situational information. This generally requires that more control measures be tied to identifiable terrain.

• Liaison officer teams are critical.

• The staff must recognize that integrating an analog unit into a digital unit requires retention of most of the analog control techniques. In essence, both digital and analog control systems must be in operation, with particular attention paid to keeping the analog unit apprised of all pertinent information that flows digitally.

SECTION III – INFORMATION OPERATIONS

2-119. Military information support operations are planned to convey selected information and indicators directed towards foreign, friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately behavior. (Refer to FM 3-53 for more information.)

2-120. The SBCT Infantry battalion likely conducts targeted information sharing activities while establishing civil control with the purpose of positively influencing public behavior to support the unit and the developing host-nation security forces (HNSF) and government operations. Tactical military support operations teams are often attached or serve in direct support to maneuver units, particularly in stability operations. Military information support operations (MISO) units disseminate noninterference messages provide information on the consequences of interfering with operations and can be a means for the local populace to provide tips on insurgents and their activities.

2-121. Information-related capabilities are capabilities that support a commander’s ability to communicate across a range of operations and many audiences to inform or influence and, consequently, shape desired outcomes. Theoretically, all capabilities send a message (or make an impression) and serve to inform and influence audiences. While conducting IO, commanders consider all capabilities in devising solutions and plans. The commander and staff regularly use traditional information-related capabilities when conducting the following IO:

• Public affairs.

• Military information support operations.

• Soldier and leader engagements.

• Combat camera.

• Military deception.

• Cyber electromagnetic activities.

• Operations security

MILITARY DECEPTION

2-122. Military deception involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers. This information-related capability intends for the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The S-3 plans officer has responsibility for planning military deception. Often, commanders assign a specific individual to serve as the military deception (MILDEC) officer, responsible for shepherding the deception through planning, hand-off, and termination. The S-3 IO coordinates with this person to synchronize MILDEC efforts with other information-related capabilities to affect threat decision making, while protecting our own. (Refer to FM 6-0, Chapter 11 for more information.)

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

2-123. Cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) protect the mission command system by seizing, retaining, and exploiting an advantage over the enemy in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum while denying and degrading enemy use of the same. CEMA includes cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and electromagnetic spectrum operations. These activities deny, degrade, or disrupt the enemy‘s use of its command and control systems and other cyber capabilities.

SECTION IV – PLANNING

2-124. The commander’s intent focuses the operations process. This process (planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment) is described in detail in ADRP 5-0. Although planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur continuously in operations, they need not occur sequentially. The SBCT Infantry battalion must prepare to perform all four actions simultaneously, and the commander’s intent is at the center of the process.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

2-125. The commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning how the force will achieve that end state. Commanders summarize their visualization in their intent statement. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.) Because the enemy can be unpredictable, and not constrained to friendly parameters, the commander’s intent should allow subordinate leaders to exercise their initiative in the face of adverse tactical situations.

2-126. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander relies on his professional training and tactical experience to develop his intent. Of all the activities required of a SBCT Infantry battalion commander, visualizing an operation from start to finish and describing that visualization to his staff and company commanders, are the most critical. When possible, the commander delivers his intent personally. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander’s intent can be summarized as—

• The purpose of the operation (the why).

• What key tasks the SBCT Infantry battalion must accomplish.

• The end state.

2-127. The commander’s intent is critical to mission accomplishment. The military designs and executes its operations around the commander’s intent:

• The commander develops his intent and concept of the operation within the framework of his higher commander’s intent.

• During planning, the commander’s intent drives the MDMP.

• Subordinates use the commander’s intent to decide what to do when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies.

• During execution, staffs work within the commander’s intent to direct units and control resource allocations.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

2-128. The commander and staff use the MDMP to develop plans and orders. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.) The MDMP is not a stand-alone process; it is synchronized with several other processes. These other processes do not occur at distinct points within the MDMP. They may occur before, during, or after the MDMP. At the battalion level, the processes and their products that support MDMP can include:

• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

• Targeting. (Refer to ATP 3-60 for more information.)

• Risk management. (Refer to ATP 5-19 for more information.)

• Information collection. (Refer to chapter 2 for more information.)

2-129. Although commanders at all levels are expected to be involved in the MDMP, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander should ensure that his intent (that is visualization) is clear to his subordinates during the entire operations process. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander and staff should ensure all officers and NCOs are trained on the MDMP process and its products to enhance their planning capabilities.

2-130. Throughout the operations process, the SBCT Infantry battalion staff analyzes the current situation in terms of METT-TC and prepares their running estimates. A running estimate is a staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations. The running estimate enables the staff to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable. (ADRP 5-0) An effective running estimate relies on accurate and continuous reporting from individuals and units in order for the staff to update running estimates and make adjustments to the operation as necessary. Generally, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander empowers his staff to make adjustments within their areas of expertise. When a decision is outside their authority, staff officers present the situation to those delegated the authority to act (for example, the S-3 or XO) or to the commander.

2-131. Thinking in terms of desired and undesired effects helps commanders throughout the operations process. Desired effects are results that support accomplishment of the mission. Undesired effects could adversely affect accomplishment of the mission. The commander and staff examine ways to achieve desired effects best, while mitigating undesired effects. By integrating risk management processes throughout MDMP, the commander and his staff mitigate environmental and collateral damage. The commander and staff use control measures to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure and the natural environment while ensuring the mission accomplishment. Regardless of the situation, the commander and staff are expected to make values-based decisions that are ethical and effective.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTS

2-132. In time-constrained environments, the staff might not be able to conduct a detailed MDMP, and might choose to abbreviate the process using parallel and collaborative planning as described in ADRP 5-0. The abbreviated process uses all seven steps of the MDMP, but the steps are done in a shortened and less detailed manner.

PARALLEL PLANNING

2-133. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s staff does not wait for the BCT OPORD before beginning the MDMP. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s MDMP usually begins with a BCT WARNORD. However, a change in the situation, anticipation of an order from the BCT, or changed CCIR can lead the commander to begin planning, and to base this planning on the apparent changes. This is referred to as parallel planning. It is accomplished by issuing warning orders to subordinate units at various stages of the MDMP. Parallel planning depends on distributing information as it is received or developed.

COLLABORATIVE PLANNING

2-134. Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction among commanders and staffs at two or more echelons developing plans for a particular operation. This can be collaboration between the BCT and SBCT Infantry battalion’s or the battalion and its companies. One example could be a SBCT Infantry battalion’s conducting collaborative planning for a cordon and search. The responsible company knows its AO better, so it can recommend the necessary terrain information (such as routes and civilian locations), and timing for the operation. This allows the company to begin planning earlier and with more accurate information, while the SBCT Infantry battalion’s focuses on integrating other warfighting functions into the concept of the operation.

DISTRIBUTED PLANNING

2-135. Digital communications and information systems enable members of the SBCT Infantry battalion’s staff to execute the MDMP without being collocated. Distributed planning saves time and increases the accuracy of available information through the use of rapid voice and data transmissions that the SBCT Infantry battalion’s can use throughout the AO, including the command group, main CP, CTCP, and FTCP.

FRAGMENTARY ORDERS

2-136. The commander often bases a FRAGORD on newly acquired intelligence. Predictive intelligence provides commanders and Soldiers with a high level of shared situational understanding (SU), delivered with the speed, accuracy and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential and conduct successful operations. Often the SBCT Infantry battalion’s XO/S-3, acting within the commander’s intent, issues a FRAGORD to take advantage of the new information. The FRAGORD ensures that all subordinates and subordinate units stay synchronized. Synchronization involves more than arranging military actions; it requires unity of effort throughout the force.

NESTED CONCEPTS

2-137. As the SBCT Infantry battalion’s completes MDMP and prepares the necessary orders, each subordinate unit must understand how the purpose of its assigned tasks has been incorporated, or “nested” into the SBCT Infantry battalion’s operation. Nested concepts, however, are more than links between a subordinate unit’s task and purpose, and the SBCT Infantry battalion’s main effort's task and purpose. Nested concepts include the integration of all the warfighting functions (for example, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection during the course-of-action development process).

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

2-138. Troop leading procedures (TLP) is a dynamic process used by small unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. The MDMP and TLP are similar, but not identical. The type, amount, and timeliness of the information that the battalion passes to the companies and the scout platoon directly influence these subordinates’ TLP. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 and FM 6-0 for more information.)

PREPARING FOR OPERATIONS

2-139. During preparation, the battalion commander continues to drive mission command and the operation process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing leading, and assessing the information and intelligence provided to him through his staff from higher and subordinate echelons. Preparation takes place any time the SBCT Infantry battalion’s is not executing. Ideally, preparation begins with the receipt of an order (as does planning) and ends as execution begins. Preparations for major operations include information collection tasks, plan refinement, rehearsals, coordination, inspections, and movement.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-140. Information collection begins during planning to fill any IRs that were identified during mission analysis. IRs are those information elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. Those IR identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making are the CCIRs. (ADRP 5-0) During MDMP, the commander decides whether to designate an IR as a CCIR based on his likely decisions and his visualization operation. The staff develops an initial information collection plan focused on the intelligence gaps identified during mission analysis. This initial information collection plan should answer the IR needed to develop effective plans. The initial information collection plan can be issued as part of a WARNORD, a FRAGORD, or an OPORD.

2-141. During preparation, the SBCT Infantry battalion’s commander receives answers to some of his IR, and improves his situational awareness through his available information collection assets (such as scout platoon, unmanned aerial system (UAS), requested brigade assets, and so forth). The battalion plans and executes reconnaissance and security tasks with the same level of importance as any operation. As the scout platoon supported with information collection assets gathers information (answering IR), the plan is modified to account for new IR or answered CCIR, and efforts are redirected. The S-3 usually updates the information collection plan with FRAGORDs.

2-142. The commander and staff continuously review IPB products against the current situation. The commander (or S-3) redirects the scout platoon or other information collection assets to focus on the most important unknowns remaining, while emphasizing the current CCIR. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.) When determining his need for information, the SBCT Infantry Battalion’s commander must take several factors into consideration:

• The ability of the scout platoon to gather the needed information.

• The risk to the scout platoon during collection.

• The specialized augmentation necessary for the scout platoon to perform its role in the time allotted and the degree of detail required.

• The ability to sustain the scout platoon over time and distance.

• The requirement to have the scout platoon available at critical times and places to support the decisive action.

• The availability (time, type, and quantity) of other information collection assets.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

2-143. Information operations integrate the employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision- making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Units want the civilian population in their area of operations to be neutral, or in favor of their activities. Leader engagements at all levels are the key to influencing the local populace perception of U.S. presence.

REHEARSALS

2-144. Rehearsals are the commander’s tool for ensuring that staffs and subordinates understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Rehearsals focus on synchronization and coordination See figure 2-1 on page 2-24 for an example of a rehearsal. Each of the four types of rehearsals achieves a different result and have a specific place in the preparation time line. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

Figure 2-1. Example rehearsal script

EXECUTING OPERATIONS

2-145. The commander’s intent and mission orders focus every level of the SBCT Infantry battalion’s on executing the concept of operations. During execution, ensure the commander has the information he needs to assess the operation. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s main CP conducts battle tracking, which involves monitoring all reports to identify information in order to keep the subordinate units and warfighting functions synchronized. The commander and staff assess the probable outcomes of the ongoing operation to determine whether adjustments are required to accomplish the mission, to anticipate unforeseen enemy actions, or to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

2-146. When the operation is progressing satisfactorily, critical ongoing functions must occur. These include:

• Focus all assets on the decisive operation.

• Conduct continuous information collection and target acquisition.

• Conduct security operations.

• Adjust CCIRs and IRs based on the situation.

• Perform clearance of fires.

• Evacuation of casualties.

• Facilitate assured mobility.

• Adjust graphic control measures.

• Employ airspace control measures.

• Continue liaison and coordination.

• Maintain communications architecture.

• Conduct the targeting process.

• Manage movement and positioning of sustainment units.

• Perform terrain management.

2-147. If the operation does not proceed as planned, and adjustments and synchronization are not leading to mission accomplishment, the staff conducts a quick meeting or huddle to develop alternate courses of action (COAs). In most cases, the XO (or S-3) conducts a mental wargame to validate the COAs. The commander then decides on a COA and the staff implements the decision. The most important staff actions are resynchronizing the warfighting functions and disseminating changes to control measures.

2-148. The commander organizes his staff into CPs that provide staff expertise, communications and information systems that work in concert to aid the commander in planning and controlling operations. All CPs have the responsibility to conduct the five basic functions of information management:

• Collect relevant information.

• Process information from data to knowledge.

• Store relevant information for timely retrieval to support mission command.

• Display relevant information tailored for the needs of the user.

• Disseminate relevant information.

2-149. While each echelon and type of unit organizes CPs differently, two types of CP cells exist: functional and integrating. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

Chapter 3

Reconnaissance and Security

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area (JP 2- 0). Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.)

SECTION I – INFORMATION COLLECTION

3-1. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.) At the tactical level, reconnaissance, security, and intelligence operations are the primary means by which the SBCT Infantry battalion’s executes information collection to answer the CCIRs and support decision making for the decisive operation. In addition to answering CCIR, information collection facilitates targeting and fills voids in information.

3-2. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data and information provided by information collection assets. Timely and accurate intelligence provides Soldiers with the tools and the confidence they need to proceed aggressively or overcome an enemy’s superiority in Soldiers and materiel. Timely and accurate intelligence usually depends on aggressive and continuous information collection.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3-3. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information. Leaders rely on information and the intelligence resulting from it to make informed decisions. With timely and reliable information commanders can exercise their leadership through mission command. Everyone from the commander to the Soldiers on the ground has a role to play in the information battle and the effective application of combat power. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

COMMANDER

3-4. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish the situation’s context. Understanding involves analyzing and understanding the operational or mission variables in a given operational environment. It is derived from applying judgment to the common operational picture through the filter of the commander’s knowledge and experience.

3-5. The commander prioritizes collection activities primarily through providing guidance and intent early in the planning process. Commanders must identify and update CCIRs to ensure they support the scheme of maneuver and decision points and are limited to only the most critical needs.

KEY STAFF

3-6. The SBCT Infantry battalion executive officer coordinates and directs the efforts of special staff officers, integrates and synchronizes plans and orders, and supervises management of the CCIRs.

3-7. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s intelligence cell is responsible for providing timely and accurate intelligence to the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The battalion S-2 leads the cell and supervises and coordinates information collection (in conjunction with the battalion S-3) and the production and dissemination of intelligence. The battalion intelligence cell—

• Makes analytical predictions on when and where actions will occur.

• Provides analysis on the effects of the operational environment on friendly and threat COAs and capabilities.

• Evaluates the threat in terms of doctrine, threat characteristics, HVTs and HPTs, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

• In conjunction with the battalion S-3, coordinates the entire staff’s recommended PIRs for inclusion in the CCIRs.

• Integrates staff input to IPB products for staff planning, decision making, targeting, and assessment.

• Plans and controls intelligence operations in coordination with the S-3 and battalion fire support officer.

3-8. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s primary means of collecting information are their subordinate maneuver companies, patrols, scout platoon, snipers, Soldier observations, and field artillery forward observers. The battalion S-2 may also request support from BCT information collection assets. If allocated, these assets would normally have a support relationship with the battalion. The BCT military intelligence company commander assists the battalion in planning when military intelligence company assets are provided to the battalion.

3-9. The S-2 section formulates collection requirements based on inputs from the commander and staff to develop the information collection synchronization matrix and the information collection plan. The S-2 also identifies those intelligence assets and resources that can provide answers to CCIRs.

3-10. The 2X is the doctrinal term used to refer to the person who manages counterintelligence and human intelligence operations in support of the overall unit operation. The 2X section works with the S-2 in information collection planning and assessing, taking developed counterintelligence and human intelligence requirements and identifying the proper assets to answer the requirements. This information is used to develop requirement planning tools and the overall collection plan.

3-11. The S-3 tasks and directs the staff along with the organic and assigned assets for information collection execution. The S-3 collaboratively develops the information collection plan to ensure its synchronization with the operation plan.

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM

3-12. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s S-2 section can provide an intelligence analyst to the companies to support the commander with processing, exploitation and dissemination of timely usable relevant intelligence. Depending on the operational tasks, the analyst can work independently for the commander, or as part of a COIST supported by other company allocated personnel as determined by the commander.

3-13. In a more static environment the commander may form a robust COIST support team capable of collecting and analyzing data from multiple sources to make recommendations to the commander and disseminate information and intelligence to the S-2.

SBCT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

3-14. During operations, the SBCT Infantry battalion may receive support from the military intelligence company. The military intelligence company supports the Battalion through collection and analysis of information, and dissemination of intelligence. Task-organized via command and support relationships, the military intelligence company provides continual input for the SBCT Infantry battalion commander by intelligence operations and intelligence analysis tasks as part of the information collection plan. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 for more information.)

OTHER INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

3-15. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander may have access to other information collection assets from the ABCT and higher, including UAS, cavalry troops, and possibly Army aviation. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander also may receive support from or provide support to human intelligence (HUMINT) or signals intelligence. The SBCT has both signals intelligence and HUMINT capability in its military intelligence company. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)

INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCESS

3-16. Information collection is a continuous feed of relevant information that facilitates the commander’s situational awareness, and enables him to make better decisions. Information collection involves the entire staff. The SBCT Infantry battalion S-3 is the chief integrator of the information collection process. The S-2 assists the S-3, along with the rest of the staff. The SBCT Infantry battalion XO supervises synchronization of the information collection plan and its subsequent execution of the following collection tasks, which are described in detail in FM 3-55:

• Plan requirements and assess collection.

• Task and direct collection.

• Execute collection.

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

3-17. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander and staff develop information requirements to answer uncertainties about the enemy or other conditions of the operational environment that could influence planning or execution. The staff develops information requirement during mission analysis and war gaming as part of the MDMP. One result of the MDMP is linking the situation and event templates with named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted area of interest (TAIs), both of which are linked to DPs for the commander. The commander approves selected information requirements as his CCIR for his decision points (DPs).These NAIs, TAIs, and DPs are expressed on the decision support tool (DST). DSTs link the information the commander needs to know with the geographic location where the information can be found, and the time the information is likely to be available (based on the event template). The SBCT Infantry battalion subsequently receives specific information requirements from the SBCT. (See figure 3-1.) Finally, DSTs could have specific RFIs from subordinates and adjacent units. Placed together, these information requirements drive the information collection operations.

Figure 3-1. Information requirements

3-18. Regardless of the source, each IR should specify—

• WHAT (activity or indicator).

• WHERE (NAI or TAI).

• WHEN (time that the indicator is expected to occur and the latest time the information is of value [LTIOV]).

• WHY (justification - what decision is the PIR linked to).

• WHO (who needs the results).

3-19. As the staff gathers all of the IRs and PIRs, they sort the requirements to eliminate redundancies, and prioritize them to assist in allocating resources. The commander then re-evaluates each requirement and finalizes his CCIR. This is a continuous process; as a given CCIR is answered or the operational situation changes, other CCIRs usually are generated.

3-20. Ideally, each information requirement is detailed and specific enough to facilitate collection. Once the commander approves the information requirement, he breaks the information requirement down into indicators. He then develops specific information requirements to ask very specific questions about indicators. Finally, the commander tasks these indicators to collectors and, taken together, they answer the larger question. For example: one of the SBCT Infantry Battalion commander’s PIR is “Will the enemy regiment attack through avenue of approach with two battalions abreast, or from the march?” This is a broad question and many indicators could lead to its answer. Specific information requirements to support this PIR might include:

• Will enemy units of 3-5 combat vehicles enter NAIs 11, 12, and 13 between 130400MAR and 130700MAR?

• Will enemy battalion #2 move from its assembly area at NAI 7 prior to 130230MAR?

• Identification of second enemy battalion (over 40 BMP2s) in NAI 11, 12, or 13.

DETERMINE INITIAL CCIRS AND EEFI

3-21. Determining initial CCIRs and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) is the most important prerequisite for information collection planning. The staff refines the list of requirements they derive from the initial analysis of information available and from intelligence gaps identified during IPB. They base this list on higher headquarters tasks, commander’s guidance, staff assessments, and subordinate and adjacent unit requests for information. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)

3-22. The staff then nominates these requirements to the commander to be CCIRs and EEFI. Commanders alone decide what information is critical based on their experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and input from the staff. The CCIRs are the primary focus for information collection activities.

DEVELOP THE INITIAL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

3-23. The initial information plan is crucial to begin or adjust the collection effort to help answer requirements necessary to develop effective plans. The initial information collection plan sets information collection in motion. (A sample information collection matrix, formatted under the targeting method of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) is depicted in figure 3-2 on page 3-5.) Staffs may issue it as part of a warning order, a fragmentary order, or an operation order. As more information becomes available, staffs incorporate it into a complete information plan to the operation order.

3-24. At this point in the MDMP, the initial information plan has to be generic because the staff must still develop friendly COAs. The basis for the plan is the commander’s initial information collection guidance, the primary information gaps identified by the staff during mission analysis, recommendations from the targeting meeting and the enemy situational template developed.

Figure 3-2. Information collection matrix

Perform Risk Assessment

3-25. The commander must consider whether the gathering of CCIR is worth the risk of compromising EEFI. This is often the case during surveillance of the maneuver objective. Commander emphasis on EEFI might change his assessment, and may cause him to change his CCIR or adjust his assigned sensor.

3-26. By the nature of their missions, information collection assets must be placed where they might be lost to enemy action. The commander makes the decision whether the intelligence to be gained outweighs the risk to the information collection asset.

Develop the Final Information Collection Plan

3-27. Once the SBCT Infantry battalion chooses an asset to collect information for an information requirement, planners turn the special information requirements into a task for a subordinate unit. This task is a directive statement that tailors the reporting criteria to the collection capabilities of the tasked unit. The information collection plan is developed through asset tasking. Below are two examples:

• Example 1, mixing reconnaissance management:

◦ A special information requirement could ask, “Is the enemy artillery battalion (over 12 2S-1s) located in NAI 8 between 040800 and 052000MAR?”

◦ An information collection task to a scout team might state, “Report the presence of 2S-1 artillery systems in NAI 8 between 040800 and 052000MAR. LTIOV: 052200MAR.”

◦ An information collection task to a UAS team might state, “Report movement in NAI 8 between 040800 and 052000MAR. LTIOV: 052200MAR.”

• Example 2, mixing reconnaissance management:

◦ A special information requirement could ask, “Is the Gordian insurgency using the mosque in NAI 5?”

◦ An information collection task to an Infantry patrol might state, “Report the presence of males in NAI 5 outside normal prayer hours (0545, 1215, 1430, 1700, and 1930) between 011200 and 071200NOV. LTIOV: 071400NOV.”

◦ An information collection task to a Prophet team might state, “Report any radio transmissions in NAI 5 between 011200 and 071200NOV. LTIOV: 071400NOV.”

3-28. Units prioritize information management tasks for each specific asset. For example, an information collection task that is the number one priority for an UAS might be lower in priority for a scout team. Figure 3-3 depicts an information collection tasking matrix.

Figure 3-3. Information collection tasking matrix

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

3-29. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) is a general concept that facilitates the allocation of assets to support intelligence operations. Under the PED concept planners examine all collection assets and then determine if allocation of additional personnel and systems are required to support the exploitation of the collected information. Accounting for PED facilitates processing collected information into usable and relevant information for all-source production in a timely manner. PED enablers are the specialized intelligence and communications systems, advanced technologies, and the associated personnel that conduct intelligence processing as well as support other single-source analytic capabilities within intelligence units. These enablers are distinct from intelligence collection systems and all-source analysis capabilities. PED enablers are prioritized and focus on intelligence processing and assessment to quickly support specific intelligence collection requirements and facilitate improved intelligence operations. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 and FM 2.0 for more information on PED and PED enablers.)

Disseminate Information Gathered

3-30. The ultimate goal of the dissemination process is to get the right information in the hands of the battalion commander in time for them to make a decision. Planners arrange direct dissemination from the collector to the requestor. Whenever possible, the information collection plan includes the requirement for direct dissemination of information to the requestor. For example, information regarding NAI 1 that triggers a targeting decision at TAI 1 (employment of CAS) should go to the battalion commander as well as the FSO, ALO, and S-2. The staff does this to determine if the information answers the CCIR and is what the commander wants to target. A well-synchronized information collection plan directs the collectors as to what nets to use to pass on information and to whom. The plan should detail when to use a net call, use of precedence coding (flash, priority, and so forth), and dissemination using digital systems. Perishability is a key consideration in dissemination. At the battalion level, most information generated during execution is combat information and requires immediate dissemination to the commander and subordinate units affected.

Monitor Operations

3-31. As the operation progresses, the S-2 tracks the status of each information collection task, analyzes specific information requirements, and ultimately answers the CCIR. The S-2 pays particular attention to which assets are not producing the required results. It is very likely that the staff’s assumptions about the enemy COAs will not prove entirely correct. This may result in changes to the IR or adjustments to the collection timeline. During execution, the staff assesses the value of the information they received from collection assets and refines information collection tasks to fill in gaps.

3-32. Each unit monitors and evaluates its information collection efforts during execution. Company commanders can use the intelligence analyst from the S-2 section, or the COIST, when METT-TC allows the formation of one to manage the information collection task by maintaining database information, collecting and reporting information to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

Update Information Collection Plan

3-33. As with all operations, the collection plan rarely survives contact with the enemy and requires adjustment during execution. The following factors could drive changes to the collection plan:

• A CCIR is satisfied or overcome by events, freeing an asset for other operations.

• A single information collection asset has unexpected success, freeing redundant assets for other operations.

• An asset cues the collection manager but requires confirmation that requires dynamic retasking of other assets.

• The timing of the operation has become desynchronized, requiring modification of LTIOV or changes to prioritization.

• The commander generates new CCIR as the operation evolves and the enemy situation develops.

• A change to the enemy situation (that is the enemy follows an unexpected COA).

• Higher headquarters changes the mission of the battalion into an unplanned operation.

3-34. The steps in updating the information collection plan are collaborative efforts by the S-2 section and operations staff. Some steps predominately engage the intelligence staff, others the operations staff. Some steps may require coordination with other staff sections, and others may engage the entire operations and intelligence working group. The steps in updating the collection plan are discussed in further detail in FM 3-55.

Human Intelligence Team

3-35. The MFT HUMINT Soldiers hold the military occupational specialty (MOS) of 35M (human intelligence collector). These Soldiers can perform HUMINT collection activities, including screening, interrogation, debriefing, and liaison (all of which are category 2 or 3 source operations). Category 2 or 3 source operations conducted by MFTs; however, should be viewed as short-term source acquisition efforts for further exploitation. The MFT 35M Soldiers maintain close coordination with the assistant S-2 (also known as the S-2X) or the supported unit and their parent unit to pass collected information on potential sources for more extensive, long-term exploitation by a HUMINT collection team (HCT). The MFT 35M soldiers will also perform the duties of a site exploitation team to either augment or perform the duties of Weapons Intelligence (W6 ASI) personnel.

Signal Intelligence

3-36. The MFT’s SIGINT (signal intelligence) Soldiers hold MOS 35P (cryptologic linguist) and 35N (SIGINT analyst). These Soldiers rely heavily on the analysis of the supported units’ SIGINT cell and supporting CSTs. MFT SIGINT Soldiers are capable of conducting—

• SIGINT collection and direction finding. They do this by using mounted, dismounted, and man portable (such as low-level voice intercept [LLVI]) equipment. MFT SIGINT Soldiers are not intended to conduct long-term static collection. They conduct collection to provide indications and warning for specific operations or early warning to the assault force while moving to or on an objective.

• Signal surveys. The MFT SIGINT Soldiers may also conduct signal surveys of a given area to provide commanders with a general awareness of the area’s most active emitters. Technical information collected during a signal survey can later be used to cue SIGINT collection assets to perform longer term signal surveillance of an area. As an example, an MFT conducting a reconnaissance patrol with a scout platoon could potentially cue the SIGINT platoon to collect on an emitter acquired during the patrol.

UAS Platoon

3-37. As of this publication, the SBCT UAS platoon is equipped with four Class 3 Shadow UAVs. It is capable of providing twenty-four hour observation by rotating each of the UAV’s. It has two remote terminals for the pilots to operate the vehicles that can join into the battalion main CP to support operations. (See figure 3-4 on page 3-9.)

Figure 3-4. UAS platoon

SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE

3-38. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian population. The information gathered from reconnaissance allows commanders to maneuver their forces freely and rapidly to seize the initiative and deploy combat power at the decisive time and place.

3-39. Reconnaissance can be passive or active. Passive reconnaissance includes such techniques as infiltration and hide positions. Active reconnaissance includes techniques such as engagements with local population or seizing key terrain to observe an area. The scout platoon is the primary reconnaissance element within the SBCT Infantry battalion but all subordinate units perform some type of reconnaissance in their tasks.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

3-40. The seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations are as follows:

• Ensure continuous reconnaissance.

• Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.

• Orient on the reconnaissance objective.

• Report information rapidly and accurately.

• Retain freedom of maneuver.

• Gain and maintain enemy contact.

• Develop the situation rapidly.

3-41. Effective reconnaissance is continuous and done by all organizations within the SBCT and must enable the decisive employment of combat power in space and time. Effective reconnaissance operations are driven by intelligence preparation of the operational environment and the commander’s situational understanding. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations through numerous reconnaissance handovers conducted between the sensor that detects the enemy to the SBCT Cavalry squadron, to the SBCT Infantry battalion scout platoon, and then to the SBCT Infantry rifle companies. Before an operation, reconnaissance focuses on filling gaps in intelligence about the enemy and terrain. During an operation, reconnaissance focuses on providing the commander with updated information that verifies the enemy’s composition, dispositions, and intentions as the operation progresses through active reconnaissance or security tasks. After an operation, reconnaissance focuses on maintaining contact with the enemy to determine his next move and collecting information necessary for planning subsequent operations or confirming intelligence from post operations.

3-42. The SBCT Infantry battalion scout platoon should never be kept in reserve. It should work constantly to the front of the battalion and supported by sensors in a contiguous environment. In a noncontiguous environment it should operate within the entirety of the battalion area of operation, providing information gained through continuous reconnaissance and security tasks. This does not mean that they are committed all the time. The commander uses his reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and mission variables to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the CCIRs.

RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS

3-43. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts reconnaissance throughout its operations to gain the initiative. All of its subordinates units contribute to the reconnaissance effort but has units either organic, attached or mutually supporting whose primary role is to conduct reconnaissance.

SCOUT PLATOON

3-44. The fundamental role of the scout platoon is to conduct aggressive and stealthy missions that satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements. The commander gives missions to the platoon and the platoon progressively builds situational awareness (SA) of the OE for the commander. The critical information provided by the platoon enables the commander to develop situational understanding, make comprehensive plans and decisions, and direct follow-on or future operations. (See figure 3-5 on page 3-11.)

Figure 3-5. SBCT Infantry battalion scout platoon

SNIPER SQUAD

3-45. The sniper squad can support the battalion commander with the reconnaissance and security effort as well with their traditional roles of providing long range precision fire on designated target to achieve effects. They are excellent at providing long duration observation. They are often supported by the scout platoon to assists with infiltration and security. (See appendix A.)

SBCT HABITUAL ATTACHED RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

CAVALRY TROOP (POSSIBLE ATTACHMENT OR ADJACENT UNIT)

3-46. A common task organization for an SBCT Infantry battalion is to attach an SBCT Cavalry troop to support reconnaissance and security operations. This is common when the SBCT Infantry battalion is operating far from the main body of the SBCT. The troop can develop the situation by focusing on threats in a designated AO allowing the majority of combat power residing in the SBCT Infantry rifle companies to focus as the decisive point of the operation unimpeded by enemy disruption efforts. This discussion focuses on the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT Cavalry troop. (See figure 3-6.)

Figure 3-6. SBCT Cavalry troop

Common Capabilities and Limitations

3-47. SBCT Cavalry troops have the following capabilities:

• They provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely information through the combined use of long-range scout surveillance systems and UASs, and mounted and dismounted scouts.

• They can gather information about hybrid threats.

• Troop leadership can rapidly assess situations and direct combat power and reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to meet the PIR.

• They can rapidly employ synchronized reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and scouts, without the delays and excessive compartmentalization associated with staff-centric surveillance.

• They can defeat enemy deception, decoys, and cover and concealment by employing integrated and synchronized reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

• They support targeting and target acquisition using available ground and aerial assets, to include the fire support team (FIST), fire support surveillance system, and UAS.

• They can rapidly develop the situation.

• They can conduct stealthy reconnaissance.

• They reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the battalion to avoid contact or achieve a combat power advantage, if contact is necessary.

• They assist in shaping the OE by providing information or directing fires to disrupt the enemy.

• They can fight for information against Infantry and armor protected vehicle forces.

3-48. The SBCT Cavalry troops have the following limitations, which can be mitigated with careful employment or augmentation:

• With limited dismounts within scout sections, sections may have to be combined to generate the required dismounts to conduct the following:

◦ Long-duration observation posts (OP).

◦ Continuous screening.

◦ Dismounted tasks associated with zone, area, or route reconnaissance.

• Limited direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability.

• Require augmentation to perform technical engineer tasks.

• Speed of movement is generally equal to that of the main body, making it difficult to stay ahead while on the march.

• Limited sustainment assets that frequently operate over extended distances.

CBRN RECON PLATOON

3-49. The CBRN reconnaissance platoon resides with the BEB of the SBCT. It can be assigned to the SBCT Infantry battalion if it is likely that the threat in the area may possess CBRN capabilities. The platoon is equipped with three nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicle (NBCRV) Stryker vehicles and

12 Soldiers with 74 series military occupational specialty (MOS). The platoon provides a mounted reconnaissance and surveillance capability to the SBCT to protect the force during unified land operations (see figure 3-7 on page 3-14.)

Figure 3-7. CBRN Recon platoon

3-50. The CBRN reconnaissance platoon has the following capabilities and limitations:

• Can detect chemical, biological, and radiological by identifying most agents in liquid from (persistent), detecting and classifying nonpersistent (nerve and blister agents) 5 km planning radius.

• Can operate in long duration in a contaminated environment.

• Limited organic decontamination capability.

RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

3-51. Reconnaissance planning starts with the commander identifying the CCIR. This process may be conducted while the unit is planning or preparing for an operation; in many cases, it continues throughout the operation. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander outlines the following:

• Reconnaissance objective. Enables subordinates to prioritize tasking and narrow their scope of operations.

• Decision points. Link decision points to enemy actions. Decision points ensure that the battalion commander can apply or preserve combat power throughout an operation based on information received from reconnaissance assets.

• Tempo. Outlines the time requirements the commander envisions for the reconnaissance force and expresses them in order, outlines the degree of completeness, the degree of covertness, and the risk the commander is willing to accept. The commander knows that he accepts increased risk to both the reconnaissance element and the main body when he accelerates the pace of reconnaissance. This risk can be somewhat offset by employing air reconnaissance and technical means to cover open terrain or areas of lower threat.

• Engagement and disengagement criteria. Establishes the size or type of enemy forces the commander expects his reconnaissance force to engage, and at the expected level of force. This helps leaders to plan direct and indirect fires, as well as establish bypass criteria.

3-52. The commander uses the reconnaissance objective to coordinate and direct his unit’s reconnaissance efforts, ensuring that combat forces are committed to seize and retain the initiative. The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy about which the commander wants to obtain additional information in order to make an informed decision about how to apply combat power (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information).

3-53. Reconnaissance assets must acquire and report accurate and timely combat information about the enemy, civil considerations, and the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. Combat information may quickly lose its value. Reconnaissance assets must report exactly what they see and, if appropriate, what they do not see.

3-54. Reconnaissance assets must be agile and retain mobility to complete their missions. If these assets are decisively engaged, reconnaissance stops and the unit in contact must break contact, destroy the engaging force, or develop the situation for follow-on forces. Reconnaissance assets must have clear engagement and disengagement criteria that support the commander’s intent. They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and SOPs.

3-55. Once a unit conducting reconnaissance gains contact with the enemy, it maintains that contact be it visual, direct fire, indirect fire, obstacle, aerial; CBRN; electronic warfare, and nonhostile. Through reconnaissance handover SBCT units maintain contact with the enemy from detection until it is destroyed, neutralized, bypassed, or the enemy displaces and breaks contact. This does not mean that elements cannot break contact with the enemy if engaged. The commander of the unit conducting reconnaissance is responsible for maintaining contact using all available resources.

3-56. When a reconnaissance asset encounters an enemy force or an obstacle, it must quickly determine the threat it faces. For an enemy force, it must determine the enemy’s composition, dispositions, activities, and movements and assess the implications of that combat information. For an obstacle, it must determine the type and extent of the obstacle bypasses and whether it is covered by fire. Obstacles can provide the attacker with combat information concerning the location of enemy forces, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires.

3-57. The commander considers METT-TC as he assigns tasks and organizes his forces. Conditions that can result in a decision to conduct mounted, dismounted, or aircraft reconnaissance include the following:

• Time constraints.

• Required detail level of reconnaissance.

• Availability of air units to perform coordinated reconnaissance with ground assets.

• IPB.

• Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit enemy weaknesses.

• Key positions, especially flanks that can be exploited.

• OPs.

• Type of terrain.

• Environmental conditions, such as deep snow and muddy terrain that greatly hinder mounted reconnaissance as well as high winds or clouds that prohibit aircraft operations.

3-58. The commander considers employing UASs to support reconnaissance and coordinates air space control criteria. UASs provide the commander with essential terrain and enemy information. Most UASs can operate in daylight or limited visibility, and are difficult to detect or shoot down. (Refer to FM 3-04.155 for more information.)

3-59. Leaders at all echelons coordinate and synchronize reconnaissance efforts. The key point is to use reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities, and use their complementary capabilities to verify and expand on available intelligence.

3-60. Sustainment planning is indispensable throughout the planning process. The commander assesses all constraints and considers the following:

• Resupply procedures for both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance missions.

• Predetermined locations and times for resupply of Classes I, III, IV, V, VII, and IX.

• Reviews TTPs for casualty extraction and medical evacuation.

• Pickup points and times for pickup and medical evacuation of casualties.

• Review TTPs for ground and air vehicle recovery procedures.

Fire Support

3-61. The commander asks the following questions as he prepares his fire support plan:

• Where are the enemy target acquisition assets (such as radar)?

• Where will the enemy deploy his artillery? This intelligence helps plan direct and indirect counter fires.

• What are the HVT?

• What are the HPT that were developed during the war-gaming or targeting processes?

• What is the range of the enemy’s indirect fires?

• What is the position and gun target line of the supported Artillery unit?

• Will they have the range to support the scheme of maneuver by phase?

RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

3-62. Reconnaissance handover is the process of transferring information and responsibility from one element to another to facilitate observation or surveillance of enemy contact or an assigned NAI/TAI. A reconnaissance handover must occur when transferring information from the reconnaissance element to the force that will conduct the decisive operation. Reconnaissance handover normally occurs from one of the Cavalry troops of the SBCT Cavalry squadron to the SBCT Infantry battalion scout platoon during offensive and defensive operations or it may occur from a scout platoon to an Infantry company. Reconnaissance handover is associated with a trigger, coordination point, or phase line designated at the reconnaissance handover line to ensure positive control and chain of custody from the initial force to the force assuming responsibility and control. Throughout the process, contact with a threat force is never lost–the form of contact may change from direct visual to aerial, electronic and back–but during the handover, contact with an enemy is never lost. Reconnaissance handover prevents gaps or seams to emerge that the enemy can exploit. Once handover is complete, the Cavalry force transferring control either passes to the rear through the main body assuming responsibility for the reconnaissance objective as a rearward passage of lines or continues further into zone to continue their reconnaissance mission. Reconnaissance handover assures that information requirements are transferred between units to maintain initiative, tempo and to ease transitions. Well planned and executed reconnaissance handover ease transitions in plans, phases, and priorities of effort and mitigates information gaps between units. (See figure 3-8 on page 3-17.)

3-63. Information considerations for reconnaissance handover include: threat location and disposition; routes to and from vantage points that are observing the threat; patterns of life that may be applicable; potential high-value/high-pay off targets; potential attack and assault positions; threat egress routes; threat orientation.

Figure 3-8. Reconnaissance handover

RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES

3-64. There are two reconnaissance techniques commanders employ to answer information requirements: reconnaissance push and reconnaissance pull. Commanders employ these techniques based on their level of understanding of the operational environment combined with the time available to refine their understanding. In selecting one technique over the other, the commander considers the following:

• Degree of the situational understanding of the enemy.

• Time available to collect the information.

• Leadership ability of subordinate commanders.

• Proficiency of subordinate units to plan and rapidly react for uncertain situations.

3-65. Reconnaissance push is used when commanders have a relatively thorough understanding of the operational environment (FM 3-98). In these cases commanders ‘push’ reconnaissance assets into specific portions of their areas of operation to confirm, deny, and validate planning assumptions impacting operations. Reconnaissance push emphasizes detailed, well-rehearsed planning.

3-66. Reconnaissance pull is used when commanders are uncertain of the composition and disposition of threat forces in their areas of operation, information concerning terrain is vague, and time is limited (FM 3-98). In these cases, reconnaissance assets initially work over a broad area to develop the enemy situation. As they gain an understanding of enemy weaknesses, they then ‘pull’ the main body to positions of tactical advantage. Reconnaissance pull knowingly emphasizes opportunity at the expense of a detailed, well-rehearsed plan, and unity of effort. Plans are based on several viable branches or COAs triggered by decision points that reconnaissance assets operate to answer associated CCIR. Leaders at all levels must understand and rehearse branches and sequels.

FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE

3-67. The forms of reconnaissance operations are—

• Route.

• Area.

• Zone.

• Reconnaissance in force (RIF).

• Special Reconnaissance. (Normally conducted by Special Forces units.)

3-68. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts zone reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force as its primary forms of reconnaissance when tasked by the SBCT commander. Its subordinate units conduct route and area reconnaissance as a shaping operation for offensive or defensive tasks during operations supporting stability.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

3-69. Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. A route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information on a specific route as well as on all terrain from which the enemy can influence movement along that route (ADRP 3-90). A route reconnaissance is usually conducted by an SBCT platoon sized unit but could be as small as a squad or as large as a battalion depending on its length and enemy situation along the route. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.9 for more information.) Trafficable routes are made easier to determine in an SBCT because the Stryker vehicles are made of the same chassis. Consideration will include the largest and heaviest vehicle for friendly forces within the operating area. Task organizing engineers’ to the reconnaissance elements can also assist tasks for technical reconnaissance of trafficability and obstacle information. (Refer to FM 3-34.170 for more information.)

3-70. Route reconnaissance tasks are as follows:

• Find, report, and—based on engagement criteria—clear all enemy elements that can influence movement along the route.

• Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly force?

• Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route, such as choke points, ambush sites, and pickup zones (PZs), landing zones (LZs), and drop zones (DZs).

• Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route.

• Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses and underpasses, and culverts along the route.

• Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses, and reinforcing obstacles to include built-up areas along the route.

• Locate all obstacles, interdict and reduce improvised explosive device (IED)/UXO (unexploded explosive ordnance) and create lanes as specified in execution orders.

• Report the above route intelligence to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a route overlay.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

3-71. Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADRP 3-90). The area can be any location that is critical to the unit’s operations. Examples include easily identifiable areas covering a large space (such as towns or military installations), terrain features (ridgelines, wood lines, choke points), or a specific point (a bridge or a building). The SBCT Infantry battalion normally assigns area reconnaissance to its scout platoon or Infantry rifle companies.

3-72. Additional intelligence operations assets reside within the military intelligence company (MICO) to assist in area reconnaissance. The ability to detect potential enemy threats or provide early warning is increased when using these assets. Maintaining situational awareness and requesting intelligence reports for specific areas in a routine or timely manner provides a better operational understanding before conducting area reconnaissance. The tasks of an area reconnaissance are the same as those for a zone reconnaissance and are conducted in the same manner.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

3-73. Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADRP 3-90). The SBCT Infantry battalion usually conducts zone reconnaissance when the enemy situation is vague, or when information concerning cross-country trafficability is required. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

3-74. Zone reconnaissance tasks are as follows:

• Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.

• Clear all enemy forces in the designated AO within the capability of the unit conducting reconnaissance without becoming decisively engaged.

• Determine the trafficability of all terrain within the zone, to include built-up areas.

• Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone (normally augmented with CBRN platoon).

• Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts in the zone.

• Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses, and reinforcing obstacles to include built-up areas in the zone (normally augmented with engineers).

• Locate all obstacles as specified in execution orders. Conduct covert breach when possible or identify bypass.

• Report the above information to the commander directing the zone reconnaissance, to include providing a sketch map or overlay.

3-75. Zone reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force must be specified by the SBCT commander for the battalion to conduct and must include intent that clearly differs from a movement to contact. The information communicated from the SBCT to the SBCT Infantry battalion must include:

• The value of information about the area and population is of greater importance than making contact with the enemy. Finding and engaging the enemy is within the scope but it is not the primary purpose as it is in a movement to contact.

• Mission success can be achieved without making contact with the enemy. This occurs when the battalion confirms that there is no enemy presence.

• If the enemy initiates contact the mission may not be considered a success. This occurs if the reconnaissance focus is stealthy.

PLAN

3-76. For zone reconnaissance missions, the SBCT Infantry battalion conducts parallel planning with SBCT as part of MDMP. Planning must allow for flexibility and promote subordinates Commander’s and leader’s initiative. This is accomplished by issuing a clear commander’s intent, developing a simple concept of operations, and developing a series of decision points to execute likely maneuver options. In developing his concept, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander conducts backwards planning identifying his main reconnaissance objectives with information collection requirements. He matches forces to tasks by phases, cueing assets to collect and synchronizing the maneuver. Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system (FM 3-90-2). The commander then defines the conditions and actions of enemy and friendly strengths and dispositions that are likely to trigger execution maneuver options, decision points, and branches or sequels.

3-77. The SBCT Infantry battalion augmented with information collection assets or additional units deploys its forces based on METT-TC in a Vee formation with two SBCT Infantry rifle company/teams maneuvering abreast close to the boundary lines of the zone. The third company is organized in the center of the formation normally in a wedge or column. The battalion scout platoon can operate between the two forward companies to maintain lateral coordination; assigned a specific reconnaissance objective, or augment the main effort. This ensures maximum coverage with reconnaissance towards the front and flexibility and maneuver space to react to contact if engaged.

3-78. During the planning phase, the S-2 and S-3 sections work to identify previously published information about the zone. This information is usually published by echelons above or adjacent to the SBCT and could include imagery, human terrain team reports, possible contaminated areas, and open source intelligence. Once analyzed, the S-2 uses the information to determine information requirements that the unit conducting the zone reconnaissance must answer.

PREPARE

3-79. Preparations at the battalion level begin with publication of rehearsal and synchronization timelines, finalizing and disseminating graphics for the operation, receiving and integrating task organization, coordinating enabling assets, and stockpiling of additional sustainment items (if required).

3-80. The SBCT Infantry rifle companies follow troop-leading procedures to prepare for zone reconnaissance. Because the SBCT Infantry battalion does not normally conduct zone reconnaissance, Leaders must offset limitations with adaptive methods. The Infantry rifle company uses its organic Class 1 UAS (unmanned aircraft system) capabilities, FSV, and its forward observers (FOs) for long range surveillance. Acquiring LRAS3 systems or Stryker RVs could enhance long-range surveillance.

3-81. Soldiers at all levels must understand and be able to apply the engagement and disengagement criteria, be able to utilize all communications equipment identified by the primary alternate contingency emergency (PACE) plan, and understand the battalion’s information requirements. During PCCs/PCIs, leaders should ask Soldiers to articulate the battalion’s information requirements. (Refer to ADRP 6-0 for more information.)

EXECUTE

3-82. During the employment of the Infantry battalion in a zone reconnaissance, the commander may choose to employ two of his three Infantry companies abreast in order to conduct area and route reconnaissance missions along the flanks of the battalion’s zone. Once the companies reach a reconnaissance objective, they transition into area security tasks that provide early warning to the battalion and isolate the battalion’s AO. Once conditions are set, the battalion commander employs his third maneuver company to focus on a deliberate reconnaissance of the zone interior. Regardless of task and purpose, each Company is responsible for reporting information that contributes to the answering of battalion information requirements. (See figure 3-9 on page 3-21.)

3-83. The SBCT Infantry battalions’ staff exercises the control functions of mission command by battle tracking, answering information requirements, and adjusting and synchronizing the decision support matrix. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander exercise command by adjusting PIR as the situation develops and maneuvering his forces accordingly. When necessary, the battalion coordinates to ensure mixing. Mixing is using two or more different assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement (FM 3-90-2). The SBCT Infantry battalion utilizes the Scout platoon to confirm enemy presence along a route synchronized with the shadow UAS conducting surveillance.

3-84. The SBCT Infantry rifle company executes area or route reconnaissance ensuring that all portions of their AO is properly reconnoitered and that PIR is answered for their assigned tasks. Leaders must be fully cognizant on the location of adjacent units. When enemy units are identified in the area of an adjacent unit, the SBCT Infantry rifle company commander may either contact the adjacent unit to conduct target handover or clear the engagement with the adjacent unit. This clearance may occur before the conduct of the operation. The commander must weigh the risks and advantages associated with the engaging enemy forces without conducting adjacent unit coordination.

Figure 3-9. SBCT Infantry battalion zone recon

ASSESS

3-85. Assessment is constant during a zone reconnaissance. It occurs at the same time as execution and does not end until a change of mission is executed. As part of the assessment the information gained from the reconnaissance is analyzed and shared to feed the SBCT’s intelligence cycle to generate SBCT commander decisions.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

3-86. Reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information (ADRP 3-90). The SBCT Infantry battalion or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force mission. It normally arrays its forces like zone reconnaissance but may be organized with a SBCT Cavalry troop or antiarmor company to assist.

3-87. Techniques for reconnaissance in force for the SBCT Infantry battalion include movement techniques similar to those used in zone reconnaissance or moving rapidly and seizing key terrain. When seizing key terrain the subordinate units of the battalion establish base camps or outposts for periods of time and conduct reconnaissance and combat patrols to collect information. This is common for the initial response phase of stability.

3-88. Criteria for selecting between the zone reconnaissance and recon in force include the time available, the current assessment of enemy disposition, and the commander’s comfort with the BCT’s intelligence assessment of the terrain. The SBCT commander would assign a zone reconnaissance to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, and terrain and enemy forces within a zone- in the essence of recon pull. Alternatively, the commander would assign a recon in force as a deliberate combat operation focused on the enemy and not the terrain- in the essence of recon push.

SECTION III – SECURITY

3-89. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). Security operations enable the commander to detect enemy operations, protect another unit, and develop the situation. Security operations include reconnaissance aimed at reducing terrain and enemy unknowns; gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy to ensure continuous information collection; and providing early and accurate reporting of combat information to the protected force. Security forces orient in any direction from a stationary or moving force. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

FUNDAMENTALS

3-90. The fundamentals of security operations are as follows (FM 3-90-2):

• Provide early and accurate warning.

• Provide reaction time and maneuver space.

• Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected.

• Perform continuous reconnaissance.

• Maintain enemy contact.

PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

3-91. The SBCT Infantry battalion attempts to detect the threat force quickly and report the combat information accurately to the commander. The battalion arrays its forces, normally platoon size elements, but can be Company size to the left and right flanks of its area of operations and places its main body in the center. This attempts to funnel the enemy forces into the center of the battalion formation. Early warning of threat activity provides the commander with the time, space, and information he needs to retain the tactical initiative and to choose the time and place to concentrate against the threat.

PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

3-92. More distance usually yields greater reaction time and maneuver space for the protected force commander, but may require the security force to fight for longer periods of time before the protected force can arrive, provided communications are maintained. The security force fights as needed to gain and retain adequate time and space for the protected force commander, allowing the main body to maneuver against the enemy.

ORIENT ON THE FORCE, AREA, OR FACILITY TO BE PROTECTED

3-93. The security force focuses all its actions on protecting the secured force or facility and providing maximum early warning of threat activity. It operates between the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body’s scheme of maneuver and maneuver his force so it remains between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force depends on the operational area security it provides to the main body commander.

3-94. In stability tasks, the SBCT Infantry battalion should orient on the routes or areas where enemy activities frequently occur. They could reemphasize on locations where IEDs or other explosive hazards have been repeatedly used. Another example is the security force orienting surveillance on the offices occupied by a newly seated foreign government whose legitimacy may be contested and targeted for violence by threat factions.

PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

3-95. Security comes in large part from knowing as much as possible about the threat and terrain within the assigned AO. This detailed knowledge results from ongoing, focused reconnaissance that aggressively and continuously reconnoiters key terrain; seeks the location, composition, and disposition of the enemy; and attempts to determine the enemy’s course of action early so that the SBCT Infantry battalion can counter it. Planning for continuous reconnaissance by focusing where to collect information when and what likely enemy indicators are there allow for overlay of the information collection plan. These are stated in the SBCT Infantry battalion commanders PIR and set the guidance and intent on what information is to be collected.

3-96. Stationary security forces use combinations of observation posts and patrols, using their optics and other information collection assets to perform surveillance. They coordinate with one another to pass targets from one another as they move through the area of operations. This technique assists the reconnaissance from being detected. Moving security forces accomplish this fundamental by performing area-, zone-, or route- reconnaissance in conjunction with temporary observation posts and battle positions (BPs).

MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

3-97. Once gained, contact is not broken unless otherwise directed. The individual or sensor that first makes contact does not have to maintain it. However, the security force, collectively, must maintain contact. The security force must continuously conduct information collection on the threat’s activities, and prevent the threat from surprising the main body or endangering adjacent friendly forces. The fundamentals of maintaining enemy contact require the following:

• Continuous contact (visual, electronic, sensor, or a combination).

• Capability to use direct and indirect fires.

• Freedom to maneuver.

• Depth (of observers in time and space).

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

3-98. Counterreconnaissance is an essential component of security operations. The security force should deny the enemy information and intelligence concerning the friendly force. The SBCT Infantry battalion accomplishes counter reconnaissance as part of the advance guard within the SBCT security force by destroying, defeating, or deceiving enemy reconnaissance units or sensors according to engagement criteria and the rules of engagement (ROE). The SBCT Infantry rifle company does the same for the SBCT Infantry battalion when it serves as an advance guard in the security force.

SECURITY TASKS

3-99. The security tasks are—

• Screen is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected forces (ADRP 3-90).

• Guard is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (ADRP 3-90).

• Cover is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting intelligence and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADRP 3-90). Unlike a screening or guard force, the covering force is a self-contained force capable of operating independently of the main body.

• Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90).

• Local security is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

3-100. The SBCT Infantry battalion can conduct screen, guard, and area security independently without external augmentation. Each element in the SBCT Infantry battalion provides its own local security. Screen and guard are normally performed by the reconnaissance squadron of the SBCT, but the SBCT Infantry battalion is capable. Normally the SBCT Infantry battalion participates as an advance guard during offensive tasks as part of the security force.

3-101. Within the SBCT Infantry battalion, the scout platoon can perform a screen. The primary mission of the Infantry battalion scout platoon is to conduct reconnaissance and security to answer the CCIR, normally defined within the battalion’s information collection plan. The platoon also participates as part of a larger force in guard missions.

AREA SECURITY

3-102. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). Area security operations are conducted to deny the enemy the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area, or to deny the enemy use of an area for its own purposes. This can entail establishing and occupying a 360-degree perimeter around the area being secured, or taking actions to destroy enemy forces already present in the area.

3-103. The area to be secured can range from specific points (bridges, defiles) to areas such as terrain features (ridgelines, hills) to large population centers and adjacent areas. Area security requires a variety of shaping operations that include reconnaissance, defensive, offensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authority’s tasks.

3-104. When conducting an area security mission, the SBCT Infantry battalion prevents threat ground reconnaissance elements from directly observing friendly activities within the area being secured. It prevents threat ground maneuver forces from penetrating the defensive perimeters established by the commander. The commander may employ a variety of techniques (such as establish combat outposts, movement to contact, attack, and area reconnaissance) to accomplish this security mission.

3-105. An analysis of mission variables enables the commander to determine the task organization for his SBCT rifle company, with particular consideration given to the need for information collection assets, aviation support, engineers, military police, joint or combined partnership, and artillery. Early warning of threat activity is paramount when conducting area security missions, and provides the commander with time and space to react to threats. Proper intelligence analysis and information collection planning, coupled with other security tasks are essential to successful operations, especially when securing fixed sites. Failure to conduct continuous reconnaissance can create a vulnerable seam through which the enemy can execute an infiltration or attack.

3-106. When a perimeter is not feasible, the SBCT Infantry battalion secures the area by establishing a presence and conducting operations throughout the area. The SBCT Infantry battalion establishes area security by allocating and coordinating forces to secure critical infrastructure, and high-value assets, while other units conduct operations to establish presence, provide security, and conduct stability tasks out of base camps and combat outposts. Other missions or tasks in support of area security may include the following:

• Screens along zones of separation or other designated areas.

• Route or convoy security of critical lines of communication.

• Checkpoints to monitor or control movement.

• Biometric enrollment stations integrated into each of the other missions already mentioned.

• Demonstrations to maintain an observable presence.

LOCAL SECURITY

3-107. Local security includes any local measure(s) taken by units to prevent surprise by the enemy. It involves avoiding detection by the enemy or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. Local security is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include observation posts, patrols, and conducting stand-to. Passive measures include camouflage, noise and light discipline, and sensors to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.

3-108. Stryker vehicles should consider using Infantry for local security. Stryker vehicles are vulnerable from attacks on its rear and sides and require 360 degree local security.

GUARD

3-109. The SBCT Infantry battalion performs advance, stationary, flank and rear guard to protect another force. Most commonly it performs advance guard (see chapter 4, this publication, for more information). It performs stationary, flank and rear guard as an economy of force mission or when directed by the SBCT commander based on the size of the protected force and the size of the enemy force. A guard force must contain sufficient combat power to defeat, cause withdrawal of, or fix threat combat forces before they can engage the protected force. A guard is appropriate when—

• Contact is expected.

• There is an exposed flank or a threat force to the rear.

• The protected force is conducting a retrograde operation.

• There is a requirement for greater protection than a screen can provide.

Planning

3-110. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander organizes his forces based on METT-TC. He must consider the depth of his assigned area for a guard to provide maneuver space for the protected force. Often the frontage of the assigned area operation for a guard is more than the SBCT Infantry battalion can cover on line oriented towards the enemy force. Relying on the mobility of the Stryker platform and placing units in depth support the guard. The Vee formation with two companies abreast on the flanks of the boundary and one in the center support a stationary and rear guard. Leapfrogging platoon positions by company supports flank guard.

3-111. Detailed IPB can eliminate unnecessary efforts by determining enemy mobility corridors. Orienting sensors and forces on those corridors to confirm or deny enemy presence further enhance the guard.

Executing

3-112. A guard force routinely engages enemy forces with all available means—including direct and indirect fires—to prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position where it could observe and engage the main body. The guard mission may entail decisive engagement of the enemy. The guard force is deployed in a smaller AO or narrower frontage than a screen to permit flexibility and concentration in applying combat power. The guard force may act as a fixing force to enable maneuver of the main effort

Chapter 4

Offense

The primary purpose of the offense for the SBCT Infantry battalion is to decisively defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Offensive tasks let the commander seize the initiative (choose when and where to fight), retain the initiative, and effectively exploit his strengths. The commander may take offensive actions to deceive or divert the enemy, deprive them of resources or decisive terrain, gather combat information, or fix the enemy in position. The keys to a successful offensive operation are to identify the enemy’s decisive point, choose a form of maneuver that avoids the enemy’s strength and ensure an operation that masses overwhelming combat power. This chapter discusses the basics and sequence of the offense, planning considerations, and direct fire planning which apply to all offensive operations. It discusses the concept of synchronized attacks that maximize the battalion’s unique capabilities, and the planning considerations in transitioning to other tactical operations.

SECTION I – BASICS OF THE OFFENSE

4-1. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four primary offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. The SBCT Infantry battalion can participate in an exploitation or pursuit as part of a larger force by conducting movement to contact or attack as part brigade and higher echelon formations. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE TASKS

4-2. The SBCT Infantry battalion gains and maintains the initiative and keeps constant pressure on the enemy throughout its area of operation. The SBCT Infantry battalion transitions from one offensive operation to another without pausing largely due to the working relationship between its security force, main body, and sustainment organizations. Planning and preparing for the next and follow-on operations occur simultaneously with execution of the current action. Success in offensive operations depends on the proper application of the fundamental characteristics of the offense discussed in the following paragraphs. The battalion’s ability to maneuver through restricted and severely restricted terrain, while maintaining relatively low electronic and audible signatures are key attributes.

SURPRISE

4-3. In the offense, surprise is achieved by attacking the enemy at a time or place he does not expect or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Estimating the enemy commander’s intent and denying him the ability to gain thorough and timely situational understanding are necessary to achieve surprise. Unpredictability and boldness help gain surprise. The SBCT Infantry battalion achieves surprise by:

• Gaining and maintaining contact through detection from sensors, confirmation through reconnaissance, conducting security operations, and maneuvering to position of tactical advantage unaware by the enemy.

• Shaping operations (SO) nested with the decisive operation (DO) that mass combat power to assist the DO at the decisive point.

• Striking the enemy from a position of tactical advantage that they are unaware of and unable to react.

• Quickly changing the tempo of the operations.

• Being unpredictable.

• Deception.

CONCENTRATION

4-4. The force achieves concentration by massing the effects of combat power. Superior timing, precision maneuvers and speed (made possible by shared combat information, the Stryker FSV, and deploying Infantry squads), allow the battalion commander to mass the effects of his forces. He can do this when and where needed, and he can shift quickly from one objective or direction to another. Because he has the advantage of near real time combat information he receives, he better understands the effects of his actions. For example, it is easier for him to determine if he has succeeded or if he needs to continue the attack. If he must continue the attack, he can then apply available combat power more efficiently and focus his main effort more effectively. Once an SBCT Infantry battalion succeeds through the concentration and control enabled by this understanding, it can quickly disperse, if needed, to avoid enemy counteractions. The battalion achieves concentration through the following:

• Designation of a decisive operation and allocation of resources to support it.

• Careful planning and coordination based on a thorough analysis of terrain and enemy, combined with accurate, timely reconnaissance and security.

• Position forces that allow it to mass effects with Infantry squads, Infantry weapons squads, and weapon systems on the Stryker vehicle initiating fires at the same time.

• The ability to synchronize the effects of direct, indirect, CAS, close combat attack (CCA), and nonlethal assets.

TEMPO

4-5. Tempo is the ability to adjust the rate of operations to circumstances and to the enemy’s capability to react. It is the controlled rate of military action. While a rapid tempo is often preferred, tempo should be adjusted to ensure synchronization. The combination of Infantry squads and the Stryker family of vehicles enables adjusting the tempo and to maintain pressure on the enemy. Controlling and altering tempo promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off balance, denies the enemy freedom of action, and contributes to the security of the battalion.

AUDACITY

4-6. Audacity is a simple plan of action boldly executed. Audacity inspires Soldiers to overcome adversity and danger. Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive action and increases the chance for surprise. It depends on the commander’s initiative to take action according to his higher commander’s intent, to decide in time to seize opportunities, and to accept prudent risks. Leaders must assess risks, understand when and where to take risks, identify control measures, and execute boldly. The sharing of intelligence between leaders at all echelons reduces the risk but does not eliminate the many uncertainties associated with operations. Mission command systems improve the commander’s ability to make quick situational assessments, to conduct on-the-spot risk assessments, and to make bold decisions based on near-real-time information.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

4-7. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts offensive tasks to gain, maintain and exploit the initiative as part of their operation. The offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. The battalion conducts movement to contact and attack independently and participates in exploitation and pursuit as part of a larger force.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-8. Movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90). Units plan and conduct movement to contact to gain or regain contact with the enemy. It ends when they make enemy contact and the operation transitions to attack, defend, or bypass. Movement to contact includes search and attack and cordon and search.

ATTACK

4-9. An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (ADRP 3-90)

EXPLOITATION

4-10. Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90). Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but surrender or take flight. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels to the current operation. The SBCT Infantry Battalion can participate or recommend to initiate an exploitation based on combat information.

PURSUIT

4-11. A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADRP 3-90). A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, any offensive task can transition into a pursuit, if enemy resistance has broken down and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. The SBCT Infantry Battalion can participate in or initiate a pursuit as part of a larger force.

FORMS OF MANEUVER

4-12. The commander selects the form of maneuver based on his analysis of METT-TC. The commander then synchronizes the contributions of all warfighting functions to the selected form of maneuver. An operation may contain several forms of offensive maneuver. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) The forms of maneuver are as follows:

• Envelopment.

• Flank Attack.

• Turning movement.

• Frontal attack.

• Penetration.

• Infiltration.

ENVELOPMENT

4-13. Envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be destroyed in their current positions (FM 3-90-1). There are three types of envelopments—

• A single envelopment results from maneuvering around one assailable flank of a designated enemy force.

• A double envelopment results from simultaneously maneuvering around both flanks of a designated enemy force.

• Vertical envelopments are tactical airborne and air assault operations.

4-14. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. The commander’s decisive operation focuses on attacking an assailable flank and it avoids the enemy’s strength—his front—where the effects of his fires and obstacles are the greatest. The commander prefers to conduct an envelopment instead of a penetration or a frontal attack because the attacking force suffers fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. Envelopment produces great psychological shock on the enemy. The attacking force creates an assailable flank if none is available.

4-15. The SBCT Infantry battalion normally conducts envelopment with the scout platoon identifying the enemy force either on its own or by conducting a reconnaissance handover from the one of the SBCT security force elements. Once the threat is identified an SBCT Infantry rifle company (normally the advance guard of the SBCT Infantry battalion) will fix the enemy force.

4-16. This allows another SBCT rifle company to execute a bold movement or maneuver out of contact to a point that forces the threat to fight in two directions simultaneously. Another SBCT Infantry company may attack on a wider axis or may follow and support or act as a reserve to reinforce allowing the envelopment to continue to seize objectives beyond their position.

FLANK ATTACK

4-17. A flank attack is a form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy force. A flank is the right or left side of a military formation and is not oriented toward the enemy (ADRP 3-90). It is usually not as strong in terms of forces or fires as is the front of a military formation. A flank may be created by the attacker through fires or by a successful penetration. The primary difference between a flank attack and envelopment is one of depth. A flank attack is an envelopment delivered squarely on the enemy’s flank and is designed to defeat the enemy force while minimizing the effect of the enemy’s frontally-oriented combat power. Conversely, envelopment goes beyond the enemy’s flank and into their rear area, but short of the depth associated with a turning movement.

4-18. SBCT Infantry battalions normally conduct flank attacks as the decisive operation. They use mission command systems, mobility of their Stryker vehicles and indirect fires augmented with air ground operations to initiate the flank attack unaware to the enemy. They capitalize on situations where speed and simplicity are the main factors ultimately retain the initiative. Usually, a supporting effort such as an organic SBCT Infantry rifle company or another SBCT maneuver battalion engages the enemy’s front by fire and maneuver while the decisive effort maneuvers to attack the enemy’s flank. This shaping effort diverts the enemy’s attention from the threatened flank.

TURNING MOVEMENT

4-19. When conducting a turning movement the attacking force avoids the enemy’s main defensive positions. The attacking force seizes objectives behind the enemy’s current position which causes the enemy force to move out of his current position or divert major forces to meet the threat. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

4-20. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses mission command systems to communicate situational understanding and the mobility of the Stryker platform to seize and retain vital areas in the enemy’s support area before the main enemy force can withdraw or receive support or reinforcements. A turning movement differs from envelopment because the force conducting a turning movement seeks to make the enemy force displace from their current locations. An enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in their established location from an unexpected direction.

FRONTAL ATTACK

4-21. In a frontal attack the attacking force destroys a weaker enemy or fixes a larger enemy force in place over a broad front (FM 3-90-1). An attacking force can use a frontal attack to rapidly overrun a weak enemy force. The Stryker Infantry battalion uses a frontal attack with its Infantry while the ICV, MGS, and mortars provide support by fire.

PENETRATION

4-22. In a penetration the attacking force penetrates and ruptures enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-90-1). Exploiting friendly forces defeat, isolate, and destroy the enemy and their defenses. The penetration extends from the enemy’s main defensive positions through the security area into the enemy support area.

4-23. The Stryker Infantry battalion conducts a penetration when there is no assailable flank; enemy defenses are overextended and weak spots are detected in the enemy’s positions; or time pressures do not permit envelopment. They use fires and effects to support Infantry by suppressing, fixing, or obscuring the enemy, allowing the Infantry to engage in close combat. The Stryker vehicle should be used to either provide direct fires on the enemy in support of Infantry or capitalize on the platforms mobility and speed if a covered and concealed axis of attack is identified that the enemy cannot effect. The Stryker Infantry battalion commander should not assume risk and utilize the Stryker vehicle as a fighting platform to close the distance on the enemy force if exposed to enemy fires.

INFILTRATION

4-24. An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those enemy positions while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-90-1). Infiltration occurs by land, water, air, or a combination of means. Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions is time consuming. The force must avoid detection and engagement to successfully infiltrate. Since this requirement limits the size and strength of the infiltrating force—and infiltrated forces alone can rarely defeat an enemy—infiltration is normally used in conjunction with and in support of other forms of maneuver.

4-25. The SBCT Infantry battalion can conduct an infiltration in total, or support subordinate units that do through decisive action. The scout platoon and snipers squad are the primary elements that conduct infiltrations. The SBCT Infantry battalion monitors their maneuver and supports their tasks by augmenting them with indirect fire, CAS, and CCA. The SBCT Infantry battalions tasks its maneuver company to provide a quick reaction force if they are compromised.

COMBAT FORMATIONS

4-26. A combat formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground (ADRP 3-90). A commander can use seven different combat formations depending on the mission variables of METT-TC: column, line, echelon (left or right), box, diamond, wedge, and Vee. Terrain characteristics and visibility determine the actual arrangement and location of the unit’s personnel and vehicles within a given formation.

OFFENSE IN RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN

4-27. SBCT units are capable of conducting offensive tasks in any terrain. They take additional considerations when operating in restrictive terrain.

URBAN

4-28. The Stryker Infantry battalion has a significant advantage in the urban environment during offensive tasks with its force structure, technology, firepower and protection. The force structure allows it to place a lot of Infantry into an urban area that can maneuver, communicate, and search. It has the firepower to be able to organically conduct dynamic building breaches and suppress or destroy significant fortified emplacements using MGS, .50cals, MK-19s or demolition charges if ROE allow. They can also infiltrate snipers to provide long range precision fires or surveillance. The vehicles themselves provide protection with their armor and can engage enemy safely and accurately with the remote weapon station. The air guard hatches allow a protected position from the rear of the vehicle for Soldiers to engage as well. The Infantry provide protection to the vehicle by preventing enemy from attacking it from its blind spots when stationary through dismounting and providing local security. The SBCT Infantry Battalion conducts its operations in an urban environment in the same process as all of its operations through planning, preparing executing and assessing.

Planning

4-29. In addition to normal considerations in the offense the SBCT Infantry battalion places emphasis on additional considerations in the urban environment. Some considerations will include ROE and collateral damage, local population sentiment, weapons orientation, and how to achieve surprise when the enemy can view your movements. The offensive operation in an urban environment follows the sequence of understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition.

Preparing

4-30. Shaping operations are often vital to the success of the overall missions. In urban operations they may consume much of the SBCT Infantry battalion combat power. This is vital to separate the enemy force from the noncombatants to prevent collateral damage. The battalion uses its Infantry to seize key terrain and control local population; its Stryker vehicles to block road ways and secure major avenues of approach; its scout platoon and sniper platoon to conduct reconnaissance and security operations, its mortar sections and platoons to provide indirect fires or illumination and additional support if ROE is restricted such as quick reaction force or flying UAS.

Executing

4-31. Once the urban environment is shaped the remainder of the force conducts the engagement and consolidation. Rapid and bold maneuver is required on the part of the SBCT Infantry battalion during the execution phase to prevent enemy from breaking contact, repositioning, or counterattacking. Mission command plays a vital role during this phase. Enemy forces have the ability to limit their exposure in engagements so engagements must quick and accurate, pursued or passed off to another friendly force if enemy tries to break contact.

4-32. Consolidation must occur without loss of momentum. The SBCT Infantry battalion should quickly reach its limit of advance, eliminate pockets of resistance and immediately consolidate its forces and prepare for counter attack.

Assessing

4-33. Upon completion of the offensive operation and in conjunction with the consolidation the SBCT Infantry battalion immediately transitions into a defense unless a pursuit or exploitation is initiated. The battalion then considers the conditions to transition to stability, or retrograde.

MOUNTAIN

4-34. Determining the known or suspected location of the enemy is a key factor when conducting offensive tasks in mountainous terrain. It is extremely difficult to target the enemy in rugged mountainous terrain with physical characteristics such as caves, rock formations, depressions, rifts, and wooded areas. These offer excellent cover and concealment to Infantry or paramilitary forces within a dispersed area. The second factor is determining an appropriate method to fix or place the enemy in an engagement area where they can be attacked without escaping.

4-35. The mountainous, restrictive terrain drives most offensive combat tasks to dismounted movements with smaller elements. Correspondingly, tasks tend to become more decentralized and take place at the platoon and squad level. Leaders must plan for dismounted operations in detail, while ensuring the integration of mounted assets is retained. Junior leadership initiative and decisiveness guided to their higher commander’s intent is essential during the conduct of these tasks.

4-36. Leaders plan offensive engagements on favorable terms to the attacking force. As with all offensive tasks, the initiative is with the attacker. The attacker chooses the time, place, and method of attack, while the defender must consider all possible methods of attack and avenues of attack. Units can execute effective attacks in the mountains with careful planning and preparation. Understanding the enemy and how they use mountainous terrain and weather to their advantage is crucial to developing a scheme of maneuver. Reconnaissance will be limited in gaining timely information because the terrain offers cover and concealment from visual contact as well as limits signal signatures for both forces. Establishment of long duration OP equipped with enhanced optics from points overwatching likely routes can mitigate some of the lack of information. Leaders who understand enemy mountain tactics are able to use the same mountain characteristics to their advantage. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.50 for more information.)

CLOSE FIGHTS WITH INFANTRY

4-37. Mountain combat is close as the opposing forces meet in the rugged terrain. Even though engaging targets near the limits of direct fire weapons does occur in mountain engagements, intervening crests, hills, ridges, gullies, depressions, and other terrain features often limit long range battles with the enemy. The upper levels of mountainous terrain are characterized by a lack of trafficable roads. Infantry execute the mission when use of motorized vehicles is restricted. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses its mission command capability to synchronize tasks with its organic mortar platoon, scout platoon, and augmented assets to set conditions for its rifle companies to fix and attack enemy forces.

DECENTRALIZED SMALL-UNIT OPERATIONS

4-38. Mountainous terrain environments do not support the meeting and maneuver of large units requiring conflicts to be fought at the platoon and squad level. Mountainous terrain can separate brigades from battalions, battalions from companies, and companies from platoons for long periods. Communication with higher and adjacent units can be difficult at times. Contingencies for establishing PACE communications should be established. Intent based operations should be clearly communicated to allow platoon and squad level leaders to take actions according to the commander’s intent in case communications cannot be maintained. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.50 for more information.)

DEGRADED MOBILITY AND INCREASED MOVEMENT TIMES

4-39. The ruggedness of mountainous terrain restricts mobility to foot movements using file type formations on roads and trails and often not on a direct route to the objective. A relatively short distance from point to point may be an arduous movement over steep, rocky, uneven terrain, with multiple trail switchbacks that increase the distance traveled and the energy expended to traverse it. In mountainous terrain, the Infantry platoons dismount to move through defiles, choke points, and other restricted terrain at higher or lower elevations. This allows the Stryker vehicles to carry majority of the Infantry equipment and sustainment needs to lessen the combat load weight.

UNIQUE SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES

4-40. Sustainment in a mountainous terrain is a challenging and time-consuming process. Terrain and weather complicate sustainment tasks to include logistics resupply, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), CASEVAC, and Soldier health and hygiene. The network of restrictive mountain roads rarely supports resupply vehicles with a large turning radius, or two-way traffic. Often time’s vehicle traffic can use more terrain favorable routes at lower elevations along the base of mountains and through rivers and streams. Periodic link up points should be planned along traveled routes to conduct resupply movement of supplies includes air, vehicle, foot, and animal. Each technique has its own challenges in mountainous terrain.

OPERATIONS IN THINLY POPULATED AREAS

4-41. The populace that lives in mountainous terrain lives in small villages in the valleys with some scattered villages in the upper mountain areas. Although the farmers and animal herders graze there, that vast amount of mountainous terrain remains unpopulated.

4-42. Mountainous terrain and weather conditions can be both an advantage and a disadvantage to friendly or enemy forces. If unprepared, the terrain can be a unit’s adversary. They should plan mutually supporting elements, quick reaction forces to conduct air assault, synchronized fires with CAS and CCA, and TTPs to adjust to rapidly changing conditions.

JUNGLE

4-43. Movement to contact is the primary offense tasks the SBCT Infantry battalion conducts. The uncertainty of the enemy disposition and intent is a constant and the SBCT Infantry battalion must consider it in their planning for the offense. Additionally their MK-19’s, M2 .50cal, and MGS may not be able to engage at maximum distances. The Stryker vehicles themselves will be limited to roads and shallow creeks for maneuver pathways. The Infantry should dismount constantly and move through the restricted terrain in a proximity determined by METT-TC to mutually support one another.

SUBSURFACE

4-44. For SBCT units conducting offensive tasks involving subsurface areas they must consider it a movement to contact. Shaping operations to locate and control every entry and exit point for the subsurface area must be secured prior to entering the subsurface area. The subsurface area must be cleared sequentially and systematically. Augmenting forces such as engineers, military working dogs, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), CBRN specialists, medical personnel, can assists based on METT-TC factors

SECTION II – MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-45. Battalions conduct movement to contact independently or as part of a larger force. The battalion is normally given a movement to contact mission as the lead element of an attack or as a counterattack element of a BCT or higher level unit. A properly executed movement to contact develops the combat situation and maintains the commander’s freedom of maneuver after making contact. This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative.

4-46. Purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized execution, and the hasty deployment of formations from the march to conduct offensive, defensive, or stability tasks characterize a movement to contact. The fundamentals of a movement to contact for SBCT units are as follows:

• Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.

• Detect the enemy first using reconnaissance and security forces augmented with sensors and air assets.

• Confirm or deny enemy by making visual contact with the smallest force possible and be consistent with protecting the force. This allows the commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation.

• Avoid decisive engagement on ground chosen by the enemy by making initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces.

• Provide priority of fires and air support to forward reconnaissance forces for the initial phase of the operation.

• Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.

• Keep subordinate Stryker units within supporting distance and in timely communication to facilitate a flexible response. Unilateral communication and coordination between subordinate units is preferred for quicker responses.

• Maintain contact regardless of the course of action adopted once contact is gained.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

4-47. The SBCT Infantry battalion organizes a movement to contact with a security force and a main body. A technique for the SBCT is to attach a Cavalry troop to an SBCT Infantry battalion to be its covering force when conducting movement to contact independently. This allows the SBCT Infantry battalion to allocate more forces to the main body or reserve.

SECURITY FORCES

4-48. The primary advantage to having this organization is the early and accurate reporting it provides about the enemy and terrain. Depth is essential to providing early warning and reaction time for leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. It enables leaders to conduct actions on contact that preserve the parent unit’s freedom of movement and maneuver. This security force is normally the unit’s initial main effort.

Covering Force

4-49. The scout platoon of the SBCT Infantry battalion is normally its covering force. It is normally augmented with attachments such as snipers, engineers, sensors, and UAS support. The primary mission of the reconnaissance force during a battalion movement to contact is to conduct an area or route reconnaissance. The goal of the reconnaissance force is to establish contact with the enemy force which allows the battalion to transition from a movement to contact to an attack. The SBCT Infantry battalion may assign the following tasks to the reconnaissance force:

• Conduct area or route reconnaissance to confirm or deny enemy presence, and the CCIR.

• Neutralize enemy security forces and high pay off targets within its capabilities.

• Do not become decisively engaged and maintain freedom of maneuver.

• Disrupt enemy forces.

• Bypass, or conduct covert breach of obstacles along the main body’s axis of advance.

• Conduct reconnaissance handover with the battalion’s advance guard.

• Transition to a screen upon the battalion’s change of mission to an attack or defense.

4-50. This element may operate under the control of the battalion headquarters, remaining far enough ahead to provide early warning to the advance guard. The reconnaissance force can be attached, organic, or operational control (OPCON) to the advance guard in some circumstances. The reconnaissance force covers the width of the battalion axis of advance and focuses on finding enemy elements.

4-51. If the SBCT is conducting a movement to contact often there will be an element to the front of the SBCT Infantry battalion. Normally it is an element from the Cavalry squadron. Direct coordination and monitoring of their progress could alleviate the need to conduct a movement to contact allowing the SBCT Infantry battalion to transition to an attack or defense.

Advance Guard

4-52. The advance guard is a task-organized unit or detachment (usually an SBCT Infantry rifle company) that precedes a formation to protect the main body from ground observation or surprise by the enemy. The advance guard develops the situation to protect the deployment of the main body. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander, through analysis of the factors of METT-TC and situational understanding during execution, determines how far forward of the main body the advance guard operates. The advance guard operates within the supporting range of the main body to reduce vulnerability, but far enough forward for successful accomplishment of the mission. The advance guard provides its own local security to protect its flank and rear.

4-53. The SBCT Infantry battalion may assign the following tasks to the advance guard:

• Reinforce the reconnaissance force.

• Destroy enemy security forces.

• Bypass or breach obstacles along the main body’s axis of advance.

• Fix, suppress, or block enemy forces to develop the situation for the main body.

Flank and Rear Security

4-54. Platoon-size elements from the SBCT Infantry battalions main body companies normally provides a moving flank or rear screen using alternating or successive bounds with squads or section under company control to provide flank and rear guard. These elements remain at a distance from the main body. Flank security elements operate far enough out to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body with direct fires. Units plan indirect fires on major flank approaches to enhance security.

MAIN BODY

4-55. The combat elements of the main body are prepared to deploy and maneuver rapidly to a decision point in the area of operation to destroy the enemy. The main body keys its movement to the advance guard. It maintains information of the advance guard’s activities via FM crosstalk or digital communication, primarily BFT II/JCR. The main body, remaining attuned to the advance guard’s situation, provides responsive support when the advance guard is committed.

4-56. Tasks the company can perform within the main body include the following:

• Find, fix, defeat, destroy, or contain the enemy’s fixing force, followed by the enemy assault force or exploitation force, to retain freedom of maneuver for the remainder of the brigade combat team.

• Execute a course of action to defeat or destroy a designated enemy main body element.

4-57. Standard formations and battle drills allows the battalion commander, using the information available to him through the Army Mission Command System (AMCS), to shift combat power rapidly in the AO. Companies employ the appropriate movement techniques within the battalion formation (see figure 4-1 on page 4-10). Company commanders, based on their knowledge of the commander’s intent and their own situational awareness, anticipate the battalion commander’s decisions for commitment of the main body and plan accordingly.

Figure 4-1. Organization of movement to contact

CONTROL MEASURES FOR A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-58. The commander controls the course of action by using graphic control measures such as phase lines, contact points; target reference points (TRP) and checkpoints. Soldiers should be mindful of surface danger zones of their weapon systems to prevent friendly fire or collateral damage. The commander controls the depth of the movement to contact by using a limit of advance or a forward boundary. The commander could designate one or more objectives to limit the extent of the movement to contact and orient the force. However, these are often terrain-oriented and used only to guide movement. Although a movement to contact may result in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus should be on the enemy force. The commander should plan some other type of offensive action if he has enough information to locate significant enemy forces.

PLANNING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-59. Planning a movement to contact must allow for flexibility and promote subordinate initiative. It begins with a thorough understanding of the operational area through a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Much of the analysis will be on the terrain because knowledge of the enemy situation is limited. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander and staff develop and execute the information collection annex to the operations order to determine the enemy’s location and intent while conducting security operations to protect the main body. The SBCT Infantry battalions S-2 section develops feasible threat courses of action that address all aspects of the enemy’s potential capabilities.

4-60. Developing the concept of the operation needs to have an emphasis on ultimate control of the objective, and conducting a reverse planning sequence from the objective to the line of departure. This is accomplished by issuing a clear commander’s intent, developing a simple concept of operations, and developing a series of decision points (DP) to execute maneuver options. Units place increased emphasis on developing an aggressive and flexible information collection effort that is linked to the commander’s PIR focusing on locating and identifying the enemy’s strength, disposition, and activities.

PREPARING FOR A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-61. In a high-risk environment, it is usually better to increase the reconnaissance effort and refine information collection plan and allow more time for reconnaissance and security forces to develop the situation. The main body should take a more deliberate rate of advance when uncertain of the enemy situation. Upon confirmation of the enemy force the mission could change from a movement to contact to another task and should be a branch or sequel to the plan.

4-62. Through backbriefs and rehearsals, the commander ensures that his subordinates understand his intent and their individual missions as new information becomes available. Simple, flexible plans that rely on SOPs, battle drills, and plans that are rehearsed repeatedly against various enemy conditions are essential to success.

4-63. The commander rehearses the operation from initiation to occupation of the final objective or limit of advance; he prioritizes the maneuver options and enemy courses of action to be rehearsed. Primary, secondary, and tertiary communications systems should be rehearsed at all levels. Actions to consider during rehearsals include:

• Making enemy contact (advance guard).

• Making contact with an obstacle not identified and reported (advance guard).

• Making enemy contact (flank security force).

• Reporting requirements and bypass criteria.

• Fire support.

• Transitioning into a maneuver option (formation or movement technique).

4-64. The commander’s reconnaissance and security forces determine the enemy’s location and intent while protecting the main body. Based on the commanders decision points the security forces conduct reconnaissance handover with the main body to maintain surveillance of the enemy. This allows the main body to focus on planning and preparation including rehearsals, on the conduct of attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdrawal. The reconnaissance and security force to move to future objectives within the SBCT scheme of maneuver.

EXECUTING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

MOVEMENT TO THE LINE OF DEPARTURE

4-65. When attacking from positions not in contact, Infantry battalions often stage in tactical assembly areas, conduct a tactical road march to attack positions behind friendly units in contact with the enemy, conduct forward passage of lines (FPOL), and begin the attack.

APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE

4-66. The commander and staff plan the approach to the objective to ensure security, speed, and flexibility. They select routes (direction of attack or axis of advance), techniques, formations, and methods (mounted or dismounted) that support actions on the objective best. All leaders must recognize this portion of the battle as a tactical operation, not an administrative movement. The battalion may fight through enemy combat forces, obstacles, artillery strikes, security elements, or possible spoiling attacks to reach the initial objective. The commander employs techniques that avoid the enemy’s strength when possible and conceal the battalion’s true intentions. The commander tries to prevent the enemy from focusing fires on decisive operations, uses surprise to take advantage of his initiative in determining the time and place of his attack, and when available, uses indirect approaches to strike the enemy from a flank or the rear. As part of setting the conditions for success, the battalion also develops an indirect fires plan, CASEVAC plan, and sustainment plan. Although the unit may not expect contact before crossing the line of departure (LD), it must be prepared for it. The approach phase is terminated when the battalion reaches the objective or decisively engages the enemy force.

Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

4-67. The commander uses all available information collection assets to find the enemy’s location and dispositions. Sensors alone cannot confirm the exact disposition and location of all enemy forces. Infantry Soldiers should dismount their vehicles before the maximum effective range of the most likely enemy direct fire weapon system on the last known point of enemy detection. This ensures that the commander can commit friendly forces under optimal conditions.

Deploy and Report

4-68. When the security element detects an enemy unit or obstacle, it deploys its forces before the last known enemy point. If the security element is under enemy fire, it uses direct and indirect fire to suppress the enemy and restore freedom of maneuver. Simultaneously, the commander of the security element reports the contact using a spot report (SPOTREP) format, providing all available information on the situation to its higher headquarters adjacent units by updating the common operational picture. This alerts the commander and allows the initiation of necessary actions. (Refer to FM 6-99 for the spot report format.)

Evaluate and Develop the Situation

4-69. The SBCTs security force develops the situation rapidly within mission constraints in different ways based upon two situations. The first situation is to establish contact with the enemy while remaining undetected. This is best accomplished with stealthy and deliberate reconnaissance by the covering force; unfortunately, this is time-consuming. After submitting a SPOTREP, the covering force conducts a reconnaissance handover with the advanced guard.

4-70. The second situation is when contact is mutually established between the security force and the enemy. The security force maintains contact with the enemy to develop the situation across the front. This provides more maneuver space to execute further actions by allowing other elements not currently in contact to maneuver against the enemy. The commander may develop a COA base on the different forms of maneuver, such as an envelopment, flank attack, turning movement, frontal attack, penetration, or infiltration.

4-71. After evaluating the situation, the commander continues the security mission, if possible by destroying, neutralizing, or isolating the enemy force. As the situation develops and the enemy's dispositions, strength, and intentions become clearer, the security force submits additional reports allowing the main body to engage the enemy force.

CHOOSE, EXECUTE, AND RECOMMEND A COURSE OF ACTION TO THE HIGHER COMMANDER

4-72. The next three steps of choose, execute, and recommend a course of action to the higher commander will be to attack, defend, bypass, delay or withdrawal. Deciding on a course of action will be based on timely information defined within the CCIR. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information on how to choose, execute, or recommend a course of action.)

ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

4-73. During an offensive operation, the SBCT Infantry Battalion’s objective may be terrain or force oriented. Terrain-oriented objectives usually require the battalion to seize or secure key or decisive terrain. However, to gain a terrain-oriented objective often requires fighting through enemy forces. Actions on the objective start when the battalion echelons its fires onto the objective. Actions on the objective phase terminate when the unit reaches the limit of advance (LOA) and begins consolidation and reorganization.

Disrupt the Enemy

4-74. The covering force disrupts the enemy by engaging its reconnaissance forces, destroying high pay off targets within its capabilities by using indirect fires and limited engagements. It conducts reconnaissance handover to the advance guard and moves further beyond the identified force to locate other targets or screen an enemy follow on force. The main body brings overwhelming fires onto the enemy to prevent him from conducting either a spoiling attack or organizing a coherent defense.

4-75. The advance guard commander gathers as much information as possible about the enemy’s dispositions, strengths, capabilities, and intentions. As more information becomes available the advance guard informs the main body on the most advantageous point to attack, defend, or bypass enemy forces.

Fix the Enemy

4-76. The SBCT Infantry battalion maneuvers at a tempo the enemy cannot match since success in a movement to contact depends on effective actions on contact. The techniques the commander employs to fix the enemy when both forces are moving are different than those employed when the enemy force is stationary during the meeting engagement. The SBCT Infantry battalion normally uses its advance guard to fix the enemy main body and the two remaining companies to attack. The advance guard fixes the enemy with fires by attacking or defending.

Maneuver

4-77. The commander quickly maneuvers his main body, normally two SBCT Infantry rifle companies, to conduct a penetration, flank attack or envelopment if the security force cannot overrun the enemy with a frontal attack. He uses his mission command systems that provide current information to deploy his forces to overwhelm the enemy force from a place of tactical advantage before it can react effectively or reinforce. The commander attempts to defeat the enemy in detail while still maintaining the momentum of his advance. The main body commander resumes the movement to contact after a successful attack. If they did not defeat the enemy, he has three main options—bypass, transition to a more deliberate attack, or conduct a defense.

4-78. Main body elements deploy rapidly to the vicinity of the contact if the commander initiates a frontal attack. Commanders of maneuvering units coordinate forward passage through friendly forces in contact, as required. The intent is to deliver the assault before the enemy can deploy or reinforce his engaged forces. The commander can wait to attack until he can bring the bulk of the main body forward. He avoids piecemeal commitment except when action is essential and combat superiority at the vital point is present and can be maintained throughout the attack, or when compartmentalized terrain forces such a course of action. The commander focuses on attacking the enemy’s flanks and rear before he can prepare to counter these actions when trying to conduct envelopment. The commander uses the security force to fix the enemy while the main body maneuvers to look for an assailable flank or he uses the main body to fix the enemy while the security force finds the assailable flank. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

4-79. The battalion reorganizes and consolidates as required by the situation and mission to transition to the next mission. The consolidation and reorganization plan should be as detailed as the assault plan. Consolidation and reorganization tasks are discussed as part of the transition following offensive and defensive tasks.

Follow Through

4-80. The unit transitions back into a movement to contact and continues to advance if the enemy is defeated. Under optimal conditions the covering force has identified another target or established contact with an enemy follow force. This allows the SBCT Infantry battalion to continue the offense shortly after a movement to contact if it is capable. The movement to contact terminates when the unit reaches the final objective or limit of advance or it must transition to a more deliberate attack, defense, or retrograde.

ASSESSMENTS

4-81. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment can be applied to offense, defense, and stability tasks. Continuous monitoring and evaluation of an operational environment are essential in determining what changes might affect the conduct of operations. Three measurement tools assist commanders and staffs with assessments: measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators. (Refer to JP 3-0 for more information.)

FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS

4-82. The SBCT Infantry battalion executes follow-on missions as directed by the higher commander. Follow-on missions can include continuing the attack, supporting a passage of lines for a follow-on force, defending, or participating in an exploitation or pursuit. As populated areas are freed from enemy control, some portion of the force may conduct stability tasks. This could include defeat of insurgents until control of the area reverts to local civil authorities. The battalion develops plans for follow-on missions based on the higher headquarters plan, the higher commander’s intent, and the anticipated situation. Follow-on missions or tasks are discussed further during the follow through of offensive and defensive task execution.

SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-83. Search and attack is a decentralized movement to contact, requiring multiple, coordinated patrols to locate and destroy the enemy. It is most often used when operating within noncontiguous areas of operation during a small scale contingency (SSC). The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts this form of the movement to contact to destroy enemy forces, deny the enemy certain areas, to protect the force, or for information collection. Execution of the search-and-attack will typically be by company-sized elements in battalion-sized AOs. This is based on their speed with the mobility of the Stryker vehicle and flexibility of their organic task organization. The SBCT Infantry battalion may task its subordinate units to conduct the following missions:

• Locate enemy positions or habitually traveled routes.

• Destroy enemy forces within its capability, or fix and block the enemy until reinforcements arrive.

• Maintain surveillance of a larger enemy force through stealth until reinforcements arrive.

• Search urban areas.

• Secure military or civilian property or installations.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-84. The commander task-organizes the unit into covering, fixing, and finishing forces, each with a specific task and purpose. The size of the covering force is based on the available intelligence about the size of enemy forces in the AO. The commander primarily employs Infantry when the enemy is operating with small, dispersed elements or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area.

Finding

4-85. The covering force conducts an area reconnaissance to reconnoiter identified NAIs. Once detection is made by sensors it must be confirmed, preferably through visual contact. The covering force must be small enough to achieve stealth, but large enough to provide adequate self-defense until the fixing and finishing forces arrive.

Fixing

4-86. The fixing force develops the situation, and then executes one of two options based on the commander’s guidance and METT-TC. The first option is to block identified routes that the enemy can use to escape or to be reinforced. The fixing or support by fire force maintains contact with the enemy and positions its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing force attacks. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in his current position until the finishing force arrives. The fixing force can be a combination of MGS, ICVs, and dismounted Infantry that can be supported by the mortar section. The fixing force requires enough combat power to isolate the enemy once the reconnaissance force finds him. The fixing force attacks if that action meets the commander’s intent and it can generate sufficient combat power against the enemy.

Finishing

4-87. The commander uses his finishing force to destroy the detected and fixed enemy during a search and attack. The SBCT Infantry battalion has many organic, attached, or supporting assets to use in synchronization with maneuver. The SBCT Infantry battalion finishes the enemy force in close combat using Infantry. They are supported by fires, near real time combat information, and follow on forces to isolate the objective, destroy a retreating force, or disrupt an enemy counterattack.

Planning and Preparing a Search and Attack

4-88. Applying all of the warfighting functions, the commander conducts a search and attack for one or more of the following purposes:

• Destroy the enemy. Render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective.

• Deny the area. Prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area (for example, in any area he is using for a base camp or for logistics support.).

• Protect the force. Prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.

• Collect information. Gain combat information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the enemy course of action predicted as a result of the IPB process.

4-89. The search and attack plan places the finishing force, as the decisive operation, where it can maneuver to destroy enemy forces or essential facilities located by reconnaissance assets. Typically, the finishing force occupies a central location in the AO. However, the mission variables may allow the commander to position the finishing force outside the search and attack area. The commander allocates additional combat power to this decisive operation by using priority of fires and assigning priorities to available combat multipliers, such as engineer elements and helicopter lift support. The commander establishes control measures as needed to consolidate units and concentrate the combat power of the force before the attack. Once the covering force locates the enemy, the fixing and finishing forces can fix and destroy. The commander develops a contingency plan in the event that the covering force is compromised.

Control Measures for a Search and Attack

4-90. The commander establishes control measures that allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. The minimum control measures for a search and attack are an AO, TRPs, objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. TRPs facilitate responsive fire support once the covering force makes contact with the enemy. The commander uses objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of subordinate elements. Coordination points indicate a specific location for coordinating fires and movement between adjacent units. The commander uses other control measures, such as phase lines, as needed.

Execution of the Search and Attack

4-91. Each subordinate element operating in its own AO is tasked to destroy the enemy within its capability. The commander should have in place previously established control measures and communications means between any closing elements to prevent fratricide and friendly fire. The covering force conducts a zone reconnaissance to reconnoiter identified NAIs.

Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

4-92. Once the covering force augmented with sensors finds the enemy force, the fixing force develops the situation and executes one of two options. The first option is to block identified routes into and out of the objective. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in their current positions until the finishing force arrives. The fixing force maintains contact with the enemy and positions its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing force attacks. The fixing force attacks only if that action meets the commander’s intent and it can generate sufficient combat power against the detected enemy.

Disrupt the Enemy

4-93. The commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. The force attempting to disrupt an enemy must attack the enemy with enough combat power to achieve desired results with one mass attack or sustain the attack, until it achieves the desired results. It may involve attacking the enemy force while it is still in its assembly areas or in an approach march before it can deploy into a combat formation.

Fix the Enemy

4-94. If conditions are unfavorable for using the finishing force or the main body to attack the detected enemy, the covering or the fixing force can continue to conduct reconnaissance and security activities to further develop the situation. Whenever this occurs, the force maintaining surveillance must avoid detection and possible enemy ambushes.

Maneuver

4-95. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces, or it may locate at a pickup zone (PZ) and air assault into a LZ near the enemy once he is located. The finishing force or the main body must be responsive enough to engage the enemy before he can break contact. The commander provides additional mobility assets so the finishing force and main body can respond within that timeframe.

4-96. The commander may have the finishing force or the main body established in an area ambush and use the covering and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the ambushes.

Follow Through

4-97. After the search and attack the commander transitions to the appropriate task; continuing offensive tasks, defensive tasks, or stability tasks.

CORDON AND SEARCH

4-98. A cordon and search is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a target area and searching suspect locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1). The purpose of cordon and search is to obtain weapon caches, materiel or information, a specific high-value target, or persons of interest. Soldiers use tactical biometric collection devices to enable cordon and search missions by collecting biometric data and identifying the individuals within the cordon and determining if any match the individuals tracked on the biometrically-enabled watch list (BEWL).A cordon and search involves two processes—limiting freedom of movement and searching dwellings. These two actions have the potential to produce negative consequences; therefore, organizing cordon and search elements requires extensive mission tailoring. Commanders must always be prepared for a civil disturbance.

4-99. Searches are an important aspect of populace and resource control. The need to conduct search or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain.

4-100. Cordon and search involves isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents or contraband. It involves the emplacement of a cordon, or security perimeter, to prevent traffic in and out of the area. The cordon permits the search element to operate unimpeded within the secured area. The Stryker vehicle provides a means of establishing control points by using its size to block high speed avenues of approach. It can provide coverage on both inner and outer cordon security when paired with another Stryker vehicle. The Stryker vehicles are vulnerable to dismounted attacks in close proximity and require a local security element when they are not moving.

4-101. There are two cordon and search techniques: cordon and kick, and cordon, knock, and ask. The primary consideration is to capture the designated personnel, site, or equipment. Additional factors such as the enemy threat, local populace support, and host-nation security force (HNSF) capabilities must be taken into account during operation planning.

• Cordon and kick. The cordon and kick method is used to maintain speed, surprise, and tempo during entry to the target within the objective. In this instance, considerations of population perceptions and integration of HNSF are less important than accomplishing the task(s) of capturing the target individual, site, or equipment. Proper safety precautions will need to be strictly followed as well as specific considerations regarding ROE to include dynamic breaching capability and collateral damage.

• Cordon, knock, and ask. If the mission is focused on increasing the legitimacy of the host nation (HN) government and security forces, it may be necessary to sacrifice a degree of surprise and timeliness to achieve that goal. In this instance, the unit focuses on maintaining a presence and control of an area by incorporating local authorities into the mission.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A CORDON AND SEARCH

4-102. A cordon and search requires four elements to perform the major tasks—a command element, a security element, a search and assault element, and a support element. The security element sets up the cordon, which usually comprises an outer cordon “ring” and an inner cordon “ring.” The search and assault element is the decisive operation and will clear and search suspected buildings to capture or destroy insurgents or contraband. The support element may be the reserve, provide support by fire, and be prepared to perform the other cordon and search tasks.

Command Element

4-103. The location of the TAC must be able to support the mission command warfighting function during a cordon and search. The ability to observe the search and assault element generally causes the command element to colocate with the inner cordon. Visibility and communications capability are deciding factors in identifying the best location for the TAC during the actual mission.

4-104. The TAC may include security vehicles, interpreters, host nation officials or local authorities in its composition. The TAC must remain mobile and able to move to any point within the cordon and search operation to ensure coordination of all elements and supporting assets. When host nation forces or authorities are involved in the operation, the command element coordinates with them and integrates them as identified during the planning phase of the operation. Operation and communications security is the guiding principle when conducting unified action with host nation forces.

4-105. The TAC is the single point of coordination for supporting assets and for status reporting to higher headquarters. The command element is a critical component of the cordon and search operation so a backup team is designated in the event it becomes combat ineffective. The command element ensures that all actions are documented when necessary and that the rules of evidence are followed. The command element monitors the documentation, security, and transport of every person detained. The command element ensures that damage caused during the cordon and search is documented to identify legitimate future claims by the occupants of the target.

Security Element

4-106. The security element’s primary task is to isolate the target area. The security element limits enemy or civilian influence in the objective area and prevents targets from escaping the cordon. It is usually comprised of a Stryker Infantry rifle company. They may have to use multiple avenues of approach and operate decentralized to accomplish their mission. They may have to establish multiple blocking positions and observation posts and conduct patrols to isolate the target area. The security element may include—

• Vehicle-mounted sections or platoons.

• Interpreter(s).

• Detainee teams.

• Crowd control teams.

• Control points or blocking positions.

• HNSF (military or police).

• Aerial Reconnaissance assets.

• Infantry squads or platoons.

• Female search teams.

• Small unmanned ground vehicles (SUGV) to assist in searches.

• Nonlethal munitions (for example, rubber pellets, bean bag rounds, and tear gas.) for crowd control.

• Biometric identify data collection team.

4-107. The execution of the outer cordon mission is an integral part of the security element in any cordon and search mission. The outer cordon isolates the objective area and prevents enemy or civilian influence. As such, it requires detailed planning, coordination, integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects, lethal and nonlethal, required for mission execution. Some considerations for the outer cordon include—

• Vehicles for traffic control points or blocking positions.

• Fire planning and coordination.

• Overwatch positions.

• Aviation assets to observe target area and inform outer cordon if vehicles or persons leave the target area. Constant communication between the aviation element and the outer cordon facilitate the isolation of the target area.

• An initial detainee collection point for the receipt and temporary holding of detainees.

• An initial material collection point for consolidation of captured material.

4-108. Each subordinate outer cordon element (control point, blocking position) must have a designated leader a clear task and purpose, and Class IV materials to accomplish the tasks. Weapons systems to consider for outer cordon positions are primarily ICV and MGS variants with remote weapons station (RWS), crew- served weapons, javelin with the command launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman. Keep Infantry in close proximity and to the rear of the vehicles to increase their security.

4-109. The leader of the outer cordon element must develop and maintain situational awareness of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the search elements. This enables him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect fires, and facilitate the achievement of the outer cordon’s task and purpose. Aviation assets, communications systems, and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate situational awareness for the entire element.

Search and Assault Element

4-110. The search and assault element’s mission is to assault, clear, and search the objective to capture, kill, or destroy the targeted individuals or materials. The search and assault is one or more Stryker Infantry rifle companies. The search and assault element initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The element accomplishes its mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant personnel, and by conducting a systematic search of the target areas. These areas may be searched selectively (only specific rooms, buildings, or blocks) or systematically (everything within a given area). Due to the split-second decisions that have to be made, it is imperative that this element not only understands but can follow ROE in a dynamic environment.

4-111. To accomplish its mission the search and assault element has three primary tasks—securing, clearing, and searching the target. The search and assault element may be task-organized into four teams— assault, search, security, and support to facilitate accomplishing its mission. All of these teams must understand and be prepared to assume the role of the other teams in the search and assault element.

Support Element

4-112. The support element reinforces, and is capable of accomplishing, the task and purpose of the unit’s decisive operation. This element is usually task-organized toward a specific purpose and can be comprised of any subordinate units within the SBCT Infantry rifle company. The commander may direct the support element to accomplish priority planning tasks. This means that the support element leader must be intimately familiar with all aspects of the cordon and search mission from planning through its completion.

4-113. The commander must identify the tasks the support element needs to execute. These tasks must be prioritized and given to the support element leader so he can plan and rehearse these actions according to the commander’s plan. Probable tasks assigned to the support element during a cordon and search are as follows, but are not limited to—

• Reinforce outer and inner cordon.

• Clear buildings.

• Search buildings.

• Secure, safeguard, and escort civilians or detainees.

• Secure and safeguard captured material or equipment.

4-114. Commitment criteria is a guide to assist the commander in deciding when to commit the support element, but is not intended to be a trigger for employment. Possible commitment criteria are as follows:

• Hostile crowd forming around inner cordon.

• Loss of main effort.

• Numerous rooms in building being searched.

• More than a specified number of detainees.

• Enemy engages inner cordon.

• Enemy element penetrates or escapes cordon.

PLANNING A CORDON AND SEARCH

4-115. Commanders must consider numerous factors when planning and preparing for a cordon and search. Commanders apply the same steps used in MDMP, applying the warfighting functions as discussed in Chapter 1. When the objective of the cordon and search is a high payoff target, the planning time can be extremely limited between when a SBCT Infantry rifle battalion gives the OPORD to the participating elements and when it actually executes the mission. Planning time may require planning by key leaders of all the supporting elements and accelerated TLPs due to the complexity of the mission and the many assets task-organized to support the operation. As in all cases, the quality of the intelligence associated with METT- TC is critical. In particular, the “civil considerations” variable of METT-TC should be specifically considered, and interpreters as well as biometric tactical collection devices and operators (to positively identify or verify a high-value individual [HVI]) should be added, as required.

Control Measures for a Cordon and Search

4-116. Standard tactical control measures are essential to effective mission command over forces approaching and conducting cordon and search.

• Assembly areas. Forward operating bases (FOB) or combat outposts are the most convenient areas for staging a cordon and search due to the relative safety, size, and location. However, commanders must assume that all friendly positions are under constant observation. If possible, position assembly areas in remote or separate areas or use multiple assembly areas to minimize any enemy surveillance efforts.

• Checkpoints. Checkpoints leading to the target and in the objective area are essential in ensuring that all units arrive at the target in the proper order and on time.

• Target reference points. Weapon orientation for crew served weapons is a key safety consideration. Surface danger zones will need consideration with the types of munitions potentially fired from the weapon systems particularly with MGS main gun, .50 cal (caliber) and MK-19 if used. A method of orienting on check points and rally points as TRPs is also acceptable.

• Rally points. Rally points to and from the objective area allow for cordon and search elements to reorganize if units become engaged, lost, have vehicle trouble, or lose communications during ingress and egress from the target.

• Phase lines. Phase lines (PL) are helpful in controlling cordon and search elements that are approaching the target from different directions or at different times.

• Structure numbering system. Structure numbering system allows for clear and expedient communication for mission command functions.

4-117. Techniques for cordon and search are as follows:

• Position key leaders so that they can see and control all subordinate elements.

• Position key assets such as crew-served weapons and interpreters at the critical locations.

• Be prepared to move leadership and support assets from one location to another during mission execution or as needed.

• When executing searches and biometrics identity data collection, position vehicles and personnel to be searched so that the security element’s sectors of fire face to the outside of the friendly element and away from noncombatants.

• Keep the bulk of the forces within the perimeter so that if the situation escalates they are essentially in a battle or support by fire position.

• Ensure that all personnel understand the direct fire plan as well as any contingency plans. For example—

◦ Actions to take in the event a vehicle penetrates a control point from outside the established perimeter.

◦ When to cease fire, and what signal to use for cease fire.

PREPARING A CORDON AND SEARCH

4-118. A search can orient on people, material, buildings, or terrain and may include host-nation security forces. Authority for search has to be carefully reviewed. Military personnel must perform searches only in areas of military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). They must conduct searches only to apprehend suspects or to secure evidence to an offence. Collection of biometric identity data enables the identification or verification of people within the cordoned area.

4-119. Soldiers record and maintain the chain of custody for the seizure of contraband, evidence, captured enemy or detainee documents, weapons, and materiel, supplies, or other items for the seizure to be of legal value. Search teams have detailed instructions for handling controlled items. Lists of prohibited or controlled distribution items should be widely disseminated and on hand during searches. The unit may contact host- nation security forces to work with the populace and the resource control program before the search begin. Units must consider the effect of early warning on the effectiveness of their search.

4-120. Cordon and search involves isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents or contraband. A unit conducts the search at a pace that helps ensure an effective search, but rapidly enough to prevent the enemy from reacting to the search. Soldiers use only the necessary force to eliminate any resistance encountered. There should be plans for securing the search area (establishing a cordon) and for handling detained personnel.

4-121. Human intelligence personnel should interrogate all detained personnel to gain information that could lead to immediate follow on operations. If HUMINT collectors are not available, trained unit personnel may have to tactically question the detainees. When conducting tactical questioning the detained persons they should be searched, silenced, safeguarded, segregated and sped to the rear. (See FM 2-22.3 for more information.)

4-122. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. Cordons are designed to prevent persons of interest from escaping, prevent insurgents from reinforcing, and protect the forces conducting the operation. Based on factors of METT-TC, the SBCT Infantry rifle company can establish an inner cordon and an outer cordon. Both cordon elements must emphasize on inward and outward for security purposes. (See figure 4-2 on page 4-21.)

4-123. The outer cordon’s composition and capabilities should be based on METT-TC. The mission of the outer cordon is to provide containment and prevent a HVT from escaping the objective area. The outer cordon may have to accomplish this task by being more terrain-oriented on the most probable avenues of approach into and out of the objective area. The outer cordon can be tasked to block specific locations and prevent escape from inside and interference from outside of the objective area.

4-124. The mission of the inner cordon is to contain the immediate vicinity of the target to prevent escape and provide security to the search and assault element. If the cordon and search is opposed by a hostile force, the inner cordon provides support by fire (SBF). The inner cordon provides direct fires to suppress the enemy force and allow maneuver of the search and assault element to the objective.

Figure 4-2. Establishment of a cordon

SECTION III – ATTACK

4-125. An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (ADRP 3-90).

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

4-126. The battalion organizes into a security force, a main body, and a reserve, all of which are supported by some type of sustainment organization. The commander should complete any changes in task organization in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements.

SECURITY FORCES

4-127. Security forces in an attack are organized the same as in a movement to contact and are comprised of a covering force, advance, flank, and rear guard. Variables of METT-TC determine the composition, disposition, and intent of these forces conducting reconnaissance and security tasks.

MAIN BODY

4-128. The commander organizes the main body into combined arms formations to conduct the decisive operation and necessary shaping operations. The commander aims the decisive operation toward the immediate and decisive destruction of the enemy force, its will to resist, seizure of a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemy’s plan. The maneuver scheme identifies the decisive operation. All of the force’s available resources operate in concert to assure the success of the decisive operation. The subordinate unit or units designated to conduct the decisive operation can change during the course of the attack. The commander designates an assault, breach, and support force if the commander expects to conduct a breach during the attack. The assault force is primarily made of Infantry. The breach force can be a combination of Infantry, combat engineers (when augmented), or MGS depending on the obstacle. The support force is usually comprised of an SBCT Infantry rifle company but primarily uses its weapons at longer ranges to suppress enemy positions.

4-129. If it is impractical to determine when or where the echelon’s decisive operation will be, such as during a hasty attack, the commander retains flexibility by arranging forces in depth, holding out strong reserves, and maintaining centralized control of long-range fire support systems. As soon as the tactical situation develops to allow the commander to designate the decisive operation, the commander focuses available resources to support that decisive operation. Enemy actions, minor changes in the situation, or the lack of success by other elements cannot be allowed to divert either forces or their effects from the decisive operation. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

RESERVE

4-130. The commander uses the reserve to exploit success, defeat enemy counterattacks, or restore momentum to a stalled attack. For a battalion mission, this would usually be a platoon-size force. Once committed, the reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s decisive operation, and the commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by the revised situation. Often the commander’s most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve. The reserve is not a committed force; it is not used as a follow and support force, or as a follow and assume force. The commander must decide what type of reserve force is best suited according to METT-TC. The reserve can be comprised of MGS, Infantry with ICVs or combination of.

4-131. In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the level of uncertainty about the enemy, especially the strength of any expected enemy counterattacks. The commander only needs to resource a small reserve to respond to unanticipated enemy reactions when detailed intelligence about the enemy exists. When the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a small fraction of the command. When the situation is vague, the reserve may initially contain most of the commander’s combat power. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATION

4-132. The commander resources his sustainment assets to support the attacking force. The commander organizes the supporting sustainment and other logistics assets into combat and field trains and they are overseen by the forward logistical element leader.

CONTROL MEASURES FOR AN ATTACK

4-133. Units conducting offensive tasks are assigned an area of operation within which to operate. Within the area of operation the commander designates the following control measures regardless of whether the attack takes place in a contiguous environment or a noncontiguous environment:

• Areas of operations for subordinate units.

• Phase lines to include the line of departure, which also may be the line of contact.

• Time to initiate the mission.

• Objectives.

4-134. The commander can use any other control measures necessary to control the attack. Effective control measures for maneuver are best developed from backwards planning by starting beyond the objective to a limit of advance and working backwards in sequence to the line of departure. Control measures include:

• A final coordination line (FCL), assault positions, SBF and attack by fire positions, and time of assault to further control the final stage of the attack can be used between the probable line of deployment (PLD) and the objective.

• Beyond the line of departure and line of contact, the commander may designate checkpoints, phase lines, probable line of deployment, assault positions, and direct fire control measures, and fire support coordination measures.

• Short of the line of departure and line of contact, the commander may designate assembly areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive tasks or waits for the establishment of the required conditions to initiate the attack.

PLANNING AN ATTACK

4-135. Friendly forces seek to place the enemy in a position where the enemy can easily be defeated or destroyed in an attack. The commander seeks to keep the enemy off-balance while continually reducing the enemy’s options. In an attack the commander focuses movement and maneuver effects, supported by the other warfighting functions, on those enemy forces that seek to prevent the unit from accomplishing its mission and seizing its objective. Planning helps the battalion commander synchronize the effects of combat power through MDMP. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for information on MDMP.)

MISSION COMMAND

4-136. The commander leads the staff through the operations process providing his intent and specific planning guidance about the attack. During the mission analysis portion of MDMP the S-2 determines the probable line of contact and enemy trigger lines using the enemy situational and weapons templates previously developed. The commander arrays subordinate elements to shape the area of operation, friendly weapons systems are matched against the enemy’s to determine the probable line of deployment, and mission command systems and nodes are planned and template to ensure situational awareness can be maintained between subordinate elements.

4-137. Once the commander determines the probable line of deployment, he establishes how long it takes subordinates to move from the LD to the probable line of deployment and any support-by-fire positions the attack requires. The commander establishes when and where the force must maneuver into enemy direct-fire range. He ensures that mission command posts relocate following the main body of the formation conducting battle handoff between main command post, tactical command posts, and field trains command posts ensuring constant situational awareness to the battalion.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

4-138. In the plan of attack, the commander seeks to surprise the enemy by choosing an unexpected direction, time, type, or strength for the attack and by exploiting the success of military deception operations or information gathered through reconnaissance. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy command and control, induces psychological shock in the enemy, and reduces the coherence of the enemy defense. The commander achieves tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, maintaining a high tempo, destroying enemy forces, providing the timely intelligence from information gained, and employing sound OPSEC. The commander can plan different attack times for the decisive and shaping operations to mislead the enemy and allow the shifting of supporting fires to successive attacking echelons. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial assault. They prevent the enemy from concentrating defensive fires against successive attacks.

4-139. When planning an attack, the commander focuses on the enemy and terrain to develop a course of action that achieves surprise on the enemy and is flexible enough to sustain the initiative to complete the attack to the limit of advance. Some terrain locations may require the attacking unit to change its combat formation, direction of movement, dismount and remount points, or movement technique when it reaches those locations. These can be planned by using phase lines, checkpoints, rally points and subsequent objectives that have detailed instructions outlined by the scheme of maneuver.

INTELLIGENCE

4-140. The commander must have detailed knowledge of the enemy’s organization, equipment, and tactics to employ his capabilities and tactics as well as the operating environment. The commander must understand the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses and how they intend to operate within the environment and what information that they will provide that can be identified as an indicator. He bases his PIR on indicators that reconnaissance elements and information collection assets can easily identify and that the S-2 can use for analysis as well as gaps, or unknown aspects about the enemy situation.

4-141. The commander cannot conduct a deliberate attack if he does not have good intelligence and, therefore, does not know where most of the enemy’s units and systems are located. He uses reconnaissance and information collection assets to confirm or deny his initial intelligence estimates and his PIR (see chapter 6 for more information on reconnaissance). The attacking unit can conduct a movement to contact, a hasty attack, or conduct additional information collection if the enemy situation is not clearly understood.

FIRES

4-142. The planning process synchronizes the unit’s maneuver with the provision of fire support. It must identify critical times and places where the commander needs the maximum effects from fire-support assets as well as direct fire assets to include the MGS platoon, the mortar section platoon and the antitank guided missile (ATGM) if augmented. The commander combines maneuver with fires to mass effects, achieve surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive results.

4-143. Battalion commanders will often find themselves as the approval authority for battalion fires. Understanding echelonment of fires is critical for the indirect fire plan to be effectively synchronized with the maneuver plan. The purpose of echeloning fires is to maintain constant fires on a target while using the optimum delivery system to the point of its risk-estimate distance in combat operations or minimum safe distance, and airspace management. Echeloning fires provides protection for friendly forces as they move to and assault an objective, allowing them to close with minimal casualties. It prevents the enemy from observing and engaging the assault by forcing the enemy to take cover, allowing the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded.

4-144. The commander’s attack criteria goal is to concentrate fires on seizing the initiative. The commander emphasizes simple and rapidly integrated fire support plans. This is done using quick-fire planning techniques and good SOPs. The commander integrates fire assets as far forward as possible in the movement formation to facilitate early emplacement. Fires concentrate (mass) on forward enemy elements to enable maneuver efforts to close with the enemy positions.

SUSTAINMENT

4-145. The commander must plan, along with the XO, MEDO, FSC commander, and S-4, to provide sustainment to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. He places his supported logistical elements following the main body of the battalion and will either move forward to support once the objective of the attack is secured or have elements from the main body move rearward to their location during the attack. The commander and command sergeant major establish standard operating procedures for how the subordinate elements interact with maneuver forces (see chapter 7 for more information).

PROTECTION

4-146. Protection facilitates the commander’s ability to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. It determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and counters or mitigates those threats. The commander and staff identify vulnerabilities during mission analysis and develop means to protect during course of action development. Leaders ensure that control measures are implemented and are in compliance with protecting the force by planning mobility and survivability, CBRN considerations, cyber defense, EOD, air and missile defense, and personnel recovery. Leaders conduct checks, inspections, rehearsals, and assessments for OPSEC violations, physical security, antiterrorism measures, and force health protection. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces.

PREPARING AN ATTACK

4-147. Attacks are best organized and coordinated in assembly areas. If the commander decides that rapid action is essential to retain a tactical advantage he may opt not to use an assembly area. Detailed advance planning, combined with effective communications, SOP, and battle drills, reduces negative impacts of such a decision.

4-148. Unless already in an assembly area, the attacking unit moves into one during the preparation phase. The unit moves with as much secrecy as possible, normally at night and along routes that prevent or degrade the enemy’s capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. It avoids congesting its assembly area and occupies it for the shortest length of time possible. Each unit handles its own security activities, such as local ground security, while in the assembly area.

4-149. The attacking unit should continue its operations process to the extent the situation and mission allow before moving to attack positions. These preparations include, but are not necessarily limited to—

• Protecting the force.

• Conducting task organization.

• Performing reconnaissance.

• Refining the plan and updating mission data into mission command systems.

• Briefing the troops.

• Conducting rehearsals, to include test firing of weapons.

• Moving sustainment and medical support forward.

• Promoting adequate rest for both leaders, and Soldiers.

• Positioning the force for subsequent action.

4-150. Leaders at all levels should conduct a reconnaissance of the actual terrain when it will not compromise operational security or result in excessive risk to the unit leadership. If a limited-visibility attack is planned, they should reconnoiter the terrain at night (FM 3-90-1).

REHEARSALS

4-151. The commander exercises and refines the maneuver, fire, and sustainment plans during rehearsals, which are an important part of ensuring the plan’s coordination and synchronization. As part of the rehearsal process, the commander reviews his decision points and the anticipated battle sequence with subordinate leaders, ensuring all units understand the plan, the relationship between fire and movement, and the synchronization of critical events. These critical events include—

• Actions on the objective.

• Reconnaissance handover.

• Moving from the assembly area to the LD.

• Maneuvering from the LD to the PLD, to include dismount points.

• Occupying support-by-fire positions.

• Conducting the breach or gap crossing if applicable.

• Consolidating on the objective.

• Exploiting success or pursuing a withdrawing enemy.

• Actions of echelon reserves.

• Resupply operations.

4-152. The unit should conduct rehearsals under as many types of adverse conditions as possible, with time and other restraints, to identify and prepare the unit to cope with problems. At lower tactical echelons, the rehearsal includes battle drills, such as creating lanes through minefields, react to contact, loss of communications, CASEVAC, and so forth.

EXECUTING AN ATTACK

4-153. Stryker Infantry battalions conduct an attack after analyzing information about the enemy through reconnaissance, setting the conditions through shaping efforts and effects, maneuvering the main body to its assault position, and initiates the attack from a position of tactical advantage unaware to the enemy. The commander does not delay the attack to preserve the alignment of subordinate units or to adhere closely to the preconceived plan of attack.

4-154. He must avoid becoming so committed to the initial plan that opportunities are neglected. The mission command systems within the SBCT provide constant information updates throughout the SBCT in near real time. That information provides for the commanders situational understanding and result in constant adjustments to an attack. Good attacks conducted by SBCT units are simple in concept but allow tactical flexibility and initiative by subordinate leaders. Battalion commanders must be mentally prepared to abandon planned attacks and to exploit any unanticipated successes or enemy errors by seizing the initiative either themselves or empowering subordinate leaders to take action. The battalion commander’s intent and a clear understanding of the purpose facilitates the initiative of subordinate leaders to adjust to constant changes.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

4-155. The commander considers the following shaping operations to execute an attack.

Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

4-156. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy through active reconnaissance efforts supported with information collection assets establishes a base for a successful attack. Detecting the enemy first and confirming or denying the enemy presence allows the SBCT Infantry battalion’s security force the ability to reduce enemy disruption efforts. The enemy commander wants to use his security area to strip away friendly reconnaissance forces and hide his dispositions, capabilities, and intent.

4-157. Detection, followed by reconnaissance and confirmation allow the SBCT units to see first, and react accordingly. Information gained from reconnaissance is quickly shared through mission command systems laterally and vertically throughout the SBCT to allow its combat units to maneuver and destroy the enemy.

Disrupt the Enemy

4-158. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy weakens his entire force and allows the friendly commander to attack the remaining force in piecemeal. The assessment and decisions regarding what to disrupt, when to disrupt, and to what end are critical.

4-159. Once any type of contact is made with the enemy, the commander wants to use the element of surprise to conduct shaping operations by his forces that strike at the enemy and disrupt both the enemy’s combined arms team and his ability to plan and control his forces. Once this disruption begins, it continues throughout the attack.

Fix the Enemy

4-160. A primary purpose in fixing the enemy is to isolate the objective of the force conducting the echelon’s decisive operation to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to reinforce the unit targeted for destruction. The commander allocates the bulk of his combat power to the force conducting his decisive operation within his main body, so fixing is normally given to his advance guard.

4-161. The commander must carefully consider which enemy elements to fix and target only those that can significantly affect the outcome of the fight. If the commander has to commit his main body to fixing the enemy he can try to destroy them with fires by conducting a frontal or flank attack supported with indirect fires and air ground operations.

MANEUVER

4-162. The commander maneuvers his forces to gain positional advantage so he can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. He avoids the enemy’s defensive strength by identifying them through reconnaissance or intelligence. He employs tactics that defeat the enemy by attacking through a point of relative weakness, such as a flank or the rear. The key to success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a portion of the enemy force, then quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus maintaining the momentum of the attack without reducing the pressure. The commander considers the following to conduct maneuvers—

• Movement from the LD to the PLD.

• Actions at the PLD, assault position, or FCL.

• Breaching.

• Actions on the objective.

• Follow through.

Movement from the Line of Departure to the Probable Line of Deployment

4-163. SBCT units deploy their forces in a covered and concealed position prior to the last known point of enemy detection after passing the line of departure. It moves forward using appropriate movement techniques and changing as necessary based upon the terrain. Whenever possible, the SBCT attacking unit uses dismounted avenues of approach with cover and concealment that avoid strong enemy defensive positions. The Stryker vehicles remain behind the Infantry and support their movement by occupying a support by fire position. The unit uses obscurants to conceal its movement when cover and concealment are not available.

Actions at the Probable Line of Deployment, Assault Position, or Final Coordination Line

4-164. The attacking unit maintains the pace of its advance as it approaches its PLD. The attacking unit splits into one or more assault and support forces once it reaches the PLD, if not previously completed. All forces supporting the assault force should be in their support-by-fire positions before the assault force crosses the probable line of departure. The commander synchronizes the occupation of these support-by-fire positions with the maneuver of the supported attacking unit to limit the vulnerability of the forces occupying these positions.

Breaching

4-165. Once the support force sets the conditions, the breach force reduces, clears, and marks the required number of lanes through the enemy’s tactical obstacles to support the maneuver of the assault force. The commander must identify the conditions that allow the breach force to proceed to avoid confusion. From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy to take advantage of the support force’s efforts to suppress the targeted enemy positions. Successful obstacle breaching depends on effectively applying the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA). (Refer to chapter 9, for more information about breaching.)

Actions on the Objective

4-166. The commander employs all fire support means to destroy and suppress the enemy and sustain the momentum of the attack. The commander improves the likelihood of success by carefully synchronizing the effects of fires and air ground operations. The effects of the overwhelming and simultaneous application of fire, movement, and shock action characterize the final assault.

4-167. The Infantry maneuver to close with and destroy or defeat the enemy on the objective. Stryker units have the advantage of both an Infantry element to assault and a Stryker vehicles to support by fire or maneuver to the rear of the enemy position. If the Stryker vehicle is not engaged in its support by fire position supporting the Infantry it can maneuver to engage a withdrawing enemy force in an attack by fire or blocking position. Commanders must dictate the appropriate level of leadership and security based on METT-TC with this force to ensure its success and safety when operating independently of Infantry.

Follow Through

4-168. The commander has two alternatives after seizing the objective—exploit success and continue the attack or terminate the offensive task. The most likely on-order mission is to continue the attack after seizing the objective.

Consolidation

4-169. Consolidation is organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy (FM 3-90-1). The attacking unit tries to exploit its success regardless of the assault type. In some situations, however, the unit may have to consolidate its gains. Consolidation may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and security elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, to the organization and detailed improvement of the position for defense.

4-170. Consolidation comprises actions taken to secure the objective and defend against an enemy counterattack. Consideration should be given that the enemy that occupied the objective may have planned artillery and mortar targets to assist in their counterattack. The commander ensures that the SBCT Infantry battalion is ready to conduct the following actions that usually are part of consolidation:

• Eliminate enemy resistance on the objective.

• Establish security beyond the objective by securing areas that may be the source of enemy direct fires or enemy artillery observation.

• Establish additional security measures such as screen or guard.

• Prepare for and assist the passage of follow-on forces (if required).

• Continue to improve security by conducting defensive actions. These defensive actions include engagement area (EA) development, direct fire planning, and battle position preparation.

• Protect the obstacle reduction effort.

• Secure EPWs and detainees.

• Prepare for the enemy counterattack.

Reorganization

4-171. Reorganization is usually conducted concurrently with consolidation. It comprises actions taken to prepare the SBCT Infantry battalion for follow-on missions. As with consolidation, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander plans and prepares for reorganization as he conducts his operations process. He ensures that the SBCT Infantry battalion take the following actions:

• Provide essential medical treatment and evacuate casualties, as needed.

• Treat and evacuate wounded detainees, and process the remainder of detainees.

• Cross-level personnel and adjust task organization when necessary to support the next phase or mission.

• Conduct resupply operations, to include rearming and refueling.

• Redistribute ammunition.

• Conduct required maintenance.

• Coordinate augmented forces to return to home unit of follow on operating unit, if necessary.

SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

4-172. Special purpose attacks are ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack (FM 3-90-1). The commander’s intent and the mission variables of METT-TC determine which special purpose attack(s) to employ. Each attack can be conducted as either a hasty or deliberate attack. The commander’s intent and METT-TC mission variables and factors determine the specific attack form. As subordinate attack tasks, they share many of the planning, preparation, and execution considerations of the attack. Demonstrations and feints, while forms of attack, are associated with military deception operations. (Refer to FM 3-13 for more information.)

AMBUSH

4-173. An ambush is an attack by fire, or other destructive means, from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90-1). Ambushes are normally performed by company and below level units. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.9 for more information on SBCT unit ambushes.) Battalions may order companies to perform ambush as part of a larger operation.

COUNTERATTACK

4-174. A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives (ADRP 1-02). Units conduct counterattacks to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action (for example, regaining lost ground, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units). The objective of counterattack is to deny the enemy his goal when attacking.

4-175. The two levels of counterattacks are major and local counterattacks. In both cases, waiting for the enemy to act first may reveal the enemy’s main effort and create an assailable flank. A commander also conducts major counterattacks to defeat or block an enemy penetration that endangers the integrity of the entire defense, or to attrite the enemy by the defeat or destruction of an isolated portion of the attacking enemy.

4-176. The SBCT Infantry battalion counterattack is most effective in urban and restricted terrain. This type of terrain allows it to take advantage of tactical mobility maintaining contact with the enemy through sensors, sharing through direct coordination with adjacent units but unknown to the enemy.

4-177. SBCT’s battalion’s conduct counterattacks assisted with mission command systems and maneuver to a point of tactical advantage to initiate the attack with the enemy forces. They take advantage of the speed and protection of their vehicles to deploy and initiate their attacks.

DEMONSTRATIONS

4-178. In military deception, a demonstration is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought. It is made to deceive an adversary and is like a feint, but no actual contact with the adversary is intended (JP 3-13.4). Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy.

FEINTS

4-179. A feint is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4). Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy, but avoid decisive engagement. As in the demonstration, the commander uses feints in conjunction with other military deception activities.

RAID

4-180. A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal (JP 3-0). Raids are usually small, involving battalion-size or smaller forces and are normally conducted in five phases. The SBCT Infantry battalions conducts raids as part of a larger force to accomplish many missions, to include the following:

• Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel.

• Capture or destroy specific enemy command and control locations.

• Destroy enemy materiel or installations.

• Obtain intelligence concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strength, intentions, weaknesses, vulnerabilities or methods of operation.

• Confuse the enemy or disrupt his plans.

• Liberate friendly personnel.

4-181. In the first phase, the raiding force inserts or infiltrates into the objective area. Dismount points for Soldiers should be before any enemy force on the objective can identify the friendly force. Due to its relatively quiet running motor, the Stryker vehicle can deceive the enemy of its proximity, especially at night, and assist with infiltration.

4-182. In the second phase, the objective area is sealed off from outside support or reinforcement, including enemy air. With proper placement of each Stryker vehicle and assigned sectors of fire, the Stryker vehicle establishes blocking positions at entrances and exits at key choke points around the objective. These blocking positions are further enhanced with an Infantry local security element and MGS providing long range precision fires.

4-183. In the third phase, any enemy forces at or near the objective are overcome in a violently executed surprise attack using all available firepower (for shock effect). Snipers provide long range precision fires onto enemy observation points to support by fire maneuvering forces and assists in infiltration.

4-184. In the fourth phase, the force seizes the objective and accomplishes its assigned task quickly before any surviving enemy in the objective area can recover or be reinforced.

4-185. In the fifth phase, the raiding force withdraws from the objective area and is extracted. Mounting and extraction points should be on the objective or adjacent to it and out of potential enemy contact or counterattack. Extraction should not be on the far side of the objective due to risks of enemy counterattack. The extraction element must be synchronized with the operation and allow the maximum time for the attacking force to completes its assault and site exploitation on the objective. The extracting element cannot be too early and create clutter on the objective and it cannot be too late risking enemy contact.

4-186. When a unit’s commander and staff plan a raid, they develop course of actions that meet ethical, legal, political, and technical feasibility criteria. Planners require precise, time-sensitive, all-source intelligence. The planning process determines how mission command, sustainment, target acquisition and target servicing occurs during the raid. Techniques and procedures for conducting operations across the forward line of own troops, given the specific mission variables expected to exist during the conduct of the raid, are also developed. They carefully weigh each alternative. Besides those planning considerations associated with other offensive tasks, they determine the risks associated with conducting the mission and possible repercussions. All elements involved in a raid fully rehearse their functions, if time, OPSEC, and deception requirements permit.

SPOILING ATTACK

4-187. A spoiling attack is a tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is forming or assembling for an attack. A spoiling attack usually employs armored, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack on enemy assembly positions in front of a main line of resistance or battle position (FM 3-90-1).

4-188. The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy’s offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying targeted enemy personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives. Conditions when conducting spoiling attack are—

• The spoiling attack’s objective must be obtainable. The enemy should be unable to respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated manner.

• The commander must prevent the force conducting the spoiling attack from becoming over extended.

SECTION IV – EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT

4-189. BCTs, Divisions, and Corps execute exploitation and pursuits. The SBCT Infantry battalion may recommend to initiate or participate based on combat information. Indicators will include signs that the enemy force is withdrawing or has been degraded in combat power. Units participating in exploitation or pursuits typically operate over a wider front than an attacking force, and the battalion may operate with their supporting assets beyond normal supporting ranges. This will force the battalion to operate carrying less the three days of supply and assume some risk in order to be successful. The SBCT Infantry battalion utilizes its mission command systems and tactical mobility of the Stryker vehicles at their maximum ranges to ensure success.

SECTION V – TRANSITIONS

4-190. The commander ceases an offensive task when it results in complete victory and ends hostilities, reaches a culminating point, or the commander receives a change in mission from a higher commander. This change in mission may be the result of other elements of national power, such as a political decision.

4-191. For all attacks, the SBCT Infantry battalion must plan to exploit success. However, at the conclusion of an engagement, the commander may be forced to defend. Units make use of the terrain to enhance their survivability for short defensive tasks. If a longer defense is required, engineer defensive preparation efforts are prioritized based on the commander’s threat assessment. Deliberate defensive efforts for survivability are time and labor intensive and should be weighted based on threat. (Refer to ATP 3-90.8 and ATP 3-37.34 for more information.) The SBCT Infantry battalion commander considers the higher commander’s concept of operations, friendly capabilities, and the enemy situation when making the decision to defend or continue offensive tasks.

TRANSITION TO DEFENSIVE TASKS

4-192. As the offense approaches a culmination, the commander orders a transition to a defense. The commander uses two basic techniques when he transitions to the defense. The first technique requires the leading elements to commit forces and push forward to claim enough ground to establish a security area anchored on defensible terrain. The second technique is to establish a security area along the unit’s final positions, moving the main body rearward to defensible terrain.

4-193. The commander takes the following actions as the unit transitions from the offensive to the defensive:

• Maintains contact and information collection on the enemy using a combination of reconnaissance units and surveillance assets to develop the situation and facilitate planning of future operations.

• Establishes a security area and local security measures (to include biometric identity data collection).

• Redeploys indirect fire assets to ensure the support of security forces.

• Redeploys forces based on probable future employment.

• Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO and ensures that units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous AO.

• Transitions the engineer effort by shifting the emphasis from mobility to countermobility and survivability.

• Consolidates and reorganizes.

TRANSITION TO STABILITY TASKS

4-194. Upon order from higher headquarters, the commander orders a transition to operations focused on stability tasks. These tasks establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation between local or regional threats. Stability tasks aim to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.

4-195. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander must ensure that contingencies are planned for to transition quickly from offensive to stability tasks and vice versa. (For example, it may be wise for commanders to plan a defensive contingency with an on-order offensive mission for stability tasks that could deteriorate.)

4-196. Subordinate leaders must be fully trained to recognize activities that would initiate this transition. Actions in one unit’s area of operation can affect a change in whatever type task an adjacent unit is conducting. (For example, an offensive action may cause noncombatants to be displaced to another section of the city requiring a support operation for the unit in that area of operation.)

Chapter 5

Defense

Defensive tasks are tasks conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive tasks include—

• Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy.

• Attrite or fix the enemy as a prelude to offensive tasks.

• Surprise action by the enemy.

• Increasing the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.

Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive tasks retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. This chapter describes the primary defensive tasks and transitioning from the defense to other types of operations.

This chapter discusses the basics of the defense, defense of a linear object, perimeter defense, reverse slope defense, engagement area development, and transitions.

SECTION I – BASICS OF THE DEFENSE

5-1. As part of the higher echelon’s defensive tasks, the SBCT Infantry battalion may defend, delay, withdraw, or counterattack. It may also perform security tasks for the SBCT. The SBCT Infantry battalion may defend as part of the higher headquarters’ main battle area, or it may conduct autonomous defensive or stability tasks within a small scale contingency. The SBCTs Infantry battalion and its higher headquarters conduct operations to create conditions for success as enemy forces enter into the main battle area and by weakening the enemy prior to the commencement to close combat.

5-2. There are three basic defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. Each of these tasks contains elements of the others, and usually contains both static and dynamic aspects. SBCT Infantry battalions serve as the primary maneuver elements, or terrain controlling units, in all three defensive tasks. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)

5-3. The SBCT Infantry battalion usually defends in the main battle area. The SBCT Infantry battalion can conduct the defense to achieve one or more of the following actions:

• Gain time.

• Retain key terrain.

• Support other missions.

• Preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another.

• Attrite enemy forces at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly actions.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSE

5-4. Successful defenses employ the characteristics of disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security.

DISRUPTION

5-5. Defenders subvert an attacker’s tempo, formations and synchronization by countering his initiative and preventing him from massing overwhelming combat power. Disruption attacks the enemy’s will to fight and his means of effective command and control. Deep precision fires, long-range precision sniper fires, electronic countermeasures (jamming), scatterable minefields (SCATMINE), unexpected defensive positions, local counterattacks at all levels, and attacks delivered by a reserve force, combine to disrupt the enemy’s attack and break his will to continue offensive operations. Repositioning forces, implement aggressive protection measures, the employment of roadblocks, ambushes, checkpoints, and information operations combine to disrupt the threat of asymmetrical attack. These tasks disrupt enemy efforts to fight as a combined-arms team.

FLEXIBILITY

5-6. The defender gains flexibility by sound preparation and task organization, disposition in depth, retention of reserves, repositioning, and effective mission command. The defense is characterized by rapid, simultaneous, and collaborative planning with flexible execution. Contingency planning permits flexibility. Flexibility also requires that the commander see the battlefield to detect the enemy’s scheme of maneuver early. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield determines likely enemy actions; while security elements confirm or deny those actions.

MASSING EFFECTS

5-7. The battalion shapes and decides the battle by massing the effects of overwhelming combat power. Effects are synchronized in time and space and should be rapid and unexpected so that they break the enemy’s offensive tempo and disrupt his attack. The commander employs integrated intelligence, with reconnaissance efforts to deliver the effects of fires and maneuver at the decisive point on enemy forces so that they are repeatedly focused and refocused to achieve decisive, destructive, and disruptive effects upon the enemy’s attack.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

5-8. Integration of all combat power throughout the area of operation improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick, violent, and simultaneous action throughout the depth of the Battalion’s area of operations can attrite, confuse, and even degrade an enemy force when he is most exposed and vulnerable. Such actions weaken the enemy’s morale and do not allow any early successes to build their confidence. Operations in depth prevent the enemy from gaining momentum in the attack. Synchronization of actions in deep, close, and security areas facilitate mission success.

5-9. Alternate and supplementary positions, combat outposts, and mutually supporting strongpoints forward of the perimeter extend the depth. Fires are planned throughout the defensive area up to the maximum range of available weapons and reconnaissance assets. Fires move and reposition to maintain contact with enemy forces and observe NAIs in depth as the battle develops. During periods of reduced visibility, obstacles are emplaced around critical locations within the perimeter to disrupt the enemy’s plan, and add depth to the defense.

PREPARATION

5-10. The battalion commander determines likely enemy avenues of approach, likely enemy schemes of maneuver, where to kill the enemy, integration of obstacles, unit positioning, and integration of indirect fires, and he assigns missions accordingly. Defensive preparations include the following:

• The battalion staff executes the military decision making process under the executive officer’s supervision for the commander’s approval.

• Enact survivability measures that involve action against conventional threats (preparation of fighting positions, digging-in mission command nodes, and similar actions) as well as asymmetric threats (terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction employment).

• Designate a reserve.

• Conduct rehearsals to ensure synchronization. These include employment of the reserve and counterattack forces.

• Position forces in depth.

• Reinforce terrain with obstacles that support the scheme of maneuver.

• Coordinate with SBCT reconnaissance squadron or joint assets forward of the battalion’s security area.

SECURITY

5-11. Security operations are measures taken by the SBCT Infantry battalion to protect itself against all acts designed to impair its effectiveness, and prevent the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. Because a force defends to conserve combat power for use elsewhere or later, commanders must secure the force. The battalion ensures security by employing reconnaissance elements throughout the entirety of its assigned AO. The battalion may employ a counterreconnaissance force, combat outposts, or a force conducting a screen to provide security. Information operations capabilities such as psychological operations, military deception, and electronic warfare (EW) can aid in securing the force and confuse the enemy as to the battalion’s manner of defense. The battalion integrates its security operations with those of the SBCT and other adjacent or partnered units.

DEFENSE TASKS

5-12. Defensive task – A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0) The SBCT Infantry battalion participates in all defensive tasks. Defensive tasks are—

• Area.

• Mobile.

• Retrograde.

AREA DEFENSE

5-13. The area defense is a defensive task that denies enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90). The emphasis is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting positions and controlling the terrain between positions. The defeat mechanism is fires into engagement areas, which reserve units can supplement. The commander uses his reserve force to reinforce fires, add depth, block penetrations, restore positions, or counterattack to destroy enemy forces and seize the initiative.

MOBILE DEFENSE

5-14. The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The commander uses the fixing force to hold attacking enemy forces in position, to help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush areas, and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force. A mobile defense requires an AO of considerable depth.

RETROGRADE

5-15. The retrograde is a type of defense task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90). The enemy may force these actions or the commander may execute them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force executing the operation must approve the retrograde. Retrograde is conducted to improve a tactical situation or to prevent a worse situation from developing. Battalions usually conduct retrogrades as part of a larger force, but may conduct independent retrogrades when necessary such as on a raid.

FORMS OF THE DEFENSE

5-16. Forms of the defense can be applied within area and mobile defensive tasks. They have special characteristics, purposes and their own unique planning considerations. The forms of the defense are defense of a linear obstacle, perimeter defense, and reverse slope defense. The forms of the defense are used by subordinate elements of the SBCT Infantry battalion to support a defensive task. An example would be the SBCT Infantry rifle company commander chooses to conduct a reverse slope defense (form) in his assigned area in taking part in an area defense (task).

DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE

5-17. Linear obstacles include terrain features such as mountain ranges or river lines or man-made obstacles such as railroads. When defending an area with a linear obstacle a forward defense is normally a better option than a defense in depth. The linear obstacle may force the enemy forces to slow down, stop, mass or canalize during their attempt to cross the linear obstacle providing an opportunity for the defending force to strike the enemy force.

5-18. The commander’s use of a defense in depth accepts the possibility that the enemy may force a crossing at a given point within an area defense. The depth of the defense should prevent the enemy from rapidly exploiting its success. It defuses the enemy‘s combat power by forcing the enemy to contain bypassed friendly defensive positions besides continuing to attack positions in greater depth.

5-19. The defensive plan involving a linear obstacle should be more flexible when there is less information of the enemy course of action. A flexible plan can impact the task organization of forces. Techniques for the SBCT Infantry battalion commander for defending a linear obstacle are as follows:

• Security forces should conduct an area reconnaissance to determine the likely crossing points of the linear obstacle. Attaching an engineer squad to assist with determining low water crossings, and determining bridge classifications can assist in reconnaissance. UAS can provide additional coverage to previously uncovered areas.

• Establish a quick reaction force to respond to enemy contact that the security force encounter forward of the linear obstacle.

• Assign the MGS platoon and Stryker vehicles an area that allows them the ability to engage with longer ranges of their main gun or crew-served weapon systems.

• If antiarmor Stryker vehicles are attached using tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) systems do not place in positions firing over water.

• Assign areas of operation to SBCT Infantry rifle companies overwatching crossing points. Establish boundaries and coordinating points between companies. Require company elements to patrol between likely crossing points to prevent enemy infiltrations.

PERIMETER DEFENSE

5-20. A perimeter defense is a defense oriented in all directions. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses it for self- security, and to protect other units located within the perimeter. In terms of positioning forces, weapons emplacement, direct and indirect fire integration, and reserve employment, the commander conducting a perimeter defense plans to respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The SBCT Infantry battalion might be called upon to execute the perimeter defense under a variety of conditions, including—

• When it must secure itself against attacks to conserve or build combat power in order to execute follow on offensive tasks or develop the situation through patrolling.

• When it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units.

• When it has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place.

• When it conducts occupation of an independent assembly area or reserve position.

• When it begins preparation of a strong point.

• When it is directed to concentrate fires into two or more adjacent avenues of approach.

5-21. The commander should consider the following while in a perimeter defense:

• Placing security as far out as possible. Maximize the use of optics and sensors to provide early warning.

• Positioning antiarmor weapons and MGS vehicles in protected positions, and concentrating their fires on armor avenues of approach and related engagement areas.

• Placing the mortar platoon and sections in a secure inner area to support units on the perimeter.

• Maintaining a reserve, usually a platoon-size element and criteria to deploy them.

• Retaining key terrain.

• Sustaining operations and security.

5-22. Estimated time spent occupying a location of the perimeter defense determines the level of planning and coordination involved. The longer the time of occupation the more built up the defensive perimeter should be. Perimeter defenses are prepared in this order—

• Reconnaissance of the area to defend.

• Occupation of the area.

• Establish security.

• Begin priorities of work.

5-23. Adjustments in the perimeter are constant to ensure security. The leaders should constantly check, inspect, and update the perimeter defense plan. All adjustments need to be communicated to the commander. He is responsible for the coordination of the perimeter. The commander is responsible for perimeter and all adjustments are coordinated and approved through him.

TYPES OF BASES

5-24. Bases are an example of long term perimeter defenses. A base may be used to establish and maintain secure locations for conducting operations and logistics support activities, or delivering supporting indirect fire supporting fires or observation. SBCT Infantry battalions can establish or participate in the establishment of several kinds of bases. The most common bases are—

• Intermediate staging bases.

• Forward operating bases.

• Fire bases.

• Combat Outpost.

5-25. Base camps provide a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Operating from base camps is a fundamental tactic of ground-based forces. (Refer to ATP 3-37.10 for more information on planning and execution considerations.)

REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

5-26. An alternative to defending on the forward slope of a hill or a ridge is to defend on a reverse slope. In such a defense, the SBCT Infantry battalion is deployed on terrain that is masked from enemy direct fire and ground observation by the crest of a hill. Although some units and weapons might be positioned on the forward slope, the crest, or the counterslope (a forward slope of a hill to the rear of a reverse slope), most forces are on the reverse slope (see figure 5-1 on page 5-7). The key to this defense is control of the crest by direct fire.

5-27. The commander can adopt a reverse slope position when—

• Enemy fire makes the forward slope untenable.

• Lack of cover and concealment on the forward slope makes it untenable.

• The forward slope has been lost or has not yet been gained.

• The forward slope is exposed to enemy direct fire weapons fired from beyond the effective range of the defender’s weapons. Moving to the reverse slope removes the attacker’s standoff advantage.

• The terrain on the reverse slope provides better fields of fire than the forward slope.

• The defender must avoid creating a dangerous salient or reentrant in friendly lines.

• Surprising and deceiving the enemy as to the true location of the SBCT Infantry battalion defensive positions is essential.

5-28. When executing a reverse slope defense, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander places special emphasis on—

• A fire support plan to prevent the enemy’s occupation and use of the crest of the hill and to destroy, disrupt, and attrite enemy forces on the forward slope

• OPs or reconnaissance elements on the forward slope provide observation across the entire front and security to the main battle positions.

• A counterattack plan that specifies measures necessary to clear the crest or regain it from the enemy.

5-29. The forward edge of the position should be within small arms range of the crest. It should be far enough from the crest that fields of fire allow the defender time to place well-aimed fire on the enemy before they reach friendly positions. The battalion can deploy the scout platoon and sniper squad forward of the topographical crest. This allows long-range observation and early warning over the entire front and indirect fire coverage of forward obstacles.

Special Considerations

5-30. The following are considerations that commanders may apply when defending on a reverse slope:

• Observation of the enemy is more difficult. Soldiers in this position see forward no farther than the crest. This makes it hard to determine exactly where the enemy is as he advances, especially when visibility is poor. Observation posts must be placed forward of the topographic crest for early warning and long-range observation.

• Egress from the position might be more difficult.

• Fields of fire are usually short.

• Obstacles on the forward slope can be covered only with indirect fire or by units on the flanks of the battalion unless some weapons systems are initially placed forward.

• If the enemy gains the crest, he can assault downhill. This may give him a psychological advantage.

• If observation posts are insufficient or improperly placed, the defenders might have to fight an enemy who suddenly appears in strength at close range.

5-31. The slope degrades the enemy from being able to conduct reconnaissance and retreat if committed to an attack. The Stryker vehicles can provide direct fire with their mounted crew served weapons firing up while Infantry fire from slope to slope. This technique provides mass from direct fire weapon systems with the enemy receiving fire from below and to their front.

Figure 5-1. SBCT Example of a reverse slope

DEFENSE IN RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN

5-32. SBCT units are capable of conducting defensive tasks in any terrain. They take additional considerations when operating in restrictive terrain.

URBAN

5-33. Battalions defend urban areas to defeat an attack, gain time, economize forces, protect infrastructure, protect a populace, and shape conditions for offensive or stability tasks. Usually two or more of these reasons apply to the urban defense. Defensive tasks in urban environment provide commanders with opportunities to turn the environment’s characteristics to the advantage of Army forces. Urban areas are ideal for defensive tasks and enhance the combat power of defending units. SBCTs have a significant advantage defending urban terrain because of their task organization with more snipers, MGS, mortars and Infantry, and weapons squads.

5-34. Urban defensive success depends on synchronizing the following simultaneous operations as one action:

• Decisive operations may not be effective if the unit’s purpose is not nested under the higher headquarters’ overall mission plan.

• Shaping operations vary greatly depending on the type of defense and create the conditions for decisive operations.

• Sustaining operations ensure freedom of action, secure lines of communications, and establish movement control.

5-35. In a built-up area, the defender takes advantage of inherent cover and concealment afforded by the urban environment. Infantry are able to engage at closer ranges and take advantage of close quarters combat, subterranean movement corridors for cover and concealment, and fire from elevated positions from structures.

5-36. The battalion commander considers restrictions to the attacker’s ability to maneuver and observe. The Stryker vehicles can be emplaced to provide blocking positions at intersections, streets, alley ways, and entrances to structures. Infantry can use cover and concealment to engage in close combat negating maximum effective ranges of enemy weapon systems. By using the terrain and fighting from well prepared and mutually supporting positions, a defending force can delay, block, fix, or destroy a much larger attacking force. The defense of a built-up area is organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of the defense and provide the defender with ease of movement to include above ground and subterranean areas. The defender organizes and plans his defense by observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and movement, cover and concealment (OAKOC). (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)

Mountain

5-37. Defensive tasks in a mountainous terrain are conducted to resist, defeat, or destroy an enemy attack to support subsequent offensive actions. Commanders use defensive tasks to withstand an enemy attack while preparing to seize the initiative and develop conditions favorable for transitioning to the offense. A thorough understanding of the commander’s intent is especially critical in the defense, which demands precise integration of all assets to include maneuver and sustainment.

5-38. Stryker forces operating in mountainous terrain environments often possess weapons and equipment more advanced in technology than the enemy. Mountainous terrain allows SBCT units to provide early warning by taking advantage of their optics. Knowing this, enemy offensive tactics commonly involve short violent engagements followed by a hasty withdrawal through preplanned routes. The enemy often strikes quickly and fights only as long as the advantage of the initial surprise is in their favor. Attacks may include direct fires, indirect fires, or IEDs and may be against stationary or moving forces. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.50 for more information.)

5-39. In the defense of mountainous terrain, the Stryker vehicles use their mobility to maneuver to places of advantage, while the Infantry secure severely restricted and key terrain. The RWS on Stryker vehicle can take advantage of engaging targets that are in positions of elevation above them, thus allowing an engagement area with mounted forces shooting upward and Infantry shooting downward. This allows the Stryker units to take advantage of reverse slope defenses. The availability of 120-mm mortars mounted and 81-mm and 60- mm dismounted supported with fires from the artillery battalion enhance the defense by covering likely enemy avenues of approach and dead space.

Jungle

5-40. Defense in the jungle makes it difficult for the SBCT Infantry battalion to react. The enemy has an advantage of cover and concealment. Defensive positions have limited visibility and fields of fire. The SBCT Infantry battalion mitigates this through orienting sensors forward to detect enemy, active security patrols, and designating a larger reaction force.

Subsurface

5-41. Subsurface area favors the defender. The attacking forces are limited in their knowledge of the exact location of the defense. The nature of subsurface areas funnels the enemy into known avenues of approach in confined spaces. The defender can make use of explosive devices focused at the enemy. These devices effects are enhanced by the confined spaces. They can also be used to collapse walls and ceilings. Maintaining surveillance on the surface and keeping an alternate route to reposition or escape is key to surviving a subsurface attack.

SECTION II – AREA DEFENSE

5-42. There are two forms of defensive maneuver within an area defense—defense in depth and forward defense. The SBCT Infantry battalion can do both. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander selects the type of area defense to use, and provides guidance to allow the company commander to define the general defensive scheme for the company. He selects terrain to defend from based on the weapons capabilities of the enemy and considers his own. If he has an advantage with range and standoff for example the terrain selected would offer fields of fire allowing engaging of targets at long distances. If the enemy has the advantage of range then the battalion commander may select covered terrain, reverse slopes, and urban areas that allow the Infantry to engage in close combat. The specific mission may impose constraints such as time, security, and retention of certain areas that are significant factors in determining how it will defend.

DEFENSE IN DEPTH

5-43. A defense in depth reduces the risk of the attacking enemy force penetrating the defense quickly. The enemy is unable to exploit a penetration because of additional defensive positions employed in depth. The in-depth defense provides more space and time to defeat the enemy attack.

5-44. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses a defense in depth when—

• The mission allows the SBCT Infantry battalion to fight throughout the depth of the AO.

• The terrain does not favor a defense well forward, and there is better defensible terrain deeper in the AO.

• Sufficient depth is available in the AO.

• Cover and concealment forward in the AO is limited.

• Weapons of mass destruction may be used.

FORWARD DEFENSE

5-45. The intent of a forward defense is to prevent enemy penetration of the defense. A forward defense is the least preferred due to its lack of depth. The SBCT Infantry battalion deploys most of its combat power into forward defensive positions near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The commander fights to retain its forward position, and may conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations, or to destroy enemy forces in forward engagement areas. Often, counterattacks are planned forward of the FEBA to defeat the enemy.

5-46. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses a forward defense when—

• Terrain forward in the area of operation favors the defense.

• Strong natural or man-made obstacles, such as a river or a rail line, are located forward in the area of operation.

• The assigned area of operation lacks depth due to the location of the area or facility to be protected. Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the area of operation is limited.

• Directed by higher headquarters to retain or initially control forward terrain.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

5-47. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander organizes his forces into security force, main body, reserve and sustainment.

Security Forces

5-48. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts reconnaissance and security by orienting sensors forward covering enemy likely avenues of approach as well as areas not directly covered by a ground element to detect the enemy. All detection must be confirmed or denied of enemy presence. The Infantry battalion establishes security by placing its scout platoon and sniper squad forward to screen. If a guard is required the SBCT may attach a Cavalry troop. If not the SBCT Infantry battalion may assign one of its Infantry rifle companies to do the mission.

Main Body

5-49. The advantage Stryker units possess in their techniques is that the Infantry fight forward of the vehicle. Their Infantry position is less likely to be identified than the Stryker vehicle. With Infantry forward and Stryker vehicles towards their rear, with MGS and antitank vehicles further back; allows for concentrated direct fires to be massed all at once in an engagement area. Adding the indirect fires from battalion mortar platoon and company mortar section further enhance concentration of effects. A Stryker Infantry rifle company has the capability to fire all of its weapons systems at maximum effective ranges at one time provided that all elements are positioned outside of surface danger zones.

Reserve

5-50. The battalion reserve force is normally one of its Infantry rifle platoons. METT-TC determines its exact composition. The reserve force could consist of an entire Infantry rifle company, a mix of MGS and Infantry, an MGS platoon or an attached armored element if augmented. The reserve force should be mobile and capable of reinforcing a point of possible enemy penetration, used as the counter attacking force, conducting a spoiling attack, or as the battalion commander designates.

Sustainment

5-51. The sustainment element consists of the battalion trains and FSC. They are normally one terrain feature from the main body or colocated with the SBCT support area (see chapter 7 of this publication for more information).

PLANNING AN AREA DEFENSE

5-52. A successful area defense integrates and synchronizes all assets on terrain preferable to the defender to provide fires against an enemy force at a point that they are vulnerable. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander decides where to concentrate the effort, where to take risks, and adjusts as information on the attacking enemy force is gained. The keys to a successful area defense includes the—

• Capability to concentrate effects.

• Depth of the defensive area.

• Reconnaissance and security.

• Ability to take full advantage of the terrain (such as intervisibility lines, restricted terrain, natural obstacles).

• Flexibility of defensive tasks.

• Timely resumption of offensive actions.

MISSION COMMAND

5-53. During the MDMP the SBCT Infantry battalions IPB determines how the commander envisions how the enemy will fight, and the enemy’s plan for the operation. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander determines where and how they will defeat or destroy the enemy aligned with the SBCT commander’s guidance. This guidance facilitates his subordinate company commander to integrate and synchronize maneuver and fires schemes to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time within their subordinate engagement areas. Once the company commanders have determined how to concentrate their fires the battalion commander refines his plan to control his elements and adjusts as identified through reconnaissance. The best technique to ensure higher guidance is followed is to receive a backbrief from subordinate elements to ensure bottom up refinement and application meet the commander’s intent. (Refer to ADRP 6-0 for more information on mission command.)

INTELLIGENCE

5-54. The S-2 must obtain or develop products by conducting IPB and conduct continuous analysis of information and disseminate new and updated intelligence throughout the mission. He may need to request intelligence from the SBCT or other battalions to answer PIR that are integrated into specific NAIs. This allows the Stryker Infantry battalion commander to decide where to focus his information collection effort. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)

5-55. IPB is a critical part of defensive planning. It helps the commander define where to concentrate combat power, where to accept prudent risk, and where to plan potential decisive operations. The IPB must present all feasible enemy courses of action to aid in the development of a flexible defensive plan. The essential areas are—

• Analyze terrain and weather.

• Determine enemy force size and likely course of action with associated decision points.

• Determine enemy vulnerabilities and HVTs.

• Impact of civilian population on the defense.

5-56. The commander makes his determination of how and where to defeat the enemy on where he believes the enemy will go, the terrain, and the forces available. The SBCT Infantry battalion may define a defeat mechanism that includes single or multiple counterattacks to achieve success. The company commander analyzes his unit’s role in the SBCT Infantry battalion fight to determine how to achieve success.

Civil Considerations in Area Defense

5-57. The unit’s defensive plans address how the preparations and the conduct of area defense impacts the civilian population in the AO, and the commander’s legal obligations to the civilian population is met. Ideally, the host nation government has the capability to conduct the five primary stability tasks. If they are unable to conduct the minimum essential stability tasks, the defending unit attempts to make up the shortfall. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-58. In noncontiguous operations, the battalion often must defend either on a broad front, or in an AO so large that it would be unrealistic to employ units in mutually supporting positions. This requires a judicious effort by the commander and his staff in determining the positioning of maneuver forces. The battalion has the ability to defend in restricted and severely restricted terrain with Infantry. Mounted avenues of approach or open areas can be covered with MGS and ATGM if attached, Javelins against Armored threats and .50cals and MK-19 for light armored threats. During the terrain analysis, the commander and staff must look closely for choke points, intervisibility lines, and reverse-slope opportunities to take full advantage of the capabilities to mass firepower while providing protection for the Infantry.

5-59. Once the commander has assigned AOs to his maneuver units, he must determine any potential gaps between units. The battalion should plan to cover these gaps with reconnaissance assets, aggressive patrolling from the company and local observation posts. The battalion must plan local counterattacks to isolate and destroy any enemy that manages to penetrate through a gap in the AO. The commander should also plan to reposition units not in contact to mass the effects of combat power against an attacking enemy.

5-60. The need for flexibility through the mobility of forces requires graphic control measures to assist in maneuver during local counterattacks and repositioning of forces. Specified routes, phase lines, attack- and support-by-fire positions, BPs, EAs, TRPs, and other fire control measures are required to synchronize maneuver effectively.

Depth of the Defensive Area

5-61. The SBCT Infantry battalion establishes depth by aligning two companies forward and one to their rear in a contiguous environment. In a noncontiguous environment they should be in proximity to mutually support one another. Within these positions the SBCT Infantry rifle company adds more depth to the defense by placing its platoons into primary, alternate, and supplementary positions and establishes engagement and displacement criteria. The SBCT Infantry battalion plans branches and sequels into their defensive plan allowing criteria for each of the companies to reposition, reinforce, or counter attack.

Ability to Take Full Advantage of the Terrain

5-62. SBCT units take full advantage of terrain in the defense due to the limited digging capability. Infantry should seek covered and concealed positions forward of the Stryker vehicles and are prepared to dig their own fighting positions. Stryker vehicles should take advantage of intervisibility lines that allow maximum protection for the hull with the ability of the remote weapon station to engage. This allows the Stryker vehicle to engage the enemy without exposing itself.

Flexibility of Defensive Tasks

5-63. SBCT units provide flexibility in the area defense through task organization, fighting as a combined arms team, mobility, information sharing, and initiative of subordinate elements if provided with depth in their area of operation.

Timely Resumption of Offensive Actions

5-64. The SBCT Infantry battalion quickly transitions to offensive actions upon identified combat information that triggers the transition. Active reconnaissance and information collection efforts quickly identify opportunities to regain the initiative and begin offensive operations. This information is quickly shared through mission command systems. Subordinate units require minimal time to resume the offense because of minimal logistic requirements with the Stryker vehicle all being the same platform and Soldiers keeping 72 hours of supply.

FIRES

5-65. For the fire support plan to be effective in the defense, the SBCT Infantry battalion plans and executes fires in a manner that achieves the intended task and purpose of each target. Indirect fires serve a variety of purposes in the defense, to include the following:

• Slow and disrupt enemy movement.

• Prevent the enemy from breaching.

• Destroy or delay enemy forces at obstacles using massed fires or precision munitions.

• Disrupt enemy support-by-fire elements.

• Defeat attacks along dismounted avenues of approach with final protective fire.

• Disrupt the enemy to enable friendly elements to disengage or conduct counterattacks.

• Obscure enemy observation or screen friendly movement during disengagement and counterattacks.

• Provide smoke screens to separate enemy echelons or to silhouette enemy formations to facilitate direct fire engagement.

• Provide illumination using infrared or traditional methods.

• Execute suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions to support aviation missions.

5-66. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander evaluates the indirect fire systems available to provide support through both time and area for each subordinate company when developing the fire plan. Considerations, when developing the plan, include tactical capabilities, weapon’s ranges, and available munitions. The battalion and company commanders and their FSOs must consider echelon of fires from their available indirect fire systems with the company mortar section, battalion mortar platoon, field artillery battery, and so forth. These factors help the SBCT Infantry battalion commander and FSO determine the best method for achieving the task and purpose of each target in the fire plan and which asset engages which target. Characteristics of defensive fire plans include—

• Ensuring fires assets are in positions to support maneuver forces within time constraints.

• Targets are confirmed or denied by information collection efforts.

• Targets are destroyed in the main battle area (MBA).

• Designation of target sensor-to-shooter communication links.

• Air support to destroy enemy units, artillery assets, and command and control nodes.

• Proactive suppression of enemy air-defense effort.

• Suppression and obscuration fire plan to support breaking contact with the enemy.

• Prepositioned ammunition backed by prepackaged munitions stocks capable of rapid delivery.

• Integration of primary and alternate observers to engage targets.

• Fire support coordination measures that protect friendly forces, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces.

• Air space graphic control measures are planned for expedient clearance of airspace. (See chapter 8 for more information.)

SUSTAINMENT

5-67. The SBCT Infantry battalion staff coordinates with sustainment assets from the BSB to ensure support during the defense. The following sustainment considerations apply to defensive planning:

• Preposition ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), and barrier materiel in a centrally located position.

• Make plans to destroy those stocks, if necessary.

• Resupply during limited visibility to reduce the chance of enemy interference.

• Plan to reorganize to reconstitute lost sustainment capability.

• Use maintenance support teams in the unit maintenance collection point to reduce the need for recovering equipment in the brigade support area.

• Consider and plan for the additional transportation requirements for movement of Class IV barrier materiel, mines, and prepositioned ammunition; plus the sustainment requirements of additional engineer units assigned for preparation of the defense.

• Plan for prepositioning and controlling ammunition on occupied and prepared defensive positions.

• MEDEVAC LZ’s are positioned far enough behind friendly forces to not compromise the location of their position, out of range of enemy direct fire weapon systems, and out of observation of enemy units. They must be close enough (such that the response time for the air MEDEVAC is not greater than the time for a ground MEDEVAC) to provide timely response to a casualty.

• Role 1 and 2 medical care facilities positioned to treat casualties in a responsive time but have enough time to react if a friendly position is overrun. Ambulance exchange points and distribution of MEVs facilitate expedient MEDEVAC.

5-68. Besides the sustainment functions required for all missions, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander’s planning process includes pre-positioning of ammunition, the battalion trains and its concept of support, and Class IV and V supply points and mine dumps.

5-69. The commander’s mission analysis may reveal that the company’s ammunition requirements during an upcoming mission exceed its basic load. This requires the battalion to coordinate for pre-position ammunition caches between the logistical element and the company emplacing the cache. The company usually positions ammunition caches at alternate or subsequent positions.

5-70. The SBCT Infantry battalion trains usually operate one terrain feature to the rear of the main battle area to provide immediate recovery and medical support. The battalion trains normally exchange needed supplies to the company trains and then stabilizes, repairs, and coordinates transport to the brigade support area. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander ensures all elements know the casualty evacuation procedures and the locations of the battalion combat and field trains and BAS.

PROTECTION

5-71. The protection cell comprised of the S-2, S-3, and FSO monitor information provided by the security force to determine vulnerabilities of SBCT key resources. Key resources to be protected in defensive tasks include command posts, lines of communication, information collection assets, and indirect fire assets. Loss of these assets enhances the ability of the enemy to isolate the friendly force.

5-72. Survivability includes the construction of fighting positions, protective positions, and hardening facilities. These are prepared to protect vehicles, personnel, and weapons systems. Positions can be constructed and reinforced with overhead cover to increase the survivability of Infantry and crew-served weapons against shrapnel from airbursts. Vehicle fighting positions can be constructed with hull down observation positions. The SBCT Infantry battalion may use digging assets for ammunition caches at alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions. All leaders must understand the survivability plan and priorities.

Engineer Support

5-73. The survivability effort for the defense must enable units to concentrate firepower from fixed positions. To avoid detection and destruction by the enemy, units move frequently and establish survivability positions quickly. To provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.

5-74. Personnel and physical assets have inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that can be enhanced through various means and methods. When existing terrain features offer insufficient cover and concealment, survivability can be enhanced by altering the physical environment to provide or improve cover and concealment. Similarly, natural or artificial materials may be used as camouflage to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy or adversary. Together, these are called survivability operations—those military activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover, concealment, and camouflage. By providing or improving cover, concealment, and camouflage, survivability operations help military forces avoid or withstand hostile actions. Although such activities often have the added benefit of providing shelter from the elements, survivability operations focus on providing cover, concealment, and camouflage. All units conduct survivability operations within the limits of their capabilities. Engineer and CBRN personnel and units have additional capabilities to support survivability operations. (Refer to ATP 3-37.34 for additional information.)

5-75. Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the physical environment. They accomplish this by providing or improving cover, concealment, and camouflage in the following four areas:

• Fighting positions.

• Protective positions.

• Hardened facilities.

• Camouflage and concealment.

5-76. Engineer support in the SBCT has limited capacity. The priority of effort transition to countermobility and survivability over mobility requires detailed planning at the battalion level to ensure subordinate engineers have adequate time for TLPs. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE), with guidance from the brigade engineer and BEB staff, plans for the brigade defense. During planning, defensive positions and mobile reserves are identified as well as gaining a thorough understanding of the tactical-obstacle effort of subordinate units. The engineer battalion staff, in conjunction with the ABE, ensures that subordinate battalions defensive plans are mutually supporting. The engineer staff and ABE track preparation by monitoring subordinate unit status reports and specific progress on obstacle emplacement and survivability timelines, anticipating and resolving problems that may occur. The following planning considerations apply to engineer support:

• Position site obstacles early and link them to natural and other manmade obstacles.

• Plan situational obstacles based on time or event triggers and synchronize them with a decision support template.

• Plan multiple obstacle locations to support depth and flexibility in the defense. Ensure adequate security for obstacle emplacement systems. Integrate triggers for the execution of situational and reserve obstacles in the decision support template.

• Focus the countermobility effort to encourage the enemy to maneuver into positions of vulnerability where the Battalion intends to kill them.

• Ensure adequate mobility support for withdrawing security forces, the reserve, the counterattack force, and the repositioning of MBA forces.

• Ensure the integration of survivability priorities for critical systems and units through the development and implementation of an execution matrix and timeline.

• The survivability effort for the defense must enable units to concentrate firepower from fixed positions. To avoid detection and destruction by the enemy, units move frequently and establish survivability positions quickly. To provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.

PREPARING AN AREA DEFENSE

5-77. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses the preparation time available to build the strongest defense possible and refine counterattack plans. Commanders and staffs supervise and assess unit preparations while continuing to maintain situational awareness of developments in the area of operation. The SBCT commander prioritizes engineer assets, and request additional support to meet defense and survivability requirements of EA development. SBCT Infantry battalion commanders should coordinate with the SBCT to gain engineer support through parallel planning during the operations process. Reconnaissance and security operations are conducted aggressively while units occupy their assigned initial positions and rehearse their defensive actions. Sensors and other detection devices are employed to provide early warning to the defenders. Fires from the field artillery battalion elements support the security force but also refine, register, and confirm targets from the fires plan.

ESTABLISH SECURITY

5-78. The SBCT Infantry battalion moves to its defensive position in the same manner as conducting a movement to contact by focusing sensors forwards, followed by security, main body, and sustainment forces. The commander must be cautious of enemy surprises and take every effort to preserve the force.

5-79. The commander may direct the establishment of a forward security area. The first priority in the defense is to establish security normally a screen conducted by the scout platoon augmented with the sniper squad. If a guard is required, then it is normally conducted by one of the SBCT Infantry rifle companies and is augmented with the scout platoon and sniper squad or the SBCT assigns a Cavalry troop to conduct the mission. The size of the security force is based on METT-TC and increases in its composition as the enemy situation is less certain. It must be able to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces, disrupt its advance guard and displace upon identification of the main body. Clear displacement criteria must be given to prevent this element from becoming fixed or destroyed.

5-80. All units must maintain a high level of local security. Employment of patrols, establishment of observation posts, skillful use of UAS and sensors, and effective use of the terrain to conceal dispositions are essential for effective security.

5-81. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander also considers the potential threat to the defense that noncombatants with access to communication and recording devices may present. Security measures such as shutting down telephone exchanges and cell phone towers, and preventing unauthorized personnel from moving in the defensive area, may be required. The SBCT Infantry battalion should request guidance from higher HQ before implementing any defensive measures that could affect the civil population.

Deception and Operational Security

5-82. As part of the defense, higher HQ may have created a military deception operation and associated story to protect the force, cause early committal of the enemy, and mislead the enemy as to the true intentions, composition, and disposition of friendly forces. The SBCT Infantry battalion aids in the execution of a military deception plan to—

• Exploit enemy prebattle force allocation and sustainment decisions.

• Exploit the potential for favorable outcomes of protracted minor engagements and battles.

• Lure the enemy into friendly territory exposing their flanks and rear to attacks.

• Mask the aggressiveness of the sustaining and operational forces committed to the defense.

5-83. Defensive tasks contain branches and sequels that provide the commander decision points to exploit the situation. It is around these branches and sequels that military deception potentials exist. Specific deceptive actions the SBCT Infantry battalion commander can take to hasten exhaustion of the enemy offensive include, but are not limited to—

• Masking the conditions under which the decisive battle is accepted.

• Luring the enemy into a decisive battle, the outcome of which facilitates branching or sequencing to the offense.

• Employing camouflage, decoys, false radio traffic, movement of forces, and the digging of false positions and obstacles.

Main Battle Area Preparation

5-84. During the conduct of the defensive tasks, the commander and staff monitor preparatory actions, and track the higher and adjacent unit situations and the enemy situation. The status of engineer equipment and progress is followed to ensure timeliness of the defenses is constructed. The SBCT Infantry battalion units take full advantage with preparation and adjustments of positions by using the line of site function on their mission command systems. This provides a quick means to develop an overlay that shows their fields of fires.

5-85. Plans are refined based upon status of friendly force preparations, additional combat information provided by security force and intelligence updates. The SBCT Infantry battalion and the SBCT staffs assure that defending elements maintain a highly accurate view of the enemy, environment, and significant civilian factors. They continue preparations of the defense with established priorities of work.

Position the Reserve

5-86. The reserve is positioned away from hostile enemy fire and observation and in a position to be rapidly committed. The reserve’s commander should expect to receive specific decision points (DPs) and triggers for employment on each contingency. This allows the reserve commander to conduct quality rehearsals and to anticipate his commitment as he monitors the fight.

5-87. During preparation of the battalion defense, the reserve sometimes conducts other tasks. The commander might initially position his reserve in a forward location to deceive the enemy, obscure subordinate boundaries, or show strength in an area where he intends to accept risk. The reserve could serve in the forward security area and provide area security for the logistics sites or unoccupied areas of the AO. However, the commander must consider the impact of these types of missions on his reserve force’s ability to prepare for its critical role as the reserve during the MBA engagement.

Aviation Support

5-88. In defensive operations, the speed and mobility of aviation can help maximize concentration and flexibility. During preparation for defensive operations, aviation units sometimes support the commander with aerial reconnaissance and fires.

5-89. During the defense, aviation forces can attack deep against HPTs, enemy concentrations, and moving columns and they can disrupt enemy centers of gravity. The division will likely employ attack reconnaissance helicopter units to attack follow-on echelons before they can move forward to the close battle. Aviation forces might conduct screening operations, and might conduct guard operations of an open flank in conjunction with ground forces.

5-90. Attack reconnaissance helicopters routinely support security area operations and mass fires during the MBA fight. Synchronization of aviation assets into the defensive plan is important to ensure aviation assets are capable of massing fires and to prevent fratricide. Detailed air-ground operation and coordination are necessary to ensure efficient use of aviation assets. If augmented with aviation assets, the battalion must give careful consideration to EA development and involve the direct fire planning and the supporting aviation unit, through its aviation LNO, in the planning process.

Rehearsal

5-91. The SBCT Infantry battalion should rehearse its defense, if METT-TC permits. The commander can use any of the five types of rehearsals. They are confirmation brief, backbrief, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal, and battle drill.

5-92. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander ensures that the enabling forces are completely integrated into the defensive scheme of maneuver. Rehearsals provide a mechanism for ensuring this integration. Rehearsals should cover where the SBCT Infantry battalion commander sees the enemy forces disruption points, when it will be fixed, where it will be destroyed, engagement and displacement criteria and counterattack. Rehearsals should cover where the enemy force will conduct disruption points, when it will be fixed, where it will be destroyed, engagement and displacement criteria, and counterattack.

MONITORING DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

5-93. As subordinate units position their elements and execute defensive preparations, the staff monitors and coordinates their activities and the overall situation. The S-2 monitors the enemy situation and focuses on indicators that reveal the enemy’s likely time and direction of attack. The staff continually analyzes this assessment to determine the effects on preparation time available. The commander must update his PIR as the situation changes and be prepared to adjust the reconnaissance effort to answer those questions. The S-3 monitors the status of rehearsals and updates the plan as needed based on continuously updated intelligence and the status of preparations. The XO analyzes the status of logistics and equipment maintenance to determine any required adjustments to the plan or task organization. The engineer battalion staff and ABE monitor the progress of all engineer efforts within the AO. He continually projects the end state of this effort based on the current and projected work rates. They identify potential shortfalls and recommend where to accept risk.

5-94. As the enemy closes on the AO, the battalion begins final preparations that typically include:

• Final coordination for battle handover and passage of lines.

• Positioning of situational obstacle employment systems.

• Verification of communications status.

• Evacuation of unused Classes IV and V (obstacle materiel and ammunition) to prevent capture or loss to enemy action.

• Withdrawal of engineer forces from forward areas.

• Linkup of mobility, protection, and sustainment assets with reserve or other supported combat forces (if not previously accomplished).

• Review of reconnaissance plan to ensure it still meets the commander’s PIR.

• Final positioning or repositioning of reconnaissance assets, security forces, and observers.

• Positioning of teams to close lanes in obstacles or execute reserve obstacles.

• Execution of directed, reserve, or situational obstacles.

• Registration of indirect fire targets with mortars.

• Periodic situation updates and issuing of final guidance to subordinates.

Occupation of Positions

5-95. As units occupy positions, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander and staff monitor and resolve any problems with the reconnaissance and security efforts. The SBCT Infantry battalion may have to make minor adjustments to area of operations, engagement areas, obstacles, battle positions, and other defensive coordination measures based on unanticipated METT-TC conditions. The SBCT Infantry battalion makes only critical changes to the defense plan due to the loss of time and wasted expenditure of unrecoverable Class IV barrier and obstacle material.

EXECUTING AN AREA DEFENSE

5-96. In an area defense, the SBCT Infantry battalion fights mainly from positions of tactical advantage to concentrate combat power effects against attempted enemy breakthroughs and flanking movements.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

5-97. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s security forces detect first with sensors forward and confirm or deny to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Normally, this happens in the security area with a unit conducting a screen or a guard. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s first concerns are to identify committed enemy units’ disposition, composition and strength. From this information the staff led by the S-2 determines the enemy’s intent and direction of attack.

Security Area Engagement

5-98. The SBCT Infantry battalion’s security force gains contact with the approaching enemy, reports their movements, avoids becoming fixed or destroyed, disrupts enemy reconnaissance, and withdraws as enemy main body formations enter the SBCT’s Infantry battalion security area. The commander can direct the security forces to disrupt, delay, or destroy lead or rear portions of enemy formations. The security forces can also be used as part of an effort to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the MBA or conduct a rear passage of lines with the main body. The commander considers the follow-on missions of the security forces, their potential to be over-run or isolated, and the overall impact their direct combat achieves. To remain abreast of the situation and maintain mutual support, main battle forces monitor on the reconnaissance and security force fight.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

5-99. The commander executes shaping operations, to include the conduct of military deception operations, to disrupt the enemy regardless of their location within the area of operation. After making contact, the commander seeks to disrupt the enemy’s plan, their ability to control forces, and the combined arms team. Ideally, the results of the commander’s shaping operations should force a disorganized enemy, whose ability to synchronize its elements has been degraded, to conduct a movement to contact against prepared defenses. Once the process of disrupting the attacking enemy begins, it continues throughout a defensive task. Using indirect fires, air ground integration, and other available lethal and nonlethal effects during this phase of the battle allows the SBCT to—

• Support the security force’s delaying action.

• Disrupt or limit the momentum of the enemy’s attack.

• Support the friendly force’s decisive operation by destroying HPTs.

• Divert the enemy’s attack.

• Reduce the enemy’s combat power.

• Separate enemy formations.

Execution of Planned Indirect Fires

5-100. The planned indirect fires usually consist of security force elements’ or a FIST’s execution of one or two indirect fire targets on a primary enemy avenue of approach. This may be in support of the higher headquarters’ scheme of fires since the SBCT usually controls artillery assets throughout most of the engagement.

5-101. During the MBA engagement, the SBCT and battalion shift combat power and priority of fires to defeat the enemy’s attack. This may require—

• Adjusting subordinates’ AOs and missions.

• Repositioning of forces.

• Shifting of the main effort.

• Committing the reserve.

• Modifying the original plan.

5-102. Forward forces, obstacles, and fires within the MBA usually break the enemy’s momentum, reduce his numerical advantage, and force his troops into positions of vulnerability. The battalion masses fires (direct and indirect) to destroy attacking enemy forces as they enter the EAs. Depending on the defensive scheme, the battalion may conduct delay operations, capitalizing on movement and repeated attacks to defeat the enemy or it may fight primarily from a single series of positions.

Execution of Situational Obstacles

5-103. The purpose of these obstacles is to force premature enemy deployment, thus slowing the enemy’s advance. This allows for more effective engagement with indirect fires and, therefore, forces early deployment of enemy breaching assets. These obstacles usually are planned and triggered about specific enemy attack options. Situational obstacles may support an essential task for fires support. In this situation, an SBCT Infantry rifle company may be employed forward to cover fire support elements with direct fires, and then withdraw to its own defensive positions within the MBA.

FIX THE ENEMY

5-104. The commander uses shaping operations to fix the enemy and allow friendly forces to execute decisive maneuver elsewhere. This could include numerous offensive or defensive tasks such as feint, raid, ambush, or show of force. The intent is to make the enemy move into the engagement area and friendly forces to initiate with fires to achieve surprise. Fixing the enemy takes the initiative away and allows the defending force to synchronize effects against them.

Maneuver

5-105. In an area defense, the decisive operation occurs in the main battle area. This is where the effects of shaping operations, coupled with sustaining operations, combine with the decisive operation to defeat the enemy. The commander’s goal is to prevent the enemy’s further advance with a combination of effects from fires and air ground operations from positions overwatching obstacles, and synchronized with the deployment of the mobile reserves.

5-106. Generating massed effects is especially critical for the commander conducting defense of a large area against an enemy with a significant combat power advantage. The attacker has the ability to select the point and time of the attack, and the attacking enemy can mass forces at a specific point. The defending commander quickly determines the intent of the enemy commander and the effects of terrain. This allows the defender to maneuver to positions of tactical advantage and place combination of effects from fires and air ground operations to restore a more favorable force ratio.

Main Battle Area Engagement

5-107. All systems and units focus on fixing and destroying enemy forces that enter the MBA. During the MBA engagement, the SBCT Infantry battalion shifts combat power and priority of fires to defeat the enemy’s attack. This may require—

• Adjusting subordinates’ AOs and missions.

• Repositioning forces.

• Shifting the main effort.

• Repeating commitment and reconstitution of a reserve.

• Modifying the original plan.

5-108. The forward forces mission within the MBA is usually breaking the enemy’s momentum, reducing their numerical advantage, and forcing them into positions of vulnerability. The SBCT Infantry battalion can economize and take risks in less threatened areas, shift fires, and maneuver the reserve or MBA forces to gain local fire superiority at critical locations. Obstacles, security forces, surveillance assets, and fires can assist covering areas where risk is accepted. Massing forces and fires is done swiftly because periods that allow gaining an advantage are usually brief (see figure 5-2 on page 5-20).

Figure 5-2. Forward defense

Penetrations

5-109. Each maneuver commander is responsible for controlling enemy advances within an assigned area of operation. These commanders provide the SBCT Infantry battalion commander early warning and reaction time for potential enemy penetrations. If a maneuver unit is threatened with a penetration, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander may take several actions to counter the situation. In order of priority, the commander can—

• Maintain contact with the penetrating enemy force. Forward MBA forces may be able to transition into a delay to maintain contact, or the commander may redirect reconnaissance assets, security forces, and observers to locate enemy. The commander seeks to determine the enemy force’s size, composition, direction of attack, and rate of movement. Forces in contact adjust indirect fires and air ground operations against the enemy to disrupt, delay, or divert their attack.

• Take immediate actions to reinforce at the point of penetration. This may require changing task organization, adjusting adjacent unit boundaries and tasks, emplacing obstacles, committing the reserve, or shifting priority of fires.

• Move threatened sustainment units. Based upon the enemy’s direction of attack, sustainment units may need to move away from the penetration. These movements are controlled to ensure they do not interfere with counterattack plans or movement of combat forces.

• Determine where and how to engage the penetrating enemy force. Based upon the enemy’s size, composition, and direction of attack, the commander selects the best location to engage the enemy. The reserve may counterattack into the enemy’s flank, or it may establish a defensive position in depth to defeat or block them. The staff establishes control measures for the reserve’s attack. The reserve can use an engagement area or objective to orient itself to a specific location to engage the enemy, or can use a BP as a position along defensible terrain. When the situation is vague or the enemy has multiple avenues of approach, the commander may establish an AO for the reserve. This requires the reserve to locate and move to intercept and engage the enemy, anywhere in the assigned AO. The commander and staff develop a concept of fires and consider required adjustments to fire support coordinating measures. They decide on the commitment of directed, reserve, or situational obstacles to support the action. Traffic control is especially critical. Sufficient routes are designated for the reserve force to use, and military police conduct traffic regulation and enforcement to ensure those routes remain clear of civilian traffic, dislocated civilians, and stragglers.

• Issue fragmentary orders (FRAGORD) that reflect adjustment decisions necessary to modify the original plan to account for the actual situation. If the operation is not well controlled, the situation could easily deteriorate into a total force failure. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander develops orders quickly and issues them clearly, concisely, and calmly. A simple, well-thought-out plan, developed during the initial planning process, greatly improves the ability of subordinates to react effectively.

COUNTERATTACK

5-110. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts counterattacks to take advantage of an attacking enemy’s weakened condition by striking against the flanks or rear, or denying the enemy commander momentum and initiative. As the enemy’s advance slows, weakens, or overextends, there are fewer maneuver options. As a result, the enemy could transition to a hasty defense along the forward line of own troops, or attempt to gain a foothold within the MBA from which to defend.

5-111. This situation enables the SBCT Infantry battalion commander to seek decisive opportunities by counterattacking the enemy with all available force, and ultimately securing the initiative of the battle. Timing and intelligence is critical to a counterattack. Assuring the mobility of the counterattack force while maneuvering out of contact against the enemy is critical. If committed too soon, the counterattack force might not have the desired effect, or may not be available for a more dangerous contingency. If committed too late, they might be ineffective. Once committed, counterattack forces can penetrate the enemy’s flanks, attack the enemy’s artillery and logistics areas, or attack from the rear. All of these are potentially decisive, creating concern for the enemy.

FOLLOW THROUGH

5-112. The purpose of defensive tasks is to retain terrain and create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative. The area defense does this by causing the enemy to sustain unacceptable losses short of their objectives. A successful area defense allows the commander to transition to an attack. An area defense could result in a stalemate with both forces left in contact with each other.

5-113. It could result in the defender being overcome by the enemy attack and needing to transition to a retrograde operation. Any decision to withdraw takes into account the current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the commander who ordered the defense can designate a new FEBA or authorize a retrograde operation. (See figure 5-3.)

Figure 5-3. Defense in depth

SECTION III – MOBILE DEFENSE

5-114. The SBCT Infantry battalions’ mission in a mobile defense is either part of a fixing force or a striking force, but not both. As part of the fixing force, the SBCT Infantry battalion defends within its assigned area of operation. It can use numerous offensive and defensive tasks, such as movement to contact, raid, spoiling attack, and area defense to fix the enemy.

Note. Units smaller than a division do not usually conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of their AO, while simultaneously resourcing the striking, fixing, and reserve forces. Typically, the striking force in a mobile defense comprises one-half to two-thirds of the defender’s combat power.

5-115. As part of the striking force, the SBCT Infantry battalion plans, rehearses, and executes offensive tasks. The striking force is a committed force and has the resources to conduct a decisive counterattack as a part of the mobile defense. The striking force decisively engages the enemy as he becomes exposed in his attempts to overcome the fixing force. The striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, and is usually augmented with armored forces.

SECTION IV – RETROGRADE

5-116. Retrograde can accomplish the following:

• Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces.

• Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.

• Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.

• Gain time.

• Secure more favorable terrain

• Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements of other friendly units.

• Disengage a force from an ongoing mission for use elsewhere in other missions.

5-117. Disengage is a tactical mission task where the commander has the unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement (ADRP 3-90). It involves moving to a location where the enemy cannot engage the friendly force with either direct fires or observed indirect fires. Disengaging from the enemy while displacing from one position to the next is a difficult procedure. A disengagement plan includes the following:

• The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disengagement, along with the movement routes for each subordinate unit.

• Fires to suppress the enemy and cover the unit’s movement.

• Screening smoke to conceal the unit’s movement, as part of a deception operation, or to cover passage points.

• Contact and passage points if moving through friendly lines.

• The time disengagement starts.

• The earliest time that functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements move.

5-118. There are three types of retrograde—

• Delay.

• Withdrawal.

• Retirement.

DELAY

5-119. Delay is a task that allows the unit to trade space for time, avoiding decisive engagement and safeguarding its elements (ADRP 3-90). Delays gain time to—

• Allow other friendly forces to establish a defense.

• Cover a withdrawing force.

• Functions as an economy of force effort that enables other forces to counterattack.

5-120. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts delays by initiating and breaking contact with enemy forces with their Infantry to prevent from being decisively engaged. This technique forces the enemy to deploy, and then reorganize to continue operations forcing them to use time to accomplish these tasks. The Infantry must keep the Stryker vehicle in close proximity but out of direct fire contact during the engagement. Remounting the vehicle under direct fire should only be done if the enemy force can be suppressed with fires and is preferred to be done out of contact. The MGS platoon, mortar section, can assist the dismounted element break contact by direct and indirect fires.

WITHDRAWAL

5-121. Withdrawal operation is a planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (JP 1-02). There are two types of withdrawals, assisted, and unassisted. The commander’s intent and METT-TC determine which type of withdrawal the unit uses.

ASSISTED WITHDRAWAL

5-122. The assisting force occupies positions to the rear of the withdrawing unit and prepares to accept control of the situation. It can assist the withdrawing unit with route reconnaissance, route maintenance, direct and indirect fire support, and sustainment. Both forces closely coordinate the withdrawal.

UNASSISTED WITHDRAWAL

5-123. The withdrawing unit establishes routes and develops plans for the withdrawal, then establishes security force as the rear guard while the main body withdraws. Sustainment and protection elements usually withdraw first, followed by combat forces. The detachment left in contact (DLIC) disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to its final destination as the unit withdraws.

RETIREMENT

5-124. A retirement is an operation where a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90). A retiring unit organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy ground forces. Typically, another unit’s security force covers the movement of one formation as the unit conducts a retirement. However, mobile enemy forces, unconventional forces, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may attempt to interdict the retiring unit. The commander must plan for enemy actions and organize the unit to fight in self-defense. The commander conducts a retirement to reposition his forces for future actions or to accommodate the concept of the operation. Units conduct retirements as tactical road marches where security and speed are the most important considerations.

SECTION V – TRANSITIONS

5-125. During the planning for any operation, the commander must discern the follow-on missions from the higher headquarters’ OPORD and begin to plan how they intend to achieve them. The SBCT Infantry battalion must pause to consolidate and reorganize before the next operation. If required, the commander decides the best time and location that facilitates future operations and provides security. (Refer to FM 3-90- 1 for more information.)

CONSOLIDATION

5-126. Consolidation is organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy (FM 3-90-1). SBCT Infantry battalion units might need to consolidate to reorganize, avoid culmination, prepare for an enemy attack, or allow time for movement of adjacent units. Consolidation is planned for every mission. Actions during consolidation include—

• Maintaining contact with the enemy and conducting reconnaissance.

• Establishing security consistent with the threat.

• Eliminating pockets of enemy resistance.

• Positioning forces to enable them to conduct a hasty defense by blocking possible enemy attacks.

• Neutralizing obstacles to support friendly movement and reorganization activities.

• Planning and preparing for future operations.

REORGANIZATION

5-127. Reorganization usually is conducted concurrently with consolidation. It comprises actions taken to prepare the SBCT Infantry battalion for follow-on operations. As with consolidation, the battalion commander and staff plan and prepare for reorganization. He ensures that the battalion takes the following actions:

• Establish security consistent with the threat. This may include moving forces, adjusting boundaries, changing task organization, and adjacent unit coordination.

• Destroy or contain enemy forces that still threaten the SBCT Infantry battalion.

• Replace or shift reconnaissance and surveillance assets, if needed.

• Treat and evacuate casualties.

• Redistribute ammunition, supplies, and equipment as necessary.

• Send relevant logistics and battle reports by digital means and voice (if not digitally equipped) to coordinate sustainment operations.

• Repair and replace damaged equipment or coordinate transfer of damaged equipment to the BSA.

• Process detainees, as required, to include enrolling them into the tactical biometric collection device. Have S-2 or HUMINT collect information from detainees before transferring them to the SBCT detention facility.

• Repair and emplace additional obstacles and improve/construct additional fighting positions.

• Repair and restore critical routes within the SBCT Infantry battalion area of operation to assure mobility of the force.

• Reposition mission command elements, communications assets, logistics, and fire support assets for future operations.

CONTINUING OPERATIONS

5-128. The SBCT Infantry battalion may continue the defense, or if ordered, transition to focus on the conduct of offensive or stability tasks at the conclusion of an engagement. The commander considers the higher commander’s concept of operations, friendly capabilities, and the enemy situation when making this decision. All missions should include plans for exploiting success or assuming a defense.

TRANSITION TO RETROGRADE

5-129. A defending commander may transition from participating in a higher echelon’s area or mobile defense to the retrograde as a part of continuing operations. A retrograde usually involves a combination of delay, withdrawal, and retirement operations. These operations may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other operations, the commander’s concept of operations and intent drive planning for retrograde operations. Each form of retrograde operation has its unique planning considerations, but considerations common to all retrograde operations are risk, the need for synchronization, and rear operations.

TRANSITION TO OFFENSE

5-130. Higher headquarters may order the SBCT Infantry battalion to conduct a movement to contact, attack, or participate in exploitation or pursuit.

5-131. The battalion may execute a counterattack to destroy exposed enemy elements and free decisively engaged friendly elements. The counterattack element must maneuver rapidly to its firing position, often fighting through enemy flank security elements, to complete the counterattack before the enemy can bring follow-on forces forward to influence the fight.

5-132. Planning and preparation considerations for the counterattack vary depending on the purpose and location of the operation. For example, the counterattack may be conducted forward of friendly positions, requiring the reserve force to move around friendly elements and through their protective and tactical obstacles. In other situations, the commander may use a counterattack to block, fix, or contain a penetration. In any case, the reserve force conducts the counterattack as an enemy-oriented operation.

TRANSITION TO STABILITY TASKS

5-133. Battalion commanders and Soldiers must be aware that elements of the SBCT could be conducting offensive or defensive tasks, simultaneously within a small radius of each other. ROE must be assessed, updated, disseminated, and trained on while this transition occurs. Establishing security within the area of operation for civilian population may call for a rapid response and initiative. The Stryker Infantry battalion makes these transitions rapidly through dissemination of information with mission command systems, leadership that takes the initiative, and active reconnaissance.

Chapter 6

Stability

Stability tasks focus on identifying and mitigating the root causes of instability to set the conditions for long-term development by building the capacity of local institutions. Military operations try to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, allowing essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief to occur. These activities support the legitimate government and facilitate the instruments of national power. Stability tasks can be conducted simultaneously with offensive or defensive tasks, and with activities where the needs of the population are addressed immediately. In some situations, stability tasks may be the predominant activity in the SBCT Infantry battalion AO. The primary characteristic of stability tasks is the focus on support in conjunction with non-military organizations, for the civilian population.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF STABILITY

6-1. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development (FM 3-07). Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment; provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADRP 3-07).

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

6-2. SBCT Infantry battalions conduct operations to provide a secure environment for the population, gain information for an understanding of the operational environment’s sources of instability, and understand capability and intentions of key actors. Sources of instability are actors, actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority’s capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil control, and ensure economic development.

6-3. Enemy forces leverage sources of instability to create and drive conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states. Examples of sources of instability include, but are not limited to:

• Insurgents forming shadow government

• Religious, ethnic, economic, political indifferences among the local population.

• Natural disasters or resource scarcity

• Super-empowered individual disrupting legitimate governance

• Severely degrading infrastructure

• Severe economic strife

• Immature, undeveloped or atrophied systems

• Ineffective or corrupt host-nation security forces

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

6-4. The SBCT applies stability principles to determine what actions to take, how to array its forces, and what guidance to give its subordinate units. For the SBCT Infantry battalion stability principles are nested with the higher commanders’ intent addressing the purpose for conducting actions to provide a stable environment.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

6-5. Conflict transformation is the process of converting the actors and conditions that motivate violent conflict into the governmental process to address the causes of instability (ADRP 3-07). It aims to set the host nation on a sustainable, positive trajectory in which transformational processes directly address the dynamics causing instability.

UNITY OF EFFORT

6-6. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—and is the product of successful unified action (JP 1).Military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in stability operation. This is the essence of unified action: the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach when conducting stability tasks in operations.

6-7. Unity of effort is more than working with other U.S. governmental agencies. Political leaders, governmental agencies, security forces, and local businesses are examples of host-nation actors that a brigade works with during stability operations. Brigades leverage their relationships with host-nation actors to develop their understanding of the operational environment and to answer information requirements.

LEGITIMACY AND HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP

6-8. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. Host nation ownership is the will or ability of the ruling entity to resolve its own problems and assuming responsibility for solutions that it supports and can implement. Legitimacy enables host-nation ownership by building trust and confidence among the people. The principle of legitimacy impacts every aspect of operations from every conceivable perspective.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

6-9. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. Brigades working with their partnered organizations, apply a comprehensive and unified approach to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities that address shared interests.

PHASES OF STABILITY

6-10. Stability is a constant process of improving and degrading conditions but has distinction described in its phases. The phases of stability assist the commander to in preparation for conducting operations. The ability to distinguish what conditions separate each phase of stability layout the milestones that can be achieved for progress.

INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE

6-11. These actions generally reflect activities to stabilize an area of operations. The BCT typically performs initial response actions during, or directly after, a conflict or disaster in which the security situation prohibits the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response actions aim to provide a secure environment that allows relief forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population.

TRANSFORMATION PHASE

6-12. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity-building are transformation phase actions that are performed in a relatively secure environment. Transformation phase actions may take place in either crisis or vulnerable states and aim to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY PHASE

6-13. Military forces perform fostering sustainability phase actions when the security environment is stable enough to support efforts to implement the long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation. These actions capitalize on capacity building reconstruction activities to enable sustainable development. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts in support of broader, civilian-led efforts.

STABILITY TASKS

6-14. The stability tasks are—

• Establish civil security.

• Establish civil control.

• Support to governance.

• Restore essential services.

• Support to economic and infrastructure development.

6-15. Each stability task supports one another when actions are conducted by civil and military organizations and key actors. Progress or regress in one of the stability tasks effects other tasks within an operating environment. Each stability task is nested closely in its application of stability by civil and military organizations and key actors. (See figure 6-1 on page 6-4.)

Figure 6-1. Stability principles and tasks

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-16. The SBCT Infantry battalion performs operations that support stability as part of unified land operations. Their role is to implement the strategy given to them by the SBCT, aligned with specific partners to conduct security tasks that bring stability amongst the local population through acceptance of local governance and economic development.

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

6-17. Stability tasks are conducted in a dynamic environment. Understanding the dynamics of the environment helps units successfully adapt to the special requirements presented. Although not applicable in every mission, the following considerations apply to many stability tasks—

• Military operations should align with political objectives.

• Commanders must be aware that their operations can create more enemies if mitigations are not taken.

• Noncombatants are defining characteristics of most modern military operations.

• Joint, interagency, and multinational cooperation is desired but not always aligned with one another’s goals.

• Decentralized operations.

• Mission creep risk.

• Commanders must be prepared to discuss their efforts with a myriad of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

• Information intensity.

• Constraints.

• Army forces must establish good working relations with indigenous personnel and leaders.

• Nonlethal weapons.

• Stability tasks place great demands on small units and small unit leaders.

• Stability tasks normally require interpreters.

PLANNING

6-18. The elements of operational art are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie tactical missions to the desired end state. They help refine and focus the concept of operations that forms the basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During planning and execution, commanders and staffs consider the elements as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the mission unfolds and reframe as needed. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

6-19. Planning for stability tasks draws on all elements of operational art though some elements are more relevant than others to stability. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.) Elements essential to successful operations characterized by stability tasks include: end state conditions, decisive points, and lines of effort. These elements are described below.

END STATE AND CONDITIONS

6-20. Commanders explicitly describe the end state and its defining conditions for every operation. Every operation then focuses on a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state.

DECISIVE POINTS

6-21. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 3-0). During operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, the commander identifies the decisive points that directly influence the end state conditions during operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks. Decisive points shape the design of operations and help the commander select decisive, attainable objectives that establish the end state.

LINES OF EFFORT

6-22. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). Lines of effort link multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. They are useful during stability operations, where the physical and positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In these operations, where the human dimension typically becomes the focus of the force, lines of effort often work best to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

6-23. Operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). An operational approach provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations and provides the framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. The operational approach conceptualizes the commander‘s vision for establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.) Commanders use stability and defeat mechanisms to develop an operational approach.

6-24. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander and staff determine the appropriate combination of stability mechanisms (compel, control, influence, and support) and defeat mechanisms (destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, isolate) to achieve desired results. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ stability tasks in operations. When military forces intervene in an unstable situation, forces use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions enough to protect the civilians. In a stability context, U.S. forces employ nonlethal means against nonmilitary individuals or organizations in part by acting against their motivations, not just their capabilities. Commanders consider stability and defeat mechanisms concurrently as units simultaneously counter belligerents and build the host nation. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.)

ORGANIZATION

6-25. Before deployment the SBCT Infantry battalion and subordinate units are tailored and organized for specific land force requirements. Once deployed the SBCT Infantry battalion will continue to adjust force tailoring and organization to meet changing requirements. A commander organizes his forces using force tailoring and task-organizing.

6-26. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0). During operations featuring a dominant level of stability tasks, force tailoring involves selecting the right force structure from available units. Commanders then sequence the selected forces into the operational area as part of force projection. Commanders request and receive forces for each phase of an operation, both for combat and stability tasks, adjusting the quantity and capabilities of forces to match the weight of effort required.

AUGMENTATION

6-27. The unique aspects of stability tasks may require partnership to support unique requirements. Partnership supports coordination with the media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, other multinational forces, and civil-military elements. Mission variables dictate partnership agreements.

6-28. Stability tasks may require individual augmentees and augmentation cells to support force-tailoring requirements and personnel shortfalls. The commander needs to identify what resources are available and either use them or request them. These may include and account for the expenditure of commander‘s emergency response funds, civil affairs functional experts, or interagency representatives. Commanders may also consider task-organizing small liaison teams to address situations that develop with the local population. When available, human terrain teams can be attached to the SBCT Infantry battalion to provide sociocultural research and analysis of the local population.

6-29. Military police Soldiers and leaders apply this policing approach when conducting all operations. The military police view shares a common general understanding of the operational environment, while adding a degree of focus on those aspects that are necessary to maintain order and enforce laws. Care should be taken to eliminate jurisdictional overlap and under lap. Police operations include—

• Performing law enforcement.

• Conducting criminal investigations.

• Conducting traffic management and enforcement.

• Employing forensics capabilities.

• Conducting police engagement.

• Providing customs support.

• Providing host nation police development.

• Supporting civil law enforcement.

• Supporting border control, boundary security, and the freedom of movement.

TASK ORGANIZATION

6-30. Task-organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0). Task-organizing occurs within a previously tailored force package as commanders organize groups of units for specific stability tasks or as they modify their staff accordingly. It continues as commanders reorganize units for subsequent tasks. This ability enables the commander to configure units to take advantage of available resources.

6-31. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander organizes his assets for the type of mission to be performed, integrating attached assets and the assets from higher headquarters to accomplish the mission. The task organization must enable it to meet changing situations. The commander must consider which resources to request and allocate to his subordinate units and which to maintain control of himself. Task organization and support arrangements change frequently during long term stability tasks. Commanders must frequently shift the support elements from one area of operation to another.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS

6-32. As the SBCT commander develops his commander’s intent and concept of operations, he sets priorities for each warfighting function. The following information describes some of the considerations SBCT Infantry battalion commanders and staffs use to set those priorities.

MISSION COMMAND

6-33. The conduct of stability tasks is difficult and may require special skills of staff officers and NCOs. Staff members may need to be reorganized to perform the specialized responsibilities managing themes and messages helping forces accomplish their objectives and operational contract support tasks. These tasks can be associated with specific duty positions or can be selected based upon an individual Soldier experience and knowledge. These Soldiers require specialized training opportunities that should be identified and coordinated prior to entering an area of operation.

6-34. Retaining the initiative is often difficult during stability tasks due to the troops available with the tasks to be performed. Establishing subordinate units with clear understanding of commanders’ intent with achievable endstates while retaining flexibility for constant adjustments allow the SBCT Infantry battalion to achieve success.

Initiative

6-35. Seizing and retaining the initiative in complex environments requires the expansion of multinational and joint efforts critical for consolidating gains and ensuring progress toward accomplishing objectives. These critical efforts might include building security forces, restoring essential services, establishing rule of law, information engagement, and facilitating political and economic development.

6-36. Initiative is facilitated through ongoing communication that updates relevant audiences on what the unit is doing. Commanders are responsible for informing and influencing audiences inside and outside their organizations. Staffs assist commanders in developing information themes and messages to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversarial audiences, and enemy networks. The SBCT Infantry battalion must use effective multilevel diplomacy, MISO, public affairs, meetings, and other means of informing and influencing activities to obtain support from a wide set of stakeholders. These efforts may be conducted with different identity groups, economic groups, or other groups. (Units should understand that influence efforts are limited to foreign, non-U.S. domestic audiences only; refer to FM 3-61 and FM 3-13.)

Building Relationships

6-37. Success in stability tasks is often defined by the quality of relationships developed between the SBCT Infantry battalion and host nation security forces, government officials, and key opinion makers. Additionally, partnership with multinational, interagency and nongovernmental factors will often force commanders to adjust to ambiguous command and control relationships. SBCT battalion commanders define the role and scope of the unit mission up front and then establish clearly understood engagement strategies that include a clear narrative nested with the higher commander’s intent and a clear delineation of responsibilities for meeting with key leaders within the operating environment. This prevents confusion among host nation leaders about who they should talk to in the security force and the overall message and purpose of actions within the SBCT.

Soldier and Leader Engagement

6-38. Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). It can occur as an opportunity, a face-to-face encounter on the street, or a scheduled meeting. This interaction can also occur via telephone calls, video teleconferences, or other audiovisual mediums. Soldier and leader engagement is an information-related capability that supports the commanders’ responsibility to inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organizations. Soldiers and leaders conduct this engagement to provide information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. These engagements provide a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information. Effectively integrating soldier and leader engagement into operations increases the potential for commanders to mitigate unintended consequences, counter adversary information activities, and increase local support for friendly forces and their collective mission. (Refer to FM 3-13 for more information.)

Civil and Cultural Considerations

6-39. The elements of civil and cultural considerations help supported units and organizations understand the evolving sociocultural environment and considerations, with special focus on civilians, thereby refining decision making across a broad spectrum. The commander decides how a human terrain team supports the staff. The commander can attach any of these teams to the S-7 to maximize inform and influence efforts in the information environment.

6-40. Civil considerations involve attaching human terrain teams to SBCTs. Civil considerations use observed sociocultural research and analysis to fill a large operational decision making support gap. This research provides current, accurate, and reliable data generated by on-the-ground research on the specific social groups. This knowledge provides a sociocultural foundation for the staff’s support to the commander’s military decision-making process, both in planning and execution. It enables an effective rotation of forces by creating and maintaining an enduring sociocultural knowledge base. (Refer to FM 3-13 for more information.)

Civil Military Operations

6-41. Tactical-level civil-military operations include the support of local level stakeholders. Operations promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of a United States presence and operation among locals. At the same time, these operations minimize friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information.)

6-42. Civil affairs (CA) forces support unified land operations in every environment across the range of military operations. During unified land operations, CA forces conduct civil affair operations (CAO) that support and are nested within the overall mission and commander’s intent. CAO are a cornerstone to the successful execution of stability tasks. The success of the overarching CAO plan is predicated on the actions of the civil affairs team (CAT) at the lowest tactical levels.

6-43. An SBCT Infantry battalion will normally be augmented with a CAT. The civil affairs team is the basic CA tactical support element provided to a supported commander. The CAT executes CAO, and is capable of conducting Civil Reconnaissance and Civil Engagement to assess the civil component of the AO, interfacing with indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), other civilian and government organizations, and military forces, and providing CAO and CMO planning and coordinating capabilities, as well as reach back for functional CA specialty expertise in order to shape operations. The CAT, due to its limited capabilities, must rely on its ability to leverage other CA assets and capabilities through reach back to the CMOC. (Refer to FM 3-57 for additional information on the capabilities of the CAT in support of the SBCT Infantry battalion.)

Media Considerations

6-44. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every Soldier involved in all operations. All leaders and Soldiers must know how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. This should include an understanding of subjects they are authorized to discuss and subjects the public affairs officer (PAO) must address.

6-45. The objective of the SBCT Infantry battalion commander in dealing with the media is to ensure that operations are presented to the public in proper context. All leaders and soldiers must know how to deal effectively with reporters and photographers. They should understand which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to the PAO.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

6-46. If another security force is performing the mission before the SBCT Infantry battalion occupies its AO, a formal transfer of authority or mission reassignment occurs as directed by the higher headquarters or coordinated between the SBCT Infantry battalion commander and his counterpart. The incoming SBCT Infantry battalion assumes tactical responsibility for its assigned base camp(s) and the AO at that time. Before transfer of authority or assumption of the mission, the unit to be replaced retains command of the operations and may control the movements of the incoming SBCT Infantry battalion as provided for by the order. Once transfer of authority or mission change has occurred, the incoming SBCT Infantry battalion exercises tactical control of departing elements for security and mission performance. Command relationship must be established and coordinated before the incoming battalion begins to occupy its AO.

6-47. Several additional considerations for movement and maneuver include:

• Establish presence. Being on the ground establishes links with the local populace and the population begins to trust and relate to friendly forces. Stability tasks must include continuous reconnaissance and security tasks and will most likely include offensive and defensive tasks.

• Create conditions for small unit success. Subordinates exercise initiative and act based on the commander‘s intent.

• Employ quick reaction forces. Normally, the SBCT Infantry battalion establishes quick reaction forces for the security of its checkpoints, outposts, observation posts, and work sites, and to support patrols, meetings, and convoys in the area of operations.

• Modify tactics as conditions evolve. External events can sometimes negate local advances and the commander must assess, consolidate, regain situational understanding, and prepare his unit to expand control and security again when the situation allows.

• Mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering. Stability tasks often require significant engineer support that is linked directly to the SBCT mission and responsibility.

6-48. Maneuver of the SBCT Infantry battalion in stability tasks is often decentralized to the company, platoon, or squad level. As required, these units receive relief from units such as engineers, sustainment, and medical personnel. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander must be prepared to rely on maneuver support and sustainment elements to assist the maneuver forces when the need arises. When new requirements develop, maneuver support and sustainment elements must be ready to shift priorities.

6-49. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses only the level of force necessary to stabilize the crisis. Depending on the ROE, the SBCT Infantry battalion may precede force with a warning or nonlethal means, employing lethal means only if a threat does not stop interfering.

INTELLIGENCE

6-50. Information collection plays an important role in the SBCT’s ability to accomplish its stability tasks. Every member of the SBCT Infantry battalion plays a role in fighting for and gathering information to be analyzed to support the SBCT Infantry battalion commanders’ decisions. The commander uses his intelligence sections that conduct information sharing to enhance situational understanding for the commander. The SBCT Infantry battalion may also have counterintelligence, HUMINT, SIGINT, or other theater intelligence resources they can coordinate with to gain information.

6-51. The SBCT Infantry battalion S-2, assisted by other staff members, uses the IPB process and the intelligence process as cornerstones for successful stability tasks. These help the commander visualize who the threat and enemy are, what capabilities they have, and where they are vulnerable. The development of detailed PIR and IR enables all personnel in the area of operation to gather critical information necessary to support the decision-making and to assess the area.

FIRES

6-52. In stability tasks, artillery units can perform such doctrinal roles as—

• Quick reaction fire support for patrols and counterinsurgency operations.

• Mortar and rocket counterfire.

• Show of force fire missions.

• Base camp security.

6-53. Artillery, and air and missile defense units and staff must be prepared to execute tasks such as—

• Synchronize information-related capabilities

• Synchronize civil affairs operations with nonlethal effects.

• Local, area, route, and convoy security.

• Security force assistance (SFA).

• Airspace management (see chapter 8 of this publication).

6-54. Other planning considerations for fire support include:

• Developing procedures for the rapid clearance of fires.

• Increasing local security for firing positions of indirect weapons.

• Enabling 360 degree firing capability in positions.

• Coordinating with HN officials and security forces in areas of operations.

• Establishing communications with host nation forces and area control centers.

• Understanding the restrictions on dual-purpose improved conventional munitions and area denial antipersonnel mine/remote antiarmor mine system.

• Using illumination rounds to defuse enemy night activities.

• Using radars/artillery in a protection role for rapid targeting and suppression of indirect fire attacks.

SUSTAINMENT

6-55. The capability of the SBCT Infantry battalion to sustain itself is a function of coordination with multiple sustainment elements and systems and can involve augmented, joint, combined, and local contract support. During operations with a dominant stability component, SBCT sustainment assets and their augmentations sustain not only the military forces, but also may provide support for civil-military operations. Sustainment for stability tasks is unique and more complex due to physically dispersed unit locations, lack of adequate infrastructure, nontraditional demands by civil-military operations, partnership with other units, and the burden caused by displaced civilians. Planning considerations for conducting sustainment in this type of environment include:

• Flexibility to support varying task organizations.

• Indigenous support through contracting and local purchase of supplies, facilities, utilities, services, labor/manpower, and transportation support systems.

• Existing indigenous facilities (such as roads, ports, airfields, and communications systems).

• Development or improvement of the indigenous capabilities for self-support for the eventual transfer of responsibilities to the host nation.

• Economy of resources.

• Availability and employment of health services.

• Sustainment elements may provide support for coalition, governmental agencies, and civilians when authorized by law.

• Operational contract support is an effective force multiplier.

• Increased consumption of Classes I, III, IV, and VIII supplies.

• Requirement to sustain detention facilities and resettlement camps.

6-56. Sustainment of stability tasks often involves supporting U.S. and multinational forces in a wide range of missions. It can be conducted in support of a HN, interim government, or as part of an occupation when no governments exist. Stability tasks range from long-term humanitarian and civic assistance missions to major short notice peace enforcement. Some stability tasks involve combat, so tailoring supplies, personnel, and equipment to the specific needs of the operation is essential.

6-57. Host nation support, operational contract support, and local purchases are force multipliers in many of these operations. Situations that lack optimal sustaining capabilities may require using nonstandard logistics to augment or replace existing logistic capability. They can reduce dependence on the logistic system, improve response time and free airlift and sealift for other priority needs. Contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) should precede the main body of Army forces, if feasible. Nonstandard logistics may be employed for—

• Limited supplies, such as Classes I, II, III, IV, VII, and IX.

• Services such as food service, maintenance and repair, sanitation, and laundry.

• Transportation.

PROTECTION

6-58. The SBCT Infantry battalion implements survivability, operations security, force health protection, and antiterrorism tasks at all fixed locations to maximize protection. The SBCT Infantry battalion may have to consider the protection of civilians from deliberate targeting, collateral damage, and other threats. The close proximity of civilians and Soldiers can lead to force health protection issues (such as communicable diseases) through close contact with local civilians, detainees, or local foods. The protection of civil institutions, processes, and systems required to reach the end state conditions of the stability strategy can often be a decisive factor because they are essential for long-term success.

6-59. The presence of any environmental contamination must be identified. The contamination may have existed before U.S. forces operated in the area, yet may pose a direct threat to the population that they are not prepared to handle. When environmental contamination is suspected, units as soon as possible report and coordinate with unit or higher force health protection elements to assist in the identification and amelioration of health risks posed by the suspected environmental contamination. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 and FM 3-24.2 for more information.)

6-60. Protection requires special consideration in stability tasks since threats may be different and, in some cases, opposing forces may seek to kill or wound U.S. Soldiers or destroy or damage property for political purposes. Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating protection considerations into all aspects of operational planning and execution. Commanders and leaders throughout the SBCT Infantry battalion deliberately analyze their missions and environments to identify threats to their units. They then make their soldiers aware of the dangers and create safeguards to protect them. Commanders must always consider the aspects of protection and how they relate to the ROE. Some considerations are—

• Secure the inside perimeter if the host nation secures the outside perimeter.

• Avoid becoming a lucrative target and do not become predictable.

• Include security in each plan, SOP, OPORD, and movement order.

• Develop specific security programs (such as threat awareness and OPSEC).

• Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit’s location.

• Constantly maintain an image of professionalism and readiness.

• Consider force protection throughout the range of military operations; base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.

• Protection comprises OPSEC, deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.

• Use biometric data collection devices to identify or verify identities of person(s) that should or should not be in the area.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations

6-61. The SBCT Infantry battalion must be prepared to respond against a CBRN attack. The SBCT Infantry battalion does have a CBRN officer assigned, and the SBCT has a CBRN reconnaissance platoon in the BEB. However, the SBCT Infantry battalion may require augmentation to conduct any large scale CBRN decontamination or reconnaissance mission.

6-62. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense is a subordinate part of CBRN operations. (Refer to FM 3-11 for more information.) It is composed of passive measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to and effects of CBRN attacks. CBRN passive defense focuses on maintaining the joint forces ability to continue military operations in a CBRN environment. The three principles of CBRN passive defense are:

• Contamination avoidance. (Refer to FM 3-11.3 for more information.)

• Protection. (Refer to FM 3-11.4 for more information.)

• Decontamination. (Refer to FM 3-11.5 for more information.)

Force Health Protection

6-63. The conduct of stability tasks are long term and require close contact with the local population in often unsanitary conditions. Force health protection encompasses measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, protect the force from health hazards, and include the prevention aspects of many Army medical department functions:

• Preventive medicine.

• Veterinary services.

• Combat and operational stress control (COSC).

• Dental services, including preventive dentistry.

• Laboratory services.

6-64. Soldiers of the SBCT Infantry battalion must be physically and behaviorally fit. This requirement demands programs that promote and improve the capacity of personnel to perform military tasks at high levels, under extreme conditions, and for extended periods of time. These preventive and protective capabilities include physical exercise, nutritional diets, dental hygiene and restorative treatment, combat and operational stress management, rest, recreation, and relaxation that are geared to individuals and organizations. (Refer to FM 4-02 for more information.)

Provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Protection Support

6-65. The role of EOD is to eliminate or reduce the effects of explosive ordnance and hazards to protect combat power and the freedom of action. Explosive ordnance and hazards are ever-present dangers in most areas of operation. They limit mobility, deny critical assets, and potentially injure or kill Soldiers and civilians. The U.S. and multinational use of munitions that disperse submunitions across a wide area has led to increased amounts of unexploded ordnance on the battlefield. EOD forces have the capability to render- safe and destroy explosive ordnance and hazards across the range of military operations. EOD units are specifically trained in render-safe procedures and the disposal of explosive ordnance, explosive hazards, and CBRN munitions. While other forces may have the ability to destroy limited explosive ordnance by detonation, they are not properly equipped, trained, or authorized to perform render-safe procedures or other disposal procedures. (Refer to ATP 4-32 for more information.)

6-66. All SBCT units require EOD support for destruction of ammunition, and to ensure that ordnance is rendered safe. Explosive ordnance disposal capabilities are not organic to any SBCT unit. Augmentation is requested from higher HQ. Requests for EOD support are processed through operational channels to the higher protection cell, which forwards requests to the supporting EOD HQ. Once an IED or UXO is located and reported, the EOD HQ determines what EOD assets may respond. If there is a constant presence of IED/UXO hazards, EOD teams are attached to the battalion.

Conduct Detention Operations and Resettlement

6-67. Detention and resettlement operations are conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees, U.S. military prisoners, and dislocated civilians) as a result of military or civil conflict and to facilitate criminal prosecution:

• Detention involves the detainment of a population or group (U.S. military prisoners or detainees) that pose some level of threat to military operations.

• Resettlement involves the sheltering, sustaining, guarding, protection, and accountability of a population or group as a result of military or civil conflict or natural or manmade disasters.

6-68. These operations inherently control the movement and activities of their specific population for imperative reasons of security, safety, or intelligence gathering. The Army is the DOD executive agent for all detainee operations and for the long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners. (Refer to FM 3-63 for additional information.) Detention and resettlement operations include—

• Performing detention.

• Interning U.S. military prisoners.

• Supporting host nation corrections reform.

• Conducting resettlement operations.

• Conducting detainee operations.

SECTION III – EXECUTING STABILITY TASKS

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

6-69. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace within the SBCT Infantry battalion area of operations is a key for obtaining their support to the overall operation. Such an environment allows the introduction of the civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts ensure long-term success. When the people have confidence in the security sector providing for their safety, they offer the cooperation required to control crime and subversive behavior, defeat insurgents, and limit the effects of adversaries. For political and economic reform to be successful, people, commodities, and currency flow freely throughout the region.

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-70. The SBCT Infantry battalion can conduct civil security tasks with augmentation. These tasks are characterized by area security, site exploitation operations, civil-military operations, and synchronize information-related capabilities. Tasks to establish civil security that SBCT Infantry battalion units might be directed to perform include—

• Enforcing cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.

• Determining disposition and constitution of national armed and intelligence services.

• Conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

• Conducting border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

• Supporting identification.

• Protecting key personnel and facilities.

• Support clearing and disposing of explosive ordnance and CBRN material.

6-71. The SBCT Infantry battalion is the primary tactical formation that conducts stability tasks within the SBCT. Many of the tasks for the battalion during operations focused on stability are related to security. Although the battalion can be assigned missions and support tasks within all five primary stability tasks, it is most suited for providing the security and control that leads to a safe and secure environment while enabling and supporting the brigade‘s long-range plan for stability.

6-72. The SBCT Infantry battalion allocates its forces to establish security by identifying specific requirements that contribute to the success for the term of the operation. It arrays forces with other joint, attached, and host nation organizations to ensure an overall presence within the area of operation. Retaining a reserve or temporarily shifting forces contribute to the flexibility of the operation.

TRANSFORMATION

6-73. During the transformation phase the SBCT Infantry battalion will partner, train and develop local security forces. This phase relies on unity of effort, legitimacy and host nation ownership, and building partner capacity principles for operations.

Security Force Assistance (SFA)

6-74. Security force assistance are those DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the United States government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance counters irregular threat, prevents conflicts, and facilitates transitions. Foreign security forces (FSF) include but are not limited to military, paramilitary, police, intelligence forces, border police, coast guard, customs officials, prison guards, and correctional personnel. They provide security for a host nation and its relevant population, or support a regional security organization’s mission. (Refer to FM 3-22 for more information.)

6-75. It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to sustain SFA gains. HNSF need to have the capability to perform required functions across the stability sectors; have sufficient personnel to perform these functions wherever and whenever required; and the sustainability to perform functions well into the future, long after external forces are no longer engaged. Successful SFA involves thorough and continuous task assessment to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise FSFs.

6-76. The SBCT Infantry battalion is designed to operate at the tactical level across the range of military operations. However, it can be augmented (based upon the requirements of the operational environment) with enabling assets and capabilities to support distributed SFA. Potential augmentation may include military police, legal, public affairs, civil affairs, MISO, engineering, sociocultural experts, sustainment, and military transition team personnel. Whenever these forces are within the battalion area of operation the SBCT Infantry battalion commander and his staff must align their efforts with other partnered organizations through engagements especially when they are not subordinate.

6-77. The SBCT augmented for SFA has subordinate units whose sole focus is working with foreign security forces. These advisor teams may be formed from battalion organic resources, external augmentation, or a combination. These teams optimally are embedded with the counterpart unit, or they may reside on a U.S. camp and commute to the foreign security force area they support. The SBCT Infantry battalion facilitates the military transition team‘s operation with protection, sustainment, and communications functions.

6-78. The SBCT Infantry battalion may not be augmented to conduct security force assistance, and will have to source assistance teams internally. The battalion must pay careful consideration to the HNSF organization, what is the rank structure and skill level of the HNSF leadership and Soldier. After assessing the HNSF organization, the battalion must then evaluate, select and train the SFA team. Advising HNSF requires the ability to influence others, work across cultural and language barriers and negotiation skills; SFA teams should be selected with those considerations in mind. Subordinate units of the SBCT Infantry battalion may cohabitate inside joint base camps or combat outposts. Key considerations for cohabitation may include the threat, foreign security force acceptance, physical space inside the foreign security force base, sustainment capabilities, medical facilities, and availability of quick reaction forces. Collocation facilitates the integration with the foreign security force and allows for mutual understanding and encourages trust. Working in close cooperation improves the population’s perception of the legitimacy of both the SBCT Infantry battalion and the foreign security force, which may be an essential condition of the overall mission‘s end state.

FOSTERING STABILITY

6-79. In the fostering stability phase the SBCT Infantry battalion has no direct tasks that support stability.

ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

6-80. Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. It reduces risk and promotes security. Initial response tasks aim to develop interim enforcement mechanisms for establishing rule of law. These tasks typically involve assessing and building indigenous police, and penal capability. Transformation tasks focus on restoring the justice system and the processes for reconciliation. Sustainability tasks establish a legitimate, functioning justice system founded on international norms. These conditions define success within the AO while reflecting the end state needed to ensure the foundation for enduring stability and peace. SBCT battalions should expect substantial augmentation by civil affairs and military police elements to conduct this primary stability task properly.

6-81. Primary tasks the battalion may participate in establishing civil control are—establish public order and safety, support law enforcement and police reform, support property dispute resolution, support war crimes courts and tribunals, and support public outreach and community rebuilding programs. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.)

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-82. Most military efforts will focus on building temporary or interim capabilities until permanent capabilities are put in place by either the host nation or United States and international agencies. When possible, existing methods of host nation civil control should be continued. The SBCT Infantry battalion may not have the cultural, language, and resource capacity to attempt a wholesale replacement of the host nation system, which may be beyond the scope of the mandate.

Establish Public Order and Safety

6-83. Establishing public order and safety is the task the battalion is most capable of conducting without significant specialized augmentation. The tasks within this category provide a broad range of activities to protect the civilian populace, provide interim policing and crowd control, and secure critical infrastructure. These essential tasks represent actions that must occur during and after direct armed conflict to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts.

6-84. The speed and effectiveness in performing these tasks directly correlates with the length of time required to return the host nation to a normal state. Executing these tasks as soon as practical after intervening reduces the time required for related efforts and allows the mission to be accomplished far sooner. However, the military’s legal authorities for all activities in the justice sector, particularly involving enforcement and adjudication of the law, must be clear.

TRANSFORMATION

6-85. The SBCT Infantry battalion may operate alongside a wide range of other actors to accomplish civil control tasks. United States organizations may include other military units. Besides other military units, host nation organizations may include police forces, militias, and other organizations. International organizations may include United Nations Formed Police Units, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, human rights nongovernmental organizations, and multinational partners.

FOSTERING STABILITY

6-86. In the fostering sustainability phase the SBCT Infantry battalion transfers all public security responsibilities to host-nation forces while monitoring and reporting on progress as well as identifying modernization needs and the means to achieve them. Through engagements the leaders ensure political authorities don’t abuse their institutions and maintain civil control.

RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

6-87. While the SBCT Infantry battalion generally centers efforts on initial response tasks for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Normally, the SBCT Infantry battalion supports HN and civilian relief agencies with these efforts. However, when the host nation cannot perform its roles, the SBCT Infantry battalion may execute these tasks directly. The performance of this primary stability task is characterized by substantial interaction and cooperation with unified action partners.

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-88. The SBCT Infantry battalion is normally incapable of restoring essential services, other than a limited supply of food, water, and first aid, unless augmented by the SBCT or outside agencies. The battalion can provide a secure environment and ground-level coordination with local officials so that other agencies and organizations can operate within the battalion area of operations to restore essential services. In this effort, the battalion operations are nested and closely coordinated with the SBCT, higher headquarters, and other agency and organization efforts. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.)

6-89. When the security situation allows for outside support for restoring essential services, the Infantry battalion can—

• Provide essential civil service.

• Support tasks related to civilian dislocation.

• Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.

• Support public health programs.

• Support education programs.

Civil Reconnaissance

6-90. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of an operational environment. The battalion‘s information collection plan integrates civil reconnaissance, enhancing the common operational picture development. Information collected can be verified and analyzed with availability of the human terrain team to provide better understanding of the area of operation.

6-91. Typically, the companies are a primary source of this information through targeted reconnaissance and the execution of their security operations, patrolling, and area reconnaissance. Placing information collection support of COIST can support the S-2 in developing Intelligence and enhancing the common operational picture. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information.)

TRANSFORMATION

6-92. Operations conducted during the transformation phase establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, dislocated civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking. SBCTs Infantry battalions primarily conduct operations that secure the environment to enable other agencies and host nation to meet the needs of the populace. Battalions closely monitor the actions and progress of their partners and ensure that their efforts are in the best interests of the local population, and the legitimate government. An indicator of sources of instability for essential services is if the distribution or access for the essential services is not equal to that of the population. The SBCT Infantry battalion applies the principles of unity of effort and unity of purpose with unified action partners, legitimacy and host-nation ownership, and building partner capacity during transformation. That allows a combined effort toward sustained social well-being for the population and achieving progress towards the fostering stability phase.

FOSTERING STABILITY

6-93. Fostering sustainability tasks ensures the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society. Conditions for sustained social well-being depend on the ability of the legitimate authority to meet basic needs of the population, ensure right of return, address instances of civilian harm, promote transitional justice, and support peaceful coexistence.

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

6-94. When a legitimate and functional local government is present in the AO, the SBCT Infantry battalion operating in support of local governance has a limited role. However, if the local government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—for whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A government’s legitimacy among its people is partly tied to its perceived ability to provide these essential services. In extreme cases, the civil government may be completely dysfunctional or absent altogether. In such cases, international law requires the military force provide the basic civil administration functions of the HN government under the auspices of a transitional military authority. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 and ATP 3-07.5 for more information)

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-95. During this phase the government may not be established or it may be ineffective. The SBCT Infantry battalion must consider that it may have to fulfill roles as a temporary governing element for the safety and security of the local population. Actions that should be considered are establishment of curfews, standards for local population having weapons for their own protection, and securing key infrastructure or culturally sensitive sites.

6-96. Reconnaissance should focus on identifying local leaders that could be potential civic leaders and people or organizations that can bring positive economic changes. The SBCT Infantry battalion Leaders must influence these people to support the government for progress through engagements. Clear communication, agreements, understandings, or accords must be reached to conduct operations for laying the foundation of governance during the initial response phase. Conducting operations after engagements confirm or deny unified action partners motivations and agendas. Assessing the outcomes of operations and actions unified action partners take reveal their relationship to the BCT and provide direction on how to further support governance. This phase normally concludes with the establishment of a government after an election.

TRANSFORMATION

6-97. The SBCT Infantry battalions’ tasks to support governance operations closely mirror the SBCT’s. The battalion commander and staff may be the initial local governing body or may be tasked to support a competent authority put in place by the higher transitional authority. Once adequate civilian authority is identified and formed, the battalion quickly moves to a support role. The battalion may be most effective performing the following tasks:

• Transitional administrations.

• Development of local governance.

• Anticorruption initiatives.

• Support to elections.

• Sustaining host nation government programs and services.

FOSTERING STABILITY

6-98. The fostering stability phase begins with the host nation capable of conducting good governance with minimal assistance, accepted by the local population, and prepared for long-term development. This phase ends with the complete withdrawal of the SBCT Infantry battalion interacting with local government on a routine basis. The support to governance during fostering stability oversees the transfer of responsibility of governance to an enduring host-nation authority. Conditions allow the SBCT Infantry battalion to permit off duty Soldiers to circulate in the local areas and to follow host-nation laws.

SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

6-99. Support to economic and infrastructure development helps a host nation to develop capability and capacity in these areas. Support may involve direct and indirect military assistance to national, regional, and local entities. Military forces play a significant role in supporting economic stabilization and infrastructure development at the local level. The building blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local level. At the local level, emphasis is on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure. Military forces may have access to a variety of monetary instruments during operations focused on stability, the most familiar one of which is probably the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP). Leaders, however, must be vigilant to work with other key unified action partners so that support to economic and infrastructure development can be accomplished smartly, without overlap or waste. (Refer to FM 3-07 and ATP 3-07.5 for more information.)

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-100. The SBCT Infantry battalion supports economic and infrastructure development by first securing their area of operations. Improvements to the security of an area foster economic and infrastructure development as a secondary effect.

6-101. The battalion may have to take the lead in responding to immediate economic needs, including assessing the critical micro- and macro-economic conditions, during the initial response stage. These economic needs include ensuring that agricultural products and other goods can be brought to safe and secure marketplaces, generating jobs that can be filled with qualified laborers, and others. Unity of effort is essential for the battalion to identify and engage all relevant actors from the host nation, United States civil agencies, and international organizations at the initial stage. These evolving partnerships and assessments will significantly enhance the transition of management of economic development tasks from the battalion to the government civil agencies and host-nation actors. Actors can take advantage of gaps if the actors are not already engaged, and they could exploit opportunities and profit from them, contributing to long term instability.

Commanders Emergency Response Program

6-102. CERP or other funding sources may be available to stimulate the local economy and to reduce causes of local violence. Developing the public sector is usually managed by organizations such as the United States Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development, but this may not always be the case.

6-103. SBCT Infantry battalions and companies support to economic and infrastructure development is very limited unless fully nested with higher efforts especially with those of external organizations and agencies. Generally, this stability task is not possible without some form of external funding to stimulate the initial creation of short term jobs for the local populace. The battalion can facilitate initial steps to get the populace working and getting money flowing within the local economy, if provided adequate support through available civilian or military funding programs.

6-104. Support to economic and infrastructure development is dependent on the efforts of the SBCT Infantry battalion. Economic support and infrastructure development focuses primarily on continuing civil security and civil control operations to provide a safe and secure environment so external agencies can leverage their capabilities. As in other stability tasks, leader and Soldier engagement with local officials and the population are ongoing. At the company level and below, leaders and Soldiers coordinate closely with external agencies to identify the economic and infrastructure development needs at the local level. They match those needs with available programs and funding sources synchronized by their supporting levels of command.

TRANSFORMATION

6-105. The goal of the transformation stage is to firmly establish the foundation for sustainable economic development and to begin to transition control of economic development to United States Government civil agencies, international civil agencies, and host-nation economic officials and entrepreneurs. The collective emphasis is on establishing host-nation institutions that can provide sustainable economic growth during this stage. Once a civilian administration assumes control, the primary economic development role of the battalion is to advise and assist local leaders.

FOSTERING STABILITY

6-106. In the fostering sustainability stage, the goal is to institutionalize a long-term sustainable economic development program and to transition control of the economy completely to host-nation officials, entrepreneurs, and civil society. This stage also includes follow-on steps which build on and reinforce the successes of the initial response and transformation stages. Steps taken during this stage support sustainable economic growth based on a healthy society supported by healthy communities and neighborhoods. The primary economic development role for the battalion is to continue to advise and assist host-nation civilian economic officials.

SECTION IV – TRANSITIONS

6-107. If the stability tasks are unsuccessful, the SBCT Infantry battalion may be ordered to transition to offensive or defensive tasks. The commander and staff must always keep in mind that the situation may escalate to offensive or defensive tasks at any time. An escalation to offensive or defensive tasks is a clear indicator that the peace enforcement effort has failed. The SBCT Infantry battalion must always retain the ability to conduct decisive action. Preserving the ability to transition allows the SBCT Infantry battalion to maintain the initiative while providing force protection. The commander must task-organize the SBCT Infantry battalion to expeditiously transition to offensive or defensive tasks while maintaining a balance between conducting stability tasks and maintaining a combat posture.

6-108. If the stability tasks are successful, the SBCT Infantry battalion may be ordered to transition to defensive task of retrograde. This will include a series of transfers of authority to host nation security forces of local government. This operation will become resource intensive with the focus shifting from that of the local population to the security of the U.S. government interests and return of its property.

TRANSITION TO OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-109. During the stability tasks there may be instances where SBCT Infantry battalion units quickly transition back to offense against irregular forces, or defense to defeat counterattacks. Under decisive action, SBCT Infantry battalion units conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

6-110. Offensive and defensive tasks focus on defeating enemy forces. Security tasks, including area security, pertain to actions taken to protect the force. They are associated with offensive and defensive tasks. In contrast, stability tasks focus on security and control of areas, resources, and populations. Civil security and civil control are two types of stability tasks. SBCT Infantry battalion commanders expect a mission of protecting and providing security for a population to be expressed in terms of civil security or civil control.

TRANSITION TO DEFENSIVE TASKS

6-111. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander plans a defensive contingency during stability tasks should the operational environment deteriorate or a political decision influence military involvement. Subordinate leaders identify activities that would initiate this transition, such as the change in the relationship of government, military, or security forces. The SBCT Infantry battalion can expect to perform or participate in all three defensive tasks when transitioning from stability.

6-112. The conditions for transitioning from stability to a retrograde normally occur during transformation or fostering stability phases. This is most likely when an intended political outcome is aimed at the influence of the military and security force presence. The SBCT Infantry battalion will most likely support a withdrawal or a retirement as part of a larger force. Most likely it will provide security as personnel, equipment, and property are moved out of the host nation.

Chapter 7

Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of the logistics, personnel services, and health support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADRP 4-0). In the SBCT Infantry battalion, the commander has the ultimate responsibility for sustainment. The battalion XO executes the battalion’s sustainment processes through coordinating the efforts of the battalion S-4 in the planning, and the FSC and line commanders in their preparation and execution of those processes. They work closely with the SBCT and BSB staff to ensure they receive the required support for the battalion’s assigned operations. This chapter discusses responsibilities, trains, and functions of sustainment.

SECTION I – SUSTAINMENT FUNCTIONS

7-1. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). The sustainment warfighting function includes the following tasks:

• Conduct logistics.

• Provide personnel services.

• Provide health service support.

7-2. SBCT Infantry battalion operations are fast paced, can be conducted over wide areas and require flexibility. Battalion commanders must be willing to assume risk logistically by increasing days of supply on vehicles, operating at below optimum levels with certain classes of supply or get logistic assets further forward to ensure that combat units retain the initiative and continue operations with an increased tempo.

7-3. In some situations, sustainment planning begins before receipt of the mission, as part of the ongoing process of refining the battalion running estimate. To provide effective support, sustainment planners and operators understand the mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. The SBCT sustainment planners at the battalion and company level must plan, prepare, execute, and assess for operations with Infantry squads and Stryker vehicles over long distances.

CONDUCT LOGISTICS

7-4. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces (ADRP 4-0). For the SBCT Infantry battalion, logistics consists of supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering support.

SUPPLY AND FIELD SERVICES

7-5. The general classes of resupply operations are routine, emergency, or prestock. The battalion’s SOP specifies cues and procedures for each method, which the battalion rehearses during team training exercises. The SBCT Infantry battalion carries 72 hours of supply on hand for offense, defense, and stability tasks. The actual method selected for resupply in the field depends on METT-TC factors and is according to the need to replenish a 72 hours of supplies. This allows the subordinate units to carry enough supply to operate for extended periods of time but not inhibit offense, defense, and stability tasks.

7-6. Supplies are divided into 10 major categories, which are referred to as classes—

• Class I, Food, rations, and water.

• Class II, Clothing.

• Class III, Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

• Class IV, Fortification and barrier materials.

• Class V, Ammunition.

• Class VI, Personal items.

• Class VII, Major end items.

• Class VIII, Medical supplies.

• Class IX, Repair parts.

• Class X, Materiel to support nonmilitary program.

Note. There are a few items that do not fit into any of the 10 supply classes, they are categorized as miscellaneous.

MAINTENANCE

7-7. The nature of the modern battlefield demands that the maintenance system that is flexible and responsive, and focused on returning systems to operational status quickly and as near as possible to the point of failure or damage. This requirement implies a forward thrust of maintenance into the SBCT area. Maintenance assets move as far forward as the tactical situation permits to return inoperable and damaged equipment to the battle as quickly as possible.

7-8. The FSC has a combat field maintenance section and a maintenance control section. The field maintenance sections perform repairs as far forward as possible, returning equipment to the battle quickly. During combat, they perform battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR), diagnostics, and on-system replacement of line replaceable units. If the tactical situation permits, they focus on completing jobs on site. Field maintenance sections carry limited on board combat spares to facilitate repairs forward. Examples include repair and component replacement on tactical wheeled vehicles, power generation equipment, and weapon systems.

7-9. SBCT field maintenance is performed by the field maintenance company and the FSCs. The field maintenance company in the BSB provides field maintenance support for the SBCT units not supported by an FSC and supports FSCs for low density equipment items such as armament, electronics, allied trades, and ground support equipment. The field maintenance company provides lift capabilities for the repair shops, recovery of organic equipment, and recovery to supported units, and support of maintenance evacuation. The FSCs provide similar field maintenance support to the infantry battalion.

Field and Sustainment Maintenance

7-10. Field maintenance is generally characterized by on (or near) system maintenance, often using line replaceable unit and component replacement, battle damage assessment, repair and recovery. Field level maintenance is not limited to remove and replace, but also provides adjustment, alignment, service and fault/failure diagnoses. Field maintenance is performed at all levels of the Army and most units have at least some organic field level maintenance capability. Sustainment maintenance is characterized by “off system” component repair or “repair and return to supply system” and can be employed at any point in the integrated logistics chain. Field maintenance is always repair and return to the user and includes maintenance actions performed by operators.

7-11. Sustainment maintenance is off-system component repair and end item repair and return or both to the supply system or by exception to the owning unit, performed by national level maintenance providers. The intent of sustainment maintenance is to perform off-system repairs on all supported items to a standard that provides a consistent and measurable level of reliability.

TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION

7-12. The BSB distribution company and FSCs have transportation capability and are used to distribute supplies within the SBCT. The transportation platoon within the distribution company transports supplies to the FSCs. The transportation platoon headquarters provides leadership, supervision and technical guidance to tactical truck squads performing motor transport operations to SBCT units. The transportation platoon executes missions when ordered by the company or BSB. The FSC distribution section has transportation assets to distribute supplies to the supported SBCT Infantry battalion. (Refer to ATP 4-11 for more information.)

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

7-13. Contractors and Department of the Army civilians are playing an ever-increasing role in providing sustainment to military forces. The battalion may use contractors to bridge gaps between required capabilities and actual force structure available within an AO. Contractors may be employed, subject to METT-TC, throughout the AO and in virtually all conditions. Protecting contractors on the battlefield is the battalion commander’s responsibility. When contractors are expected to perform in potentially hostile areas, the supported military forces assure the protection of their operations and personnel which can include coordination with contracted security firms and other military or paramilitary forces.

GENERAL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

7-14. General engineering provides support that enables logistics. Engineers units from outside the SBCT combine and apply capabilities from three engineer disciplines (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) to establish and maintain the infrastructure necessary for sustaining military operations. This involves general engineering tasks that consist of building, repairing, and maintaining roads, bridges, airfields, port facilities, and other structures as well as reinforcing force protection measures. Other tasks also include the planning, acquisition, management, remediation and disposition of real estate, supplying mobile electric power, utilities and waste management, environmental support, diving and firefighting (refer to ATP 3-34.40 for more information).

PROVIDE PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-15. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force. It also maintains Soldier readiness, promotes moral and ethical values, and enables the fighting qualities of the Army (ADRP 4-0). It includes essential personnel services such as evaluations, leaves and passes, awards and decorations, rest and recuperation, postal, personnel accountability, casualty operations, and personnel management. Personnel services include the following functions and are provided by the battalion’s S-1, the SBCT’s brigade legal section, and the unit ministry team.

• Human resources. (Refer to FM 1-0.)

• Financial management. (Refer to FM 1-06.)

• Legal support. (Refer to FM 1-04.)

• Religious support. (Refer to FM 1-05.)

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

7-16. The SBCT’s organic BSB provides sustainment support to the brigade. The BSB commander is the senior sustainment operator in the SBCT and is the primary advisor to the SBCT commander on the sustainment of all brigade operations. The BSB commander, assisted by the support operations officer (SPO) exercises overall mission command for sustainment operations (including AHS) for the SBCT commander. The SPO plans and monitors support operations, and makes necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met. The SPO requests and coordinates augmentation with the supporting sustainment brigade when requirements exceed capabilities. The BSB also has a sustainment automation management officer who assists with maintenance of logistics-related logistic information systems (LIS), Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and Combat-Service-Support Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI) systems throughout the SBCT. The BSB companies are (refer to ATP 4-90 for more information)—

• Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

• Supply and Distribution Company.

• Field Maintenance Company.

• Medical Company (BSB).

• Six Forward Support Companies.

7-17. The BSB of the SBCT has six organic FSCs that are task organized to support the maneuver battalions. The role of the FSC is to provide direct logistics support to the SBCT Infantry battalion. The FSC provides the supported commander with dedicated logistics assets organized specifically to meet the battalion’s requirements. The FSC provides field feeding, bulk fuel, general supply, ammunition, and field maintenance. The FSC commander receives technical logistics oversight and mentoring from the BSB commander. FSC commanders must have a continuous relationship with the BSB SPO. The BSB commander will utilize the SPO to ensure that all FSC commanders understand the BSB commanders brigade logistics support plan. The FSC commander is the senior logistician for the battalion. The FSC commander assists the battalion S 4 with the battalion logistics planning and is responsible for executing the logistics plan following the BSB and supported battalion commanders’ guidance. The FSC receives supplies and maintenance support for low density equipment from the BSB. The FSC is organized to support—

• Food and water (Class I).

• Fuel (Class III).

• Ammunition (Class V).

• Repair parts (Class IX).

• Maintenance and recovery.

• Supply and distribution.

7-18. The FSC may be assigned, attached to, or placed under OPCON of the Infantry battalion for the duration of an operation. The decision to establish these types of command relationships is made by the SBCT commander upon the advice of the BSB commander after careful and thorough mission analysis. The FSC may split its capabilities and place some elements of that company in the BSA if the mission dictates this. The FSC normally colocates its CP with or near the CTCP of the battalion it supports. The location of the FSC’s platoons and sections is determined by the battalion commander to support maneuver once a command support relationship has been established for the operation. (See figure 7-1 on page 7-5.)

Figure 7-1. Forward support company

SUSTAINMENT STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

7-19. Within or attached to the SBCT Infantry battalion, the following staff sections or special staff officers have the responsibility for synchronization and coordination of sustainment operations for the battalion:

• Executive officer.

• S-1 (human resources support).

• S-4 (logistics).

• HHC commander.

• FSC commander.

• Medical platoon leader or surgeon.

• Unit ministry team.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

7-20. The duties of the executive officer include management of the CCIR, organization of the staff into functional and integrating cells and working groups when required. Other XO duties include supervising the creation of and approval of the logistics report, its operations, and positioning a liaison element within the BSA. The XO provides guidance to the SBCTs Infantry battalion’s chaplain and surgeon as well.

S-1 AND HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

7-21. The S-1 serves as the principal staff officer for human resources support and other issues impacting on the health, morale, and welfare of personnel. This includes manning, HR services, personnel support, and HR staff operations and planning.

7-22. The S-1 coordinates external human resources support through the higher headquarters (G-1[assistant chief of staff, personnel]) and the HR operations branch within the supporting sustainment brigade. The S-1 section relies on automated personnel systems for updating personnel management information.

S-4 AND LOGISTICS

7-23. The S-4 plans the coordination and execution of internal logistic support requirements for the battalion. The S-4 provides technical supervision for unit level support within the battalion. Specifically, the S-4 coordinates transportation for administrative moves and internal supply functions, determines supply requirements (except medical), determines supply priorities for publication in operation plans (OPLANs) and OPORDs, and coordinates the requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and equipment.

7-24. The S-4 monitors and coordinates the collection and distribution of surplus and salvage supplies and equipment, assists the S-3 in the execution of deployment plans for the headquarters and subordinate units, maintains status of internal logistics situation, assists units in the development of their unit movement plan, and screens transportation requests and passes to the distribution operation section.

UNIT MINISTRY

7-25. The SBCT Infantry battalion unit ministry team (UMT) is part of the special staff and is responsible for operational religious support and advises the commander on religion as it impacts the unit mission. Chaplains work for their respective commanders.

7-26. Through the operations process, personal interaction, regulations, policies, and doctrine, the SBCT Infantry battalion UMT ensures required capabilities provide–religious leader and advise–religious staff and core competencies (nurture, care, and honor) are executed within the SBCT Infantry battalion commander’s intent and in support of the unit mission. (Refer to FM 1-05 for more information.)

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

7-27. The battalion HHC handles the administrative and sustainment support for the HHC and battalion staff and its command posts. It has a supply section to provide unit-level supply and armorer support to the Soldiers and equipment of the battalion headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY COMMANDER

7-28. The HHC commander’s duties and areas of emphasis are assigned by the battalion commander. Depending on the emphasis in ongoing operations and guidance from the battalion commander, the HHC commander’s primary duties are typically to supervise the operations of the scout and mortar platoons and the sniper section. In a tactical environment, the HHC headquarters section provides direct interface collocating with the CTCP. They also keep an element lead by a member of the HHC command group in the BSA at the FTCP.

MEDICAL PLATOON

7-29. The medical platoon provides AHS support to the battalion. Its personnel provide immediate trauma and combat medical treatment and ground evacuation support to the headquarters and maneuver companies. Additionally, the medical platoon stocks and provides all Class VIII supply support for the battalion as well as trains combat lifesaver (CLS) personnel.

Medical Personnel

7-30. Role 1 medical treatment is provided by the combat medic or by the physician, the physician assistant (PA), or the health care specialist in the battalion aid station/Role 1 MTF (medical treatment facility). This includes:

• Tactical combat casualty care (immediate care under tactical conditions) comprises those lifesaving and life preserving steps that do not require the knowledge and skills of a physician. The combat medic is the first individual in the medical chain that makes medically substantiated decisions based on medical military occupational specialty-specific training.

• Emergency medical treatment is the immediate provision of medical care to injured or ill Soldiers or others, in a nontactical environment.

• At the battalion aid station, the physician and the PA are trained and equipped to provide advanced trauma management to the patient. This element conducts routine sick call when the tactical situation permits. Like elements provide this role of medical care at brigade and echelons above brigade.

Medical Aid Station and Medical Platoon

7-31. Medical platoon vehicles are responsible for medical evacuation of patients from forward areas back to the BAS. Medical evacuation from the BAS is performed by ground ambulances from the brigade support medical company (BSMC) and forward support medical evacuation teams. CASEVAC* is nonmedical vehicles evacuating patients. Evacuation is based on the principle that rear higher echelon medical units are responsible for evacuating patients from supported units. Lower echelon supported and supporting units ensure evacuation support plans are complete and current by close, direct coordination. A technique used to reduce evacuation times is the prepositioning of evacuation vehicles with supported units.

*WARNING

Casualties transported in this manner may not receive proper en route medical care or be transported to the appropriate MTF to address the patient’s medical condition. If the casualty’s medical condition deteriorates during transport, or the casualty is not transported to the appropriate MTF, an adverse impact on his prognosis and long-term disability or death may result.

7-32. The SBCT battalion medical platoon is the focal point of AHS support. It is organized to support battalion CPs and companies; acquire casualties, treat and evacuate patients; and coordinate further evacuation as needed. Generally, the medical platoon leader is the supervising physician in the BAS. The platoon has a medical operations officer to assist in planning and a PA to assist with advance trauma management. The primary responsibility of the senior medical NCO is to coordinate and supervise medical evacuations, Class VIII resupply, and support for the platoon.

Battalion Surgeon/Medical Officer

7-33. The battalion surgeon/medical officer (Captain, Medical Corps) is the medical advisor to the battalion commander and his staff. He is the supervising physician (operational medicine officer) of the medical platoon treatment squad. The battalion surgeon is responsible for all medical treatment provided by the platoon. His responsibilities include planning and directing Role 1 AHS support for the battalion. The battalion surgeon—

• Advises the battalion commander and his staff on the status of the health of the command.

• Supervises the administration, discipline, maintenance of equipment, and supply functions.

• Provides organizational training and employment of assigned or attached personnel.

• Supervises and oversees all medical treatment provided by platoon personnel.

• Examines, diagnoses, treats, and prescribes courses of treatment for disease and nonbattle injury and wounded patients, to include ATM.

• Coordinates the establishment and training of nonmedical personnel for patient decontamination

• Supervises teams.

• Trains CLS.

• Supervises the battalion behavioral health/combat and COSC program, to include training troop leaders in the preventive aspect of stress on soldiers.

• Supports humanitarian assistance programs, when directed.

• Oversees the common task training, continuing medical education/training (such as training tactical combat casualty care), and clinical training of medical personnel.

• Supervises subordinate medical personnel.

• Monitors the command PVNTMED program, to include health assessment and medical surveillance.

• Ensures field health records are maintained by primary care providers.

Medical Platoon Leader

7-34. The field medical assistant (Lieutenant, Medical Service [MS]) is the operations/readiness officer for the platoon. He plans, coordinates, and executes AHS support for the battalion. Most of the time the field medical assistant fills the medical platoon leader’s position. Only when a battalion surgeon is assigned does the overall responsibility for the medical platoon belong to someone other than the MSC Lieutenant. He works with the battalion surgeon, the PA, and the medical platoon sergeant to ensure medical treatment and AHS support requirements are met for the battalion.

7-35. The field medical assistant is the principal assistant to the battalion surgeon and the primary leader for medical platoon operations, administration, and logistics. The platoon sergeant assists the platoon leader and supervises the operations of the platoon. The platoon sergeant serves as the medical evacuation squad sergeant.

Medical Platoon Sergeant and Physician Assistant

7-36. Responsibilities of the medical platoon sergeant include, providing leadership, mentorship, and training, coordinating, and supervising medical evacuations, Class VIII resupply and oversight, and logistic support for the platoon. He supervises the activities and functions of the ambulance section, to include operator maintenance of ambulances and equipment; OPSEC and emergency medical technician (EMT).

7-37. The PA (Captain, Army Medical Specialist Corps) performs general technical health care and administrative duties. The PA is ATM-qualified and works under the clinical supervision of a medical officer. (Refer to ATP 4-02.3 for more information.)

Note. In the absence of a battalion surgeon, the PA is the principal advisor to the battalion commander and his staff in the area of health and medical readiness.

FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY COMMANDER AND HEADQUARTERS

7-38. The FSC commander is the senior logistician when providing direct support to the SBCT Infantry battalion. The FSC commander assists the battalion S-4 with the battalion logistics planning and is responsible for executing the logistics plan following the BSB and supported battalion commanders’ guidance. The FSC normally establishes its headquarters collocated with the CTCP.

SECTION II – CONDUCT LOGISTICS

7-39. The logistic focal point for the SBCT Infantry battalion during combat operations is the battalion level trains. Sustainment personnel and equipment organic or attached to a force that provides support, such as supply, evacuation, and maintenance services, comprise the unit trains. Whether or not battalion sustainment assets are centralized or placed in multiple locations is dependent upon the tactical needs of the battalion.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

7-40. The SBCT Infantry battalion organize its forces to conduct sustainment functions for their operations into the battalion trains.

SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION TRAINS

7-41. The SBCT Infantry battalion uses unit trains based on METT-TC. In this case, the unit trains and all sustainment assets are placed in one central location. However, the battalion normally operates in echeloned trains where the trains are split into multiple locations. An echeloned train for the battalion normally comprises two types, combat trains and field trains. Communications are required between the battalion main, the FTCP, CTCP, and the BSB main CP.

Combat Trains

7-42. The combat trains are positioned based on METT-TC and usually positioned close enough to combat elements to be responsive to forward units, but beyond the range of enemy direct fires. The combat train usually comprises the HHC’s headquarters medical platoon and the FSC supporting with its field maintenance team at the maintenance collection point. They are supervised by the senior officer on site or designated by the SBCT Infantry battalion commander. If the battalion commander determines the need to establish a combat trains command post consideration should be given to the organization best suited to assume these tasks under the current situation. The FSC headquarters or someone from the battalion HHC may be tasked with combat trains command post responsibilities. The senior Soldier from the FSC is responsible to lead FSC soldiers and ensure the FSC mission is accomplished. The FSC normally establishes its headquarters collocated with the CTCP.

7-43. The battalion XO has supervisory responsibility over the combat trains. He positions the FSC CDR and battalion S-4 to ensure synchronized and timely logistics is maintained throughout operations. The combat trains usually consist of the maintenance collection point (MCP), battalion aid station (BAS), and emergency resupply trucks (for example Classes III and V). The MCP should be positioned where recovery vehicles have access to primary lines of communications routes. The CTCP is the primary maintenance collection area for equipment until it exceeds its capacity to displace in one movement.

7-44. The CTCP is responsible to coordinate with lateral units in the event that organic assets are not capable of providing timely support to subordinate companies. The CTCP may need to coordinate with adjacent battalions to utilize their resources to create efficiencies.

7-45. The CTCP has an obligation to stay abreast of the tactical situation and exercise proactive logistical support; monitor the battalion command net to identify logistics requirements; and receive requests, reports, and requirements from subordinate elements by operating the administrative and logistics net. In a contingency the CTCP can be used a primary mission command node if the battalions main CP is out of contact. Subordinate requirements are analyzed, consolidated, and forwarded to the field trains CP or other supporting activity. The FSC commander coordinates and directs elements to take action to satisfy the forward units’ requirements (for example, LOGPAC).

Maintenance Collection Point

7-46. The MCP is normally located near the combat trains for security, and should be on a main axis or supply route. The maintenance collection point is manned by elements of the field maintenance team. The MCP provides vehicle and equipment evacuation and maintenance support to the field maintenance teams. Field maintenance teams evacuate vehicles and equipment to the MCP that cannot be repaired quickly enough to support current operations.

7-47. The MCP does not have to be located in the battalion combat trains; however, if not in the same location, the MCP is normally in the general vicinity. The advantages to collocating the MCP at the combat trains is for increased security and coordination of Class IX resupply. The trains are mobile enough to support frequent changes in location, time and terrain permitting, when under the following conditions:

• Heavy use or traffic in the area may cause detection.

• The area becomes worn by heavy use such as in wet and muddy conditions.

• Security is compromised.

7-48. The maintenance control and field maintenance sections receive maintenance requests from the companies, establish priorities of repair, evacuate non-mission capable equipment to the MCP or back to the FTCP/BSA utilizing the Global Combat Support System–Army (GCCS-A) to record and track non-mission capable status and identify and request Class IX repair part.

7-49. The maintenance control team utilizes the Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal (CSS VSAT) to send repair and parts requests back to the BSB. Known as a “BLAST” (Battlefield Laser Acquisition Sensor Test), this happens at least once daily and sometimes up to five times a day as units requests move back and forth across this communications system.

Field Trains

7-50. The SBCT Infantry battalion field trains normally are positioned with the BSB. The companies normally locate a supply section representative with the oversight by the HHC to form the battalion field trains. At times, a company may store its sustainment or contingency loads with its company supply section in the BSA. The austere structure of the SBCT Infantry battalion limits its ability to store and maintain these stocks.

7-51. Field trains provide direct coordination between the battalion and the BSB. When organized, the field trains usually consist of the elements of the battalion HHC, FSC, battalion S-1, and battalion S-4. The FSC facilitates the coordination and movement of support from the BSB to the Infantry battalion and its companies. The field trains are responsible for coordination of security of its area of responsibility within the BSA.

7-52. The Infantry battalion company supply sergeants may position themselves with the FTCP. They assist the FSC/HHC in preparing company LOGPACs and then move their vehicles forward to the logistics resupply point (LRP). The FTCP maintains control of vehicles moving forward to the LRPs. Company 1SGs or their representatives meet the LOGPAC, and guide it to the company resupply point.

7-53. The battalion S-4 coordinates with company commanders through their company supply section representative to ensure that these stocks are available. The battalion field trains operate as the primary direct coordination element between the companies and the BSB. The HHC headquarters section provides direct interface with the elements of the SBCT Infantry battalion and BSB.

PLAN

7-54. Logistics planning is fully integrated into all operational planning, with the concept of sustainment support synchronized with the concept of operations. Planning is continuous and ongoing. Key sustainment planners are the XO, S-1, S-3, S-4, medical officer, and FSC commander who must actively participate in the planning process. In some situations, sustainment planning begins before receipt of the mission, as part of the ongoing process of refining the sustainment estimates such as standard rates of consumptions for operations. Sustainment planners must understand the mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations to provide effective support.

7-55. Fast, reliable communications are critical to the sustainment effort. The SBCT Infantry battalion S-4 manages the sustainment information as needed to support each subordinate company’s mission. The trains report the battalion’s status, including combat losses, and sends resupply and support requests forward.

COMBAT LOADS

7-56. Each Stryker vehicle has a combat load that can be planned for by variant (see figures 7-2 on page 7-11 and 7-3 on page 7-12). The loads identified are for planning purposes only and may vary widely based upon factors such as the ammunition controlled supply rate and other mission variables.

Figure 7-2. Sample Stryker combat load

Figure 7-3. Sample Infantry platoon combat load

DAYS OF SUPPLY: CLASS I, III, AND IV

| CLASS (CL) I | CLASS III | CLASS IV
Individual | 9 x MRE (meals ready to eat) (3 per day) 3 x gallons of Water (1 gallon per day) | None | None

Squad

99 x MRE (9 cases)

33 x gallons of water plus 2 x 5 gallon cans

CL III (P)

53 gallon (full fuel tank)

2 x 5 gallon fuel cans

CL III (B)

15w40

Dextron III

Mil 5606

80w90

Antifreeze

2 Quarts

2 Quarts

2 Quarts

1 Quart

1 Quart

4 x rolls Concertina wire

6 x Picket

Platoon

396 x MRE (36 cases)

132 gallon of water plus 8 x 5 gallon cans

CL III (P) \

212 gallon (full fuel tanks)

8 x 5 gallon fuel cans

CL III (B)

15w40 2 gallons

Dextron III 2 gallons

Mil 5606 2 gallons

80w90 1 gallon

Antifreeze 1 gallon

16 x rolls Concertina wire

24 x Pickets

AIR RESUPPLY

7-57. In the event of limited ground transportation, or unsecured ground lines of communication (GLOCs) personnel know how to conduct aerial operations. Each SBCT Infantry rifle company has designated Pathfinder allocations to its positions. The SBCT Infantry battalion ensures that these positions are occupied by certified personnel. An understanding of PZ and LZ selection, sling loading, bundle drops, and allowable cargo loads may be critical to sustainment operations.

7-58. The SBCT maneuver and subordinate units may operate in forward locations and distant hide positions requiring both rotorary- and fixed-wing resupply including both internal and external load operations. Commanders and staffs consider establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics base camps to sustain operations. (See ATP 4-48 for more information.)

Planning

7-59. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with elements reviewing the entire mission and resolving all limitations and problem areas. If a resupply item poses a problem that cannot be resolved, leaders should consider another mode of transport. Planning factors include the following:

• Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.

• Integration of the resupply operation into the tactical plan.

• Selection, identification, and marking of the PZ or LZ.

• Type/amount of cargo.

• Types of aircraft and their capabilities.

• Requirements for slings, cargo nets, parachutes, and cargo containers.

• Ground crew training requirements; such as those for ground guides and hookup personnel.

• PZ and LZ security.

• Flight routes.

7-60. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important. The battalion or company analyzes logistical and tactical considerations; taking into account that PZ/LZ positioning is at the right place to support the ground unit. The area is also accessible to the aircraft involved in the resupply operation. The air mission commander, the pilot in command, an aviation LNO, or a pathfinder qualified officer or NCO makes the final decision on PZ/LZ selection and acceptance.

7-61. The battalion or company receiving the supplies is responsible for preparing the PZ/LZ. The battalion/company performs the following specific tasks for aerial resupply:

• Recovers and assembles equipment and supplies.

• Trains available ground crews in guiding the aircraft during approach, landing, unloading/loading, departure, and de-rigging the load.

• Trains hookup personnel.

• Coordinates with the sending unit for the control and return of that unit’s transport equipment, such as slings and A-22 bags.

• Prepares, coordinates, and inspects backloads (such as slings and A-22 bags) and have them ready for hookup or loading when the aircraft arrives.

PREPOSITIONED SUPPLIES

7-62. Prepositioning of supplies is most often required in defensive or stability tasks. Usually only Class V items are prepositioned but Class I and III supplies can be prepositioned as based on METT-TC factors. During offensive tasks leaders can employ mobile prepositioning, loading supplies on trucks, and positioning them forward in the AO. This technique works well during a fast-moving operation.

PREPARE

7-63. The SBCT Infantry battalion prepares for sustainment operations by conducting rehearsals, prepositioning supplies, and configuring logistical packages.

SUSTAINMENT BRIEFINGS AND REHEARSALS

7-64. The sustainment plan for the battalion is briefed by the S-4 or FSC commander when the OPORD or FRAGORD is issued. This brief covers the concept of support, CASEVAC plan, vehicle evacuation plan, classes of supply on vehicles, any risks that the battalion will assume in sustainment operations to support the overall operation, it covers logistic release points, ambulance exchange points, and criteria for an emergency sustainment push to subordinate units. It addresses how the sustainment process will be executed from the beginning of an operation, through its execution and how assets will be postured to allow the battalion to rapidly transition to the next mission.

7-65. Thorough briefings and comprehensive rehearsals are important keys to effective sustainment planning. These activities play a critical role in ensuring that the SBCT Infantry battalion can execute its sustainment plans efficiently. They allow the commander, his subordinate leaders, and each crewman to discover potential problem areas and to develop contingency plans to avoid unforeseen difficulties.

7-66. The commander has several options for conducting sustainment rehearsals. One is to integrate the sustainment rehearsal into the unit’s larger maneuver rehearsals. Another alternative is for the unit’s sustainment operators to conduct a separate rehearsal.

7-67. The SBCT Infantry battalion CSS rehearsal should include the XO, CSM, FSC commander, the distribution and maintenance platoon leaders, a representative from the S-3, either the 1SG or XO from each company, S-1, S-4, S-6, the medical platoon leader, and a representative from battalion S-2.

7-68. The rehearsal can be conducted on a terrain board, via FM or other communications software (CPOF/BFT/JCR…). The critical part of this rehearsal is a common understanding of future operations and the integration of the sustainment processes into the combat operation.

ROUTINE RESUPPLY

7-69. Preparation for routine resupply operations covers items in Classes I, III, V, IX, as well as mail and any other items usually requested by the battalion to the BSB. Whenever possible, routine resupply should be conducted daily; ideally in limited visibility. Because Stryker vehicles consume large amounts of fuel, the SBCT Infantry battalion should resupply Class III at every opportunity. The predicted consumption rates from the planning phase allow the FSC to configure the first logistic package before operations begin.

Logistics Package Operations and Preparation

7-70. Logistics package operations and preparation for the SBCT battalions begins with the subordinate units requests combined with the battalion’s forecasted needs for future operations. Company 1SGs assisted by the supply NCO compile and coordinate all supply requests for their companies and route them through the battalion S-4. The battalion S-4 sections will compile, prioritize, and coordinate requests and needs, to the FSC if assigned or the distribution company of the BSB if the FSC is forward. This activity is coordinated and supervised by the support operations officer of the BSB.

7-71. The same request is also sent to the field trains command post, where the supervisory headquarters receives the request and begins the process of filling it. The supervising headquarters of the FTCP dispatches company supply sergeants for company specific supplies, coordinates with the SPO for more common classes of supply, prepares vehicles for a combat patrol and executes PCCs/PCIs as required.

7-72. LOGPACS are fundamentally built by the company supply sergeants for their company while in the BSA. LOGPACs are organized for each company and separate unit in the Infantry battalion and usually moved forward daily for routine resupply. Tactical situations may require LOGPACs outside routine resupply. The battalion may be forced to assume tactical risk with lower levels of Class I, III, and V for prolonged periods of time due to the nature and fluidity of its missions and role.

EXECUTE

7-73. The FSC conducts replenishment for the Infantry battalion and the method employed is based upon mission variables and the current tactical situation. The FSC distribution platoon leader leads the platoon, oversees LOGPAC operations and manages the distribution of supplies coming from or passing through the FSC in support of the Infantry battalion. The distribution platoon can be task organized into battalion and company support squads. The support squad provides all supplies for a supported battalion employing companies in a widely dispersed geographic area. The platoon provides general supplies, fuel, and ammunition to the supported battalion. Other items to be included in the replenishment are coordinated by the appropriate staff officer.

MOVEMENT AND RECEPTION OF THE LOGISTICS PACKAGE

7-74. Replenishment loads normally follow a sequence of movement from the BSA to the CTCP; from the CTCP to the LRP; from the LRP to the company trains; from the company trains to the platoon and so forth to the individual level. The transportation and security requirements vary in logistics pull and logistics push. For logistics push the higher level echelon has the responsibility to resupply its subordinate units with its organic assets at their location. For logistics pull subordinate units have the responsibility to pick up their supplies from the higher echelon with their organic assets. (See figure 7-4 on page 7-16.)

7-75. The method of replenishment within the SBCT Infantry rifle company is determined by the company commander and the company first sergeant. Replenishment of company elements may be conducted using either the supply point distribution or the unit distribution method. The method used must be described in the mission orders. The first sergeant may send company personnel and vehicles to a supply point designated by the FSC (supply point distribution) to be fed, to resupply, to turn in damaged equipment. This is often referred to as service station technique. It is normally used in assembly areas and when contact is not likely. It takes the least amount of time for the sustainers. Conversely, the first sergeant may coordinate for supplies to be delivered to a company or platoon location (unit distribution). The first sergeant may use company personnel and vehicles to go to each element to replenish them. Soldiers can remain in position when using this method. It is the most lengthy resupply method and may compromise friendly positions. This is often referred to as tailgate technique.

Figure 7-4. Battalion trains operations

Train Security

7-76. Security of sustainment elements is critical to the success of the SBCT Infantry battalion mission. Therefore, trains develop plans for continuous security operations. The SBCT Infantry battalion considers the factors of METT-TC when determining where to position the train location. The security plans complement the plans of the other units located within the BSA.

Note. METT-TC factors ultimately dictate the actual distance at which the trains operate.

ASSESS

7-77. Assessment is continuous for sustainment of the SBCT Infantry battalion to continue their operations. The management of information from current operations must be monitored, shared, and adjusted to facilitate responsive logistics. This mix of forecasted and actual sustainment needs from current operational impacts affects the timeliness of logistics packages. Once a logistics package has left the BSA it is better to let it continue to its destination rather than recall it in most situations. Finalizing and adjusting the logistic package is a constant process. Finding alternative transportation such as units that are moving close to the SBCT Infantry units, air resupply, and reconstituted forces provide better sustainment and more logistics forward to support the operation.

SECTION III – MAINTENANCE

7-78. Stryker vehicles and the equipment Soldiers carry require field and sustainment maintenance. All field and sustainment maintenance requests are generated bottom up by the Soldiers using the specified tasks in the maintenance manuals at the -10, -20, and -30 levels within the SBCT Infantry battalion. -40 and beyond must be coordinated outside the SBCT. The Stryker unit’s vehicles and equipment and maintenance must be monitored, prioritized, and approved by their chain of command. The distribution and movement of parts and equipment is normally synchronized with the LOGPAC for ordering, replacing and repairing process. Other times vehicles and equipment may require recovery missions to be undertaken. (See ATP 4-33 for more information.)

7-79. The Stryker vehicle has the advantage of self-recovery but occasionally requires a wrecker. The determination for battalion and higher support for recovery is determined by the company commander based on METT-TC. If the recovery tasks impacts the tactical mission success; that Battalion may be required to assist by coordinating the recovery and facilitate the SBCT Infantry rifle company to complete the tactical mission.

PLAN

7-80. Vehicle recovery must be planned as a contingency to an operation. The techniques with Stryker vehicle recovery are to recover the vehicle to the rear or recover the vehicle forward during reorganization and consolidation. To facilitate recovery faster the FSC may attach recovery vehicles with SBCT Infantry rifle companies or they may keep them consolidated at the MCP. Soldiers with the vehicle requiring recovery will either stay with the vehicle and assists in its repair or cross level equipment and personnel onto other vehicles and continue mission.

7-81. The preferred technique is to repair the vehicle at the battalion MCP. The CRT in the FSC has the same capabilities within the maintenance company of the BSB, the only difference is capacity. Parts for repair can be placed into LOGPACs and moved to the SBCT Infantry battalion. Some vehicles cannot always be repaired and must be evacuated in order to be replaced. The SBCT Infantry battalion will coordinate with the SBCT to gain theatre specific information for procedures.

PREPARE

7-82. Preparing for recovery procedures includes acquiring tow bars to assists in self-recovery of Stryker vehicles. Normally each platoon carries two. Rehearsals and drills for all echelons are performed in preparation phase.

7-83. Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on equipment to prevent breakdown of nonmission capable equipment. The flow of maintenance requests should be daily back to the MCP. It starts with platoons conducting their daily PMCS, those being consolidated at the company level and then moved to the MCP to be processed. From the MCP, the maintenance control section determines actions required. This may be dispatching a maintenance contact team, ordering a part to be brought forward via LOGPAC or moving a recovery section forward to evacuate the equipment.

EXECUTE

7-84. The SBCT Infantry battalion supports vehicle recovery when the company cannot support the task. The element with the vehicle requiring recovery is responsible for security of the site while the recovery is occurring. The element moving to the recovery site may have its own security assigned to it or may require the company to provide. Considerations for the personnel and their equipment should be included before the tasks begin in addition to recovering the vehicle. When the recovery element arrives and recovers the vehicle; ideally the vehicle is checked to see if it can be reconstituted back into service.

ASSESS

7-85. Assessment for recovery culminates when the vehicle can either be reconstituted back to service of is declared non-mission capable and a new vehicle is ordered to replace it.

SECTION IV – PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

7-86. Health services support is all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army medical department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army and, as directed in other Services, agencies and organizations. These treatment services include casualty care, medical evacuation, combat and operational stress control, and hospitalization. (Refer to FM 4-02 for more information.) HSS is provided by elements within maneuver companies, maneuver battalion HHCs, and the brigade medical support company in the BSB.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM

7-87. This system encompasses the 10 functional areas of medical mission command, medical treatment (area support), hospitalization, medical evacuation (to include medical regulating), dental services, preventive medicine services, combat and operational stress control, veterinary services, medical logistics (to include blood management), medical laboratory services (to include both clinical laboratories and area laboratories). Force health protection involves delineation of support responsibility by geographical area. (Refer to FM 4-02 for more information.)

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

7-88. Force health protection is a single, integrated system. It comprises all services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army and, as directed, for other services, agencies, and organizations. It is a continuum of care and support from the point of injury or wounding through successive roles of medical care to the continental United States (CONUS) base.

CASUALTY PROCEDURES

7-89. Casualties are an unfortunate part of combat. They can occur at any point during an operation and are a contingency that leaders must prepare for. Casualties vary in level of care and are treated at different facilities with varying levels of capability. They are labeled as Roles 1 to 4. Army air and ground evacuation platforms provide connectivity to assure a seamless continuum of medical care. A casualty is any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status—whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured (JP 4-02). Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)—nonmedical units use this to refer to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft without en route medical care (FM 4-02). Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) ground/air ambulance platforms are defined as: platforms designed especially for the medical evacuation mission with allocated medical equipment to provide en route care by trained medical personnel (FM 4-02). (See figure 7-5 on page 7-19.)

Figure 7-5.Categories of evacuation precedence

7-90. Within the SBCT Infantry battalion, the following vehicles can be used to support CASEVAC and MEDEVAC:

Vehicle | Max Liter | Max Ambulatory | Mix Liter/Ambulatory
MEV | 4 | 6 | 2/3
ICV | 2* | 8 | 1*/4
RV | 1 | 4 | 1 liter or 4 ambulatory
Light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) | 7* | 12 | Multiple combinations
Medium tactical vehicle (MTV) | 8* | 14 | Multiple combinations
*Indicates a modification to the vehicle can be made for a nonstandard CASEVAC Liter.

PLAN

7-91. The SBCT Infantry battalion is responsible for planning and coordinating the quickest response to a casualty with minimal impact on the mission. They determine the location of the forward aid station (FAS), medical aid station (MAS) sometimes split, ambulance exchange point (AXP), dirty and clean routes, and mass casualty (MASCAL) procedures both military and civilian.

7-92. The commander must nest his MEDEVAC/CASEVAC plan and procedures with his higher echelons as well as know the locations of adjacent unit medical facilities in order to provide a timely response for the casualty. Linkup with two moving units to exchange casualties from the SBCT Infantry rifle company element to the SBCT Infantry battalion element is normally the preferred technique. This technique takes advantage of the mobility of the MEV and allows elements conducting the MEDEVAC to return to their positions. In cases with multiple casualties originating at different points of origin the SBCT Infantry battalion may require the SBCT Infantry rifle company to take the casualty to nearest medical facility that can treat the casualty. They may send a MEV to replace the SBCT’s Infantry rifle company’s MEV.

PREPARE

7-93. Preparing for casualty procedures includes acquiring Class VIII supplies, rehearsals and drills for all echelons and inspection of all medical personnel and equipment. Medical personnel at the battalion level must rehearse various contingencies involving different casualty situations over time and space at both the FAS and the MAS.

EXECUTE

7-94. Before moving a casualty it is important to know where the casualty needs to go, this may be determined by the severity of injuries, number of casualties, and availability of the medical treatment facility. The table below will tell what evacuation procedures are required for casualties (see ATP 4-25.13 for more information).

PRIORITY I─URGENT | Is assigned to emergency cases that should be evacuated as soon as possible and within a maximum of 1 hour in order to save life, limb, or eyesight, to prevent complications of serious illness, or to avoid permanent disability.
PRIORITY IA─URGENT-SURGERY | Is assigned to emergency cases that should be evacuated as soon as possible and within a maximum of 1 hour in order to save life, limb, or eyesight, to prevent complications of serious illness, or to avoid permanent disability.

PRIORITY II─PRIORITY

Is assigned to sick and wounded personnel requiring prompt medical care. This precedence is used when the individual should be evacuated within 4 hours or his medical condition could deteriorate to such a degree that he will become an URGENT precedence, or whose requirements for special treatment are not available locally, or who will suffer unnecessary pain or disability.

PRIORITY III─ROUTINE | Is assigned to sick and wounded personnel requiring evacuation but whose condition is not expected to deteriorate significantly. The sick and wounded in this category should be evacuated within 24 hours.
PRIORITY IV─CONVENIENCE | Is assigned to patients for whom evacuation by medical platform is a matter of medical convenience rather than necessity.
The NATO STANAG 3204 has deleted the category of Priority IV—CONVENIENCE; however, it will still be included in the U.S. Army evacuation priorities as there is a requirement for it on the battlefield.

7-95. The platoon or element with the casualty is responsible to provide security, respond to the casualty (combat medic preferred), and notify the company of the situation which informs the battalion. The combat medic’s assessment of the casualty determines the time requirement and levels of treatment the commander needs to support his decision for possible options. Battalion is responsible to support coordination for MEDEVAC/CASEVAC which include:

• Coordination with adjacent units for medical support.

• Determining which MEDEVAC/CASEVAC technique to use.

• Providing guidance on routes to travel.

• Determining follow on actions to the mission.

• Moving units as a result of a casualty.

ASSESS

7-96. Assessment for a casualty is complete when that casualty is returned to duty, transitioned out of the unit due to injuries and replaced, or the remains have been sent to mortuary affairs and notification of next of kin have been completed. During this time period the S1 maintains accountability of location, status and progress of their recovery.

SECTION V – PROVIDE PERSONNEL SERVICES

7-97. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force. It also maintains Soldier readiness, promotes moral and ethical values, and enables the fighting qualities of the Army (ADRP 4-0). It includes essential personnel services such as evaluations, leaves and passes, awards and decorations, rest and recuperation, postal, personnel accountability, casualty operations, and personnel management. Personnel services include the following functions and are provided by the battalion’s S-1, the SBCT’s brigade legal section, and the unit ministry team.

• Human resources. (Refer to FM 1-0.)

• Financial management. (Refer to FM 1-06.)

• Legal support. (Refer to FM 1-04.)

• Religious support. (Refer to FM 1-05.)

7-98. Human resources support all functions that affect the Soldier’s status, readiness, and welfare. It includes essential personnel services such as:

• Personnel management and strength reporting.

• Postal services.

• Casualty operations.

• Unit reporting.

• Medical and personnel accounting.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND STRENGTH REPORTING

7-99. Personnel accounting is the process of recording by-name data on Soldiers when they arrive, depart, change duty location, or change duty status. Strength reporting is the numerical end product of the by-name accounting process. The S-1 is responsible for tracking all personnel locations and reporting their status to the battalion commander and CSM, and to the SBCT S-1.

POSTAL SERVICES

7-100. The battalion mail clerk receives and distributes Soldier mail to the company mail clerk, usually the supply sergeant, who delivers it to the 1SG, platoon sergeant or to the Soldier. All outgoing and returned mail is given to the supply sergeant or 1SG during resupply, and is turned over to the S-1 section when the LOGPAC returns to the field trains.

CASUALTY OPERATIONS

7-101. Casualty operations include production, dissemination, coordination, validation and synchronization of information regarding each casualty. This information includes casualty reporting, casualty notification, casualty assistance, line-of-duty determination, disposition of remains, and disposition of personal effects, military burial honors, and casualty mail coordination.

UNIT REPORTING

7-102. As casualties occur, the nearest observer informs the company 1SG via the most expedient method available (for example, free text within BFT II/JCR, FM voice). The 1SG submits a personnel status report (PERSTAT) to the SBCT Infantry battalion S-1 section. This report documents duty status changes on all casualties. Casualties are taken to the casualty collection point (CCP) for classification of injury type (routine, urgent, return to duty), evacuation, and integration into the medical treatment system. The 1SG ensures completed DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card) is forwarded to the SBCT Infantry battalion S-1, who then enters the data into the Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS).

7-103. Commanders must establish procedures to ensure that the Soldier’s next of kin are notified properly and according to procedure. The potential for unofficial communications that exist with killed in action (KIA) operations also exist in casualty operations. That is, cell phones and computers near the AO enable many Soldiers to contact his home station regarding the casualty—such communication is unofficial and unacceptable. The next of kin for Soldiers wounded or KIA should not receive notification through unofficial means. There is usually a communication blackout until the next of kin is notified. No internet or phone calls home are permitted.

MEDICAL/PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING

7-104. When a Soldier becomes a casualty, the platoon combat medic or senior combat medic records the medical treatment the Soldier receives on the Soldier’s Department of Defense (DD) Form 1380 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card) preferably by electronic means. The BAS and medical company (BSB) read the Soldier’s DD Form 1380 when they treat the Soldier. The SBCT Infantry battalion S-1 should receive an electronic notification message to update the Soldier’s patient tracking status. In turn, this message should be forwarded to the company. This way, a casualty’s location can be determined and Soldiers properly accounted for by the company.

Chapter 8

Augmenting Combat Power

To accomplish the assigned mission, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander must integrate and synchronize all warfighting functions as enablers to enhance the combat power of his maneuver companies. This chapter describes the air defense artillery, fires, aviation, and UAS that augment SBCT Infantry battalion's operations.

SECTION I – AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

8-1. Air and missile defense (AMD) protects the force from missile attack, air attack, and aerial surveillance, cruise missiles, conventional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and UAS. It prevents enemies from interdicting friendly forces, while freeing commanders to synchronize movement and firepower. All members of the combined arms team perform air defense tasks; however, ground-based air defense artillery units execute most Army air and missile defense operations. AMD elements coordinate and synchronize defensive fires to protect installations and personnel from over-the-horizon strikes. Army AMD capabilities increase airspace situational understanding and complement the area air defense commander. (Refer to ADRP 3-09 and ADRP 3-37 for additional information.)

8-2. The SBCT has an organic air defense and air management cell under the fires cell. The air defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell is equipped with an AMD workstation, air defense system integrator, and forward area air defense engagement operations workstation. (Refer to FM 3-01.11 for more information.) The battalion S-3 air or the FSO coordinate with the SBCT ADAM cell to manage airspace in their area of operations and integrate ADA assets into the ground maneuver plan if attached.

8-3. The type of Short-Range Air Defense Air Defense Artillery (SHORAD ADA) systems that the SBCT and its Infantry battalions may have in their AOs are:

• Stinger man portable air defense system –a man-portable, shoulder-fired guided missile system.

• Avenger–a pedestal-mounted Stinger system mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV).

• Counter rocket, artillery, and mortar.

THE THREAT

8-4. In analyzing the physical variable of a battalion’s operational environment, planners must take into account the airspace above the battalion’s AO. Some areas to consider include:

• Location of threat airfields and launching points.

• Range of aircraft and missiles.

• Physical constraints in the friendly AO.

• Buildings and other structures.

• Power lines and antennas.

• Hills, trees, and other natural barriers to movement and observation.

• Weather.

8-5. The following are some of the types of air threats and typical maneuvers that the battalion can expect to encounter against a well-equipped enemy:

• Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) are small and elusive. They usually fly low, but the altitude can vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of engagement range of ADA.

• Most surface-launched cruise missiles follow the terrain and use terrain masking. Due to their range, they might take indirect approach routes.

• Ballistic missiles are not terrain-dependent. They fly from launch point to objective. Their flight is not restricted by terrain.

• Tactical air-to-surface missiles usually fly direct routes from launch platform to the target.

• Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridgelines and military crests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the target area.

• Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range, they may fly a straight line to the target.

• Ordnance or payload can affect range and altitude of the air system and, thus, influence the selection of avenues of approach for airborne and air assault operations.

8-6. Units can expect the threat to attempt to counter U.S. defensive and offensive operations with a myriad of aerial platforms. UAS provide the threat commander the necessary information to determine friendly unit locations, movements, and objectives. Aerial and artillery strikes can be generated from the intelligence gathered against the following targets:

• Maneuver force.

• Forward arming and refueling points.

• Aviation bases.

• Command and control nodes.

• Reserve troop concentrations.

• Forward support company areas.

• Terrain features.

• Obstacles constricting unit movements as U.S. forces advance to close with the enemy forces.

8-7. Lethal UAS can be effective in disabling command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities or destroying armored vehicles. The threat will likely use cruise missiles against logistical concentration, command and control (C2) nodes, or with submunitions for area denial. It probably will use rotary wing aircraft to attack forward elements and the flanks of the advancing enemy maneuver force to slow their tempo, cause confusion and, thereby, inflict maximum casualties. Rotary wing aircraft can also be used to conduct operations across forward line of own troops (FLOT), CAS, and air insertion operations. Armed attack helicopters constitute the most widespread and capable air threats to friendly ground forces in the close battle.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

8-8. Soldiers use passive air defense measures to avoid detection from enemy air attack. Passive air defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction. (JP 3-01) Concealing large vehicles like the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) is difficult. Commanders should consider deception techniques to disguise their intentions and active air defense.

DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES

8-9. Damage-limiting measures are attempts to limit any damages should the enemy detect friendly forces. These measures are used when units are in a static position such as an assembly area, or when they are maneuvering. If caught in the open, personnel should immediately execute battle drills and move to positions of cover and concealment that reduce the enemy's ability to acquire or engage them. The same measures taken to limit damage from artillery attack are used for dispersion, protective construction, and cover. Examples of damage-limiting measures include vehicle dispersion, camouflage, and dug-in fighting positions with overhead protection. (See ADRP 3-37 for more information.)

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

8-10. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, troops must be prepared to engage attacking enemy aircraft. The decision to fight an air threat is based on the immediate situation and weapons system capabilities. Based on the mission, companies do not typically engage aircraft except for self-preservation or as directed by the battalion or company commander.

SMALLS ARMS USED FOR AIR DEFENSE

8-11. Small arms used for air defense incorporate the use of volume fire and proper aiming points according to the target. The key to success in engaging enemy air is to put out a high volume of fire. All weapons designated by the commander should be used, including Stryker Vehicles, HMMWVs and trucks, and Infantry direct fire automatic weapons. The commander must decide whether to engage and must provide the engagement command for the entire unit to fire upon the attacking aircraft rather than having Soldiers fire at the aircraft individually.

SECTION II – AVIATION

8-12. Air-ground operations (AGO) are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (FM 3-04). Air-ground operations are essential for Army forces to achieve cross-domain synergy. Success of future Army forces will require air- ground operations and airspace coordination not only between Army ground and aviation elements, but also between ground and joint air assets, to include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires.

AIR-GROUND TEAM

8-13. The air-ground team (AGT) is a combined arms team composed of Army aviation and ground maneuver forces. Joint and Army forces develop habitual relationships to achieve understanding of local conditions. Therefore, organizations at the lowest tactical level must have required enablers to integrate joint capabilities in mission planning and execution. Leaders and Soldiers train continuously to form effective air- ground teams that integrate manned and unmanned aircraft systems in combat.

8-14. Air-ground teaming is required during—

• Airborne operations.

• Air assault operations.

• Army Personnel and Aircraft Recovery Operations.

• Aerial reconnaissance and security tasks.

• Close air support tasks.

• Close combat attack tasks.

• Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) tasks.

• Airborne EW tasks.

• Air movement tasks.

• Air MEDEVAC tasks.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

8-15. An airborne operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission (JP 3-18). The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation. (See FM 3-99 for more information.)

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

8-16. Air assault operations are the movement of maneuver and sustainment forces using the firepower, mobility, protection and total integration of aviation assets in their air and ground roles to attain the advantage of surprise, to engage and destroy enemy forces, and to seize and hold key terrain. Air assaults allow friendly forces to strike over extended distances and terrain to attack the enemy when and where it is most vulnerable. By their very nature, air assaults are high-risk, high-payoff operations that are resource-intensive and require extensive planning and preparation to be successful. (Refer to FM 3-99 for more information.)

ARMY PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT RECOVERY OPERATIONS

8-17. Army personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and return of U.S. military, DOD civilians, and DOD CAAF, or other personnel designated by the Secretary of Defense.

8-18. Commanders provide personnel recovery planning guidance within their initial guidance. Personnel recovery guidance provides a framework for how the unit and subordinates will synchronize the actions of isolated personnel and the recovery force. Effective personnel recovery planning guidance accounts for the operational environment and the execution of operations. Personnel recovery guidance is addressed in the synchronization of each warfighting function. It broadly describes how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish personnel recovery tasks within the higher commander’s intent.

8-19. Recovery is action taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location (JP 1-02). Recovery is retrieving an immobile, inoperative, or abandoned aircraft from its current position and returning it to a mission-capable status or a maintenance site for repair. These actions typically involve—

• Expert assessment of the aircraft.

• Performance of standard or BDAR maintenance actions enabling aircraft to self-recover.

• Recommendation of actions or preparation of the aircraft for a dedicated recovery.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY TASKS

RECONNAISSANCE TASKS

8-20. When air reconnaissance assets complement ground reconnaissance units they often operate forward of the element (METT-TC dependent). They can conduct detailed reconnaissance of areas that are particularly dangerous or inaccessible to ground reconnaissance units, such as mountainous terrain, urban terrain, DZs/LZs, flanks and objective areas.

8-21. Attack reconnaissance aircraft can conduct zone and area reconnaissance. They can support route reconnaissance forward of reconnaissance units or be employed in conjunction with reconnaissance units when it is necessary to reconnoiter multiple routes simultaneously.

SECURITY TASKS

8-22. In security operations, air platforms complement reconnaissance units by assisting in identification of enemy reconnaissance and main body elements and by providing early warning forward of reconnaissance or ground units. When conducting armed reconnaissance they can disrupt enemy operations and destroy identified targets. Upon contact, attack reconnaissance provides early warning for the element and then maintains contact until the element conducts a reconnaissance handover to another element.

8-23. Besides acquiring enemy forces, air reconnaissance assets can play a critical role in providing security through the depth of the screen by observing dead space between ground OPs. They can support reconnaissance units during area security missions by screening or conducting reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance and Security Handover

8-24. The air and ground reconnaissance elements must share continuous combat information to achieve this. Through maneuver and coordination the two elements continue their efforts until the ground force element confirms it can observe enemy elements and have a situational awareness. (See FM 3-98 for more information.)

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

8-25. Close air support is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-0). Like CCA, CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces based on availability. All leaders should understand how to employ CAS to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy forces. (Refer to JP 3-09.3 and ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6.) Nomination of CAS targets is the responsibility of the commander, ALO, and S-3 at each level. The ground forces commander may receive CAS from United States Air Force (USAF), United States Navy (USN), United States Marine Corps (USMC), or multinational units.

8-26. The ALO and JTAC personnel in the TACP are the primary means for requesting and controlling CAS. However, reconnaissance units conducting shaping operations, such as reconnaissance and surveillance missions that have joint fires observer certified personnel, may observe and request CAS through the JTAC. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6for more information.)

8-27. Two types of CAS requests are as follows:

• Preplanned requests that may be filled with either scheduled or on-call air missions. Those CAS requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the first air tasking order distribution are submitted as preplanned air support requests for CAS. Only those air support requests submitted in sufficient time to be included in the joint air tasking cycle planning phases and supported on the air tasking order are considered preplanned requests.

• Immediate requests that are mostly filled by diverting preplanned missions or with on-call missions. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop outside the air tasking order planning cycle.

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

8-28. A close combat attack is a coordinated attack by Army attack reconnaissance aircraft (manned and unmanned) against targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. The CCA is not synonymous with close air support flown by Joint aircraft. Terminal control from ground units or controllers is not due to the capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situational understanding of the aircrew. In most instances, the attack aviation may already occupy holding areas, battle or support-by-fire positions or are in overwatch of the ground maneuver force as it begins its assault. (Refer to FM 3-04.126 for more information.) The most important factor of successful CCAs is positive and direct communication between aviation and ground elements. When providing support to ground maneuver elements, Army aviation will operate on that echelon’s command net unless directed otherwise

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE TASKS

8-29. While ground-based and airborne EW planning and execution are similar, they significantly differ in their EW employment time. Airborne EW operations are conducted at much higher speeds and generally have a shorter duration than ground-based operations. Therefore, the timing of support from airborne EW assets requires detailed planning.

8-30. Airborne EW requires the following:

• A clear understanding of the supported commander’s EW objectives.

• Ground support facilities.

• Liaisons between the aircrews of the aircraft providing the EW effects and the aircrews or ground forces being supported.

• Protection from enemy aircraft and air defense systems.

8-31. Airborne EW capabilities have certain advantages. They can provide direct support to other tactical aviation missions such as suppression of enemy air defenses, destruction of enemy air defenses, and employment of high-speed antiradiation missiles. They can provide extended range over ground-based assets. Airborne EW capabilities can provide greater mobility and flexibility than ground-based assets. In addition, they can support ground-based units in beyond line-of-sight operations.

8-32. Limitations associated with airborne EW capabilities include limited time on station, vulnerability to enemy electronic protection actions, electromagnetic deception techniques, and limited assets (support from nonorganic EW platforms need to be requested). The issue of limited assets is also the result of fixed-wing aircraft being the primary platforms for EW.

AIR MOVEMENT

8-33. Air movement is air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and air landings (JP 3-17). Army air movements are operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing aircraft and operational support fixed-wing assets for other than air assaults. Air movements are conducted to move Soldiers and equipment; emplace systems; and transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies. The same general considerations that apply to air assaults apply to air movements. (Refer to FM 3-04.113 for more information.)

AIR MEDEVAC

8-34. Medical evacuation refers to both ground and air evacuation of casualties and joint/partnered air evacuation elements. Air medical evacuation employs air assets from the air ambulance companies assigned to the combat aviation brigade and general support aviation battalions to evacuate casualties. The nine-line medical evacuation request is the standard method to request.

8-35. Casualty evacuation refers to nonmedical tracked or wheeled vehicles or aircraft to evacuate casualties. Casualty evacuation should only be used when the number of casualties exceeds the capability of the medical evacuation assets (such as in a mass casualty situation) or when the urgency of evacuation exceeds the risk of waiting for medical evacuation assets to arrive. Typically, both air and ground evacuation is planned for air assaults.

PLANNING

8-36. Employing aviation systems with ground maneuver forces requires coordinated forces-oriented control measures to support ground maneuver while minimizing fratricide risks.

EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION

8-37. Integrating effective air and ground maneuver forces is a top down bottom up refined continuous process. Planning and coordination with the supporting aviation elements ultimately results in supporting the ground tactical plan and making adjustments during its execution.

Fundamentals

8-38. To ensure effective integration, commanders and staffs should consider the following fundamentals to provide a framework for enhancing the effectiveness:

• Understanding capabilities and limitations of each force.

• Using SOPs.

• Form habitual relationships.

• Use regular training events.

• Follow mission command and command and control for Joint assets.

• Maximizing and concentrating effects of available assets.

◦ Distribution of fires coordinated prior.

◦ FSCM.

◦ Common graphics.

◦ Employment methods.

◦ Synchronization.

◦ Recovery of personnel and aircraft.

Merging Air and Ground

8-39. Synchronization involves merging the air and ground fights into one to apply proper aviation capabilities according to the supported commanders’ intent. Synchronization ideally begins early in the planning process with the involvement of the S-2, brigade aviation element (BAE), ALO cell, ADAM, FSO, tactical air control party, electronic warfare officer (EWO), S-4, medical officer, S-6, and S-3. This group advises the commander on aviation capabilities and the best way to use aviation to support mission objectives. Task and purpose for aviation support and continuous updates guide the air planning group.

AIR PLANNING AND SYNCHRONIZATION GROUP

8-40. Various staff officers attend the air planning synchronizing work group. They compile intelligence, fires and effects, sustainment, mission command, and maneuver functions as part of daily operations or a planning process. If air planning and synchronization is a collective effort done by battalion and higher staffs, the planning and synchronization group should host digital conference calls or place LNO’s in a central location to coordinate.

Mission Command

8-41. The S-6 ensures distribution of one system remote video terminal (OSRVT) to applicable levels. He explains how ground forces coordinate with air assets through various communication systems. Together with the S-3 they develop the communication plan and the overall mission command for air ground operations. (See table 8-1 on page 8-8.)

Maneuver

8-42. The BAE and ALO describe the higher level air plan with the platforms, capabilities, and allocations. Together with the fire effects coordination cell (FECC) they develop the air coordination measures to coordinate airspace management to separate aviation assets from indirect fire and air defense artillery assets by space and time.

8-43. The S-3 coordinates the ground maneuver plan to synchronize air operations with ground maneuver. He identifies gaps in coverage and tries to realign ground and air assets to fill those gaps. The S-3 accepts requests from lower level echelons and coordinates these requests with higher level echelons.

8-44. Together the group coordinates the air plan. The S-3 presents the concept of air support to the commander according to his intent and scheme of maneuver. The commander approves the plan or requires the group to make necessary adjustments.

Intelligence

8-45. The planning and synchronization begins with the S-2 providing enemy most likely and most dangerous courses of action, NAI are prioritized and queued then activated in sequences, with limited period of coverage required, and recommendations to what assets collect. This must be in collaboration with the staff weather officer (SWO) to determine effects of weather on the terrain, enemy, and friendly equipment.

Fires, Effects, and Protection

8-46. The fires cell provides the indirect fires plan, air defense plan and briefs locations of indirect fire and air defense artillery assets, area coverage, max range and elevation data, gun target lines, and weapons control status. If the EWO is available they explain all airborne electronic warfare efforts.

Sustainment

8-47. The S-4 is responsible to provide the air resupply and air movement coordination measures and plan. He explains the requirements for support to sustain the air elements to include forward area refueling points (FARPs), runways for aircraft and the concept of support the ground force must provide air elements. The S-4 explains ground forces requirements for emergency resupply, air resupply, air movements of personnel and air drops. The medical officer explains medical evacuation procedures, roles of medical care, and associated medical treatment facilities.

Table 8-1. Command responsibility of air-ground operations

| Echelons Above BCT | BCT | BN | CO and Below.

Planning

-Operational planning and allocation.

-Develop constraints on air management for operating area.

-ROE.

-Placement of Role 3 medical treatment facilities.

-Tasking authority. Recovery operations.

-Air EW.

-Approval for air assault and airborne operations.

-Placement of aerostats.

-Operational coordination.

-Airspace management plan by establishing ACM and FSCMs.

-Clearance of fires procedures.

-Class 3 UAS operations.

-Coordination for recovery response.

-Approval of ground tactical plan.

-Communication plan.

-Approve CDE.

-Placement of Role 1 and 2 medical treatment facilities.

-Developing ground tactical plan.

-Securing recovery site.

-Approving Class 1 and Class 2 UAS ROZ.

-Lowest level to host CAR with air elements.

-Lowest level for JTAC for Type 2 and Type 3 control.

-CDE on targets.

-Conops for ground tactical plan.

-Class 1 and Class 2 UAS ROZ.

-JFO allocation.

-Marking targets. Identification of friendly forces

Execution

-Operational C2 through JOC, CAOC, JECC.

-Divert/Retask air assets joint; Class 3(+) UAS, rotary wing.

-Air space management.

-Controls air assets going into objectives.

-JFE condition monitoring.

- Comms between air and ground assets.

- Divert/Retask air assets support Class 3 UAS (-).

-OPCON of all aviation elements.

-Air space control over objective area.

-Release authority.

-Confirmation of target identification.

-Type 2 and Type 3 control.

-Conduct air assault.

- Seize assault OBJs.

-Secure LZ.

-Expand lodgment.

-Declare TIC.

-Type 1 control if augmented.

Fires | -Joint Integrated JIPTL development. | -Joint fires planning/integration. -Preassault fires/JSEAD/SEAD. -Clear and direct all fires outside the air head line. | -En route fires. -Facilitation from PZ to LZ. | -Clear and direct all fires inside the air head line. -Request for fire during air operation. -Identify and mark targets.

Legend: |  |  |
ACM | airspace control measures | JSEAD | joint suppression of enemy air defense.
CAOC | combined air operations center. | JTAC | joint tactical air controller.
CAR | combined arms rehearsal | LZ | landing zone.
CDE | collateral damage estimation | OBJ | objective.
Comms | communications | OPCON | operational control.
CONOPS | concept of operations. | PZ | pickup zone.
EW | electronic warfare. | ROZ | restricted operating zone.
JECC | joint exercise control center. | SEAD | suppression of enemy air defense.
JFE | joint fires element. | TIC | troops in contact.
JFR | joint functional requirements. | UAS | unmanned aircraft system.
JIPTL | joint prioritized target list. |  |
JOC | joint operations center. |  |

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES

8-48. Airspace coordinating measures are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more information.) (See figure 8-1 on page 8-10.)

8-49. Common airspace coordinating measures are as follows:

• Coordinating altitudes use altitude to separate users and as the transition between different airspace coordinating entities. The airspace coordinating entities should be included in the air control plan and promulgated in the air control order (ACO). Army echelons incorporate air control plan guidance and integrate the ACO, area air defense plan, special instructions, and air tasking order via OPORDs. All airspace users should coordinate with the appropriate airspace coordinating entities when transitioning through or firing through the coordinating altitude.

• Restricted operations areas are airspaces of defined dimensions created in response to specific operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. They are known as restricted operating zones (ROZs). Ground control elements establish restricted operations area or ROZ to deconflict an area where prior coordination enhances aviation safety.

• Standard Army aircraft flight routes are routes established below the coordinating altitude to facilitate the movement of air assets. They normally are located in the corps through BCT support areas and do not require approval of the airspace control authority (ACA). They normally are listed on the current ACO. Direction of travel can be dictated as one- or two-way traffic.

• Air corridors are restricted air routes of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces. They are used to route aviation combat elements between such areas as forward arming and refueling points, holding areas, and battle positions. Altitudes of an air corridor do not exceed the established coordinating altitude.

• Axis of advance is a general route of advance, assigned for the purposes of control, which extends toward the enemy. The axis of advance symbol graphically portrays a commander’s intention (such as avoiding built-up areas or known enemy air defense sites). When used for attack aviation operations, it provides the general direction of movement and may be subdivided into routes.

• Air control points are points easily identifiable on the terrain or an electronic navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air movement. Designate air control points at each point where the air route or air corridor makes a definite change in any direction and at any other point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation.

• Communication checkpoints are points along the air route where serial commanders report to the air mission command. Radio transmissions should be used only when necessary. If a report is required, consider using codes to ensure a short transmission.

Figure 8-1. Airspace coordination measures

AIRSPACE DEVELOPMENT

8-50. When developing a COA, the ground maneuver unit should plan an air axis of advance. This provides the general concept to the aviation planners who further refine it into routes with enough guidance to determine the direction from which the commander wants to approach. Do not submit the developed axis of advance to the higher headquarters airspace mission command element until the plan is complete.

8-51. Airspace control requires both a control authority and a control system. Airspace control is a process used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with minimum restraint upon airspace users. Planning must include coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Proper planning cause’s effective airspace control and reduces the risk of fratricide, enhances air defense, and permits flexibility. (See ATP 3-52.1 for more information.)

8-52. Airspace control is applying airspace control to coordinate airspace users for concurrent employment in assigned missions. Effective airspace control enables all warfighting functions to work efficiently while synchronizing air operations to support the commander’s intent. Successful airspace control is dependent on the ability to perform the functions of identification, coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace users.

8-53. Properly managed airspace increases combat effectiveness. Ensuring the safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace, minimizes restraint placed on airspace users. It includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Effective airspace control reduces the risk of fratricide, enhances air defense, and permits flexibility. For air assault operations, the initial mission command is vital for vertical envelopment success.

8-54. Airspace control does not denote ownership of a block of airspace or command over activities within that airspace. Rather, it refers to users of the airspace. All air missions are subject to the air control order published by the ACA, which provides direction to deconflict, coordinate, and integrate airspace within the operational area.

8-55. Joint forces use airspace to conduct air operations, deliver fires, employ air defense measures, and conduct intelligence operations. At times, these missions may be time sensitive and avoid the ability to conduct detailed coordination with the land force. It is imperative that land forces provide their higher headquarters with all airspace control measures to provide visibility to other joint users and prevent fratricide.

AIR ROUTE PLANNING

8-56. Upon receipt of the course of action, the aviation liaison officer (AVN LNO) plans the air routes within the air axis of advance. The aviation unit normally plans multiple routes within the axis of advance since the threat air defense disposition may not be clear. The BAE and fires cell should assist in route planning, but the supporting aviation unit is responsible for completing the routes and submitting them to the higher headquarters airspace control element for inclusion on the ACO.

RESTRICTED OPERATIONS ZONE PLANNING

8-57. Any unit with organic UAS is responsible for planning their own ROZs for unmanned aircraft launch and recovery. All elements operating UAS in a BCT submit their request through the BAE and fires cell for deconfliction before submitting it to the higher headquarters airspace control element.

8-58. Unmanned aircraft launch and recovery ROZs typically should be 3 kilometers in radius or surface to coordinating altitude, but may be tailored to meet operational requirements. Due to their size, unmanned aircraft launch and recovery ROZs should not be planned near indirect fire units, supporting aviation unit area of action, or FARPs if possible.

8-59. The combat aviation brigade submits ROZ locations for mission command and air medical evacuation aircraft to the higher headquarters airspace control element. Mission command and air medical evacuation aircraft ROZs should be at least 3 by 3 kilometers in size. The combat aviation brigade plans both a primary and alternate ROZ for each aircraft. This enables control of the operation as it moves forward and provides a ROZ, if needed, for the higher headquarters mobile command group. FS units can utilize ROZs to assist in deconflicting airspace between firing locations and target locations.

8-60. Special consideration should be given to planned employment of an organic unmanned aircraft (UA) near an LZ. If required due to the tactical mission, UA should be clearly separated by a defined terrain feature from the LZ area, and the approach and exit routes of aircraft. (See FM 3-52 for more information.)

FIRES PLANNING AND CONSIDERATIONS

8-61. Airspace coordinating measures (ACM). ACMs are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-52). Refer to ADRP 1-02, chapter 7 for ACM graphical examples.

8-62. Fire support coordination measure (FSCM). FSCMs are measures employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-0). Refer to FM 3.09, appendix A for FSCM graphical examples and definitions.

8-63. While the definitions of these measures are similar, they each serve a different purpose and play an integral role when integrating fires through airspace from different service platforms. A key to effectively integrate joint fires is to constantly view the operational environment as a three dimensional area. Most ACMs affect direct and indirect joint fires trajectories and UAS because of their airspace use. Some ACM/FSCMs may be established to permit surface joint fires or UAS operations while others restrict them. (Refer to JP 3-52 and FM 3-09 for more information.)

8-64. Airspace Control Systems. The implementation of ACMs is defined by the United States Message Text Format (USMTF) 2000 or 2004 standard. USMTF is a set of character-oriented message text formats used in command and control systems for the rapid exchange of information. USMTF organizes ACMs into a set of broad categories called TYPES. (Refer to ATP 3-52.1, appendix B, for a complete list of each TYPE.) The primary airspace management tools of the Services (Theater Battle Management Core Systems [TBMCS] WEB AD and Tactical Airspace Integration System [TAIS]) will parse, display, and run conflict checks against all USMTF 2000 compatible ACMs. While TAIS can run conflict checks on all USTMF ACMs; however, the default setting for many ACMs is set to not check for conflicts (“conflict check” off – the operator can change the default setting based on SOP or orders). TAIS default settings for ACM conflict checks are noted in ATP 3-52.1 Appendix B, Table 6.

Fire Control Systems

8-65. AFATDS is the primary fire control system used by ground forces. AFATDS will parse and convert any USMTF 2000/2004 ACM built using a corridor (route for TAIS) shape into corridor geometry. AFATDS will display the converted ACM and run conflict checks with those geometries. AFATDS will not parse ACMs built using a shape other than corridor (route for TAIS) nor will it parse shapes built using serial waypoints as a geo reference. The AFATDS database only retains the last effective time for an ACM within an ACO. If the ACO contains an ACM with multiple start and stop times, AFATDS will only retain the last active period for the ACM.

ACM/FSCM Protection

8-66. Many ACMs are not relevant for fires and there is no requirement for AFATDS to process these ACMs. An example would be an air defense action area (ADAA). However, some ACMs are established to provide the airspace user protection from fires (for example, airspace coordination area). If protection from fires is a significant consideration then a corridor shape should be used to ensure the automated deconfliction process is accomplished.

8-67. AFATDS will alert the operator, when an ACM is constructed using a corridor shape, to develop alternative firing solutions if there is a conflict between the initial firing solution and the ACM. If no alternative firing solution is available, AFATDS will generate a “request coordination” message putting an authorized decision maker in the loop. At this point, the decision to fire or not fire will be a command decision.

8-68. If the airspace planner requires protection from fires but does not wish to use a corridor (route for TAIS) shape when building a particular ACM (that is, the shape may not be possible or practical for that ACM), then the airspace planner could build the ACM using any shape and place a second ACM, an airspace coordination area using a corridor shape, over the top of those volumes of airspace that require protection from fires. However, the easiest method is to enter the ACA directly into AFATDS operated by the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) or the fires cell since AFATDS will check the trajectories of rounds for conflicts with ACMs entered directly into AFATDS, or ACMs exchanged from other command and control (C2) systems built using a corridor shape. (Refer to ATP 3-52.1, Appendix B, Table 6 for more information.)

PREPARING

8-69. Preparing for air ground operations involves elements from both ground, air, and the higher unit sharing updates to plans as they are refined and ongoing. Intelligence is one of the major causes for adjustments in air integration due to situational understanding becoming clearer it possibly changes the ground maneuver plan which changes the air plan. ACM and FSCM adjustment should be continuous and shared throughout. For specific operations rehearsals and battle drills should be conducted.

REHEARSALS

8-70. The supported ground unit that controls the air space for all assets entering into their objective areas has the approval authority for release of munitions and is the primary level to host the combined arms rehearsal (CAR) for air operations. They have the most control over at the decisive point of the operation. Therefore, their rehearsal is key to synchronizing the air ground operation. Normally this is at the BCT or battalion level. Echelons above or below these levels benefit from participating in the CAR. Rehearsals involving air ground operations can combine with other rehearsals, considering the various operations involving air assets. Rehearsals must include (refer to FM 3-99 for more information):

• Ground tactical plan.

• Landing plan with emphasis on security at drop zone or landing zone.

• Air movement plan with emphasis on aircraft loading.

• Airspace Control and coordination measure.

• Downed aircraft recovery plan.

CLEARANCE OF FIRES

8-71. Clearance of fire procedures are enhanced with preplanned established battle drills. Through mission command systems and timely reporting elements can clear their area of operations by maintaining situational awareness. By merging the ground forces situational awareness with the controlling airspace elements through established ACMs and FSCMs air and ground forces can separate from one another by space and time to clear fires.

EXECUTING

8-72. Airspace management plays the key role in air and ground operation. Without airspace management, air and ground elements undergo significant risks. Separating by air and time are the methods used in airspace management. It is calculated by accounting for all physical things that move through the air and include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires. (See figure 8-2 below.)

Figure 8-2. Airspace management

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

8-73. Methods of airspace control are as follows:

• Positive control relies on positive identification, tracking, and directing aircraft within the airspace control area. It uses electronic means such as radar; sensors; identification, friend or foe systems; selective identification feature capabilities; digital data links; and other elements of the intelligence system and mission command network structures.

• Procedural control relies on combining mutually agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. These may include comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement, aircraft identification maneuvers, FSCMs, and airspace control measures. Service, joint and multinational capabilities and requirements determine which method, or which elements of each method, that airspace control plans and systems use. Procedural control is a common method used by all airspace users (to include indirect fire units) to deconflict airspace. In Army rotary-wing operations, such as air assaults, procedural control is used more often than positive control.

CAS AND CCA EXECUTION

8-74. The ALO and JTAC personnel in the TACP are the primary means for requesting and controlling CAS. However, reconnaissance units conducting shaping operations, such as reconnaissance and surveillance missions that have joint fires observer certified personnel, may observe and request CAS through the JTAC.

8-75. Any element in contact uses the CCA 5-Line attack brief to initiate the CCA. The CCA 5-Line attack brief allows the ground maneuver forces to communicate and reconfirm to the aircraft the exact location of friendly and enemy forces. The ground commander owning the terrain clears fires during the CCA by giving aircrews the situational awareness of the location of friendly elements. The ground commander deconflicts the airspace between indirect fires, CAS, and the CCA aircraft.

Ground Maneuver Force and Target Marking

8-76. The rapid and accurate marking of a target is essential to a positive target handover. Aircraft conducting CCAs will develop an attack plan that is METT-TC dependent and meets the ground commander’s task and purpose. The aircrew generally has an extremely limited amount of time to acquire both the friendly and enemy locations. Attack reconnaissance aircrews use both thermal sight and night vision goggles (NVG) to fly with and acquire targets.

8-77. Marking methods for identifying targets and friendly positions vary from one ground maneuver force to another. Request should include a detailed description of all friendly locations and target locations in relation to friendly positions. It should include the target description and how it is marked.

8-78. For mutual protection and clarity on the appropriate target, the ground maneuver force does not mark the target until requested by the aviation element. This in no way restricts the ground maneuver force from returning fire from the enemy. However, the ground maneuver force should consider that the aircrews may not be able to distinguish the correct target from other fires if they mark the target with fire. Visual markings can be viewed by the enemy force and provide them early warning to an attack from the air. Ground maneuver forces should have multiple means of marking their positions. If the target is marked by fire, the aviation element requests the ground maneuver force to stop marking. The aviation element calls when clear of the area and reports estimated BDA.

Handover

8-79. The ground forces commander ensures that effects from fires both direct and indirect systems are not endangering air assets prior to handing over the engagement to air assets. Ground forces normally require means to suppress or fix the enemy in position within moments before the air asset engages the targets.

8-80. Aircraft normally rely on a high rate of speed and low altitude for survivability in the target area. As such, the aircrew generally has an extremely limited amount of time to acquire both the friendly and enemy marks. The ground maneuver force must have the marking ready and turned on when requested by the aircrew. If target is not marked the air asset may not engage, miss its target, or commit fratricide.

8-81. After initially engaging the target, the aircrew generally approaches from a different angle for survivability reasons if another attack is required. The observer makes adjustments using the eight cardinal directions and distance (meters) with the last round’s impact and the actual target. At the conclusion of the CCA, the aircrew provides its best estimate of BDA to the unit in contact.

Considerations for CCA and CAS Execution

8-82. Aircraft leaders normally offset the battle position, attack or support by fire position from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to ensure that minimal interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position allows the aircraft to engage the enemy on its flanks rather than its front. It reduces the risk of fratricide along gun-target line.

8-83. Engagement of the target normally cannot be conducted without positive identification of friendly and enemy forces by both the ground and aviation commander before opening fire. The aviation element tailors its attack angles and weapon selections based upon the target and friendly unit proximity to the target.

8-84. CCA and CAS can continue until the aircraft have expended all available munitions or fuel. However, if the air element receives a request for another attack, the pilot must carefully evaluate his ability to extend the operation. If not able, the pilot calls for relief on station by another air element if available.

8-85. Clearance of fires considerations include―

• Ensure aircrews have the current ACMs and FSCMs for indirect fire positions (to include mortars) supporting the ground tactical plan.

• Plan for informal airspace coordinating areas and check firing procedures and communications to ensure artillery and mortars firing from within the LZ do not endanger subsequent serials landing or departing, CCA, or CAS.

• Ensure at least one of the aviation team members monitors the FS net for situational awareness.

• Advise the aviation element if the location of indirect fire units changes from that planned.

• Ensure all participating units are briefed daily on current ACO or air tasking order changes and updates that may affect air mission planning and execution.

• Ensure all units update firing unit locations, firing point origins, and final protective fire lines as they change for inclusion in current ACO.

8-86. After receiving the request for CAS/CCA the aircrew informs the ground maneuver force leader of the battle position, attack- or support-by-fire position (or series of positions) the team is occupying, and the location from which the attack aircraft engages the enemy with direct fire. The size of this position varies depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain. The position must be close enough to the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.

8-87. The ground commander owning the terrain clears fires during the CCA by giving aircrews the situational awareness of the location of friendly elements. The ground commander deconflicts the airspace between indirect fires, CAS, and the CCA aircraft.

METHODS TO DECONFLICT ON THE OBJECTIVE AREA

8-88. The three methods to deconflict airspace for aircraft on the objective are described in the following paragraphs.

Grid Line or Terrain Feature Separation

8-89. This is the most restrictive but easiest method to execute. It may not allow the attack reconnaissance units to engage targets in the CCA role during the air assault, but this technique is appropriate when time is limited for rehearsals, or when prior planning is extremely limited or not possible. With this method, the attack reconnaissance units clear the airspace for inbound assault units by moving to a designated grid line or terrain feature on either side of the objective. This movement and the subsequent maneuver of the attack reconnaissance units in and around the objective area are executed according to the instructions in the order. (See figure 8-3 on page 8-16)

Figure 8-3. Grid line method

Attack-by-Fire Positioning

8-90. Attack-by-fire positioning is the preferred method of deconfliction, as it allows attack reconnaissance aircraft the greatest flexibility to engage targets during the air assault in support of the ground tactical commander (GTC). The attack reconnaissance units occupy known attack-by-fire positions according to the published OPORD. This method restricts the attack reconnaissance units to the general vicinity of the attack- by-fire positions but not to a specific grid. (See figure 8-4 on page 8-17.)

8-91. The attack-by-fire positioning method requires the attack reconnaissance units to ensure they stay clear of the LZ and do not cross the centerline of the direction of flight. Using this method requires the attack reconnaissance aircraft to have increased situational awareness. This method is best used when all elements have adequate time to rehearse.

Figure 8-4. Attack-by-fire method

Call Clear

8-92. The call clear method is used in contingency circumstances when assault or other aircraft (such as air medical evacuation or mission command aircraft) are inbound to the objective area. It is initiated with an inbound call of the assault or other aircraft to the LZ and a response from the attack reconnaissance air mission command (AMC) indicating that all elements of the LZ and the flight path to it from the release point (RP) are clear. Avoid using this method during the main air assault itself due to congestion on the air battle net.

ASSESSING

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REATTACK

8-93. After the attack aircraft complete the requested CCA mission, the aircrew provides a BDA to the ground commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander determines if another attack is required to achieve his desired end state.

RELEASE FROM SUPPORT/RETASKING

8-94. Upon identification that air support is no longer required the ground forces release the supporting air elements from bottom up echelons. Higher level echelons always have the authority to retask and reassign air assets based upon METT-TC. Lower levels ensure that support is met within their higher level commander’s intent to support ground maneuver. The ground forces do this by submitting closing reports after air support is completed its tasks.

RESPOND TO DOWNED AIRCRAFT

8-95. Response to downed aircraft is always a planning consideration for all air assets and supported ground forces. When an aircraft is downed the nearest ground element immediately moves to secure the area and recover personnel and equipment. Various echelons have differing tasks to support downed aircraft and personnel recovery. Typically the sequence of events goes in order of—

• Determine location of downed aircraft.

• Closest ground element moves to site.

• Secure site and units rotate if needed to conduct follow on operations.

• Search for missing personnel and equipment.

• Destroy items that cannot be recovered if needed based on METT-TC.

• Form a recovery team.

• Recover equipment.

• Follow up tasks and accountability of secondary effects.

• Investigation for cause.

• Implement findings of investigation.

8-96. Follow on operations will occur while the downed aircraft is being secured or recovered. The responding unit must be aware of the actions they take as well as what they notice when they arrive onsite. The timeliness of their response mitigates the effort and impact and scope of the follow operations.

SECTION III – FIRES

8-97. The role of fires in the SBCT Infantry battalion is to enable the commander to seize and retain the initiative, gain and maintain freedom of movement and action, and defeat adaptive threats across the range of military operations. Fires are surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and joint fires including electronic attack. Fires are integrated and synchronized in support of the scheme of maneuver. (Refer to JP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09 for more information.)

FIRES CELL

8-98. The SBCT Infantry battalion fires cell is comprised of one Captain, one SFC, one SGT and two E4’s. This cell is organic to the field artillery battalion and attached to the Stryker battalion during collective training and deployments in support of unified land operations. The fires cell plans and coordinates all available supporting fires, including mortars, field artillery (FA), naval surface fire support, and close air support integration. (Refer to ADRP 3-09 for more information.)

8-99. The FSO for the SBCT Infantry battalion is a field artillery officer responsible for advising the supported commander and assisting the fires officer for the companies on fires functions and fire support. These duties and responsibilities should be fully delineated by the commander. The FSO may be given authority by the commander to—

• Provide for consolidated and focused fire support specific training, readiness, and authority (personnel management, equipment issue, and training).

• Facilitate establishing standard operating procedures across the force.

• Ensure efficiently resourced training packages.

• Plan for the allocation of fires support assets.

8-100. Functions of the fires cell include:

• Plan, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize through targeting, Army and joint fires and, when directed by the maneuver commander, other nonlethal effects.

• Coordinate target acquisition, target dissemination and target engagement.

• Integrate and synchronize airspace coordination requirements with Army and joint air capabilities and provide input to the air traffic operations (ATO), airspace control plan, and airspace control order which include FSCMs and ACMs.

• Produce and execute the fire support plan.

• Manage target nominations and track the life cycle of the nomination.

• Interface with all boards/cells.

• Provide input to the information collection plan.

• Conduct fires, assess, and recommend reattack.

• Coordinate position areas for fires units with maneuver and airspace control agencies

• Recommend FSCMs and ACMs.

• Request and coordinate CAS and air interdiction.

• Provide ROE guidance for collateral damage assessment and proper use of munitions for targets.

EQUIPMENT

8-101. The fires cell operates out of the battalion main command post or within the battalion commander’s CV if moving with the TAC. Each fire support team is equipped with digital and voice communications links to all available indirect fire support assets both stationary and on the move. It colocates in the battalion main command post to gain and maintain situational awareness and work seamlessly with other mission command system elements to effectively integrate and synchronize fires with the SBCT commanders’ scheme of maneuver. The primary system used by the fires cell to digitally communicate with fires assets, develop the fire support plan, and manage FSCM is AFATDS.

COMMUNICATIONS

8-102. The fires cell and JTAC (if attached) has the capability to transmit on or monitor these networks:

• Fires battalion fire direction net (digital). The FIST uses this net to send calls for fire.

• SBCT Infantry battalion network (voice). This network enables to monitor battalion operations, and links it to the commander for planning and coordination.

• Force XXI battle command, brigade and below. BFT II/JCR provides a COP with the SBCT Infantry battalion, the SBCT Infantry rifle company fires cell, and other fire support teams.

• SBCT Infantry battalion fire support network (voice). The FSO communicates with the fires on this network for which the fires cell is the net control station (NCS).

• Mortar platoon fire direction network (digital). As needed, the FIST sends fire missions to the supporting mortar platoon or section using this network.

• Joint Air Tasking Order (JATO) network (Digital). This network allows the JTAC to track available aircraft in theatre as well as planned SORTIES.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

8-103. Effective fire support does not happen without prior planning and coordination. The fires cell plans, coordinates, and oversees the execution of fire support for the battalion commander’s concept of operations. The FSO ensures he thoroughly understands what the battalion commander is trying to do and how the commander wants lethal and nonlethal effects to influence the operation.

8-104. The maneuver commander has the responsibility to integrate fire support with the scheme of maneuver. He provides the commander’s intent for an operation and issues guidance, including guidance for fire support. The FSO translates the guidance into tasks for fire support. In close coordination with the battalion S-2, S-3, and other key members of the staff, the FSO then plans indirect fire targets and aligns each target’s task and purpose with the commanders’ scheme of maneuver and uses the Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM) to communicate target details and requirements the battalions FISTs.

8-105. The maneuver commander also has the responsibility to ensure that observers understand what targets can be engaged, when they can be engaged, and which targets are the priority for the operation.

8-106. Observers have a responsibility to ensure they understand the criteria for engaging targets established by the commander. (Refer to TC 3-09.31 for more information.)

8-107. Fire support planning includes developing integrated fire plans (target lists, FSEM, fire support terminal matrix, scheme of fires, and overlays) and determining FO control options that support the commander’s scheme of maneuver.

Note. Risks are always present when employing fires. Everyone involved with the planning, coordinating, and delivery of fires handles evaluating and managing the risks. (Refer to ATP 5-19 for more information on risk management.)

Planning Considerations for Fires

8-108. In fire planning consider the following—

• Fire on known or suspected enemy positions.

• Fires not only in front of the force, but also to the flanks and rear.

• Massed fires on choke points and key terrain to canalize, slow, and block the enemy movement.

• Fires to suppress bypassed enemy pockets of resistance until friendly maneuver elements are safely past. Suppressive fires and other fires may then be needed to support follow-on force actions against the bypassed forces.

• Fires that do not create obstacles and barriers to friendly forces and limit forward progress.

Desired Effects

8-109. Desired effects describe the lethal and nonlethal effects fires (including electronic warfare systems) must achieve against a specific target. The company commander can use numerous terms to describe desired effects, with the most common being deceive, degrade, delay, deny, destroy, disrupt, divert, exploit, interdict, influence, neutralize, and suppress. (Refer to ADRP 3-09 for more information.)

8-110. In planning fires the maneuver commander and fire support planners must weigh the probable effects of preparation fire against the achievement of surprise and the creation of obstacles capable of impeding friendly forces movements. Preparation fire can continue while ground maneuver elements are moving. If the commander chooses to make the initial assault without preparation fire to achieve tactical surprise, fires are planned to support each subordinate unit’s maneuver throughout the operation.

Effects

8-111. An effect is—

• The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, or a set of actions.

• The result, outcome, or consequence of an action.

• A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom as the result, outcome, or consequence of an action.

8-112. Army and joint doctrine describe effects in two ways:

• Direct effect. A direct effect is the proximate, first-order consequence of an action, such as the destruction of a target by precision-guided munitions. Direct effects are immediate and easily recognizable.

• Indirect effect. An indirect effect is a delayed or displaced consequence associated with the action that caused the direct effect. Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary’s behavior. However, an indirect effect may be the one desired.

Allocation

8-113. Decisions on allocations of fires are based on the decisive operation, the task of each unit, and the expected enemy capabilities. The commander must ensure all fires assets are addressed to include target acquisition (TA). Allocation may be expressed as specific targets, numbers of targets/zones for planning purposes, or as assets available (for example, 1x FA PLT DS to Alpha Co). Priority of fires is addressed for planned activities but can change based on a change to the enemy COA, completion of events, or planned branches and sequels.

Positioning Guidance

8-114. Positioning guidance provides instructions for the movement of fires assets and observer positioning to support the scheme of maneuver. Positioning guidance should highlight any specific changes to the unit basic load, if necessary for special missions. The positioning guidance should address the CSR particularly if it impacts successful mission accomplishment. An example of positioning guidance is as follows: “MTR PLT IPRTF vice NLT H+20 and support 1st PLT breach vice OBJ CHIEFS. Ensure 40 min x 400 of smoke on hand. 2d PLT establish OP1 vice 7081 with laser designating capability. CSR limited to 10 HE (high explosive)/5 SMK/3 ILLUM.”

Attack Guidance

8-115. Attack guidance describes which delivery systems are to be used to attack specific target types and the criteria that must be met before processing the target. Initial attack guidance is usually provided from a higher headquarters order and should be modified as needed based on mission analysis and COA development. Attack guidance is usually articulated in a matrix format. It also may be included in the following products:

• High-payoff target list (HPTL).

• Target selection standards (TSS).

• Attack guidance matrix (AGM).

Restrictions

8-116. Restrictions describe constraints in terms of requiring something to do or prohibiting an action. Some considerations include restrictions on ammunition expenditures, types of fires, areas of employment, creation of obstacles, limiting risk to friendly troops, minimizing the loss of civilian life, and permissive and restrictive FSCMs. Examples of restrictions are: “No cratering munitions on HWY 322. No occupation or use of incendiary munitions in built up areas. CFL PL BLUE, o/o PL RED. NFA 1-2 in effect.”

CLEARANCE OF FIRES

8-117. The maneuver commander is the final authority to approve (clear) fires and their effects within his zone or AO. Although the commander may delegate authority to coordinate and clear fires to his FSO, the ultimate responsibility belongs to the commander. During certain operations, especially in stability tasks, it may take the SBCT commander or a division commander to approve fires. Usually, the FSO assists the commander by recommending the clearance of fires and collateral damage estimate. The preferred method for fires request is through the FSV fire support digital systems thus reducing error, decreasing transmission delay, and increasing accuracy of the time-sensitive, mission-critical targeting information. Also, units equipped with BFT II/JCR can request fires digitally by highlighting the call-for-fire box on the BFT II/JCR supporting arms liaison team (SALT) report tab or using a traditional call-for-fire format. Once the FSO receives this request via BFT II/JCR, he must still clear the request through the company level commander that is responsible for that AO. If the company commander approves the request, the FSO may have to gain approval from the battalion commander, ROE depending; before forwarding the request through the fire support channels.

OBSCURATION AND SCREENING

8-118. Obscuration fires decrease an opponent’s capability to visually sight friendly forces and the level of energy available for the functions of seekers, trackers, and vision enhancement devices. Smoke projectiles may be placed on or near adversary or enemy positions to minimize an opponent’s observation both within and beyond the position area. Screening fires are delivered in areas between friendly and an opponent’s forces or in friendly areas of operation to degrade opponent ground and aerial detection, observation, and engagement capabilities to enable freedom of friendly maneuver and actions.

8-119. When used correctly smoke can significantly reduce the enemy’s effectiveness both in daytime and at night. Use smoke to reduce the ability of the enemy to deliver effective fires, to hamper hostile operations, and to deny the enemy information on friendly positions and maneuvers. Smoke reduces the effectiveness of laser beams and inhibits electro-optical systems including some night vision devices. The four types of smoke are—

• Obscuring smoke is placed on or near the threat to suppress threat observers and to minimize their vision (ATP 3-09.30).

• Screening smoke is a smoke curtain used on the battlefield between threat observation points and friendly units to mask friendly forces, positions, and activities (ATP 3-09.30).

• Deception smoke is a smoke curtain used to deceive and confuse the threat as to the nature of friendly operations (ATP 3-09.30).

• Signaling smoke is used to establish a reference for friendly forces (ATP 3-09.30).

8-120. Use obscuring smoke to—

• Defeat flash ranging and restrict the enemy’s counterfire program.

• Obscure enemy observation posts and reduce their ability to provide accurate target location for enemy fire support assets.

• Obscure enemy direct fire weapons and lasers.

• Instill apprehension and increase enemy patrolling.

• Slow enemy vehicles to blackout speeds.

• Increase control problems by preventing effective visual signals and increasing radio traffic.

• Defeat night observation devices and reduce the capability of most infrared devices.

8-121. Use screening smoke for—

• Deceptive Screens. Smoke draws fire. Deceptive screens cause the enemy to disperse his fires and expend his ammunition.

• Flank Screens. Smoke may be used to screen exposed flanks.

• Areas Forward of the Objective. Smoke helps the maneuver units consolidate on the objective unhindered by enemy ground observers.

• Gap-Crossing Operations. Screening the primary crossing site denies the enemy information. Deceptive screens deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main crossing.

• Obstacle Breaching. The enemy is denied the ability to observe breaching unit activities.

ILLUMINATION

8-122. Illumination fires (visible or infrared) are useful in exposing an opponent at night. Illumination fires may give friendly forces an advantage by reducing the enemy forces’ ability to operate at night without being targeted and attacked with minimal collateral damage. Infrared illumination enhances the Soldier’s use of some night vision devices to more easily locate targets and enable surprise fires on enemy forces not equipped with night vision devices. Illumination fires may be used for its deterrent effect through its use as a show of force or for area denial.

FIELD ARTILLERY

8-123. FA is the battalion commander’s principal means for providing indirect FS to his maneuver forces. FA can neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy direct fire forces, attack enemy artillery and mortars, provide battlefield obscuration, and deliver field artillery scatterable mines (FASCAM) to isolate and interdict enemy forces, or to protect friendly operations. FA elements within maneuver organizations serve as the integrating center for all elements of FS. FA delivery systems include cannons, rockets, and missiles. These systems can provide fires under all conditions of weather and in all types of terrain. They can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace.

JSEAD/SEAD

8-124. Suppression of enemy air defenses is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01). Army aviation and the air platforms of other services, particularly the Air Force, enable the ground commander to quickly influence operations and to add depth to the battlefield.

REQUIREMENT FOR SEAD

8-125. The availability of fires from air assets also gives the commander the corresponding responsibility to protect those assets. This obligation is significant because the increasingly sophisticated threat that faces

U.S. forces throughout the area of operations. Enemy forces have the capability to field effective integrated air defense networks. These networks, consisting of weapon systems, radars, and control nodes, present a formidable all-altitude protection umbrella.

8-126. The most effective enemy air defense systems will be on the high-intensity battlefield. Enemy air defense capabilities in mid- and low-intensity environments also pose a significant threat to U.S. air assets Friendly air assets must be able to survive to contribute their full combat potential. SEAD is a critical function that must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.

8-127. SEAD operations must be synchronized with elements of the fire support system and with members of the joint and combined arms team to produce maximum combat power. Unity of effort is essential in this endeavor. Synchronization of fire support resources requires detailed planning and coordination and precise timing.

SECTION IV – UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

8-128. There are various UAS air platforms and systems comprised of fixed wing, rotary wing, lighter than air, operated by the department of defense, joint, and combined forces that participate in air ground operations. The discussion in this section does not represent all available but will provide some insight for the purpose of explanation of Army air-ground operations concepts. UAS are separated into classes by characteristics listed in the table below.

Table 8-2. Classes of UAS

UA Category | Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight (lbs) | Normal Operating Altitude (ft) | Airspeed (KIAS) | Representative UA
Group 1 | 0–20 | <1,200 AGL | <100 | Raven Wasp Puma
Group 2 | 21–55 | <3,500 AGL | <250 | Scan Eagle
Group 3 | 56 < 1,320 | <18,000 MSL | Any airspeed | Shadow
Group 4 | >1,320 | Hunter Predator Gray Eagle Fire Scout
Group 5 | >18,000 MSL | Global Hawk Reaper Triton

Legend:

AGL—above ground level

ft—feet

KIAS—knots indicated airspeed

kts—knots

lbs—pounds

MSL—mean sea level

UA—unmanned aircraft

Note: Groups 1, 2, and 3 are sometimes referred to as low, slow, or small UASs.

8-129. UAS bring numerous capabilities and provide the SBCT Infantry battalion with many options for employment. These UAS can conduct—

• Aerial reconnaissance and security tasks.

• Close air support tasks.

• Airborne EW tasks.

8-130. The most common system within the SBCT level is RQ-7B Shadow. It can support offensive or defensive tasks by either employing indirect fires, laser designate targets for joint aircraft and remote engagements.

8-131. The RAVEN/PUMA Class 1 UAS are assigned to the Infantry rifle company and can be deployed in various roles. This system primarily supports reconnaissance conducted by the units through aerial surveillance.

8-132. The predator UAS variants may be armed with Hellfire missiles to engage autonomously or fire its missiles from a remote designator. The control station can integrate into battalion TOCs to support their operations when they are attached. Often the division will allocate sorties to the SBCT which the battalion can request to support their operations (see ATP 3-04.64 for more information).

8-133. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units conduct reconnaissance as a maneuver force with manned and unmanned systems maneuvering interdependently. Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) is the integrated maneuver of Army Aviation rotary wing and UAS to conduct movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance, and security tasks. MUM-T enables increased depth and breadth of Aviation reconnaissance and maneuver, longer persistence over the reconnaissance objective, increased ability to gain and maintain enemy contact, greater survivability and more options to develop the situation with enhanced maneuver, fires and mission command (Refer to FM 3-04 for more information).

8-134. Aerostat is a lighter than air system that provides persistent geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and SIGINT capabilities. This system supports air ground operations with ground forces and mission command elements primarily to provide visual support to engage targets.

Chapter 9

Enabling Tasks and Activities

Enabling tasks are specialized missions that units plan and conduct to achieve or sustain a tactical advantage. Units execute these operations as part of offense, defense, or stability tasks. The fluid nature of the modern battlefield increases the frequency with which the Stryker infantry battalion enabling tasks and activities, which include, assembly area operations, battle handover, CBRN, combined arms breaching, passage of lines, relief in place, and site exploitation. This chapter establishes techniques and procedures unique to the Stryker Infantry battalion that the can apply to these specialized task.

SECTION I – ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

9-1. An assembly area is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (ADRP 1-02). Ideally, an assembly area provides—

• Concealment from air and ground observation.

• Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.

• Space for dispersion; each assembly area is separated by enough distance from other assembly areas to avoid mutual interference.

• Cover from direct fire.

• Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain the movement of the unit vehicles and individual Soldier.

• Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.

• Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the assembly area.

• Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires because it is located outside the enemy’s range.

9-2. The proper location of assembly areas contributes significantly to both security and flexibility. It should facilitate future operations so movement to subsequent positions can take place smoothly and quickly by concealed routes. The tactical mobility of the SBCT Infantry battalion units allows it to occupy assembly areas at greater distances from the LD. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

QUARTERING PARTY EMPLOYMENT

9-3. Usually, the SBCT Infantry battalion employs a quartering party (also known as an advance party) to assist in the occupation of an assembly area. A quartering party is a group of unit representatives dispatched to a probable new site of in advance of the main body to secure, reconnoiter, and organize the site before the main body’s arrival and occupation.

9-4. The SBCT Infantry battalion establishes the quartering party according to their SOPs. For example, the quartering party could consist of one vehicle from the headquarters section and one from each company. The SBCT Infantry battalion XO usually leads the quartering party. The quartering party’s actions at the assembly area include the following:

• Reconnoiter for enemy forces and CBRN contamination.

• Evaluate the condition of the route leading into the assembly area and the suitability of the area (drainage, space, internal routes).

• Organize the area based on the commander’s guidance; designate and mark tentative locations for platoons’ vehicles, command post vehicles, and trains.

• Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.

• Mark bypass or removes obstacles (within the party’s capabilities).

• Develop digital assembly area overlay and send overlays to SBCT Infantry rifle company main body and SBCT Infantry battalion main command post.

OCCUPATION OF THE ASSEMBLY AREA

9-5. Once the quartering party finishes preparing the assembly area, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the SBCT Infantry battalion. Placing subordinate elements in serials and chalks assists in maintaining distance between the elements to prevent crowding at the entry and exit points. Normally, each company sends its quartering party as its lead element. Having multiple entrances and routes to the assembly area also allow the battalion to occupy the assembly area in a faster manner. SOPs and guides assist vehicle commanders to quickly find their positions, clear the route, and assume designated positions in the assembly area. (See figure 9-1.)

9-6. The SBCT Infantry battalion should provide a security element to prevent the enemy from engaging forces along the avenue of approach. Each SBCT Infantry rifle company establishes local security to protect their forces and coordinates with adjacent units to prevent fratricide. Weapons orientation and sector of fire for each subordinate element should be sent to the SBCT Infantry battalion operations cell after units have occupied their positions.

Figure 9-1. SBCT Infantry battalion assembly area

ACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA

9-7. Following occupation of the assembly area, the SBCT Infantry battalion prepares for future operations by conducting TLPs and priorities of work. These preparations include the following:

• Establish and maintain security (at the appropriate readiness level).

• Adjust the defensive fire plan between companies.

• Track all elements entering and leaving the assembly area.

• Conduct the operations process.

• Perform maintenance on vehicles and communications equipment.

• Verify weapons system status; conduct bore sighting, prepare-to-fire checks, register indirect fire targets, test-fire weapons, and other necessary preparations.

Note. Coordination of test fires must be cleared through the SBCT Infantry battalion operations cell.

• Weapons control status

• Conduct resupply, refueling and rearming operations.

• Conduct rehearsals and other training for upcoming operations.

• Adjust task organization as needed.

• Account for SBCT Infantry battalion personnel, to include attachments and sensitive items.

• Update unit personnel on the enemy situation.

LINKUP

9-8. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances (FM 3-90-1). It happens when an advancing force reaches an objective area previously seized by another force; when an encircled force breaks out to rejoin friendly forces or when a force comes to the relief of an encircled force; and when converging maneuver forces meet. Both forces may be moving toward each other, or one may be stationary. Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much information as possible before starting a mission. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

9-9. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes—

• A common operational picture.

• Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup.

• Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, to include control measures.

• Linkup method.

• Recognition signals and communication procedures to use, to include pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, weapon orientation, panels, colored smoke, lights, and challenge and passwords.

• Actions to conduct following linkup.

CONTROL MEASURES

9-10. The commander who orders the linkup establishes control measures for units conducting the linkup. He assigns each unit an area of operation defined by left and right boundaries and a restricted fire line. He establishes a no-fire area around one or all companies to ensure that uncleared air-delivered munitions or indirect fires do not cross either the restrictive fire lines (RFL) or a boundary and impact friendly forces.

9-11. The restricted fire line assists with the prevention of fratricide. The linkup forces use the linkup points established by the commander to make physical contact with each other. The commander designates alternate linkup points, since enemy action may interfere with the primary linkup points. Control measures are adjusted during the mission to provide for freedom of action as well as positive control.

LINKUP TECHNIQUES

9-12. There are two linkup techniques. The preferred method is when the moving force has an assigned LOA near the other force and conducts the linkup at predetermined contact points. Units then coordinate further actions.

9-13. The least preferred method of linkup a commander can use during highly mobile or fluid operations is when the enemy force escapes from a potential encirclement or when one of the linkup forces is at risk and requires immediate reinforcement. In this method, the moving force continues to move and conduct long-range recognition via radio or other measures, stopping only when it makes physical contact with the other force.

PHASES OF THE LINKUP

9-14. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts linkup activities independently or as part of a larger force. The linkup comprises three phases. The following actions are critical to the execution of a successful linkup. (See table 9-1 on page 9-5.)

Phase 1, Far Recognition Signal

9-15. During this phase, the forces conducting a linkup establish both frequency modulation (FM) radio and digital communications before reaching direct fire range. The lead element of each linkup force should monitor the radio frequency of the other friendly force and its digital communications for messages.

Phase 2, Coordination

9-16. Before initiating movement to the linkup point, the forces must coordinate necessary tactical information/intelligence that includes the following:

• Present and suspected enemy situation.

• Force XXI battle command—brigade and below (BFT II/JCR) (if equipped) filter setting, address book commonality, and key role names.

• Type and number of friendly vehicles and number of vehicles equipped with BFT II/JCR.

• Disposition of stationary forces (if either unit is stationary).

• Routes to the linkup point and rally point (if any).

• Direct and indirect fire control measures.

• Near recognition signal(s).

• Communications information.

• Sustainment responsibilities and procedures.

• Finalized location of the linkup point and rally point(s) (if any).

• Any special coordination, such as those covering maneuver instructions or requests for medical support.

• Additional friendly or neutral forces in the area.

Phase 3, Movement to the Linkup Point and Linkup

9-17. All units or elements involved in the linkup enforce strict fire control measures to help prevent fratricide and friendly fire. Moving or converging forces must easily recognize linkup points and RFL. Linkup elements take the following actions:

• Conduct far recognition using FM radio or BFT II/JCR.

• Conduct short-range (near) recognition using the designated signal.

• Complete movement to the linkup point.

• Establish local security at the linkup point.

• Conduct additional coordination and linkup activities, as needed.

Table 9-1. Linkup responsibilities

Headquarters Ordering Units | Units Linking Up
A common operational picture using available mission command systems. | Provide role identifications in Mission Command Systems to include call signs, and frequency modulation (FM) frequencies to linking up unit and headquarters ordering unit.
Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup. | Acknowledge with headquarters ordering unit.
Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, including control measures. | Make recommendations for changes to linking up unit and headquarters ordering unit to refine control measures.
Linkup method. |
Recognition signals and communication procedures, including pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, gun-tube orientation, panels, colored smoke, lights, and challenge and passwords. | Confirm procedures with linking up unit and Headquarters ordering unit.
Operations to conduct following linkup. | Prepare for fragmentary order (FRAGORD), military decision-making process (MDMP), or troop leading procedure (TLP).
Designates alternate linkup points. | Acknowledge with headquarters ordering unit.

SECTION II – BATTLE HANDOVER

9-18. The battle handover is the transfer of responsibility for the battle from SBCT Infantry battalion security forces to the main body forces in the MBA. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander prescribes criteria for the handover and designates where security forces displace, pass through routes, contact points, and the battle handover line (BHL). The BHL is usually forward of the FEBA, which is where elements of the passing unit are effectively over-watched by direct fires of the forward combat elements. Battalions usually employ security forces in the area forward of the BHL (refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information).

9-19. The maneuver battalion coordinates the battle handover with the security force to their front. This coordination overlaps with the passage of lines, so the battalion should conduct the two simultaneously. To facilitate a rapid battle handover, it is best to establish a coordination SOP. Battle handover coordination usually includes—

• Communications between elements of the reconnaissance and security force to the next unit likely to make contact.

• Updating the COP.

• Coordinating passage.

• Collocating mission command systems.

• Dispatching liaisons to contact points.

• Recognition signals.

• Status of obstacles and routes.

• Fire support, air defense, and sustainment requirements.

• Coordinate contact points, lanes, and other control measures.

• Assisting the security force when breaking enemy contact.

• Coordinating and exchanging maneuver, obstacle, and fire plans.

• Rules of engagement.

• Civilian considerations (including displaced persons).

9-20. The security force adjusts to the enemy’s advance and continues to conduct security operations as far forward as possible. It continues to resist the enemy’s shaping operations, such as their reconnaissance effort, thereby upsetting the coordination and enabling the MBA commander to fight one engagement (or battle) at a time. Doing this increases the chances for success even if the enemy attack penetrates into the MBA in some areas. In some cases, the security force can attack the enemy force from its rear, or engage HPTs to isolate leading enemy units.

9-21. During battle handover, the maneuver battalion in the MBA—

• Assists in the passage of lines and disengagement.

• Gains and maintains contact with enemy forces as the battle handover occurs.

• Continues to locate and destroy enemy reconnaissance and security elements to preclude observation of the primary defensive positions.

• May execute obstacles which are part of the handover forces plan, to protect forces and further develop the situation during battle handover.

SECTION III – CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

9-22. A CBRN environment comprises conditions found in an area that resulted from immediate or persistent effects of CBRN attacks or unintentional releases. (Refer to FM 3-11 and ADRP 3-37 for additional information.) CBRN operations include the employment of tactical capabilities that counter the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards through—

• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation prevention (security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation).

• WMD counterforce (interdiction, offensive operations, and elimination).

• CBRN defense (active and passive defense).

• CBRN consequence management.

9-23. The NBCRV provides support to the brigade and can be task organized to the SBCT Infantry battalion. It can detect CBRN hazards out to 5 kilometers. It can identify chemical hazards while on the move (reconnaissance) but must be static to conduct biological surveillance. NBCRVs are employed as squads and may be used separately, but NBCRVs are always mutually supporting (one chain of command). They are IPB-focused and work for the SBCT commander fulfilling reconnaissance tasks. NBCRVs conduct search, survey, surveillance, and sampling operations:

• Search operations include route, zone, and area reconnaissance, and are conducted to find the contamination.

• Survey operations are used to determine the limits of contamination on the ground, and are time consuming.

• CBRN surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface locations, places, persons, or things by visual, aerial, electronic, photographic, or other means to confirm or detect the presence of CBRN hazards.

9-24. Sample collection is obtaining a chemical, biological, or radiological environmental sample for the commander to make tactical level decisions and for follow on analysis. The SBCT Infantry battalion CBRN staff section advises the commander on all CBRN matters. The CBRN section is responsible for collecting, consolidating, and distributing all CBRN reports from subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. The CBRN section inspects CBRN equipment and trains subordinate units on CBRN defensive tasks during peacetime and during wartime. The SBCT Infantry battalion CBRN officer is a member of the S-3 plans and operations section, and usually operates in the main CP.

9-25. The SBCT Infantry battalion CBRN officer acts as the liaison with any attached CBRN elements and is required to coordinate closely with the S-2 on the current and updated CBRN threat. Together, they develop CBRN NAIs. The CBRN officer coordinates with fire support and aviation personnel on planned obscuration operations and advises them of hazard areas. With the S-4, the CBRN officer coordinates on logistics matters such as mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), protective mask filters, and fog oil. They also identify “clean” and “dirty” routes, and contaminated casualty collection points. The CBRN officer exercises staff supervision over the CBRN reconnaissance platoon in the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), and synchronizes their activities with reconnaissance planning.

9-26. The CBRN reconnaissance platoon in the SBCT informs the commander of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards on the battlefield. The purpose of CBRN reconnaissance is to detect, identify, quantify, report, and mark specific CBRN hazards.

SECTION IV – COMBINED ARMS BREACHING

9-27. The SBCT Infantry battalion relies on mobility to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative for its operations. Breaching and gap crossing are essential tasks to maintain freedom of maneuver. The SBCT has organic capabilities to support the SBCT Infantry battalion with assets and units from the BEB with breaching and gap crossing capability.

BREACHING

9-28. A breaching operation is an operation conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of obstacles. It is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of the maneuver commander. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals, and they end when battle handover has occurred between follow-on forces and a unit conducting the breaching operation (ATTP 3-90.4). Breaching is an inherent part of maneuver. Effective breaching operations allow friendly maneuver in the face of obstacles.

9-29. Whenever possible, units should bypass obstacles, enabling it to maintain the momentum of the operation. Commanders must ensure that conducting the bypass provides a tactical advantage without exposing the unit to unnecessary danger. Breaching begins when friendly forces detect an obstacle. Breaching ends when friendly forces destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle, or when battle handover has occurred between a unit conducting the breaching and follow-on forces. Successful obstacle breaching depends on the SBCT Infantry battalion effectively applying the breaching fundamentals of SOSRA. Deliberate, hasty (including in-stride), and covert are the three general types of breaching operations. (Refer to ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.)

BREACHING TENETS

9-30. Successful breaching is characterized by applying breaching tenets. These tenets should be applied whenever an obstacle is encountered in the AO, whether during an attack or a route clearance. The tenets are—

• Intelligence.

• Breaching fundamentals.

• Breaching organization.

• Mass.

• Synchronization.

INTELLIGENCE

9-31. Success depends largely on the force commander’s ability to see the area of operation. He must identify how the enemy is using the terrain to minimize the risk of surprise. This is particularly true when attempting to counter the enemy’s use of obstacles. This is done with the IPB process. During the IPB process, the situation template is developed. Through information collection the enemy course of action becomes clearer. Adjusting the enemy overlay is a constant process throughout the operation. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)

BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS

9-32. SOSRA are the breaching fundamentals that must be applied to ensure success when breaching against a defending enemy. These fundamentals will always apply, but they may vary based on the mission variables.

Suppression

9-33. Suppression is a tactical task used to employ direct or indirect fires or an electronic attack on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires and observation of friendly forces (ATTP 3-90.4). The purpose of suppression during breaching is to protect forces reducing and maneuvering through an obstacle. The MGS platoon can provide direct fire suppression with its 105-mm main gun, M240C COAX, and .50 cal. The Stryker Infantry rifle platoon can assist with its RWS MK-19, .50 cal, or M240B equipped crew served weapon. The Infantry provides suppression with their M240B machine guns from its weapon squad. The mortar platoon can provide suppression with its M240B dismounted 81-mm and mounted 120-mm mortars using high explosive (HE) rounds. The fires battalion also supports with a battery of six 155mm howitzers. The sniper elements can provide long range precision fires and should engage enemy observers, leadership, vehicle commanders, and heavy weapons elements.

Obscuration

9-34. Obscuration must be employed to protect forces conducting obstacle reduction and the passage of assault forces. Obscuration hampers enemy observation and target acquisition and conceals friendly activities and movement. Obscuration smoke deployed on or near the enemy’s position minimizes its vision. Screening obscuration employed between the reduction area and the enemy conceals movement and reduction activities. It degrades enemy ground and aerial observations. Obscuration must be carefully planned to provide maximum degradation of enemy observation and fires, but it must not significantly degrade friendly fires and control. Sources of obscuration for the SBCT Infantry battalion can come from CBRN elements if available, artillery, mortars, and smoke grenades for the Infantry. The mortar platoon and fires battery provide both suppression and obscuration during a breach if using smoke, white phosphorus (WP) and HE rounds.

Secure

9-35. Friendly forces secure the reduction area to prevent the enemy from interfering with obstacle reduction and the passage of the assault force through the lanes created during the reduction. Security must be effective against outposts and fighting positions near the obstacle and against overwatching units, as necessary. The far side of the obstacle must be secured by fires or be occupied before attempting any effort to reduce the obstacle. The attacking unit’s higher headquarters has the responsibility to isolate the breach area by fixing adjacent units, attacking enemy reserves in depth, and providing counterfire support. Identifying the extent of the enemy’s defenses is critical before selecting the appropriate technique to secure the point of breach. If the enemy controls the point of breach and cannot be adequately suppressed, the force must secure the point of breach before it can reduce the obstacle. The breach force must be resourced with enough maneuver assets to provide local security against the forces that the support force cannot sufficiently engage. Elements within the breach force that secure the reduction area may be used to suppress the enemy once reduction is complete.

Reduce

9-36. Reduction is the creation of lanes through or over an obstacle to allow an attacking force to pass. If capable the reconnaissance force can conduct a covert breach allowing the security force to better reduce the obstacle. The number and width of lanes created varies with the enemy situation, the assault force’s size and composition, and the scheme of maneuver. The lanes must allow the assault force to rapidly pass through the obstacle. The breach force will reduce, proof (if required), mark, and report lane locations and the lane- marking method to higher headquarters. Follow-on units will further reduce or clear the obstacle when required. Reduction cannot be accomplished until effective suppression and obscuration are in place, the obstacle has been identified, and the point of breach is secure.

Assault

9-37. The breach is not complete until friendly forces have assaulted to destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle that is capable of placing or observing direct and indirect fires on the reduction area.

BREACHING ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTION

9-38. The commander organizes friendly forces to accomplish the breaching fundamentals quickly and effectively. This requires him to organize reconnaissance, support, breach, and assault forces with the necessary assets to accomplish their roles. (See table 9-2 on page 9-11 and figure 9-2 on page 9-12.)

COVERING FORCE

9-39. The covering force primary task is reconnaissance to identify the enemy position to include its obstacles. Communicating the location composition, disposition and perceived intent of obstacles and enemy forces assists the S-2 and SBCT Infantry battalion commander to develop the enemy overlay and scheme of maneuver. Whenever possible the reconnaissance force should conduct covert breach to assist the breach force. The reconnaissance force should be stealthy and infiltrate through the area of operation bypassing obstacles unless to conduct covert breach. The ability to get behind the enemy main defense should further enhance the reconnaissance effort and must be closely considered with its risk of the element to become isolated.

9-40. The scout platoon for the SBCT Infantry battalion is the covering force that conducts area reconnaissance. Task organizing an engineer squad to the scout platoon can assist with the opportunity to conduct covert breach. Placing the sniper squad with the scout platoon can assists with infiltration and can overwatch covert breach points as well as disrupt enemy defensive tasks.

Support Force

9-41. The support force’s primary responsibility is to eliminate the enemy’s ability to interfere with a breach and is usually comprised of an SBCT Infantry rifle company and mortar platoon in direct support. This element should be the primary for indirect fire support and have priorities of fires in the initial stage and continue until a breach lane is open. Placing MGS or antiarmor platoons in this force further enhances its suppression of the enemy. The Infantry element uses its weapons squads to provide an intermediate support force for engagements closer to the obstacle breach point.

9-42. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, it moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes SBF positions. The support force leader sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and complexity of the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the location of possible bypass. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the obstacle.

Breach Force

9-43. The breach force reduces the obstacle, proofs, and marks lanes. This is usually comprised of an SBCT Infantry rifle company with an engineer platoon. The breach force provides an element to conduct local support by fire.

9-44. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle or bypass. It then must organize internally to meet these responsibilities—

• Provide local security for the breach site, as needed.

• Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the obstacle or secures the bypass.

• Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to firing positions that allow it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.

Breaching Methods

9-45. The SBCT Infantry rifle company as the breach force can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets to breach the type of obstacle encountered. If the SBCT Infantry rifle company does not have this capability, it must provide close-in security for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods are—

• Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes.

• Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173 line charge, the MK 7 Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS), or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT (2, 4, 6-Trinitrotoluene [CAS Number 118-96-7; explosive]). The MGS can use this method for walls, structures, and buildings.

• Manual breaching, with Soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks, shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. This may include using logs, or other available items to conduct a breach of a wire obstacle. Manual breaching is the least preferred method.

9-46. In extreme cases, the commander may order an obstacle to be forced through. This technique requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle location. If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt to detonate mines or overrun barricades and wire obstacles.

Creating and Proofing the Lane

9-47. The mine plow and other engineer assets are the preferred breaching devices, but if they are not available the breach team may only have hand tools, picks and shovels to create the lane. When properly equipped and supported, the company can create up to two lanes through an obstacle.

9-48. Proofing verifies that a lane is free of mines and that the width and trafficability of the point of breach are suitable for the assault force. Proofing can be conducted visually (against surface-laid minefields), electronically (mine detectors), or mechanically (mine clearing rollers [MCRs]) this process ensures that the lane is clear.

Marking the Lane

9-49. After the lane is created and proofed, it can then be marked to ensure safe movement by vehicles and personnel; this is critical for follow-on forces that may not know the exact location of the cleared lane. Distinctive markers must show where the lane begins and ends. (Refer to ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.)

9-50. To minimize the necessary breaching time, the proofing vehicle may simultaneously mark the lane. Unit SOPs dictate marking methods and materials, which commonly include the following:

• Cleared lane mechanical marking system (CLAMMS).

• Pathfinder system.

• Engineer stakes with tape.

• Guides.

• Chemical lights.

• Expended shell casings.

Completing the Breach

9-51. Throughout the operation, the breach element provides continuous updates of the breach force’s progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. They coordinate with the support force for suppressive fires.

9-52. After marking is complete, the breach element uses voice and digital systems to report the location of the lane and the method of marking to expedite the movement of the assault force. Digital overlays enable units to move quickly to the breach lanes using the position navigation (POSNAV) or global positioning system (GPS).

9-53. The assault force will often move behind the breach force and closely follow the breach vehicles through the new lane.

Assault Force

9-54. The assault force’s primary mission is to destroy the enemy and seize terrain on the far side of the obstacle to prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on the created lanes. This is normally an SBCT Infantry rifle company. The Stryker vehicle is designed to provide protection to the point of deployment. It should not be used as a fighting vehicle to assault the objective on the far side of the breach. The company commander makes the determination based on mission variables of METT-TC to risk possible destruction of a Stryker vehicle to achieve speed and some protection for the assault force while moving through the breach to assault the objective. Priority of fires shifts from the support force to the assault force once the breach lane is open.

9-55. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the breach force while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault force then moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation or continues the attack according to the commander’s intent.

Table 9-2. Relationship between breaching organization and breaching fundamentals

Breaching Organization | Breaching Fundamentals | Responsibilities

Support force.

Suppress.

Obscure.

Suppress enemy direct-fire systems covering the reduction area.

Control obscuring smoke.

Prevent enemy forces from repositioning or counterattacking to place direct fires on the breach force.

The mortar section can provide both suppression and obscuration with mix of 60-mm and 81-mm dismounted, and

120-mm mounted mortars simultaneously.

Breach force.

Suppress (provides additional suppression).

Obscure (provides additional obscuration in the reduction area).

Secure (provides local security).

Reduce.

Create and mark the necessary lanes in an obstacle.

Secure the nearside and far side of an obstacle.

Defeat forces that can place immediate direct fires on the reduction area.

Report the lane status/location.

Assault force. | Assault. Suppress (if necessary). | Destroy the enemy on the far side of an obstacle that is capable of placing direct fires on the reduction area. Assist the support force with suppression if the enemy is not effectively suppressed. Be prepared to breach follow-on or protective obstacles after passing through the reduction area.

Figure 9-2. SBCT Infantry battalion breach in open terrain

GAP CROSSING

9-56. Gap-crossing is projecting combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap). It requires specific procedures, detailed planning, and technical support that differ from other tactical operations. The SBCT Infantry battalion can take part in two types of gap-crossing operations: hasty and deliberate. The battalion usually conducts hasty or covert gap-crossing and participates in deliberate gap-crossings as part of a brigade or larger element. (Refer to ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.)

9-57. The commander may choose to conduct a hasty crossing when the momentum of the operation must be maintained, when the banks are lightly held or undefended, and when sufficient engineer assets are available to support the crossing. Despite the term “hasty,” the commander must use all available time and assets to ensure that the conditions are set for the crossing. The crossing is like a breach in that suppression and obscuration normally precede any attempt to cross the obstruction.

WET GAP-CROSSING

9-58. Hasty wet gap-crossings are decentralized operations to cross inland bodies of water (such as canals, lakes, or rivers). These operations include crossing by tactical bridging, vehicle swimming or fording operations, or by Infantry if the objective area is close to the wet-gap crossing point.

SBCT INFANTRY BATTALION HASTY WATER CROSSING

9-59. The SBCT Infantry battalion commander organizes his units into reconnaissance, assault, support, follow, and support forces.

Reconaissance

9-60. The reconnaissance force primary task is to identify hasty crossing points and enemy composition disposition and strength. The reconnaissance force should be stealthy and infiltrate through the area of operation. Assault boats, air assault aircraft transport, or rope bridge are used by the reconnaissance force to cross the body of water.

9-61. The scout platoon for the SBCT Infantry battalion is the primary reconnaissance force to conduct reconnaissance. Task organizing an engineer squad to the scout platoon can assist in identifying crossing points, bridge classification, other mobility considerations and other information gained from reconnaissance. The reconnaissance force should be prepared to handover the engineers to the assault force. The reconnaissance force works closely with the assault force and usually screens for the assault force when it conducts its initial crossing of the wet gap.

Assault Force

9-62. The assault force conducts the initial assault across the body of water dismounted. Assault boats, air assault aircraft transport, or rope bridge are used by the assault force to cross the body of water. The assault force usually seizes immediate objectives on the far side to secure the crossing site for other elements. If it has the capability, the assault force then continues the advance from the exit bank to the final objective. Infantry elements establish local security on the exit bank to permit development of the crossing site. Engineers move with the assault force to breach obstacles and open or improve trails.

Support Force

9-63. The support force comprises engineer elements, Stryker vehicles, and mission command elements from the battalion headquarters. It develops the crossing site, emplaces the crossing means usually the Rapid Emplaced Bridging System (REBS) organic to the engineer company (if applicable), and controls units moving into and away from the crossing site. The controlling commander may position the support force where it can assist the assault force in the direct assault on the crossing site. The engineers provide the following types of support for crossing operations to:

• Improve mobility and reduce obstacles at the entrance and exit to the crossing site.

• Improve fording sites.

• Emplace assault boats, rafts, ferries, or bridges as the means of crossing the body of water. Bridges used by supporting engineers include the REBS, armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB), Wolverine, and ribbon or medium girder bridges. Engineers might repair a bridge so that it can support the crossing operation.

Follow and Support Force

9-64. The SBCT Infantry battalion assigns one of its Infantry rifle companies to be the follow and support force. The follow and support force primary mission is to provide operations security as the assault force moves to the far side of the water obstacle and seizes its immediate objectives. The follow and support force does this mainly by suppressing defending enemy elements with both direct and indirect fires, and by firing or calling for smoke to screen the crossing site from enemy observation. It prepares to take over the assault force’s mission.

DRY GAP-CROSSING OPERATIONS

9-65. In most circumstances, hasty gap-crossing operations are limited to “dry” gaps (such as irrigation ditches, railroad embankments, and antitank ditches). Operational considerations for a SBCT Infantry battalion hasty gap-crossing are like those for a breach, with the SBCT Infantry battalion task-organized into reconnaissance, support, breach, and assault forces. The primary crossing means in the SBCT Infantry battalion for hasty gap-crossing is the REBS, which moves as part of the breach force. Without a vehicle launched bridge, the company employs a deployable universal combat earthmover (DEUCE) or high mobility engineer excavator (HMEE) to fill in or breach through the obstacle. Additionally, if the mechanical method is unavailable, the team may employ a field-expedient method (for example, explosives) to facilitate the crossing.

SECTION V – PASSAGE OF LINES

9-66. Passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another unit’s positions with the intent of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines (JP 1-02). Units usually conduct passage of lines when at least one METT-TC factor does not permit the bypass of a friendly unit. A passage of lines is a complex operation requiring close supervision and detailed planning, coordination, and synchronization between the battalion commanders of the unit conducting the passage and the unit being passed. The primary purpose of a passage of lines is to transfer responsibility (forward or rearward) for an area from one unit to another.

9-67. A passage of lines occurs under two basic conditions. A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy. A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving away from the enemy. (Refer to FM 3-90- 1 for more information.)

9-68. The controlling SBCT is responsible for planning and coordinating a passage of lines involving the SBCT Infantry battalion. In some situations, such as the SBCT Infantry battalion using multiple passage routes (that is, a separate route for each company), the battalion commander takes responsibility for planning and coordinating each phase of the operation.

9-69. When planning a passage of lines, the commander considers the following tactical factors and procedures: passage lanes, use of deception, battle handover, obstacles, air defense, sustainment responsibilities, mission control, and reconnaissance and coordination.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

9-70. In a forward passage, the passing unit first moves to an assembly area or an attack position behind the stationary unit. Designated liaison personnel move forward to link up with guides and confirm coordination information with the stationary unit. Guides then lead the passing elements through the passage lane. (See figure 9-3 on page 9-15.)

9-71. The SBCT Infantry battalion conducts a forward passage by employing tactical movement. It moves quickly, using appropriate dispersal and formations whenever possible, and using its digital communication systems to make initial contact. The liaison personnel ensure that all subordinate elements have completed the passage of lines and coordinate with the SBCT Infantry battalion commander. Once clear of passage lane restrictions, the unit consolidates at a rally point or attack position, and then conducts tactical movement according to its orders. If needed, the liaison teams stay to coordinate rearward passage of lines.

Figure 9-3. SBCT Infantry battalion forward passage of line

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

9-72. Because of the increased chance of fratricide and friendly fire during a rearward passage, coordination of recognition signals and direct fire restrictions is critical. Rehearsals and training can help reduce fratricide and friendly fire. The passing unit contacts the stationary unit while it is still beyond direct fire range and conducts coordination as discussed previously. Near recognition signals and location of the BHL are emphasized. Both the passing unit and the stationary unit can employ additional fire control measures, such as restrictive fire lines (RFL), to minimize the risk of fratricide and friendly fire.

9-73. Following coordination, the passing unit continues tactical movement toward the passage lane. The passing unit is responsible for its security until it passes the BHL. If the stationary unit provides guides, the passing unit can conduct a short halt to link up and coordinate with them. The passing unit moves quickly through the passage lane to a designated location behind the stationary unit.

9-74. Stationary unit and passing unit responsibilities. (See table 9-3 on page 9-16.)

Table 9-3. Stationary and passing unit responsibilities

Stationary Unit | Passing Unit
Clears lanes or reduces obstacles along routes. | May assist with reducing obstacles
Provides obstacle and friendly units’ locations. | Provides order of movement and scheme of maneuver.
Clears and maintains routes up to the battle handover (BHO) line. | May assist with maintaining routes.
Provides traffic control for use of routes and lanes. | Augments the traffic control capability of the stationary unit as required.
Provides security for the passage up to the BHO line. | Maintains protection measures.
Identifies locations for the passing unit to use as assembly areas and attack positions. | Assumes full responsibility for its own sustainment support forward of the BHO line.
Controls all fires in support of the passage. | Positions artillery to support the passage.
Provide Medical facilities for role 1 and 2 if present until the unit has passed or established their role 1 and 2 facilities. | Relieve stationary unit role 1 and role 2 medical facilities.
Transport casualties that are behind the passage point to higher level medical facilities. | Transport casualties that are forward of the passage to the medical facility.
Upon link up stationary unit provides latest combat information and intelligence assessment to passing unit. | Before passing through passage point provide unit with updated intelligence assessment.

SECTION VI – RELIEF IN PLACE

9-75. A relief in place (RIP) is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned AO are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operations as ordered (FM 3-90-2). The commander conducts a RIP as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally, the unit relieved is defending. However, a relief may set the stage for resuming offensive tasks. A relief may serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks (such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, or specialized training). Sometimes, as part of a larger operation, the commander wants the enemy force to discover the relief, because that discovery might cause it to do something in response that is prejudicial to its interest, such as move reserves from an area where the friendly commander wants to conduct a penetration.

9-76. There are three techniques for conducting a relief—sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. A sequential relief occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed. A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. A staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not its geographical orientation. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute, but is more easily detected by the enemy. Sequential or staggered reliefs can take place over a significant amount of time.

9-77. A relief can be characterized as either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning and preparations associated with the relief. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally facilitates shorter execution time by determining exactly what the commander believes needs to be done and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate planning allows the commander and staff to identify, develop, and coordinate solutions to most potential problems before they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where they are needed. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

PLANNING

9-78. Once ordered to conduct a RIP, the commander of the relieving unit contacts the commander of the unit to be relieved. The collocation of unit command posts helps achieve the level of coordination required. If the relieved unit’s forward elements can defend the AO, the relieving unit executes the RIP from the rear to the front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.

9-79. When planning for a RIP, the SBCT Infantry battalion commander takes the following actions:

• Issue an order immediately.

• Send an advance party composed of key leaders and staff to conduct detailed reconnaissance and coordination.

• As the relieving unit, adopt the outgoing unit’s normal pattern of activity as much as possible.

• As the relieving unit, determine when the SBCT Infantry battalion will assume responsibility for the outgoing unit’s position.

• As the relieving unit, colocate battalion headquarters and company headquarters with the relieved unit’s echeloned headquarters.

• Maximize operations security to prevent the enemy from detecting the relief operation.

Note. Whenever possible, conduct the relief at night or under other limited visibility conditions.

• Plan for relief of sustainment elements after combat elements are relieved unless the SBCT Infantry battalion is relieved by an armored element, then sustainment forces need to be in place prior.

• As the unit being relieved, plan for transfer of excess ammunition, wire, petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and other material of tactical value to the incoming unit.

• Conduct training on specialized equipment or techniques applicable to the operating environment.

• Control movement by reconnoitering, designating, and marking routes, and providing guides.

COORDINATION

9-80. The incoming and outgoing commanders meet to exchange tactical intelligence, conduct a joint reconnaissance of the area, and complete other required coordination. The two commanders carefully address passage of command and jointly develop contingency actions to deal with enemy contact during the relief. This process usually includes coordination of the following information:

• The enemy situation.

• The outgoing unit’s tactical plan, to include graphics, fires plans, Air space control, and medical evacuation procedures.

• Fire support coordination, to include indirect fire plans and the time of relief for supporting artillery and mortar units.

• Types of weapons systems being replaced.

• Time, sequence, and method of relief.

• Location and disposition of obstacles, and the time when the commanders will transfer responsibility.

• Supplies and equipment to be transferred.

• Movement control, route priority, and placement of guides.

• Command and signal information.

Note. Units conduct relief on the radio nets of the outgoing unit.

• Maintenance and logistical support for disabled vehicles.

• Visibility considerations.

• Capability gaps and recommendations to fill gaps if the Stryker Infantry battalion is conducting relief with a non-Stryker organization.

CONDUCTING THE RELIEF

9-81. When conducting the relief, the outgoing commander retains responsibility for the AO and the mission. He exercises operational control over all subordinate elements of the incoming unit that have completed their portion of the relief. Responsibility passes to the incoming commander when all elements of the outgoing unit are relieved and adequate communications are established.

SEQUENTIAL RELIEF

9-82. Sequential relief is the most time-consuming relief method. The relieving unit moves to an assembly area to the rear of the unit to be relieved. Subordinate elements are relieved one at a time. This can occur in any order, with the relief following this general sequence:

• The outgoing and incoming units colocate their headquarters and trains elements to exercise mission command and transfer of equipment, ammunition, fuel, water, and medical supplies.

• The first element being relieved (such as a platoon) moves to its alternate fighting positions or battle positions while the relieving element moves into the outgoing element’s primary fighting positions. The incoming element occupies vehicle and individual fighting positions as appropriate.

• Incoming and outgoing elements complete the transfer of equipment and supplies.

• The relieved element moves to the designated assembly area behind its position.

• Once each outgoing element clears the rally point en route to its assembly area, the next relieving element moves forward.

SIMULTANEOUS RELIEF

9-83. Simultaneous relief is the fastest, but least secure, method. All outgoing elements are relieved at once, with the incoming unit usually occupying positions, to include battle positions, and vehicle and individual fighting positions. The relief takes place in this general sequence—

• Outgoing elements move to their alternate BPs or vehicle and individual positions.

• Incoming elements move along designated routes to the outgoing elements’ primary fighting positions.

• The units complete the transfer of equipment and supplies.

• Relieved elements move to the designated unit assembly area.

SECTION VII – SITE EXPLOITATION

9-84. Site exploitation (SE) is systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution. (Refer to ATP 3-90.15 for more information.)

9-85. Primarily, SE is a means of gathering information that supports the intelligence process. Three purposes for SE are—

• To answer information requirements (usually CCIRs).

• To facilitate subsequent operations (already planned or not yet anticipated).

• To facilitate criminal prosecution by host nation or international authorities (related to war crimes).

9-86. SE missions may concentrate on one fundamental purpose or involve all three simultaneously. The purpose of the site exploitation should be considered throughout the commander’s TLPs. The development of intelligence, through immediate analysis or off-site processing can enable the commander to target additional objectives. At the company level, many of the SE-related activities answer battalion and higher headquarters intelligence requirements.

9-87. The forces executing SE provide critical data for inclusion in the intelligence process which subsequently supports operations already planned or not yet anticipated. They identify information, materiel, and persons of interest; and collect, record, and preserve these items. After the mission is completed, they are debriefed by appropriate intelligence representatives, usually the battalion S-2 or the company COIST. The information (in any medium or form), material, or persons collected are processed by the appropriate agencies and analyzed to produce intelligence that will support ongoing or subsequent operations.

9-88. During stability tasks, units can use SE to gain information and intelligence that supports criminal prosecution by host nation authorities. Commanders should consult a staff judge advocate to facilitate criminal prosecution. Clearly documenting the details surrounding the initial detention, preserving evidence and maintaining chain of custody are critical and aid in determining if further detention is warranted, classifying the detainee, developing intelligence, and prosecuting detainees suspected of committing criminal acts. Documentation should be detailed and answer the six Ws: who, what, when, where, why, and witnesses.

SECTION VIII – TROOP MOVEMENT

9-89. Troop movement is the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means (ADRP 3-90). The ability of a commander to posture friendly forces for a decisive or shaping operation depends upon the commander’s ability to move that force. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability of conducting rapid and orderly movement to concentrate combat power at decisive points and times. Successful movement places troops and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat. There are three types of troop movement: administrative movement, tactical road march, and approach march (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information).

9-90. Troop movements are made by dismounted and mounted marches using various combinations of organic combat and tactical vehicles, air, rail, and water means. The method employed depends upon the situation, size and composition of the moving unit, distance the unit covers, urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It depends on the availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation.

TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

9-91. A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of operations to prepare for combat operations (ADRP 3-90). The primary consideration of the tactical road march is rapid movement. However, the moving force employs security measures even when contact with enemy ground forces is not expected. Stryker units conduct tactical road marches and approach marches.

9-92. Units conducting road marches may or may not be organized into a combined arms formation. During a tactical road march, the commander is always prepared to take immediate action if the enemy attacks. Stryker vehicles with air guard positions should be placed between Stryker variants without them to provide better security during tactical road marches.

9-93. The commander organizes a march column into four elements: reconnaissance, quartering/advance party, main body, and trail party. These elements are further organized with considerations concerning vehicles that have similar rates of march, levels of fuel consumption, maintenance and recovery. All elements of a march column use the same route for a single movement. The battalion may designate an alternate route for more than one column.

9-94. March column subordinate elements are a march serial and a march unit. A march serial is a major subdivision of a march column that is organized under one commander who plans, regulates, and controls the serial. An example is a battalion serial formed from a brigade-size march column. It moves and halts under the control of a single commander who uses digital, FM, voice and visual signals.

APPROACH MARCH

9-95. An approach march is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is intended (ADRP 3-90). A unit using an approach march moves in a task-organized tactical formation to its destination. The approach march is used when the enemy’s approximate location is known, allowing the force to move with greater speed and less physical security or dispersion. It is like the movement to contact, and may be used as a technique to conduct a movement to contact. The approach march terminates in a march objective, such as an attack position, assembly area, or assault position. It can be used to transition to an attack. An approach march employs security forces (advance, flank, and rear) based upon the threat situation.

Appendix A

Sniper Employment

The SBCT Infantry battalion is task organized with more snipers in its formation than any current U.S. Army battalion echelon. This provides them with an advantage in precision fire capability. This section talks about their capabilities limitations and considerations for employment in operations.

SECTION I – ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

A-1. Effective sniping does more than inflict casualties and cause inconvenience to the enemy. It increases the enemy’s insecurities and reduces morale and fighting spirit.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

A-2. The SBCT Infantry battalion has a sniper squad assigned to its headquarters and headquarters company composed of the squad leader and two sniper teams. Additionally each Stryker Infantry rifle company has a sniper team. A sniper team is comprised of a sniper team leader, spotter, and security member and all should be school-qualified snipers. Sniper teams, however, can be specifically configured to meet METT-TC conditions. Within the team, the senior sniper is usually the observer with a primary and alternate sniper. The alternate sniper usually provides security but may be assigned a sniper mission. (See figure A-1.)

Figure A-1: The SBCT Infantry battalion sniper squad

A-3. The sniper team carries standard equipment except for the specialized sniper equipment. The team leader or observer normally is armed with an M4 with the M320 grenade launcher. He also carries the observation telescope to determine wind speed and direction. The primary sniper carries the sniper weapon. The alternate sniper or security Soldier may carry the other sniper weapon. Other equipment carried by the sniper team include:

• Image intensification and infrared devices.

• Ghillie suits.

• Communications.

A-4. Sniper weapons assigned to the sniper squad include:

• The M24, a 7.62-mm sniper weapon system capable of killing personnel and destroying sensitive equipment out to a range of 800 meters.

• The M107, a .50 caliber long-range sniper rifle capable of disabling or destroying select vehicles and equipment up to the penetration performance of the ammunition out to 1800 meters.

A-5. Table A-1 presents performance data on the M24 and M107.

Table A-1. Performance data for the M24 and M107 sniper rifles

WEAPON | EFFECTIVE RANGES (meters) | AMMUNITION | TARGET TYPE(S) AND RANGE(S)
M24 Sniper Weapon System | 0 to 800 meters | Match Ball | Personnel to 800 meters. Personal armor, equipment to 800 meters.
Armor Piercing | Light armored vehicles to 600 meters. Material targets to 800 meters.
Armor Piercing, Incendiary | Light armored vehicles to 600 meters. Material targets to 800 meters.
M107 Long Range Sniper Rifle | 600 to 1,800 meters | Ball | Equipment to 1800 meters.
Armor Piercing | Light armored vehicles to 1800 meters. Material targets to 1800 meters.
Armor Piercing, Incendiary | Light armored vehicles to 1800 meters. Material targets to 1800 meters.
Armor Piercing, High Explosive, Incendiary | Barrier penetration to 1400 meters.

A-6. Using the arms room concept, the sniper squad uses the best weapon for the mission. The squad leader, sniper employment officer, or other personnel designates the weapon to take. This may include using the M4, one or both of the sniper rifles, or some other weapon for the mission,

SNIPER TEAM TASKS

A-7. Sniper tasks are specific in certain operations, but many of the tasks the snipers can perform apply to most operations. The following discussion is incomplete. Each unit sniper employment officer should develop the sniper tasks based on the unit commander’s intent and operational requirements.

PROVIDE LONG-RANGE PRECISION FIRE

A-8. The sniper supports combat operations by delivering long-range precision fire on key selected targets and targets of opportunity. Some specific missions include―

• Accurate fire.

◦ Command posts and key enemy leaders.

◦ Crew-served weapons and crews.

◦ Bunkers and embrasures.

◦ Key enemy equipment.

◦ Selected targets just prior to an attack.

• Security or cover for.

◦ Friendly engineers, demolition guards, and supply columns.

◦ Obstacles, key terrain and defiles.

◦ Counterattack routes.

◦ Flanks.

• Countersniping missions.

• Ambushes or harassment of withdrawing enemy.

• Covering fire for observation posts or fire positions.

• Observation and control of indirect fire onto enemy positions.

COLLECT AND REPORT BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION

A-9. The sniper team’s alternate mission is always reconnaissance conducted by static surveillance. They use their advanced optics to collect and report detailed battlefield information from concealed positions. ATP 3-20.98 provides more information on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and battlefield information collection and reporting.

CONSIDERATIONS

A-10. When the commander receives a mission, his decision to employ sniper teams depends on his analysis of METT-TC. The sniper employment officer assists the commander in determining exact sniper missions and the number of teams to deploy. The commander also considers—

• Rules of engagement.

• Collateral damage.

• Potential mines and unexploded ordinance.

• Shoot-on-command capability.

• Reconnaissance and security missions.

• Support by the quick reaction forces.

• Sustainment.

• Communication.

MISSION PLANS

A-11. Sniper operations should be carefully planned, coordinated, and executed. Planning for the sniper mission should account for all events from departure from friendly lines or insertion to reentry of friendly lines or extraction. Reconnaissance is vital. It is conducted on the ground or by air or, at the least, with maps, ground and air photos, and patrol debriefings. Due to its small size, a sniper team must request and coordinate many mission-essential items such as transportation, special equipment, and staging areas. The team coordinates closely with forces in contact and with units to move the team. Unit SOPs and mission checklists are valuable in helping planners concentrate on the unique aspects of the operation.

SELECTION OF TARGETS

A-12. Targets are selected based on—

• Tactical value of the target.

• Nature and type of the armor or cover.

• Active defensive measures employed by the enemy to protect the target.

• Potential collateral destruction.

• Spot on the target with the best balance of vulnerability and high payoff.

• Angle of fire relative to target.

• Maximum range from the target that will ensure penetration and the effect of the round to the area behind the target.

• Selection of ammunition that will achieve the desired effect.

ASSIGNMENT OF TARGETS

A-13. The sniper team must stay within the commander’s intent, the Law of Land Warfare, and the ROE. Overall, it’s the sniper team’s decision based on the above criteria and its own survival. The commander can use different methods to designate and prioritize targets.

• He may describe the affects or results he expects and allow the snipers to select key targets.

• He may prescribe specific types of targets. For example, if he wants to disrupt an enemy’s defensive preparation, he might task snipers to engage equipment operators and vehicle drivers.

• He might assign specific or key targets. These can include specific personnel such as leaders, radio operators, ATGM gunners, armored vehicle commanders, or weapons crews.

AREA AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE

A-14. The decision to employ a sniper team must be based on solid intelligence of the target area. The commander must consider the current threat and whether suitable targets can be identified within the target area.

Target Information

A-15. Leaders must provide the sniper team with the most current target information available. This information must include specific details about enemy locations, equipment, strengths, capabilities, and composition.

Area Intelligence

A-16. Besides target descriptions, the team commander must have other current information on the area such as aerial photographs. This helps the team commander determine the type of terrain and identify indigenous vegetation. It helps him identify suitable positions that offer the maximum standoff range while allowing the sniper team to destroy the target. The team needs to know the unit’s planned routes to and from the target area. Data on the target area’s meteorological and environmental conditions, such as prevailing winds, is also important. The team commander must decide on the direction of approach that offers―

• The best fields of fire.

• An effective range.

• A good angle of attack.

• Concealment and security.

• Quick exfiltration route.

Weapon

A-17. Based on target and area information received, the sniper team selects the best sniper weapon for the mission. For example, a heavy sniper team armed with the M107 would be overkill if a conventional sniper detachment armed with the M24 could accomplish the mission effectively.

Selection of the Tentative Final Fire Position

A-18. The sniper team must select a tentative final fire position that meets all the requirements to ensure a successful engagement. The sniper team must consider meteorological and environmental conditions such as wind speed and direction. If the ground and tactical situation permit, the commander should place the team where the sniper can shoot at a minimum angle to the wind.

Exfiltration and Extraction

A-19. During the planning phase, the commander develops contingency plans for exfiltrating and extracting the sniper team. He confirms or adjusts these plans once the team is in position. During planning, he can seldom confirm the exfiltration routes.

Multiple Team Missions

A-20. When the target area has multiple high priority and well-defended targets, the commander can deploy multiple sniper teams. The unit sniper employment officer plans and coordinates multiple team missions. He gives each team a set of responsibilities and targets or sectors in the target area. On the ground, coordination and communication between the teams is vital.

Indirect Fires on the Target

A-21. The commander should consider using indirect fire in and around the target area in conjunction with the sniper team. Indirect fires can—

• Augment the direct engagement of the team on specific targets; saturate the area and inflict collateral damage on non-priority targets.

• Disguise the sniper fire and reduce the chance that the enemy can identify the team’s location.

• Divert enemy attention while the team extracts. This requires detailed coordination with the indirect-fire elements to ensure that the team’s intended target is clear of smoke and dust before the sniper engages his target.

SPECIFIC PLANNING ELEMENTS

A-22. Regardless of what type of mission a sniper is conducting, preparation, inspections, and rehearsals are vital for success. The following elements should be specified in the team leader’s plan:

• Security.

• Control. Control measures include communications, emergency actions, and specific control measures.

• Routes. Routes include primary and alternate routes to and from the objective.

• Navigation and navigational aids.

• Weather.

• Intelligence.

• Coordination with other units.

• Contingency plans.

Precombat Inspections

A-23. Before the team departs friendly lines, the team leader should conduct precombat inspections and rehearsals.

Rehearse Specific Actions

A-24. The team leader conducts day and night rehearsals. The team never should assume something will work unless it is rehearsed.

MISSION COMMAND

A-25. The mission command of sniper teams is complicated by their isolation from other units and their locations. Also, the rules of engagement may require direct communications between the commander and his sniper teams. To aid in the control of his sniper teams, the operational command commander formulates a sniping policy and SOPs.

• The unit commander normally controls the sniper squad and teams centrally and tasks them to support subordinate units as required for operations. For special tasks, battalion or brigade commanders sometimes retain control of the sniper teams. Although the sniper section may or may not form part of the reconnaissance platoon, the commander should avoid the temptation to use it on pure reconnaissance missions.

• The tactical commander should consider sniper teams as a force multiplier.

• The commander normally controls deployed sniper teams by radio. In certain situations, such as those in urban areas, the sniper team might be attached to a subordinate unit.

• For certain sniper tasks, such as operations behind enemy lines or internal security operations, the sniper team commander must make independent judgments that could greatly affect the unit. The supported unit commander must trust his sniper team leader’s judgment and tactical abilities.

LONG-RANGE SNIPER RIFLE

A-26. The destructive, anti-materiel capability of the .50 cal. long-range sniper rifle (LRSR) allows the commander to assign tasks to the sniper team that is beyond the capability of the M24 SWS. The increased range and penetration of the LRSR round allows the commander to accurately engage and destroy high-value targets at long ranges.

MISSION PLANNING

A-27. The decision to employ a LRSR sniper team must be based on the current threat and on whether suitable targets can be identified within the target area. The commander’s plan should allow for the LRSR team’s need for additional support equipment. The increased size and weight of the LRSR and its accessories slows the team and reduces the distance it can travel dismounted. The plan must address this as well. The plan should allow the team the time and means to insert at a reasonable distance from the objective and to conduct a thorough target area reconnaissance.

EMPLOYING BOTH THE M24 AND M107

A-28. For some antimateriel missions, the commander might need to employ both the LRSR and M24 teams at the same time. This depends on the depth of the target area, on the threat, and on whether suitable targets, such as enemy Soldiers and light sensitive equipment, fall within the range of the M24.

OPERATING IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

A-29. In an urban environment, employing the LRSR depends on the availability of suitable targets and distances. Deploying a LRSR team on missions more suited for a regular sniper team exposes the team to a greater potential for compromise, because it might have to fire from a forward hide position.

OUTSIDE URBAN AREA

A-30. The LRSR team’s best advantage is to occupy key terrain or man-made features, while keeping enough stand-off distance between it and the target area. The best task for the LRSR team is to occupy key terrain outside an urban area. From there, it should target the enemy’s exposed sensitive equipment, weapon systems, communication arrays, fortified positions, and firing ports as well as human targets of opportunity. This gives the team time for multiple engagements without the need to move often to avoid detection.

INSIDE URBAN AREA

A-31. The LRSR team is more likely to employ from within than without a large metropolis. The LRSR team can use tall buildings and other prominent structures in friendly-held sectors to place accurate direct fire deep into enemy-dominated areas. If the LRSR team decides to use hide positions in prominent structures, it must reinforce the wall facing the enemy within the room it has selected. It should plan alternate firing positions, overhead protection, and a rapid evacuation route to another part of the complex, or out of it, in case of direct or indirect fire.

MULTITEAM OPERATIONS

A-32. For targets that the commander designates as high priority, and for targets dispersed throughout a large, defined target area, he might have to assign multiple LRSR teams. He might need more than one team to ensure complete coverage and destruction or disabling of all key targets simultaneously.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL

A-33. For multiteam operations to succeed, teams and resources must be coordinated as thoroughly as possible. The unit sniper employment officer divides and assigns the target area to the LRSR teams. For command and control on the ground, the commander of the senior team is the mission commander. He assesses the tactical situation in the target area and determines the best time to initiate the engagement. Depending on the tactical situation, he might grant the teams the authority to engage their respective targets in a set period of time, unless the targets appear at different times than initially expected. This way the teams can divert, confuse, and delay the enemy’s response, and then exfiltrate back to a linkup point for extraction.

TARGET ASSIGNMENT

A-34. Each team is responsible for selecting, prioritizing, and destroying targets in specific sectors of fire. Each team must communicate its location and intended targets to each another to reduce the chance of fratricide. All teams might engage an extremely high-value target at once to ensure its destruction.

INSERTION

A-35. Depending on the mission and size of the objective area, teams might insert together or individually at designated positions that offer the best approach to their target area.

SECTION II – SNIPER EMPLOYMENT OFFICER

A-36. Each unit with assigned snipers has a designated sniper employment officer. The SBCT Infantry battalion selects the sniper employment officer. Habitually the sniper squad works closely with the Scout platoon who assists them with insertion, extraction, reconnaissance, and security for every operation. The sniper employment officer would often work closely with the S-2 and S-3 during the initial phases of MDMP to identify requirements of the overall operation and suggests where they would be optimally deployed.

A-37. Who the commander makes the sniper employment officer depends on the type unit and the level of the person’s knowledge of sniper employment. The sniper employment officer can be the headquarters and headquarters company commander, the executive officer, the scout platoon leader, or any other officer. In the sniper employment officer’s absence, either the sniper squad leader or the individual sniper team leader can represent himself. The commander can assemble the battalion sniper squad, including any snipers assigned to company sniper teams to standardize training and SOPs. An experienced sniper squad leader serves as the primary trainer.

A-38. The responsibilities of the sniper employment officer can be remembered by using the acronym KACTIS—

• Know sniper capabilities and limitations.

• Advise battalion and company commanders.

• Coordinate all aspects of the sniper mission.

• Resource training requirements whether they are deployed or in garrison.

• Issue orders.

• Supervise mission planning, preparation, and rehearsals.

KNOW SNIPER CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A-39. Knowing sniper capabilities and limitations is important. Sniper employment officers participate in sniper training at every opportunity, and they ensure that snipers are trained in reconnaissance as well as sniper skills. An important aspect of the sniper team employment is the time required to plan, rehearse, travel, and recover from a mission. The sniper employment officer needs to convey to the commander that sniper teams cannot be continuously on missions. Furthermore, if all three teams are employed at the same time, then there will be a period when no teams are available.

ADVISE BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS

A-40. The sniper employment officer must know how to employ snipers effectively in support of various operations so that he can advise the commander, S-2, and S-3. When assigned to a supported unit other than the sniper team’s parent unit, the sniper employment officer represents the sniper team and advises the supported unit commander on what the assigned team can do to accomplish the supported units’ mission. Coordinating with the supported commander gives the sniper employment officer an opportunity―

• To explain proper scout-sniper employment and tactics.

• To clarify misconceptions about the capabilities, limitations, and differences of scout and sniper assets.

A-41. All officers in Infantry units should attend training provided by the sniper employment officer on sniper operations. Snipers must officially brief their chain of command on sniper capabilities. Commanders should either talk to their unit snipers about sniper employment and tactics, or they should consult a graduate of the U.S. Army Sniper School’s sniper employment officer course.

COORDINATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE SNIPER MISSION

A-42. This starts during mission planning and includes―

• Assigning teams to missions to support units or to serve as a part of the overall scout platoon mission. If the team is assigned to a subordinate unit for an operation, the sniper employment officer and subordinate unit commander must meet face-to-face, so the sniper employment officer can advise the commander on sniper employment.

• Discussing who uses what terrain and sectors of operation. This ensures that both parties understand the other one’s mission, prevents fratricide, and protects the integrity of the mission.

• Arranging for the insertion, resupply, and extraction of sniper teams operating independently of a larger unit.

TRAIN SNIPERS WHETHER THEY ARE DEPLOYED OR IN GARRISON

A-43. The sniper employment officer ensures that training is challenging, realistic, and varied. He schedules and conducts enough sniper training to maintain the sniper team’s proficiency. He also trains snipers to gather battlefield information.

SUPERVISE MISSION PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND REHEARSALS

A-44. The sniper employment officer provides general overall supervision to the mission planning and briefbacks, including the details such as team SOPs, techniques, route plans, load tailoring, time management, and cross-loading. However, he leaves the detailed supervision of the conduct of the mission planning and execution to the team leader.

SECTION III – COMBAT OPERATIONS

A-45. Sniper team missions support the overall accomplishment of the mission. Commanders and leaders at all levels must know the value of employing snipers and the threat posed by enemy snipers. They must understand the effects a sniper can have on unit operations, and how the enemy could counter his attack and minimize his threat.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

A-46. During the offense, snipers help the commander accomplish the mission by—

• Obtaining information.

• Depriving the enemy of resources.

• Deceiving or diverting the enemy from the main effort.

• Keeping the enemy from regrouping or repositioning.

• Conducting preemptive attacks to gain the initiative.

• Disrupting enemy offensive actions.

A-47. During the conduct of offensive tasks, snipers infiltrate enemy areas and engage them from unexpected directions. The teams should move out well in advance of the projected movement of the main body. This allows them to infiltrate and provides the best opportunity to remain undetected. It allows them to engage any targets that threaten the advance of the battalion. A contingency plan with a designated force to provide support if they are compromised should be coordinated prior to snipers deploying. Normally this is the scout platoon but can also be lead elements of the advance guard. The teams may use normal stalking methods, or they can be inserted by ground vehicle, helicopter, or boats. Their precision fire reduces delays during the hasty attack.

A-48. Snipers provide accuracy and optics that enable them to reduce enemy targets in the midst of friendly forces. During a deliberate attack, the unit should take care to avoid drawing enemy attention to the sniper team’s position. The team may be deployed forward to support the attack, with accurate selective rifle fire, or deployed with a cutoff force with the same task. They infiltrate behind the enemy positions to disrupt counterattacks or withdrawal and to harass enemy reinforcements if time permits. (Refer to TC 3-22.10 for more information.)

A-49. Historically, snipers have been especially useful in urban areas. They can provide long- and short- range precision fires and can help with isolation efforts. Snipers provide valuable precision fires during stability tasks. Along with engaging assigned targets, snipers are a valuable asset to the commander for providing observation along movement routes and suppressive fires during an assault. The commander may assign the following tasks to snipers:

• Conduct countersniper operations.

• Kill targets of opportunity. (The sniper team assigns priorities to these targets based on an understanding of the commander’s intent [for example, engaging enemy snipers, then leaders, vehicle commanders, radio men, sappers, and machine gun crews, in that order].)

• Deny enemy access to certain areas or avenues of approach (control key terrain).

• Provide fire support for barricades and other obstacles.

• Maintain surveillance of flank and rear avenues of approach (screen).

• Support local counterattacks with precision fire.

A-50. Sniper tasks during offensive operations should assist the commander accomplish his mission by: depriving the enemy of resources, deceiving or diverting the enemy from the main effort, fixing the enemy in place, disrupting enemy plans, and obtaining information.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

A-51. The fluidity that often occurs in this type of operation presents good opportunities for the employment of snipers. In a movement to contact, snipers can infiltrate enemy areas and engage them from unexpected directions. The teams should move out well in advance of the projected movement. This allows them to go at their own pace so they remain undetected. It also allows them to engage any targets that threaten the advance. The teams may use normal stalking methods, or they can be inserted by ground vehicle, helicopter, parachutes, or boats. The commander must maintain radio contact with these teams.

ATTACK

A-52. The coordination and planning stages of a deliberate attack give commanders enough time to take full advantage of their snipers. In a deliberate attack, snipers can be effectively employed near the fire support element. Their accuracy and optics allow them to continue to reduce enemy targets in the midst of friendly forces. The unit should take care to avoid drawing enemy attention to the sniper team’s position. The battlefield noise generated by the fire-support element can interfere with sniper team communication but it can also mask the audible signature from their weapons. The team also may be deployed forward of the fire support element to support the attack with accurate selective rifle fire; or deployed with a cutoff force with the same task. If time permits, it infiltrates behind the enemy positions to disrupt counterattacks or withdrawal, and to harass enemy reinforcements. During reorganization, sniper teams can be deployed forward of the FEBA on likely counterattack routes.

DEFENSIVE TASKS

A-53. Snipers play a vital role in the commander’s planning and help the battalion maintain an offensive posture while in the defense. The sniper team can do the following in the defense:

• Augment direct fires from Infantry with precision fire.

• Cover avenues of approach, obstacles, dead space, and key terrain features.

• Deter enemy infiltration attempts.

• Delay and disrupt attacking elements.

• Operate as an extension of patrols.

A-54. During defensive tasks in urban environment, sniper teams work outside the FEBA to provide early warning and disruption and, if possible, cause the enemy to deploy prematurely. Sniper teams do the following in the defense:

• Move out during limited visibility.

• Build hide positions that overwatch likely avenues of approach and NAIs.

• Provide early warning of impending attacks (day or night), probes, or infiltrations.

• Reduce targets of opportunity.

• Collect information.

A-55. Historically, snipers have been especially useful in urban areas. They provide long- and short-range precision fires and help with company- and platoon-level isolation efforts. Snipers provide valuable precision fires during stability tasks. Along with engaging assigned targets, snipers are a valuable asset to the commander for providing observation along movement routes and suppressive fires during an assault. (Refer to TC 3-22.10 for more information.)

AREA DEFENSE

A-56. Snipers in an area defense often are able to establish primary, alternate and supplementary firing positions, prepare hide positions, prepare range cards, and become familiar with their assigned area. Snipers can be given missions anywhere in the battalion’s AO but may be initially given missions within the security area and then displace back to the main battle area. Because of likely enemy fire, sniper teams normally are not assigned to positions close to regular Infantry forces. They should, however, be close enough to Infantry forces for protection.

MOBILE DEFENSE

A-57. As part of a mobile defense, the Infantry battalion is normally part of the fixing force and conducts an area defense within the larger mission of a mobile defense. Sniper teams normally receive the same type of missions as they do in an area defense. If assets are available to provide equal or greater mobility than the enemy, such as Army aviation, sniper teams and other battalion elements may be assigned missions to the battalion’s front or flank to deceive and delay the enemy.

RETROGRADE

A-58. During a retrograde, the sniper team is employed with and moves with the rear security elements. The snipers can delay and reduce the momentum of the enemy advance. They can also cover obstacles and employ in an economy of force mission. Some missions and considerations for the employment of sniper teams during a retrograde include:

• Dominate key terrain.

• Cover obstacles.

• Cover primary and secondary avenues of approach.

• Confuse the enemy.

• Gather and report detailed information on the terrain, route, and enemy.

• Control fire support.

A-59. Sniper teams can conduct deliberate or ad hoc stay behind missions to conduct operations and to conduct surveillance. Communications must be maintained so they can pass along information and intelligence, to control their movement, to arrange for their extraction, and allow the sniper team to call indirect fire on large enemy groups.

MISSION

A-60. Sniper teams may be assigned missions to cover intervals between units, flanks, and the rear of friendly positions where regular patrols and FEBA observation activities cannot. When possible, the commander should provide the snipers with some Infantry protection to their rear. This protection should be close enough, usually within 1 kilometer, to help the snipers extract should they have to, but not close enough to compromise the snipers.

A-61. Sniper teams must coordinate with units responsible for the AO in which they are operating in. To avoid fratricide, the sniper team must make sure that it has been included in that unit’s defensive plan. Fire control measures such as no fire areas should be used for the sniper team’s position to further prevent the possibility of fratricide. Coordination may include the sniper team providing information.

TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

A-62. During tactical enabling operations, sniper teams support the commander’s plan by providing accurate long-range fire and observation. During relief and linkup operations, snipers teams may do the following:

LINKUP

A-63. Snipers teams may be given the mission to destroy the enemy or deny it access to a specific area before the supported unit can link up with other friendly forces. Sniper teams may infiltrate the linkup areas beforehand and use direct or indirect fire to prevent the enemy from coming into the area. During the linkup itself, the snipers typically overwatch and provide flank security.

RELIEF

A-64. In a relief, sniper teams and reconnaissance elements conduct their reliefs before the main units. Incoming snipers must be fully briefed and prepared to support the main body during the relief sequence.

OTHER OPERATIONS

A-65. Inserting snipers with security elements ahead of the main body increases the effectiveness of airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations. Doing this allows the sniper teams to support the vulnerable insertion and extraction of combat forces.

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

A-66. Sniper teams can be inserted by air assault forces to positions of advantage to destroy enemy forces. They also can be moved quickly to vulnerable areas. If time is available, sniper teams may be infiltrated to observe landing zones prior to the insertion of Infantry units.

LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS

A-67. Night vision devices increase situational awareness of a perceived threat and of the environment. They increase the effective range of the eye at night and let the sniper move greater distances in low light. The sniper team can operate in all weather conditions, day or night. Sniper night operations include any in which the sniper team provides surveillance, overwatches, probes, or conducts other actions in low light. Thermal imagery and advanced night vision devices allow the snipers to conduct any operation by night that would otherwise be conducted only by day. However, because many armed forces have similar capabilities, the sniper may be vulnerable at night.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENTS

A-68. Snipers can operate in a CBRN environment. The wear of CBRN individual protective equipment causes fatigue and degrades snipers capabilities. Since sniper teams might be located on a flank or in front of a unit, they also may serve as CBRN monitors. Some of the challenges for sniper teams during CBRN environment include:

• Lack of early warning.

• Inability to stalk through contaminated areas.

• Limited site and sound.

• Degraded dexterity.

A-69. Good planning, knowledge of CBRN immediate action drills, and having good intelligence about the CBRN threats and hazards can compensate for most of these problems. The teams must carry suitable equipment and planning and time allocations should allow for the increase in weight and fatigue.

SECTION IV – COUNTERSNIPER OPERATIONS

A-70. Countersniper operations eliminate enemy snipers. The sniper squad must thoroughly plan any countersniper operation.

REPORTS

A-71. The sniper employment officer and sniper squad leader should be informed when any of the following are reported:

• Sightings of enemy Soldiers wearing special camouflage uniforms.

• Sightings of enemy Soldiers carrying weapons with long barrels, mounted scopes, or bolt action receivers, or carried in weapon cases or drag bags.

• Key personnel casualties such as commanders, senior non-commissioned officers, or weapons crewmembers, and a simultaneous reduction in enemy patrol activities.

• Reports of reflections off optical lenses

• Reports from intelligence or reconnaissance units of small groups of enemy personnel (one to three Soldiers).

• Finding single spent cartridges in sizes used by enemy snipers.

ACTIVE MEASURES

A-72. When an enemy sniper is operating in the unit area, the sniper section should use active measures such as the following to protect the unit against sniper fire:

• Gather information.

• Make a plan.

• Observe likely locations.

• Locate the enemy through observation. Stalking and tracking expose the team to higher risk.

• Kill the enemy sniper.

PASSIVE MEASURES

A-73. Examples of unit-level passive countersniper measures follow:

• Avoid consistent routines, such as meal times, ammunition resupply times, assembly area procedures, patrol routes, routes to the objective rally point, or any consistent day to day activities.

• Gather, meet, and brief under cover or in limited visibility.

• Cover or conceal equipment, such as maps, radios, and antennas.

• Remove rank and do not salute.

• Leaders avoid behaving authoritatively.

• Increase the unit’s observation capabilities through such means as observation posts.

• Inform patrols to look for signs of the presence of a sniper such as single spent rounds and camouflage materials other than those your unit uses.

• Do not dismiss the potential for a woman to be the sniper.

SECTION V – STABILITY OPERATIONS

SECTION V – STABILITY OPERATIONS

A-74. During stability operations, sniper teams are effective primarily because they can deliver selective, precision fires against specific targets following the ROE. Due to their skills in observation and familiarity of the AO, the sniper team can play a vital role in providing information. Stability operations place an additional strain on the sniper because he may be required to kill without the motivational stimulus normally associated with the battlefield. During stability operations, the sniper team’s ROE may differ from Infantry units.

A-75. Based on the current ROE and as authorized by the commander, sniper teams may be assigned the following:

• Engage criminals or terrorists involved in hijacking, kidnapping, and holding hostages.

• Engage dissident enemy snipers as opportunity targets or as part of a deliberate clearance operation.

• Covertly occupy concealed positions to observe selected areas.

• Record and report all suspicious activity in the area of observation.

• Assist in the coordination of activities by other elements from hidden observation positions.

• Protect other elements, including auxiliaries such as fire fighters, and repair crews.

CORRECT EMPLOYMENT

A-76. Commanders should avoid using sniper teams when other units are adequate. They should not over- commit their snipers but rather employ them where their specialized skills are required.

ANONYMITY

A-77. The enemy may specifically target snipers and commanders must carefully protect their anonymity. Ideally, snipers are held in a central location and employed only as required. If needed, snipers may deploy in hidden observation posts.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

A-78. The sniper team must understand its responsibilities and the correct authority to authorize its use of deadly force. The ROE spell out these responsibilities and provide the sniper team with the command authority to carry out those responsibilities. The sniper team must understand how to determine when its fire constitutes reasonable force.

A-79. Ideally, a sniper team should deploy where it can receive the order to fire from the appropriate local commander. This is often difficult. Therefore, all orders, to include targets and rules of engagement, must be absolutely clear to the sniper team before it deploys. The sniper team should rehearse its actions during all possible scenarios.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-21.21 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk. The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1SG | first sergeant
ABCS | Army Battle Command System
ACA | airspace control authority
ACM | airspace coordinating measures
ACO | air control order
ADAM | air defense and airspace management
ADP | Army doctrine publication
ADRP | Army doctrine reference publication
AFATDS | Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (JP 1-02)
AHS | Army health system
ALO | air liaison officer
AMD | air and missile defense
AMDWS | air and missile defense workstation
AO | area of operations
AR | Army regulation
ATM | advance trauma management
ATP | Army techniques publication
ATTP | Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BAE | brigade aviation element
BAS | battalion aid station
BCT | brigade combat team
BDA | battle damage assessment
BHL | battle handover line
BHO | battle handover
BP | battle position
BSA | brigade support area
BSB | brigade support battalion
CA | civil affairs
cal | caliber
CAO | civil affairs operations
CASEVAC | casualty evacuation
CAS | close air support
CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCA | close combat attack
CCIR | commander’s critical information requirement
COA | course of action
COIST | company intelligence support team
COP | common operational picture
CP | command post
CSM | command sergeant major
CTCP | combat trains command post
CV | command variant
DA | Department of the Army
DOD | Department of Defense
DSCA | defense support of civil authority
DVH | double v hull
EA | engagement area
EOD | explosive ordnance disposal
EPLRS | enhanced position location and reporting system
EW | electronic warfare
FA | field artillery
FEBA | forward edge of the battle area
FIST | fire support team
FM | field manual; frequency modulation
FOB | forward operating base
FRAGORD | fragmentary order
FSC | forward support company
FSCM | fire support coordination measure
FSO | fire support officer
FS | fire support
FTCP | field trans command post
G-1 | Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel)
HE | high explosive
HHC | headquarters and headquarters company
HN | host nation
HNSF | host-nation security forces
HPT | high-payoff target
HQ | headquarters
HR | human resources
HUMINT | human intelligence
HVT | high-value target
ICV | Infantry carrier vehicle
ICVV(S) | Infantry carrier variant scout
IED | improvised explosive device
IO | information operations
IPB | intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JP 1-02)
IR | information requirement
JSEAD | joint suppression of enemy air defense
JTAC | joint terminal attack controller
LD | line of departure
LNO | liaison officer
LOGPAC | logistics package
LRP | logistics resupply point
LRSR | long-range sniper rifle
LZ | landing zone
MBA | main battle area
MCP | maintenance collection point
MDMP | military decision-making process
MEDEVAC | medical evacuation
METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available–time available, and civil considerations
MEV | medical evacuation vehicle
MGS | mobile gun system
MICO | military intelligence company
MISO | military information support operations
mm | milimeter
NAI | named area of interest
NBCRV | nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicle
NCO | noncommissioned officer
OE | operational environment
OIC | officer in charge
OPCON | operational control
OPORD | operation order
OPSEC | operations security
PA | physician asssistant
PIR | priority intelligence requirement
PLD | probable line of deployment
PL | phase line
PZ | pickup zone
RFL | restrictive fire lines
RIP | relief in place
ROE | rules of engagement
ROZ | restricted operations zone
RWS | remote weapon station
S-1 | battalion or brigade personnel staff officer (ADRP 1-02)
S-2 | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 | battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 | battalion or brigade logistics staff officer (ADRP 1-02)
S-6 | battalion or brigade signal staff officer (ADRP 1-02)
S-7 | battalion or brigade inform and influence activities staff officer (ADRP 1-02)
S-9 | battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (ADRP 1-02)
SBCT | Stryker brigade combat team
SEAD | suppression of enemy air defense
SE | site exploitation
SFA | security force assistance
SINCGARS | single-channel ground and airborne radio system (JP 1-02)
SIGINT | signals intelligence
SOP | standard operating procedure
SOSRA | suppress, obscure, secure, reduced, and assault
SPO | support operations officer
SPOTREP | spot report
TAC | tactical command post
TAIS | Tactical Airspace Integration System
TLP | troop leading procedure
TNT | 2, 4, 6-Trinitrotoluene (CAS Number 118-96-7; explosive)
TOC | tactical operations center
TRP | target reference point
UAS | unmanned aircraft system
U.S. | United States
UXO | unexploded explosive ordnance
VHSIC | very high-speed integrated circuit
XO | executive officer

SECTION II – TERMS

adversary

A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

airborne operation

An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission (JP 3-18).

air movement

Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and air landings (JP 3-17).

air-ground operations

Are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (FM 3-04).

airspace control systems

(DOD) An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. Also called ACS (JP 3-52). See also ATP 3-52.1

airspace coordinating measures

Airspace control measures are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-52). Also called ACM.

ambush

An attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90-1).

approach march

The advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is intended (ADRP 3-90).

area defense

A defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90).

area security

Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90).

area of operations

(DOD) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 3-0) See ADRP 3-0, ADRP 3-90, ATP 3-09.24, ATP 3-55.6/MCRP 2-24A/NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP 3-2.2, FM 3-90-1, and FM 3-07.

assembly area

(Army) An area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (FM 3-90-1).

assessment

(DOD) 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. See ADP 3-37, ADRP 3-37, ADP 5-0, and ADRP 5-0. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 3-0) See FM 3-07.

attack

An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (ADRP 3-90)

breaching operation

Operation conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of obstacles. Breaching is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of the maneuver commander. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals, and they end when battle handover has occurred between follow-on forces and a unit conducting the breaching operation (ATTP 3-90.4). See also follow-on forces.

casualty

Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status—whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured (JP 4-02).

casualty evacuation

Nonmedical units use this to refer to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft without en route medical care (FM 4-02). Also known as CASEVAC.

Class I

food, rations, and water

Class III

petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Class IV

fortification and barrier materials.

Class V

Ammunition

Class VIII

medical supplies.

Class IX

repair parts

close air support

(DOD) Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS (JP 3-0). See ATP 3-06.1, ATP 3-09.24, ATP 3-55.6/MCRP 2-24A/ NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP 3-2.2, and FM 3-52.

combat formation

A combat formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and the general configuration of a unit on the ground (ADRP 3-90).

combined arms maneuver

Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative (ADP 3-0).

conflict transformation

The process of reducing the means ad motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socio-economic aspirations (FM 3-07).

consolidation

Organizing and strengthening in newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy (FM 3-90- 1).

cordon and search

A technique of conducting a movement to contact that involve isolating a target area and searching suspect locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1).

counterattack

Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives (ADRP 1-02).

cover

A security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting intelligence and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADRP 3-90).

decisive point

(DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). See ADRP 3-0, ADRP 3-07, and ADRP 5-0.

deception smoke

Deception smoke is a smoke curtain used to deceive and confuse the threat as to the nature of friendly operations (ATP 3-09.30).

defense support of civil authority

Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18).

defensive task

A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0).

delay

To slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities (FM 3-09).

demonstration

(DOD) In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended (JP 3-13.4). See also FM 3-90.1.

disengage

A tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement (FM 3-90-1). See also decisive engagement; tactical mission task.

double envelopment

This results from simultaneous maneuvering around both flanks of a designated enemy force (FM 3-90-1).

enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)

envelopment

A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be destroyed in their current positions (FM 3-90-1).

exploitation

An offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90).

feint

(DOD) In military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4). See FM 3-90-1.

fire support coordination measure

A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM (JP 3-0).

flank attack

A form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy (FM 3-90-1).

force tailoring

The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0).

guard

A security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (ADRP 3-90).

hybrid threat

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADRP 3-0)

individual initiative

The willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise (ADRP 3-0).

infiltration

(Army) A form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-90-1).

intelligence warfighting function

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations (ADRP 3-0).

line of effort

(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0).

linkup

A meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances (ADRP 3-90).

local security

A security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

main command post

A facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations (FM 6-0).

medical evacuation

The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities while providing en route medical care (FM 4-02). Also known as MEDEVAC.

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADRP 6-0)

mission command warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0).

mobile defense

A defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90).

movement to contact

(Army) An offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90).

movement and maneuver warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-0).

neutral

(Army) A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces (ADRP 3-0).

obscuring smoke

Obscuring smoke is placed on or near the threat to suppress threat observers and to minimize their vision (ATP 3-09.30).

offensive task

A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0).

operation

A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1)

operational approach

(DOD) A description of broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). See ADRP 3-0, ADP 5-0, and ADRP 5-0.

operational area security

A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within an area of operations (ADRP 3-37).

operational initiative

The setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. (ADRP 3-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0)

operations security

A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities (JP 3-13.3).

passage of lines

(DOD) An operation in which a force moves forward or reward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). See also ADRP 3-90, FM 3-90- 1, and FM 3-90-2.

personnel recovery

(DOD) The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR (JP 3-50).

protection warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0).

pursuit

An offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADRP 3-90).

raid

(DOD) An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal (JP 3-0). See also FM 3-90-1.

reconnaissance

(DOD) A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 2-0) See also ADRP 3-90, FM 3-90-2, and ATP 3-55.6/MCRP 2-24A/NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP 3-2.2.

recovery

Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location (JP 1-02).

relief in place

(DOD) An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). See also FM 3-90-2.

retirement

A form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

retrograde

(Army) A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

route reconnaissance

A directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADRP 3-90).

rule of law

A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles (FM 3-07).

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04).

screen

A security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADRP 3-90).

screening smoke

Screening smoke is a smoke curtain used on the battlefield between threat observation points and friendly units to mask friendly forces, positions, and activities (ATP 3-09.30).

security force assistance

(DOD) The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (JP 3-22) See also ADRP 3-05, ADRP 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5.

(Army) The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority (FM 3-07).

security operations

Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). See also cover; guard; screen.

signaling smoke

Signaling smoke is used to establish a reference for friendly forces (ATP 3-09.30).

single envelopment

A form of maneuver that results from maneuvering around one assailable flank of a designated enemy force (FM 3-90-1).

Soldier and leader engagement

Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13).

spoiling attack

A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack (FM 3-90-1).

stability operations

(DOD) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). See ADP 3-05, ADRP 3-37, FM 1-04, FM 3-07, and FM 3-57.

stability task

Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief (ADRP 3-07).

stabilization

The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in the law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long- term development (FM 3-07).

suppression

In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage (FM 3-09).

suppression of enemy air defenses

Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01).

sustainment

(Army) The provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0).

sustainment warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0).

tactical road march

A rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of operations to prepare for combat operations (ADRP 3-90). See also area of operations.

task-organizing

The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0).

threat

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0).

troop movement

The movement of troops from one place to another by any available means (ADRP 3-90).

unified action

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADRP 3-0).

unified land operations

How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0).

unity of effort

(DOD) Coordination, and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). See also ADP 3-90, ADRP 3-0, ADP6-0, ADRP 3-28, ADRP 6-0, and ATP 3-07.5.

vertical envelopment

(DOD) A tactical maneuver in which troops that are air-dropped, air-land, or inserted via air assault, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force (JP 3-18). See also FM 3-90-1.

warfighting function

A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADRP 3-0).

wide area security

The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative (ADRP 3-0).

withdrawal operation

A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (JP 1-02).

zone reconnaissance

A form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADRP 3-90).

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 7 December 2015.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available at: http://www.apd.army.mil.

Department of Defense Issuances are available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/index.html.

Other publications are available on the Central Army Registry (CAR) on the Army Training Network (ATN) at http://www.train.army.mil.

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.

ADP 3-05, Special Operations, 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-37, Protection, 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.

ADP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012.

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-05, Special Operations, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 14 June 2013

ADRP 3-37, Protection, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

AR 601-142, Army Medical Department Professional Filler System, 22 October 2015.

ATP 2-01, Plan Requirements and Assess Collection, 19 August 2014.

ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace, 10 November 2014.

ATP 3-04.64, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 22 January 2015.

ATP 3-06.1, Aviation Urban Operations Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations, 19 April 2013.

ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques, 31 August 2012.

ATP 3-09.24, Techniques for the Fire Brigade, 21 November 2012.

ATP 3-09.30, Techniques for Observed Fire, 2 August 2013.

ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, 30 November 2012.

ATP 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 5 April 2013.

ATP 3-34.40, General Engineering, 25 February 2015.

ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism, 3 June 2014.

ATP 3-37.10, Base Camps, 26 April 2013.

ATP 3-37.34, Survivability Operations, 28 June 2013.

ATP 3-39.32, Physical Security, 30 April 2014.

ATP 3-52.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Airspace Control, 9 April 2015.

ATP 3-55.6/MCRP 2-24A/NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP 3-2.2, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air-To-Surface Radar System Employment, 10 November 2015.

ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, 27 April 2014.

ATP 3-60, Targeting, 7 May 2015

ATP 3-90.8, Combined Arms Countermobility Operations, 17 September 2014.

ATP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation, 28 July 2015.

ATP 4-02.3, Army Health System Support to Maneuver Forces, 9 June 2014.

ATP 4-11, Army Motor Transport Operations, 5 July 2013.

ATP 4-25.13, Casualty Evacuation, 15 February 2013.

ATP 4-32, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations, 30 September 2013.

ATP 4-33, Maintenance Operations, 14 April 2014.

ATP 4-48, Aerial Delivery, 23 June 2014.

ATP 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, 2 April 2014.

ATP 5-19, Risk Management, 14 April 2014.

ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, 10 June 2011.

ATTP 3-21.9, SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, 8 December 2010.

ATTP 3-21.50, Infantry Small-Unit Mountain Operations, 28 February 2011.

ATTP 3-21.90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, 4 April 2011.

ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 10 August 2011.

DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 29 December 2010.

FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, 1 April 2014.

FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army, 18 March 2013.

FM 1-05, Religious Support, 5 October 2012.

FM 1-06, Financial Management Operations, 15 April 2014.

FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations, 15 April 2014.

FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 6 September 2006.

FM 3-01.7, Air Defense Artillery Brigade Operations, 11 February 2010.

FM 3-01.11, Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, 23 October 2007.

FM 3-04, Army Aviation, 29 July 2015

FM 3-04.113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, 7 December 2007.

FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations, 16 February 2007.

FM 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations, 29 July 2009.

FM 3-07, Stability, 2 June 2014.

FM 3-09, Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support, 4 April 2014.

FM 3-11, Multiservice Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations, 1 July 2011.

FM 3-11.3, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Contamination Avoidance, 2 February 2006.

FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003.

FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Decontamination, 4 April 2006.

FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, 25 January 2013.

FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 22 January 2013.

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 21 April 2009.

FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 April 2014.

FM 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance {MCWP 3-17.4}, 25 March 2008.

FM 3-50, Army Personnel Recovery, 2 September 2014.

FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 8 February 2013.

FM 3-53, Military Information Support Operations, 4 January 2013.

FM 3-55, Information Collection, 3 May 2013.

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011.

FM 3-61, Public Affairs Operations, 1 April 2014.

FM 3-63, Detainee Operations, 28 April 2014,

FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume I, 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2, 22 March 2013.

FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, 8 October 2015.

FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 1 July 2015.

FM 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations, 6 March 2015.

FM 4-02, Army Health System, 26 August 2013.

FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014.

FM 6-02.71, Network Operations, 14 July 2009.

FM 6-99, U.S. Army Report and Message Formats, 19 August 2013.

FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956.

TC 3-09.31, Fire Support Training for the Brigade Combat Team Commander, 15 November 2013.

TC 3-22.10, Sniper Training and Operations, 30 September 2013.

Title 32, United States Code, National Guard (http://uscode.house.gov/).

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Most Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available at: http://www.apd.army.mil.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

ATP 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, 12 August 2014.

ATP 3-21.11, SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, 4 February 18

March 2016.

Joint Publications

Most joint publications are available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.

NATO Standardization publications are available online at: https://nso.nato.int/ (left hand column, publications).

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.

JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 August 2011.

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March 2012.

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012.

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 12 December 2014.

JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 25 November 2014.

JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 January 2012.

JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 26 January 2012.

JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 30 September 2013.

JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 27 November 2012.

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 2 October 2015.

JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 13 November 2014.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.

JP 4-02, Health Service Support, 26 July 2012.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

STANAG 3204, Aeromedical Evacuation, 17 November 2014.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) web site (www.apd.army.mil).

DD Forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) web site (www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).

DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card.

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless mentioned otherwise.

A

actions on the objective. 4-73

approach to the objective. 4-66

art of command. 1-27

aviation support, 5-16

C

cordon and search

four element requirement, 4-17

techniques. 4-117

two element technique, 4-17

course of action. 1-28

D

defense

two types of withdrawal. 5-121

defense transition

two basic techniques. 4-192

defensive

three basic tasks. 5-2

two defensive maneuvers. 5-42

defensive preparations. 5-93

defensive tasks

rehearsals

five types of. 5-91

E

enabling operations

passage of lines

two basic conditions. 9-67

reconnaissance

fundamentals, 3-11

relief in place

three techniques. 9-76

route reconnaissance tasks, 3-18

security operations

enemy contact

fundamentals, 3-23

five forms, 3-24

fundamentals, 3-22

F

follow-on missions. 4-82

I

intelligence process

four steps. 1-42

L

law of armed conflict. 1-47

law of war. 1-47

linkups

three phases. 9-14

M

mission command

six fundamental principles. 1-25

movement to contact

fundamentals. 4-16

O

offense

four primary offensive tasks. 4-1

six forms of maneuver. 4-12

R

rules of engagement. 1-48

S

science of control. 1-30

search and assault

three primary tasks. 4-111

site exploitation

three purposes. 9-85

U

unified land operations. 1-14

ATP 3-21.21 (FM 3-21.21)

18 March 2016

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY

General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1606201

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115887 requirements for ATP 3-21.21.